Article 2: Can the soul separated from the body be naturally affected by bodily fire?
Quodlibet XII
There were questions about things above human beings and about human things. The first questions were about God, angels, and heaven. The questions about God touched on God’s existence, power, and predestination.
Question 1
Article 1
The first question was: Does God only have the one essential existence or a personal existence as well?
God seems to have a personal existence as well:
1. The existence of the Father, the existence of the Son, and the existence of the Holy Spirit all differ. But God’s one essential existence has no such differentiation. Therefore, etc.
2. The proper role of form is to give existence. But God has three personal characteristics, which play the role of form. Therefore, etc.
But to the contrary: Augustine says that God has only one existence.1
Answer: The truth of our faith holds that the only distinction in God is that of opposing relations. Now, relations (like any forms) have existence by reference to that in which they inhere. Hence, sonship exists by reference to the subject in which it inheres. But the relations in God are not distinguished by that in which they inhere or exist, since they are themselves the very thing that is related; instead, they are only distinguished by that to which they are opposed, which does not concern the existence of relations, but only their distinction and opposition. Therefore, God only has the one essential existence.
1. So, to the first objection: Existence has two senses. Sometimes existence means the act of an existent, but sometimes it signifies the composing of a proposition, and thus signifies an act of intellect. It is in the second sense that the existence of the Father is said to differ from that of the Son, not in the first sense.
2. To the second objection: As with every form, fatherhood causes existence—viz. the existence of the Father, which is the existence of God—and insofar as fatherhood causes existence, it causes only one existence.
Question 2
The next questions were about God’s power: (1) Can God make contradictory things to be the case at the same time? and (2) Can God make something actually infinite?
Article 1
Answer: No. Yet that does not imply that God’s power is lacking but, rather, that such a thing is impossible. For every active power produces an effect like itself, and every agent acts insofar as it actually exists. Hence, an agent’s effect actually exists. Thus, anything incompatible with actually existing is incompatible with an agent’s power. Yet just such a thing is involved in contradictory things being the case at the same time.
Article 2
Answer: At first glance, it might seem as if the existence of something actually infinite is impossible, since it would then be equal to God. But that does not follow, since something infinite in one way does not equal something infinite in every way. Suppose there was a fire of infinite size. It still would not be equal to God, since even a fire infinite in quantity would still be finite in kind, whereas God is infinite in every way.
So, is it possible for God to make something actually infinite? No. For there are two ways for something to be incompatible with the power of an intelligent agent. One way is by being incompatible with its power; the other is by being incompatible with its way of acting. Now, something actually infinite is compatible with God’s absolute power, since it does not imply a contradiction. But it is impossible, given God’s way of acting. For God acts with intelligence by means of the Word, which forms all things. Hence, everything that God makes must be formed. But the infinite is like matter without form, since the infinite plays the role of matter. Hence, if God made an infinite thing, then one of God’s works would be formless, which is incompatible with God’s way and means of acting, since God does everything by means of the Word, which forms all things.
Question 3
Article 1
The next question was about predestination: Is predestination certain?
It seems not:
It is possible for the predestined to be damned. Peter, for instance, would have been damned if he had died immediately after his sin of denying Christ.
But to the contrary: Now, you may say that the proposition just stated is true of what is said, and yet not of reality. But that distinction only applies to separable forms, whereas predestination is an inseparable form.
Answer: Predestination is part of divine providence. Now, providence means directing things to an end, which presupposes knowledge and will. Hence, predestination is certain as to God’s knowledge, which cannot be mistaken; and it is certain as to God’s will, which cannot be resisted; and it is certain as to God’s providence, which directs things to an end most certainly, since God is most wise.
So, to the first objection: Predestination is certain, yet the salvation of the predestined is not necessary, but remains contingent. For the certainty of predestination is a matter of God’s knowledge, will, and providence, none of which undermine contingency. God’s knowledge does not undermine contingency, since God knows future things as present, which is how they are determined. God’s will does not undermine contingency, since God’s will is the source of all that exists, and thus transcends the nature of contingency and necessity, which both flow from and are arranged by God’s will. Thus, God’s will makes some things contingent by preparing contingent causes for the things that God wants to be contingent (and likewise necessary causes for necessary things and effects). Hence, God’s will is always done, but some things happen without necessity in the way that God wants them to happen when God wants them to be contingent. God’s providence does not undermine contingency either, since it does not eliminate contingency.
To the objection made to the contrary: That distinction is a good one. As for the objection about forms, there is a difference between real forms and predicated forms, which imply something pertaining to an act of reason. In order for such a distinction to apply to the first forms (i.e., real ones), there has to be a separation in reality and in thought. But that is not required for the second forms; the reality just has to fall under the thought. Now, the predestined can be considered either in themselves or in relation to God’s knowledge. Considered in the first way, it is possible for them to be damned, but considered in the second way, it is not.
Article 2
The next question was about fate: Are all things subject to fate?
Answer: First, we need to know what fate is. Then it will be easy to see the answer to this question.
Now, we see that many things happen contingently, which is why people used to wonder whether things that happen in an irregular and disorderly way trace back to some ordering cause.
Those who said that they do not, such as Cicero, said that fate does not exist.2 But those who said that they do trace back to some higher knowledge and cause named that cause fate from the Latin verb “for, faris,”3 which means “to speak,” as if such things were all forespoken by a higher cause.
Yet these people were of three opinions.
Some of them, such as the Stoics, traced such things back to a series of causes,4 which they called fate, saying that everything has a cause and every cause has an effect. So, if such and such an effect happened, then it had a cause, which had another cause, and so on. For instance, a man was killed at night because he left home. Why did he leave home? Because he was thirsty. Why was he thirsty? Because he ate something salty. Thus, because he ate something salty, the man died of necessity. Aristotle responded by denying both principles.5 First, not everything that happens has a cause, but only what happens essentially. Yet it is accidental for me to be killed when I leave home. Second, he said that not every cause has an effect, since causes can be impeded. Hence, it does not follow that there is such a series of causes.
Others traced such things back to another cause—namely the heavenly bodies—saying that everything happens by their necessity, and thus fate is just the force of the position of the stars.6 This opinion is false, for two reasons. First, because human affairs arise from thought, which is a non-bodily power, and thus not subject to the action of any body. To hold that the soul is subject to the power of the heavenly bodies is just to hold that thinking is no different from sensing, as the Philosopher says at the end of book II of On the Soul.7 Yet the soul is subject to the heavens accidentally and by chance when the mind is influenced by the body’s feelings, which still never move it with necessity. Second, because much of what happens in nature does not happen by the necessity of the heavens, but rather accidentally and without a cause.
Still others traced such things back to a cause above the heavens—namely the providence of God—which predetermines and arranges everything. Thus, according to them, fate is an effect of providence, since providence is just the ordering of things in the divine mind, while fate is the unfolding of that order in reality.8 Hence Boethius says: Fate is the unchangeable arrangement of changeable things.9
Given that sense of fate, we can say that all things are subject to fate. However, the gloss on the verse She shall not call me Baal any longer, but my husband of Hosea 2 says that even though it names the same thing, God did not want “Baal” to be used, since it was the name of a pagan god.10 Thus, we should avoid pagan names; it is not appropriate to share names with pagans. Hence Augustine says: If people speak of fate in this sense, accept their claim, but correct their wording.11 They should not say fate but, rather, the providence of God.
