Article 2: Could that happen miraculously?

Article 2: Could that happen miraculously?

Quodlibet I

There were questions about God, about angels, and about human beings.

The questions about God touched on the divine nature and on the assumed human nature.

Question 1

Article 1

The question on the divine nature was: Did blessed Benedict see the divine essence in his vision of the whole world?

It seems so:

1. Gregory says of Benedict’s vision: All creation becomes insignificant to the soul that sees God.¹ But seeing God means seeing the divine essence. Therefore, blessed Benedict saw the divine essence.

2. In the same place Gregory adds that Benedict saw the whole world in the divine light.² But there is no divine light or brightness other than God, as Gregory also says.³ It says the same thing in the gloss on the verse Man shall not see me and live of Exodus 33.⁴ Therefore, blessed Benedict saw God’s essence.

But to the contrary: John 1 says: No one has ever seen God.⁵ The gloss there says that no one living in mortal flesh can see the essence of God.⁶

Answer: As Wisdom 11 says, a corruptible body weighs down the soul.⁷ But the human mind is raised highest by coming to see the divine essence. Hence, it is impossible for a human mind to see God’s essence unless, as Augustine says in book XII of his Literal Commentary on Genesis, a human being utterly dies to this mortal life or so abandons the senses as to be unsure about being in the body or out of the body, as we read of Paul in 2 Corinthians 12.⁸ Now, when blessed Benedict had his vision, he had not utterly died to this life, nor had he abandoned the bodily senses. This is clear from the fact that while he was still having his vision, he called someone else to come and look at the same thing, as Gregory relates.⁹ Hence, he clearly did not see the essence of God.

1. So, to the first objection: Gregory says that to make an argument by analogy: if those who see God’s essence consider seeing the whole of creation insignificant by comparison, then it is no wonder that the divine light enabled blessed Benedict to see more than people usually see.

2. To the second objection: Sometimes the divine light means God, but sometimes it means a light derived from God. As the Psalm says: In your light we see light.¹⁰ In this case it means a light derived from God.

Question 2

The next two questions were about Christ’s human nature: (1) Was Christ related to the Father and to his mother by one sonship or two? and (2) Did Christ die on the cross?

Article 1

We turn, then, to the first question. Christ seems to have two sonships:

1. Multiplying what accounts for relations multiplies the relations themselves. Now, being generated accounts for sonship, and Christ was generated twice, once by being born of the Father from all eternity and once by being born of his mother in time. Hence, Christ has two sonships, one relating him to the Father and another relating him to his mother.

2. Whatever receives something absolute in time without itself changing is much more capable of temporally receiving a relative characteristic without itself changing. But the Son of God received something absolute in time yet without himself changing. As Ambrose says in his comments on the verse He shall be great, and shall be called the Son of the Most High of Luke: So, it is not that he shall be great because he was not great before being born of the Virgin, but because the power that the Son of God naturally possesses, he would receive as a human being in time.¹¹ Much more, then, was the Son of God able to receive a new sonship in time without himself changing. Hence, it is acceptable for him to have two sonships, one eternal and one temporal.

But to the contrary: A thing is one such and such because what makes it such and such is itself one. Now, sonship is what makes something a son. Hence, one sonship makes a thing one son. Yet Christ is only one son, not two. Therefore, Christ has only one sonship, not two.

Answer: Relations differ from every other kind of thing in the following way. Every other kind of thing is a real thing by virtue of the very nature of that kind of thing. Quantities, for instance, are real by virtue of the nature of quantity, and qualities are real by the nature of quality. But relations are not real things by virtue of the nature of such a relationship to another, since some relationships are not real, but exist only in our minds. A knowable thing, for instance, is related to knowledge, not by any real relation existing in the thing itself, but by knowledge being related to it, as the Philosopher says in book V of the Metaphysics.¹² Instead, a relation is a real thing by virtue of its cause, which gives one thing a natural ordering to another—that real and natural ordering being the relation itself. Hence, right and left are real relations in an animal, since they result from certain of its natural powers, but in a column right and left are only relationships in our minds, given an animal’s relation to the column.

Now, a thing exists and is one by virtue of the same cause. Hence, from one cause, only one real relation results. This is clear in the case of equality, for instance. One body has only one relation of equality because of its one quantity, although there are many different relationships referred to by calling it equal to other bodies. But if all those relationships multiplied the number of real relations in that one body, then one thing would have an infinite or indeterminate number of accidents. Likewise, a teacher is the teacher of all the students in the same class because of one relation, even though there are many relationships. And, accordingly, one man is the son of both his father and his mother because of one real relation, since he gets one nature from both of them at his one birth.