Question 4
The next questions were about angels. There were two such questions.
Article 1
The first question was: Is an angel’s existence an accident of it?
It seems not:
An accident inheres in something preexisting, but an angel does not preexist its very existence.
But to the contrary: Hilary says that it is.12
Answer: Avicenna was of the opinion that “one” and “existent” are always accidental predicates.13 But that is not true. In the sense in which “one” is interchangeable with “existent,” it signifies the substance of a thing, as does “existent.” But in the sense in which “one” refers to the principle of numbers, it signifies an accident.
Now, everything that has potentiality and actuality becomes actual by participating in a higher actuality, and such a thing becomes most actual by a participated likeness to the first, pure actuality, which is existence subsisting in itself. Thus, each thing is completed by participating in existence. Hence, existence is the completion of every form, since every form is completed by having existence, which it has because it is actual. Thus, forms only exist because of existence.
So, I say that the substantial existence of things is not an accident, but the actuality of every existing form, whether it exists with matter or without matter. But, as the completion of everything, existence is the proper effect of God alone; other causes only give existence by participating in the activity of God. Thus, existence is not an accident properly speaking.
In reply to what Hilary says: In a broad sense “accident” refers to anything that is not part of a thing’s essence, and in that sense existence is an accident of created things, since only God’s essence is existence.
Article 2
The second question was: Can a demon know our human thoughts?
Answer: There are two ways to know the thoughts of our hearts: in and of themselves or through their effects.
Only God can know the thoughts of our hearts in the first way. As Jeremiah 15 says: The heart of man is perverse and unsearchable.14 Hence, angels cannot know our thoughts in this way. There are three reasons why not. First, because of the weak existence our thoughts have, since things that exist in our minds are just above the level of things that exist potentially. Second, because things under the power of a cause can only be known by the cause that naturally moves that power. Now, our thoughts depend on our will as their cause, and only God moves our will. Hence, only God can know our thoughts. Third, because angels know the things they naturally know by means of naturally infused species. Yet these species are only of natural things, not of our thoughts, since our thoughts do not trace back to any natural causes, and do not relate to the knowledge of any natural things.
Nevertheless, angels can know our thoughts through their effects, just as human beings do. Indeed, they know the effects of our thoughts more exactly. Some of the feelings that affect us stem from our thoughts, which move our hearts, and angels know these movements even more exactly than we do. Augustine says the same in his book On the Divination of Demons,15 although elsewhere he calls it presumptuous to attribute such knowledge to them.16
Question 5
The next questions were about the heavens. There were two such questions.
Article 1
The first question was: Are the heavens or the world eternal?
Answer: No, but it is a matter of faith that the world had a beginning, not a matter for demonstration. For things that depend upon God’s sheer will can either exist or not exist, and their existence does not impose any necessity on God. God’s goodness, which is the end of things, would be the same whether the world existed or not.
Article 2
The second question was: Do the heavens have souls?
Answer: The doctors of the Church disagree about this. In his comments on Ecclesiastes, Jerome says that the sun has a soul,17 but Damascene says that it does not.18 The philosophers disagreed about it as well. Plato and Aristotle held that the heavenly bodies have souls,19 but Anaxagoras did not,20 which is why he was put to death.
But I say what Augustine says in book II of his Literal Commentary on Genesis: it makes no difference to the faith whether this is the case or not.21 Hence he does not settle the question in the Enchiridion, adding that even if we hold that the heavenly bodies have souls, it still will not follow that there are three ranks to be judged at the judgment—angels, humans, and the souls of the heavens—since such souls will be included with angels.22 That seems to have been the belief of the author of the preface that says: The heavens and the hosts of heaven.23
That makes it clear . . .
Question 6
The next questions were about human beings, and touched on nature, grace, and guilt.
The questions on nature were of three sorts: the first about the soul, the second about the soul’s knowledge, and the third about consequences of its knowledge.
There were two questions about the soul.
Article 1
The first question was: Does the soul complete the body alone or by means of corporeity?
Answer: Each body has just one substantial form. There are three reasons why. First, because if a body had more forms, they would not be the substantial form that makes it exist absolutely speaking, but only accidental forms that make it exist as such and such. Second, because if it had more forms, then acquiring its substantial form would not mean coming to exist absolutely speaking. Third, because then a composite of body and soul would not be one thing absolutely speaking, but two things absolutely speaking, and only one accidentally.
If “corporeity” refers to a form of the body, then “corporeity” has two senses. Sometimes it means a body’s three dimensions, which are not substantial but, rather, accidental forms. Sometimes it means the kind of form that gives rise to three dimensions, which is just a body’s specific form.
Article 2
The second question was: Is the soul transmitted?
Answer: Augustine did not settle this question; he left it unanswered.24 There is an answer in the book On Church Dogmas,25 but that book is by Gennadius, not Augustine. Gregory did not settle the question either.26 Nevertheless, we ought to believe that the soul is not transmitted.
One reason comes from the Philosopher’s book On Animals.27 The power of the seed is a bodily power, and it is impossible for a bodily power to produce an effect that exceeds the body.
Another reason comes from book VII of the Metaphysics.28 Some people used to hold that natural forms are created. They reasoned as follows. When the matter of air receives the form of fire, it either already had that form, which was just hidden, or it did not, and thus the form came to exist anew. But if it came to exist anew, then it did not come from something, but from nothing. Thus, the form was created. The Philosopher replies that forms do not come to exist, for they are not existents, nor do they have existence in themselves. Rather, composites come to exist, since they have existence and subsist. Hence, if there were a form that subsisted in itself, it would come to exist in its own right. Yet the soul subsists and has existence in itself, and it survives the destruction of the body. Therefore, the soul must have its own coming to exist.
Question 7
Article 1
The next question was about human knowledge: Does the human intellect know singular things?
Answer: There are two ways to know something: directly and indirectly—i.e., by reflection.
Now, there is a difference between the human and divine intellect. The human intellect does not know singulars directly, but the divine intellect does. For knowledge occurs by means of a likeness of the thing known in the knower. Now, in our intellect that likeness is abstracted from individuating conditions and from matter. That is why our intellect only knows universals directly, since direct knowledge occurs by means of such a species. But the divine intellect does not know things by means of such a likeness gotten from things but, rather, by the extension of its essence to things. And that likeness in God—viz. the divine essence—is the express likeness of everything about things. That is why God knows everything about things directly, even what pertains to their individual matter.
But the Philosopher asks: if our intellect is separate, how do we know material things? He says that we must know them either with a different faculty, knowing forms joined to matter with our imagination and knowing forms separated from matter with our intellect, or in a different way—namely by extension—as our intellect is joined to our imagination, which provides it with mental images of such things, so that it can know them indirectly.29
Question 8
The next questions were about consequences of our knowledge.