Now, this line of reasoning would seem to suggest that Christ has two real sonships, one relating him to the Father and another relating him to his mother. For he is born of each and thus generated twice, and the nature he has from the Father is different from the nature he has from his mother.

But another line of reasoning runs the other way.

For we must always maintain that there is no real relation of God to creatures existing in God; there is only a relationship in our minds. For God transcends the whole created order and is the measure of every creature, on whom every creature depends, not the other way around. This applies much more to God than to the relation of a knowable thing to knowledge, which is not a real relation to knowledge for similar reasons.

We also have to recognize that the subject of sonship is not a nature or any part of a nature: we do not call humanity a son, or a head or an eye a son. Yet Christ is only one subject and one subsisting individual, just as he is only one person. And that subject is an eternal one, which cannot have any real relation to creatures, as we just said. Thus, it follows that the sonship relating Christ to his mother is only a relationship in our minds. But that does not mean that Christ is not really the Virgin’s son. Just as God is really the Lord because of the real power God has over creation, so Christ is really the Virgin’s son because of the real nature Christ received from his mother. Now, if Christ were more than one subject, then we would have to attribute two sonships to him. But I think that is a mistake, and it was condemned at the councils.

Hence, I say that Christ has only one real sonship, the one relating him to the Father.

1. So, to the first objection: We do not deny that Christ has a real sonship relating him to his mother because there is no accounting for the relation, but because there is no subject for the relation, since Christ is not a created subject or subsisting individual.

2. To the second objection: Christ received his eternal sonship as a human being in time in the same way that he received the power of God—namely in such a way that there was one person who was both a human being and God, as Ambrose says in the same place.¹³ But this was not because of anything temporal—absolute or relative—really inhering in the Son of God; it was only because of the union really existing in that created nature, though not really in the person assuming it.

To the objection made to the contrary: That argument lacks the force of necessity. For sometimes a thing is called one such and such because it is one substantial subject, even though it has many qualities, like the color and taste of an apple.

Article 2

We turn, then, to the second question. It seems that Christ did not die on the cross:

1. If he died, then it was either because he separated his soul from his body or because of his wounds. But he did not die in the first way. For then it would follow that it was not the Jews who killed Christ but, rather, he who killed himself, which is unacceptable. Yet he did not die in the second way either. For death from wounds occurs when human beings are at their very weakest, which Christ was not, since he was crying out as he breathed his last.¹⁴ Therefore, Christ did not die on the cross.

2. Christ’s human nature was no weaker than that of other human beings. But no other human being would have died so quickly from wounds to the hands and feet (the wound to his side was inflicted after his death). Therefore, Christ did not die on the cross, since there seems to have been no cause of death.

But to the contrary: John 19 says of Christ hanging on the cross: And bowing his head, he gave up his spirit.¹⁵ But the separation of the soul from the body is death. Therefore, Christ died on the cross.

Answer: We must profess without any doubt that Christ truly died on the cross.

To see the cause of his death, realize that since Christ was both a human being and God, everything related to his human nature was subject to his power, which is not the case with mere human beings, whose nature is not subject to their will. That is why Christ’s soul experienced joy and suffering at the same time: by his will, Christ’s higher powers did not overflow into his lower ones, and the suffering of his lower powers did not impede the activities of his higher ones. Such a thing could not happen to other human beings, since their powers are naturally joined together.

The same point applies to this question. A violent death occurs when one’s nature yields to an injury inflicted upon it, and such a death is delayed for as long as one’s nature can resist it. Hence, those whose nature is stronger die that much later from such a cause. Now, how much Christ’s nature would resist the injury inflicted upon it and when it would yield to it were both subject to Christ’s will. So, by his will Christ’s nature resisted the injury inflicted upon it to the very end, more than any other human being could have done. Hence at the end after shedding so much blood, he cried out with a loud voice,¹⁶ as if his powers were unaffected, and immediately by his will his nature yielded and he gave up his spirit.¹⁷ He did this in order to show that he was the Lord of nature and of life and death. Hence the centurion said in awe: Truly this man was the Son of God.¹⁸

Therefore, the Jews killed Christ by inflicting a fatal injury upon him, and yet he laid down his own life and gave up his spirit, since his nature yielded completely to the injury inflicted upon it when he wanted it to do so. Nevertheless, Christ is not guilty of killing himself. For the body exists for the sake of the soul, not the other way around. Hence, the soul itself is harmed when an injury inflicted upon the body expels the soul from the body against the soul’s natural desire (even if it happens not to be against the depraved will of those who commit suicide). But if the soul had the power to leave the body at will and to return again, then there would be no more guilt involved in leaving the body than there is in a resident leaving a house, although there would still be the guilt involved in evicting it against its will.