Article 1
The first question was: Does all the knowledge we acquire and possess remain after this life?
Answer: There are two opinions about this. Some people say no, following Avicenna, who says in his book On the Soul that acquired species only remain in the possible intellect while it is thinking.30 But that is false. For the possible intellect receives and retains species in the same way that it exists. Yet it exists permanently, since it is immaterial and indestructible. Hence, it receives intelligible species in the same way, and never loses them. Thus, it retains them even when it is not actually thinking. Book III of On the Soul makes this clear as well, where it says that such species exist in the soul in a different way when it is not actually thinking—namely as dispositions.31
So, I say that all such knowledge remains, both in the damned and in the blessed. What is destroyed is the way of thinking about the knowledge possessed. In this life we always think by turning to mental images because of the body, although the body is not the only reason we need mental images; we also need them to use our intelligible species. But that will not be the way of thinking after this life, since there will be no turning to mental images.
Article 2
The second question was: Do human words have the power to move brute animals—e.g., snakes?
Answer: Something can have a power because of its own proper nature and because of the power of a higher cause. For example, given the effect of its predominant element, a body composed of the elements has a power from the nature of the elements, but it has another power from a heavenly body. Steel, for instance, attracts iron, which is not reducible to any elemental power.
Now, some people say that not only natural bodies but even artifacts have certain powers stamped upon them by the heavenly bodies—artifacts such as images or shapes produced under a certain constellation.32 If it were true that artifacts have such higher powers stamped upon them, then one could say that words uttered at a certain time have the power to move brute animals.
But that is not true. For every natural thing with the power of a heavenly body has that power as a result of a certain form. Hence, things only reproduce things of their own kind by the power of a heavenly body.33 Thus, each thing’s form comes before any such power, and removing what comes before eliminates what comes after. Hence, if such powers are to be attributed to things, they have to be grounded in some form. But the form of artifacts is just a kind of arrangement. Therefore, it is false that words have any such power from a heavenly body.
If they have any power, it comes from an unclean spirit fusing with human words in order to deceive people, as Augustine says.34 For sometimes demons fuse with fanciful, false, and futile words and use them to trick people. Hence, they are all silly and superstitious, as are astronomical images, which involve a kind of tacit consent, even without explicitly invoking demons.
Nevertheless, reciting the holy words of God precisely and sincerely with good and godly intentions is not an incantation, but a prayer. But note Chrysostom’s comments on that verse of Matthew: They make their phylacteries broad, etc.35 He rebukes those who hang the words of the gospel around their necks, since the power of the gospel is not in the shape of the words, but in faith.36 But I do not blame those who carry the gospel around with them out of devotion, since Cecilia always carried the gospel of Christ close to her heart.37 Yet it should have no additional words or markings or any other suspicious things.
Question 9
The next questions about human beings touched on grace. They were of three sorts: the first about sacraments, the second about virtues, and the third about offices.
The first questions were of three sorts: the first about the sacraments of grace, the second about an effect of the sacraments, and the third about the identity of the Church.
There were two sorts of questions about the sacraments of grace: one was about baptism, and the rest were about penance.
Article 1
The first question was: Does water have the power to cleanse sin—i.e., does it cleanse sin by its own power, or by virtue of some concomitant power?
Answer: There are two opinions about this, not only with water but with all the Church’s sacraments.
Some people say that the sacraments only have the power or strength to affect the body, not the soul; only the concomitant power of God has the latter effect.38 Such people cite the example given by Bernard: when a bishop uses a ring to invest a man with a prebend, the ring does not cause the prebend; it symbolizes it.39 But this view is not sensible. For then the sacraments of the New Law would have no priority over those of the Old, which justified believers in the coming Christ by the attendant power of their faith.
Therefore, the sacraments have their own power to justify and to produce whatever other effects at which they aim; they are not mere symbols. Hence Augustine: What great power does water have, to touch the body but cleanse the soul?40
Realize, however, that power is of two sorts: proper and instrumental. This is clear in the case of a saw, for example. In the same way, the sacraments have the instrumental power to produce a spiritual effect, since a sacrament has that effect when it calls upon God, and this is fitting. For the Word, who gives all the sacraments their power, had flesh and was also the Word of God. Hence, just as Christ’s flesh had the instrumental power to perform miracles because of its connection to the Word, the sacraments have their power because of their connection to Christ, who suffered and was crucified . . .
Question 10
The next questions were about penance.
Article 1
The first question was: Can a priest without the responsibility to care for souls give absolution in confession?
Answer: The sacrament of penance differs from some of the other sacraments. With some of the other sacraments, those who have been ordained can by that very fact produce the effect of the sacrament whenever that effect has a real existence outside the sacrament itself. Hence, even a defrocked and excommunicated priest can still consecrate the Eucharist and baptize, in spite of his sins, just as a bishop can still ordain, since ordination produces a mark. But penance does not produce a mark or any other effect besides the justification of the penitent, which can only be accomplished by the power of a judge. And a priest without the responsibility to care for souls lacks that power.
Article 2
The second question was: Is it ever permissible to reveal someone’s confession?
Answer: No, not by word or pose or nod or any other sign; doing so is sacrilegious. For the sacraments of the New Law effect what they symbolize.41 Now, penance has the effect of hiding our sins from the eyes of God, who punishes sin, and this hiding is symbolized by the seal of confession. Hence, revealing someone’s confession is sacrilege, just as consecrating something other than bread and wine as the body and blood of Christ profanes that sacrament.
Article 3
The third question was: Is it permissible to desire to be a bishop?
Answer: There are two ways to desire to be a prelate: under force of necessity or not. The first way takes two forms: either one’s superior demands it or no one else can be found who is willing to take on the burden of being a prelate. Given such necessity, the desire is meritorious. Hence Isaiah 6: Whom shall I send, and who shall go for us?42 And Isaiah’s response: Here am I, send me.43 But first he said that he was unworthy.
The second way, viz. without the force of necessity, is impermissible. For that must either involve the vice of injustice—preferring oneself to better people—or the vice of presumption—considering oneself better than others. Hence commenting on the verse The kings of the Gentiles, etc.,44 Chrysostom says: it is neither just nor beneficial to desire primacy in the Church.45
Question 11
Article 1
The next question was about an effect of the sacraments: Do preparations for the sacraments (e.g., catechesis and the like) give rise to compaternity?
It seems so:
1. A certain decree says that marriage is impossible after the first taste of salt,46 which therefore gives rise to compaternity.
2. A catechumen counts as a Christian. But imparting Christianity gives rise to compaternity. Therefore, etc.
Answer: Some people say that anything sacramental gives rise to compaternity. Others say that only three things do so—viz. catechesis, baptism, and confirmation. But it seems to me that only two things do so—viz. baptism and confirmation. For compaternity is like paternity. Yet only generation gives rise to paternity. Hence, only sacraments involving spiritual generation give rise to compaternity, which is an impediment to marriage.
1. So, to the first objection: Those things are not meant to be taken separately, but jointly, since all of them together give rise to compaternity.
2. To the second objection: A catechumen counts as a Christian by faith, not by baptism, which has not yet been received. But imparting Christianity means imparting the sacrament of baptism.
Question 12
Article 1
The next question was: Is the Church that exists now the same one that existed in the beginning at the time of the apostles?
It seems not:
1. The Church now has different rules, since prelates at that time had no gold or silver in their purses.47 Therefore, etc.
2. Christ and the apostles had no army, but the Church now does. Therefore, etc.
But to the contrary: The last chapter of Matthew says: Behold I am with you until the end of the age.48 But that does not just apply to the apostles, since they have all died and the age has yet to end. Therefore, etc.
Answer: The Church now is numerically the same as the one then, since it has the same faith and the same sacraments of faith, the same authority and the same profession. Hence the Apostle says: Is Christ divided?49 Certainly not.
1. So, to the first objection: Those words from Matthew have been interpreted in three ways. Hilary and Ambrose interpret them in a mystical sense,50 saying: Take no gold, etc.51—i.e., do not sell any spiritual ministries for gold; nor two tunics52—i.e., do not be double minded.53
Others interpret them literally. Augustine gives one such interpretation.54 He says that those words are not meant to command, but to permit, so that keeping the rule is not a sin, but not keeping it is better. Hence, the sense is: Take no gold55—i.e., when you go out preaching do not worry about your expenses, since the people owe them to you, for the laborer deserves, etc.56 It is as if he had said: I permit you not to take gold since you deserve to receive it from the people to whom you preach. Paul did not keep this rule, and yet he did not go against it; he surpassed it.
Other saints give another interpretation. They say that those words do command, but the command was not given for all time, but for the first time they were sent. For he sent them out twice, viz. once to the Jews before the passion, and once to the gentiles after the resurrection.57 The first time he said to them: Do not go among the gentiles.58 But the second time he said: Teach all nations.59 And the first time he gave them the command, but the second time he did not. The reason is that the first time he sent them only to the Jews, who were accustomed to supporting their teachers.60 Hence, they could accept and use the power given to them without causing scandal. But the gentiles had no such custom, since they had no preachers among them. So, they would have been scandalized and would have thought that the apostles were preaching for such support.61 That is why Paul did not keep this command among the gentiles, and it is why the second time he sent them out the Lord said: Now let him who has a purse take it, and likewise a bag.62
2. To the second objection: The reply can be found in a letter of Augustine against the Donatists,63 with comments on that verse of the Psalms: Why do the Gentiles rage?64 In it he distinguishes different times for the Church. There was the time when kings stood against Christ,65 at which time they not only did not aid believers, but even killed them. But there is another time now, at which kings understand and wisely serve the Lord Jesus Christ with fear, etc.66 Hence, at this time kings are vassals of the Church. Thus, the Church is in a different state now than it was then, but it is the same Church.
Question 13
The next questions were about virtues. The first were about an intellectual virtue, viz. truth. The second were about moral virtues.
There were two questions about truth. The first was about the strength of truth and the second was about confirming the truth by oath.
Article 1
The first question was: Is truth stronger than wine, kings, and women?
Wine seems strongest, since it affects people the most. Kings seem strongest, since they make people do the most difficult thing, viz. risk their lives. Women seem strongest, since they even control kings.
But to the contrary: Esdras says that truth is strongest.67
Answer: This is the question debated by the young men in Esdras.68
Now, if we consider these four things in themselves—wine, kings, women, and truth—they are not comparable, since they are not things of the same kind. But considered in relation to a certain effect, they are the same, and can be compared accordingly. The effect they share, on which they can be compared, is their effect on the human heart. Hence, we should see which one of them affects the human heart the most.
Now, human beings can be affected either in body or in soul, and then either through their senses or their intellect, which is either practical or speculative. So, of all the things that can naturally affect the state of the body, the greatest is wine, which makes everyone talk too much.69 Of all that can affect the sense-appetites, the greatest is pleasure, especially sexual pleasure, and thus women are strongest. In practical matters and things that human beings can do, kings have the most power. But in speculative matters, the greatest and most powerful thing is truth. Now, the body’s powers are below those of the soul, and the powers of sense are below those of the intellect, and the practical intellect is below the speculative. Absolutely speaking, therefore, truth is the best, greatest, and strongest.
Article 2
The second question was: If one learned of a remedy while under oath not to share it, is one bound to keep the oath?
It seems so:
1. One under such an obligation should not do anything liable to harm the person who taught one the remedy, which would happen if one shared it with others. Therefore, etc.
2. Since withholding such a remedy is not liable to harm anyone’s eternal salvation, one does not have to share it with others. Therefore, one under such an obligation should not share it.
But to the contrary: Withholding health care or anything good is uncharitable. Therefore, etc.
Answer: The answer to this question generally speaking differs from the answer to it in a particular case.
Generally speaking, one is not bound to keep the oath, which is evil to swear. For an oath loses its force not only when the thing sworn is impermissible, but also when swearing it is false. For a binding oath has to have judgment, justice, and truth.70 Yet swearing not to do something that I am sometimes permitted not to do (e.g., not going to church) is impermissible. Although there are times when I am permitted to refrain from doing something good (e.g., going to church), I am still not permitted to take an oath and set my mind against doing such good, since that is contrary to the Holy Spirit. That is why an oath against doing any kind of good is impermissible, and not to be kept.
Nevertheless, in a particular case, one is bound to keep the oath—for instance, if a qualified doctor is present and ready to provide care and to use that remedy to restore the bodily health of others.
That makes the reply to the objections clear.
Question 14
The next questions were about moral virtues. The first was about the virtues themselves. The rest were about an act of justice, viz. restitution.
Article 1
The first question was: Are the moral virtues connected?
It seems not:
1. Virtues are acquired through actions, which are distinct and separate.71 Therefore, one virtue can be acquired without another.
2. Augustine says: It is not against a divine judgment to say that a person with one virtue does not have them all.72
3. Virtues are caused by habituation, which takes time.
Answer: Yes, as all the saints and philosophers say. But—speaking of the virtues in general—different reasons are given by different people, who speak of the virtues differently. For people have thought of the cardinal virtues in two ways.