That makes the reply to the objections clear.

Question 3

The next two questions were about angels: (1) Does an angel’s essence depend upon a bodily place, or is an angel only in a place by virtue of its activity? and (2) Can an angel move from place to place without passing through the space in between?

Article 1

We turn, then, to the first question. It does not seem that an angel is in a place only because of its activity:

1. Being is prior to acting.¹⁹ Hence, being in a place is prior to acting in a place. Yet the posterior cannot account for the prior. Therefore, acting in a place cannot account for an angel being in a place.

2. Two angels can be active in one and the same place. Hence, if an angel were only in a place because of its activity, then there could be more than one angel in the same place at the same time, which is supposed to be impossible.

But to the contrary: Nothing depends on something less excellent than itself. But a bodily place is less excellent than an angel’s essence. Therefore, an angel’s essence does not depend on a bodily place.

Answer: The way an angel is in a bodily place can be seen by considering the way a body is in a place. A body is in a place by contact with the place, and its contact occurs by means of its quantity of dimensions. Now, an angel lacks such quantity, since it is not a body. But an angel has the quantity of its power instead. Hence, just as a body is in a place by the contact of its quantity of dimensions, an angel is in a place by the contact of its power.

So, given that acting is the proper effect of a thing’s power, if one wanted to call an angel’s activity the contact of its power, then an angel could be said to be in a place because of its activity. But this activity should not be taken only to include moving a body, but any way that an angel’s power unites it to a body, whether by guarding it or guiding it, or in any other way.

1. So, to the first objection: There is no reason why a thing cannot be prior absolutely speaking and yet posterior in a certain respect. As its subject, for instance, a body is absolutely prior to its surface, but a body is posterior to its surface with respect to being colored. Similarly, a body is absolutely prior to its contact with a place, but a body is in a place by the contact of its quantity of dimensions. The same is true for an angel and the contact of its power.

2. To the second objection: If one thing is completely moved by another, then nothing else can move it by itself at the same time. Hence, this second objection leads to the opposite conclusion.

Article 2

We turn, then, to the second question. It seems that an angel cannot move from place to place without passing through the space in between:

1. Everything that changes is changing before having changed, as proved in book VI of the Physics.²⁰ Now, if an angel moves from place to place—from A to B, for instance—then when it is at B, it has changed. Hence, it was changing before that. But it was not changing when it was at A, since it had not yet moved then. Thus, it was changing when it was at C, a place between A and B. Therefore, to move from place to place, an angel has to pass through a place in between.

2. If an angel moves from A to B without passing through the space in between, then it must be destroyed at A and created again at B. But that is impossible, since then it would not be the same angel at A and B. Therefore, to move from place to place, an angel has to pass through the space in between.

But to the contrary: Everything that passes through the space between two places, first has to pass through a space equal to or less than itself before passing through one that is greater, as it says in book VI of the Physics.²¹ This is obvious to our senses as well. But no space can be less than an angel, which is indivisible. Hence, an angel must pass through a space equal to itself—i.e., an indivisible place and thus a point. But there are an infinite number of points between any two places. Hence, if it were necessary for an angel to pass through the space between two places in order to move from one to the other, then it would have to pass through an infinite number of points, which is impossible.

Answer: If it wants to, an angel can move from one place to another without passing through the space in between, and if it wants to, it can pass through all the space in between.

Here is the reason why. A body is in a place by being contained by that place. Hence, its motion follows the conditions of place, which means that it has to pass through one place in order to reach another. But an angel is in a place by the contact of its power. Hence, an angel is not in a place by being contained by that place but, rather, by containing the place through the exercise of its power over the place. Accordingly, an angel’s motion does not have to follow the conditions of place. Instead, it is up to an angel’s will to apply itself to one place and then another by the contact of its power, and if it wants to, to do so without passing through the space in between. Compare: A colored body cannot turn from white to black without passing through the colors in between. But our intellects can think of one or the other of such opposites—first of white, for instance, and then of black—with or without thinking of any colors in between.

1. So, to the first objection: What the Philosopher says there, and the proof of it, applies to continuous changes. But an angel’s movement need not be continuous, since its movement refers to the succeeding applications of its power, as we have said. It is like the succession of thoughts or states that Augustine calls the changes to spiritual creatures in book VIII of his Literal Commentary on Genesis.²²

2. To the second objection: An angel does not move by being destroyed or newly created, but by exercising its power over a place.