Some people say that these virtues are certain general qualities required for every virtue.73 Courage, for example, is a certain strength of mind about everything, temperance is a moderation of mind about everything, and so on for the rest. So, these people say that the virtues have to be connected because they are general qualities required for every virtue: if it lacks one of them, it is no virtue at all. If temperance lacks uprightness (i.e., justice), or strength of mind (i.e., courage), and so on for the rest, then it is not a virtue. This is how Augustine explains it in book III of On the Trinity,74 and how the Master does so in book III of the Sentences.75
Yet other people, such as Aristotle and the Peripatetics, distinguish these virtues by their determinate matter.76 Hence the Philosopher does not say that prudence is right reasoning about everything, but about actions. Likewise, justice is not uprightness of mind about the equality of everything, but of exchanges and distributions and human actions directed toward others. Again, courage is not strength of mind about everything, but the things about which it is most difficult for the mind to be strong, viz. the dangers of war. And temperance concerns the things about which it is most difficult to moderate the mind, viz. the pleasures of taste and touch, which are the most pleasant; it is not about any other desires, such as the desire for knowledge or money. Yet even on this way of speaking about the virtues, the moral virtues are connected. The reason for their connection comes from prudence, as the Philosopher says,77 since no virtue can be had without prudence, and prudence is impossible to have without the moral virtues. For prudence is just right reasoning about actions.78 But it is impossible to reason rightly about anything without reasoning rightly from its principles, and the principles of actions are the ends of the virtues. Yet the only way for anyone to relate well to the ends of the virtues is by having such virtues. Hence, prudence has to be accompanied by the other moral virtues. And the other virtues cannot be had without prudence either. Of course, people can be naturally inclined to acts of a certain virtue without prudence, but the more they are inclined without having the virtue, the worse it is and the more trouble it causes without prudence.79 This is clear in the case of people who have natural courage yet lack discretion and prudence. Hence Gregory says: Unless the other virtues do what they do prudently, etc.80
There is another reason for the connection among the virtues of grace, viz. charity, which connects them all. For a person with charity has all the virtues of grace, and a person with any one of them has charity.
1. So, to the first objection: According to the Stoics, virtuous actions are not separate.81 There cannot be an act of temperance without an act of courage, nor an act of courage without an act of temperance, etc.
2. To the second objection: He says that because the connection among the virtues is not proven by the authority of the Bible.
3. To the third objection: They are not called moral virtues because of habituation, but because of action, and even granting that they take time, you still will not have any virtue unless you are prudent.
Question 15
The next questions were about restitution, which is an act of justice.
There were three such questions: the first was about people in exile from their cities because of factions, the second was about a person who acquires property by prescription in bad faith, and the third was about a person who uses up someone else’s property.
Article 1
The first question was: Can people expelled because of factions demand their goods back from those who remain in their city?
It seems not:
1. Many of those who remain in their city are not to blame for the people’s expulsion, and would thus be punished for someone else’s fault.
2. The expelled people opposed the Church, which justifies war. Hence, given the legal claim against them, they are not due restitution for damages.
3. The Philosopher says that when a city’s order changes, it is not the same city.82 Yet a city’s order changes when its regime and leadership changes. Hence, it is not the same city. So, the expelled people have nothing to do with the city: their city is gone. Therefore, the citizens do not owe them restitution.
But to the contrary: Victims of robbery can seek and claim what was stolen from them. Therefore, so can those who are expelled.
Answer: The people were either expelled justly, viz. because of their guilt, in which case they cannot claim what they lost; or unjustly—i.e., without guilt and the due order of justice, in which case they can claim what they lost. But if they have a superior, they ought to seek restitution through their superior. If they do not have a superior, then they can recoup it themselves, if they can.
1. So, to the first objection: They would not be punished for someone else’s fault, but for their own. Those in power do everything by the authority and favor of the people. Hence, the people were at fault for favoring those in power. Besides, never being punished for someone else’s fault only applies to spiritual punishments, not to temporal or bodily ones, which are often inflicted on one person for another.
2. To the second objection: Insofar as they act justly, they support the Church; insofar as they act unjustly, they oppose the Church.
3. To the third objection: If they are the same people, they obviously have the same obligations; if they are different, then they do not.
Article 2
The second question was: Does a person who acquires property by prescription in bad faith have to make restitution?
It seems not:
The law says that even a person who acquires property in bad faith becomes its owner by prescription.83
But to the contrary: A decree says that the person does not become its owner and has to make restitution.84
Answer: Civil and canon law disagree about this. Under civil law, such a prescription is binding, but under canon law it is not. The two disagree because civil lawmakers have a different aim—namely promoting and preserving peace among citizens, which would be disturbed if that prescription did not hold. For then anyone who wanted to could come and say “That was mine!” at anytime. But canon law aims at the Church’s rest and the salvation of souls, and no one guilty of sin can be saved or repent of damages to another without making recompense.
Therefore, a person who possesses property in good faith and acquires it by prescription does not have to make restitution, even if the person finds out after the prescription that it had belonged to someone else. For the law can punish people for the sin of neglecting their property by granting it to someone else. But the person who acquires property by prescription in bad faith has to make amends and satisfaction by repaying the other person for the damages incurred.
To the first objection: The truth is that everything belongs to rulers to govern, not to keep for themselves or to give to others. Any laws of the latter sort are tyrannical; they do not acquit a person in conscience, but only in such a court of law with its violence.
Article 3
The third question was: Does a person who uses up someone else’s property have to make restitution?
It seems not:
The previous owner has no legal claim against the person who used up the property—i.e., if the person had the right to it by prescription.
But to the contrary: The person who used up someone else’s property possessed it in bad faith.
Answer: The person has to make restitution. The reason is that people owe each other justice, and justice consists of a sort of equality. Hence, no one can be just unless equality is restored. Yet using up someone else’s property causes inequality, and so must be repaid.
To the first objection: The owner does not have a claim under civil law, but does have a claim under divine law. For divine law aims at the salvation of souls, and thus opposes a person who uses up someone else’s property.
Question 16
The next questions were about four offices: the first about the office of commentators on sacred scripture, the second about the office of preachers, the third about the office of confessors, and the fourth about the office of vicars.
Article 1
The first question was: Is everything the saintly doctors said inspired by the Holy Spirit?
It seems not:
Some things they said are false. After all, some of their interpretations conflict, and things that contrast or conflict cannot both be true, since one part of a contradiction has to be false.
But to the contrary: The same thing that acts for the sake of an end also leads to that end. Now, scripture is inspired by the Holy Spirit for the sake of instructing human beings. But scripture cannot instruct human beings without being interpreted by the saints. Therefore, the interpretations of the saints are inspired by the Holy Spirit.
Answer: Scripture is written and interpreted by the inspiration of the same Holy Spirit. Hence 1 Corinthians 2 says: The unspiritual man does not perceive the things of God . . . but the spiritual man, etc.85 This is especially true with matters of faith, since faith is a gift of God. Hence the interpretation of speech is counted among other gifts of the Holy Spirit in 1 Corinthians 12.86
To the first objection: Freely given graces are not dispositions but, rather, movements caused by the Holy Spirit. If they were dispositions, then the gift of prophecy would allow prophets to have revelations whenever they wanted. So, sometimes the Holy Spirit touches their minds, revealing secrets to them, and sometimes not, leaving things hidden instead. Hence Elisha says in 4 Kings 3: The Lord has hidden it from me.87 But sometimes they say things by themselves. This is clear in the case of Nathan, for example, who told David to build a temple but was later rebuked by the Lord and took it back, forbidding David from doing so, as God said.88 Nevertheless, we have to hold that everything contained in sacred scripture is true; anyone who thinks otherwise is a heretic. But its commentators have expressed many of their own judgments on other matters not of faith, and hence such things can be mistaken. Even so, it is not necessary to believe what such commentators say, but only the canonical scriptures contained in the Old and New Testament.
Question 17
The next questions were about preachers. There were three such questions.
Article 1
The first question was: Can a man preach on his own authority—i.e., is he allowed to preach without a prelate’s permission?
It seems so:
1. Preaching is doing good for others, and we ought to do good to all, as Galatians 6 says.89 Therefore, etc.
2. Ecclesiasticus 17 says: God commanded each of them concerning their neighbor.90 Therefore, etc.
But to the contrary: Romans 10 says: How shall they preach unless they are sent?91 Therefore, etc.
Answer: No one—no matter how great his knowledge or holiness—can preach without being sent by God or a prelate. For no agent can act without being given the right thing to act on, and preaching means exhorting and teaching, which in the case of public preaching is addressed to the whole Church. But the whole Church, and the public responsibility for the Church, has been entrusted to prelates. Therefore, no one should do anything that requires public authority without a prelate’s authorization.
1. So, to the first objection: We are allowed to do the good suited to us, not just any good.
2. To the second objection: God commanded them to admonish their neighbor personally in private.
Article 2
The second question was: Should a man stop preaching when a secular ruler forbids him to preach?
It seems not:
1. Matthew 10 says to preachers: Do not fear those who can kill the body.92 Therefore, they should not stop preaching for fear of such rulers.
2. Acts 4 says: We must obey God rather than men.93 But God commands prelates in particular to preach. As 2 Timothy 4 says: Preach the word.94 Therefore, etc.
3. No one should obey a command that is itself a sin. But it is a sin for a ruler to forbid preaching. Therefore, etc.
But to the contrary: Acts says: Because you have rejected the kingdom of God, etc.95 And Matthew 10 says: If you are persecuted in one city, flee to another.96
Answer: This question calls for two distinctions. A man forbidden to preach is either forbidden by a tyrant alone or by a tyrant with the people. In the first case, there are still some people who want to hear him, so he should not stop preaching. But he should choose the times and places carefully in order to avoid being thwarted by people’s fear of the tyrant. He may even preach secretly in houses sometimes, as we read of the Apostle doing.97 In the second case, he ought to stop preaching and flee to other places, as the Lord commands.98 As Gregory says in his Dialogues,99 when everyone is hardened and evil, tell them what the Apostle says: Because you have rejected the kingdom of God, etc.100
Here is the other distinction to make. The preacher either has a responsibility to care for souls or not—i.e., he either preaches by necessity of office or of his own will. In the first case, he should not leave his flock even to save his own life while he can still do some good by staying with them. In the second case, he does not have to stay or lay down his life, even if staying with them would be fruitful—unless someone wanted to corrupt the faith. When the faith is in danger, we must lay down our life for our brothers; we are commanded to do so in such cases. In other cases, doing so is only a counsel, as every counsel becomes a commandment in certain cases.
1. So, to the first objection: God commands them to preach, but in the proper way that serves the salvation of souls.
2. To the second objection: God should never be disobeyed for fear of death, but it is not wise to put oneself at risk without reason or need.
3. To the third objection: That is false. As Augustine says, sometimes it is a sin for a commander to give orders, which it is not a sin for a loyal soldier to obey, especially if the soldier is not aware that it is a sin.101
Article 3
The third question was: Are preachers allowed to accept alms from usurers?
It seems so:
1. 1 Corinthians 9 says: If we have sown spiritual goods among you, etc.102
2. By natural law, people deserve a living for their work: The laborer deserves his wages, etc.103 This was granted to us by our creator, as Genesis 3 says: In the sweat, etc.104
But to the contrary: Usurers have nothing of their own.
Answer: Generally speaking, alms cannot be given from robbery, usury, and that sort of thing. As Isaiah 61 says: I hate robbery as a sacrifice.105 In a specific case, however, preachers who preach to usurers and admonish them to make restitution can accept such alms. That is one reason for doing so. Another reason is not having any other means to live. For in dire need all things are common property,106 and support for the necessities of life can be accepted from anyone.
Question 18
Article 1
The next question was about the office of confessors: Can a priest hear confessions on the pope’s authority without his own prelate’s permission?
It seems not:
1. People are required to confess to their own priest.107 Therefore, etc.
2. The pope’s authorization is not prejudicial to anyone.108 Therefore, etc.
But to the contrary: The pope has authority over everyone and everything. Hence, he can entrust and authorize anyone he wants to do whatever and however much he wants.
Answer: Some people say that any priest can absolve any person from any sin; even if it is not good to absolve a person, the person is still absolved. Their reason is that when a priest is ordained he is given both the power to consecrate the body of Christ and the power of the keys. Hence, just as he can consecrate any host, he can absolve any person. But that is a mistake. A priest can only absolve a person on his own authority if the person is somehow his subordinate. For acts can only be performed on suitable things.109 Now, sacramental absolution is connected to a judgment, and judgment can only be passed on subordinates or inferiors. Hence, a priest without subordinates cannot absolve anyone. Thus, jurisdiction is what gives a priest something suitable to absolve.110 That is not the case with the host (something suitable to consecrate). Hence, a priest who has not been entrusted with the responsibility to care for souls has what the lawyers call bound keys,111 since he has nothing suitable on which to act.
Other people say that a priest cannot absolve the subordinate of any superior against the superior’s will, not even on the authority of the superior’s own superior. For example, a priest cannot absolve a person on the bishop’s authority against the will of the person’s parish priest. But that is a mistake as well. Absolving a person requires priestly power and jurisdiction. Yet a bishop has direct jurisdiction over all his people, and hence can hear all their confessions, even against the will of their parish priest. The same is true of any priest the bishop authorizes to do so, and even more so of any priest the pope authorizes. However, an archbishop does not have direct jurisdiction over everyone in his archiepiscopate (except when it comes to appeals), and hence cannot permit or authorize a priest to hear confessions against the will of the suffragan diocesan bishop.
1. So, to the first objection: That makes the reply to the first objection clear, since a bishop and a pope have more power than a priest.
2. To the second objection: Such an authorization is not prejudicial, but helpful. Hearing confessions was not established to honor priests. That would make believers the servants instead, if honoring priests were the reason they have to confess their sins. Rather, confession was introduced for the salvation of souls.
Question 19
Article 1
The next question was about the office of vicars: Can a vicar entrust his vicarious power to someone else?
It seems so:
An effect with the power of its cause can do whatever its cause can do.
But to the contrary: Doing so seems contrary to that verse of Proverbs 27: Be sure to know the look of your flock.112
Answer: An instituted vicar cannot entrust all of his power to someone else, but he can entrust some of it. For the one who entrusted him with it intended him to use it as he can, and perhaps he cannot do everything entrusted to him to do, in which case he can entrust some of it to someone else.
So, to the first objection: An effect does not always have all the power of its cause, except [when an effect equals its cause, as when a bishop’s vicar is himself] a bishop.113
To the objection made to the contrary: He does so in order to know the look of his flock.
Question 20
The next questions related to guilt. The first were about sins. The second were about punishments.
The first questions were of two sorts: the first was about original sin and the rest were about actual sins.
Article 1
The question about original sin was: Is it transmitted by the transmission of seed?
Answer: Yes. For original sin is the sin of a nature and only affects a person insofar as the person has that nature. But human nature as a whole is like one human being.114 Hence, wherever that nature is found, the sin of that nature—i.e., original sin—is found.
(Note that hitting has the character of sin not because it is done with the hand but because it originates from the will.)
Question 21
The next questions were about actual sins. The first two were about sins of thought.
Article 1
The first question was: Is it a mortal sin to consent to pleasure?
Answer: This question is not about consenting to the pleasure of a sinful action, since that is obviously a mortal sin; it is about consenting to the pleasure of a mere act of thought, as when one thinks of the pleasure of fornication, and enjoys it, and is pleased by the thought. Now, there are two ways to be pleased by a thought: either because of the thinking itself or because of the object of thought. The first way would be when someone enjoys thinking about a triangle or the wars of a king, not because of the king but because of the thinking itself. The second way would be when I enjoy thinking about a friend because of the friend, who becomes present to me in and by thought. Hence, a thought can be pleasant precisely because of the thinking involved, which is not a sin. For instance, I might need to explain fornication to someone, and might think of a nice way to explain it, which I enjoy. But if such a thought is pleasant because of its object, that can only come from a love of fornication. Hence, consenting to it would mean consenting to the love and enjoyment of something impermissible, which is a mortal sin.
Article 2
The second question was: Is it a mortal sin to suspect others of wrongdoing?
It seems so:
The Lord threatens those who do so in Isaiah 5: Woe to you, etc.115
But to the contrary: The gloss on the verse Do not judge before the time says that it is a venial sin.116
Answer: Some kinds of acts are mortal sins precisely as such, yet incomplete movements in their direction are not mortal but, rather, venial sins. Adultery, for instance, is a mortal sin—i.e., when the will to commit it is complete: not every stirring of concupiscence is a mortal sin. Now, there are two kinds of judgment, viz. of things and of people. Judging things is always a mortal sin when it means saying something like, “Almsgiving is evil.” But judging people is not always sinful, not even when the judgment is false, unless it is made too rashly. Hence in his comments on the Sermon on the Mount, Augustine says: Even if we err in our judgment of people, let us not err in our judgment of things.117 But it is a mortal sin to make a firm judgment about others based on something slight, since that involves contempt for our neighbor.
Now, suspecting others of wrongdoing is an incomplete act of judgment, and hence an incomplete movement in that direction. Therefore, it is not a mortal sin as such, although it can become a mortal sin when it is done out of hatred.
To the first objection: Those who say that good is evil, etc., are not suspecting anyone of wrongdoing; they are judging things, and thus guilty of mortal sin.
Question 22
The next three questions were about sins of action.
Article 1
The first question was: Is it permissible to make use of lots, particularly by opening books at random?
Answer: Properly speaking, using lots means making a judgment about something unknown based on something done by a human being (I say “done by a human being” because other things used for this purpose are not lots but auguries or something else). This includes things like drawing lines, throwing dice, picking straws, and opening books at random.
Such things are done for three reasons: to reveal some will, or settle some doubt, or divine the future. Accordingly, lots are divided into three kinds: revealing, settling, and divining.
Some people do such things as though they were entrusting them to fortune. If we are unsure who should go, for instance, we might use lots to see who should go.118 Sometimes this is frivolous. Other people do such things in order to discover the judgment of something, like the judgment of the stars.119 Those who draw lines, for instance, say that their hands are moved by the motion of the heavens.120 This is sinful. Other people, such as Nebuchadnezzar, want to know the judgment of demons, which is sacrilegious. But others want to know the judgment of God, which is not always a sin.
Accordingly, there are four ways to use divinating lots. The first way is sometimes a slight sin or no sin at all. The second way is a sin, as is the third. But the fourth way is not always a sin. It is a sin when it is unnecessary, since that means tempting God. As 2 Chronicles 20 says: Since we do not know what to do, etc.121 It is also a sin when it is done without due devotion, as Bede says in his comments on Acts 1,122 and when sacred things are used for secular purposes, like opening books at random for secular reasons. Again, it is a sin when lots are used for higher things, as when an agreement cannot be reached in an ecclesiastical election and so lots are used instead. For that is an affront to the Holy Spirit, who is believed to be steadfastly with the Church and its bodies. But there is no reason why lots cannot be used for the election of secular rulers.
Article 2
The second question was about keeping superfluous things: Is it a sin not to give away one’s superfluous things for God’s sake?
Augustine says that keeping, etc.123
Article 3
The third question was about being left with no permissible options: Is it possible to be left with no permission options?124
* * *
Question 23
The next questions were about punishments.
Article 1
The first question was about temporal punishment: Should religious be expelled from the religious life for sinning if they are willing to change and be punished?
Answer: The Apostle says: Remove the evil person from among you.125 A little leaven, etc.126 Now, people are removed either by corporal punishments or by spiritual punishments. People are obviously still removed by corporal punishments, however willing they are to change. Murderers, for instance, are still hanged no matter how sorry they are. But the Church only inflicts spiritual punishments on the obstinate. The reason for this difference is that corporal punishments deprive people of something temporal, which can be compensated for by a greater good. But nothing can compensate for the loss of a spiritual good. Hence, spiritual punishments should not be inflicted on religious who remain willing to change. Yet being expelled from the religious life is like being excommunicated from the Church. Hence, only the obstinate should be expelled. The rest should be sequestered in some other way—for instance, in jail or something.
Article 2
The second question was about eternal punishment: Can the soul separated from the body be naturally affected by bodily fire?127
1 Augustine, On the Trinity VI, 4, 6.
2 Cf. Augustine, The City of God V, 9.
3 Ibid., 9.
4 Ibid., 8.
5 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics VI, 3 (1027a29–1027b18).
6 Augustine, The City of God V, 1.
7 Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul III, 3 (427a21–26).
8 Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy IV, vi.
9 Ibid.
10 Ordinary Gloss on Hosea 2:16.
11 Augustine, The City of God V, 1.
12 Hilary, On the Trinity VII, 11.
13 Cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics III, 2–6; Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics IV, 3.
14 Rather, Jeremiah 17:9.
15 Cf. Augustine, On the Divination of Demons V, 9.
16 Cf. Augustine, Retractions II, 30.
17 Cf. Jerome, Commentary on Ecclesiastes I, 6.
18 Cf. John Damascene, On Orthodox Faith II, 6.
19 Cf. Augustine, The City of God XIII, 16; Aristotle, On the Heavens II, 2 (285a29–31).
20 Cf. Augustine, The City of God XVIII, 41.
21 Cf. Augustine, Literal Commentary on Genesis II, 18.
22 Cf. Augustine, Enchiridion, 58.
23 “Common Preface” in the liturgy of the Order of Preachers.
24 Cf. Augustine, Literal Commentary on Genesis X, 21; Letter 166, On the Soul’s Origin; On the Soul’s Nature and Origin; Retractions II, 3; Retractions II, 45; Retractions II, 56; Unfinished Work Against Julian II, 178, 3.
25 Gennadius, On Church Dogmas, 14.
26 Cf. Gregory, Register of Letters IX, 148.
27 Cf. Aristotle, Generation of Animals II, 3 (736a24–b29).
28 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, 9 (1034a30–b7); Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics VII, 31.
29 Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul III, 4 (429b10–17).
30 Cf. Avicenna, On the Soul V, 6.
31 Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul III, 4 (429b5–9).
32 E.g., Al-Kindi, On Rays.
33 Cf. Aristotle, Physics II, 2 (194b13).
34 Augustine, The City of God X, 11.
35 Matthew 23:5.
36 Pseudo-John Chrysostom, Unfinished Work on Matthew, Homily 43.
37 “Responsory” for matins on the feast of St. Cecilia in the liturgy of the Order of Preachers.
38 Especially William of Auvergne, On the Sacrament of Baptism, c. 10.
39 Cf. Bernard, Sermon on the Lord’s Supper, 2.
40 Augustine, Homilies on the Gospel of John, Homily 80, 3.
41 Peter Lombard, Sentences IV, d. 4, c. 1, n. 2.
42 Isaiah 6:8.
43 Ibid.
44 Luke 22:25.
45 Pseudo-John Chrysostom, Unfinished Work on Matthew, Homily 35, on Matthew 20:25.
46 Decretals IV, tit. 11, c. 5.
47 Cf. Matthew 10:9.
48 Matthew 28:20.
49 1 Corinthians 1:13.
50 Hilary, Commentary on Matthew, 10, 5; Ambrose, On Paradise, c. 13.
51 Matthew 10:9.
52 Matthew 10:10.
53 Cf. Jerome, Commentary on Matthew I; Augustine, The Harmony of the Gospels II, 30, 75–76; Remigius of Auxerre, Commentary on Matthew.
54 Augustine, The Harmony of the Gospels II, 30, 73–76.
55 Matthew 10:9.
56 1 Timothy 5:18.
57 Cf. Jerome, Commentary on Matthew I, on 10:5–6.
58 Matthew 10:5.
59 Matthew 28:19.
60 Cf. Jerome, Against Jovinianus I, 26.
61 Cf. Jerome, Commentary on Matthew I; John Chrysostom, Homilies on Matthew, Homily 32 (33), 4.
62 Luke 22:36.
63 Augustine, Letter 93, 3, 9.
64 Psalms 2:1.
65 Cf. Psalms 2:2.
66 Cf. Psalms 2:10–11.
67 3 Esdras (1 Esdras) 4:41.
68 3 Esdras (1 Esdras) 3:4–4:42. Cf. Augustine, The City of God XVIII, 36.
69 3 Esdras (1 Esdras) 3:21.
70 Jeremiah 4:2. Cf. Jerome, Commentary on Jeremiah I, 69; Decretum II, C. xxii, q.2, c. 2; Decretum II, C. xxii, q.4, c. 23; Peter Lombard, Sentences III, d.39, c. 2.
71 Cf. Albert, Commentary on the Sentences III, d.36, a.1, s.c.2.
72 Cf. Augustine, Letter 167, 3, 10.
73 Cf. Alexander of Hales, Commentary on the Sentences III, d.33 & d.36; Phillip the Chancellor, Summa on the Good; Albert, On the Good, tr. I, q.6, a.2.
74 Rather, Augustine, On the Trinity VI, 4, 6.
75 Peter Lombard, Sentences III, d.36, c. 2, n. 3.
76 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II–VI.
77 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI, 12–13 (1144a11–1145a2).
78 Albert, Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics II, l.4.
79 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI, 13 (1144b10–12).
80 Gregory, Morals II, 46, 71.
81 This view was attributed to the stoics by Alexander of Hales, and to Cicero and Seneca by Phillip the Chancellor. Cf. Alexander of Hales, Commentary on the Sentences III, d.33 & d.36; Phillip the Chancellor, Summa on the Good; Cicero, Tusculan Disputations II, xiv, 32; Seneca, Letter 66, 15; Letter 67, 10; Letter 77, 6.
82 Cf. Aristotle, Politics III, 3 (1276b1–15).
83 Cf. Decretals II, tit. 26, c. 5.
84 Ibid.
85 1 Corinthians 2:14–15.
86 Cf. 1 Corinthians 12:10.
87 Rather, 4 Kings (2 Kings) 4:27.
88 Cf. 2 Kings (2 Samuel) 7:1–17.
89 Galatians 6:10.
90 Ecclesiasticus (Sirach) 17:12.
91 Romans 10:15.
92 Matthew 10:28.
93 Rather, Acts 5:29.
94 2 Timothy 4:2.
95 Acts 13:46.
96 Matthew 10:23.
97 Cf. Acts 5:42.
98 Cf. Matthew 10:23.
99 Cf. Gregory, Dialogues II, 3.
100 Acts 13:46.
101 Cf. Augustine, Against Faustus XXII, 75.
102 1 Corinthians 9:11.
103 Luke 10:17.
104 Genesis 3:19.
105 Isaiah 61:8.
106 A common adage.
107 Decretals V, tit. 38, c. 12.
108 Ordinary Gloss on the Decretals V, tit. 38, c. 12.
109 Cf. Aristotle, Physics II, 2 (194b8–9); On the Soul II, 2 (414a25–27).
110 Cf. Albert, Commentary on the Sentences IV, d.18, a.2.
111 Cf. Raymond of Penyafort, Summa on Penance III, tit. 34, n. 15; Henry of Segusio, Golden Summa V, On Penance and Forgiveness.
112 Proverbs 27:23.
113 The Latin text is incomplete here. For the suggestion in brackets, cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Boethius’s On the Trinity, q.6, a.3 & a.4, ad 2; Disputed Questions on Truth, q.18, a.5, ad 9; Summa Contra Gentiles I, 3; Disputed Questions on the Power of God, q.7, a.1, ad 8; Summa Theologiae I, q.12, a.12 & q.13, a.5.
114 Cf. Porphyry, Isagoge, c. 2.
115 Isaiah 5:20.
116 Ordinary Gloss & Gloss of Peter Lombard on 1 Corinthians 4:5.
117 Rather, Augustine, Homilies on the Gospel of John, Homily 90, 2.
118 This is an obscure example. Perhaps he means who should go to martyrdom, which is Augustine’s example. Cf. Augustine, Letter 228, 12.
119 The Latin text is incomplete here.
120 Cf. Albert, On Minerals II, 3, 3.
121 2 Chronicles 20:12.
122 Bede, Commentary on Acts I, 26.
123 The Latin text is incomplete here.
124 The Latin text is incomplete here.
125 1 Corinthians 5:13.
126 1 Corinthians 5:6.
127 The Latin text is incomplete here.