To the objection made to the contrary: An angel is not in a place by taking up that amount of space, but by applying its power to that place, and it makes no difference whether the place is divisible or not. Hence, an angel can move sequentially, passing through each part of space one after another, like something in a divisible place. But when it is in an indivisible place, an angel cannot move sequentially, nor can it pass through all the space between two places.

Question 4

The next questions were about human beings. The first touched on natural goods, the second on goods of grace, and the third on goods of glory.

There were three of the first questions. The first was about the union of body and soul: (1) When the soul comes to exist in the body, are all the body’s previous forms (both substantial and accidental) destroyed? The second question was about free will: (2) Can people without grace prepare themselves for grace? The third question was about natural love: (3) Did human beings in the state of innocence love God more than everything else, including themselves?

Article 1

We turn, then, to the first question. The soul’s coming to exist in the body does not seem to eliminate all the other forms the body previously had:

1. Genesis 1 says: God formed man from the dust of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life.²³ But it would have been pointless for God to form the man’s body if breathing the soul into it eliminated the form that God gave it when forming it. Therefore, the soul’s coming to exist in the body does not remove all its previous forms.

2. The soul can only exist in a body formed and disposed in a number of ways. Hence, if the soul’s coming to exist in the body removed all its previous forms and dispositions, the soul would have to form the whole body in an instant, which it seems only God can do.

3. The soul can only exist in a mixed body. But a mixture of the elements includes not only their matter but also their forms; otherwise they would just be destroyed. Therefore, the soul does not eliminate all the forms found in matter.

4. The soul is a perfection. But a perfection does not destroy; it perfects. Therefore, the soul’s coming to exist in the body does not destroy its previous forms.

But to the contrary: Every form that comes to an actual existent is an accidental form, since a substantial form makes a thing actually exist, absolutely speaking. Yet if the soul’s coming to exist in the body only added to its previous forms rather than destroying them, then the soul would come to an actual existent, since every form, as an actuality, makes a thing actual. Therefore, the soul’s coming to exist in the body eliminates its previous forms.

Answer: It is impossible for one and the same thing to have more than one substantial form. The reason is that a thing exists and is one on the same account, and a thing clearly exists on account of its form. Hence, it is one thing on account of its form as well. That is why there is not just one thing, absolutely speaking, wherever there is more than one form. A white man, for instance, is not just one thing, absolutely speaking, nor would a two-footed animal be one thing, absolutely speaking, if it were an animal and two-footed on account of different things, as the Philosopher says.²⁴

But notice that substantial forms relate to each other like numbers, as it says in book VIII of the Metaphysics,²⁵ or like shapes, as the Philosopher says of the parts of the soul in book II of On the Soul.²⁶ Greater numbers or shapes always virtually contain lesser ones, as five contains four and as a pentagon contains a tetragon. Likewise, more perfect forms virtually contain less perfect ones, which is easiest to see in the case of souls. For the intellective soul has the power to give the human body whatever the sensitive soul gives brute animals, and the sensitive soul does for animals whatever the nutritive soul does for plants, and more besides.

So, it would be pointless for human beings to have a distinct sensitive soul in addition to their intellective soul, since the intellective soul virtually contains the sensitive soul, and more besides; it would be just as pointless as four is to five. The same is true of every substantial form all the way down to prime matter. Thus, human beings do not have different substantial forms; we only differentiate them in our minds. For instance, we consider human beings as living things because of their nutritive soul, and as sensing things because of their sensitive soul, and so on.

Now, it is clear that the coming to exist of a perfect form always removes an imperfect one. For instance, as the shape of a pentagon comes to exist, the shape of a tetragon is removed. So, I say that when the soul comes to exist in the body, the substantial form the body previously had is removed; otherwise one thing would be generated without another thing being destroyed, which is impossible. The accidental forms the body previously had disposing it for the soul are destroyed as well, though not in their own right; they are only destroyed incidentally as their subject is destroyed. Hence, the same kind of accidental forms remain in the body, though not numerically the same ones. The same thing happens to the dispositions the body has from the forms of the elements, which seem to arise in matter first.

1. So, to the first objection: According to Basil, the breath of life there refers to the grace of the Holy Spirit.²⁷ But even if it refers to the soul, as Augustine says,²⁸ we still do not have to say that the man’s body received two forms, one from its formation out of the dust of the earth and another breathed into it by God. For the man’s body was not formed before being breathed into, unless we wanted to say that its formation refers to the accidental dispositions (shape and so on) naturally presupposed to the intellective soul as the material dispositions of its body. Yet the intellective soul is itself presupposed by such dispositions, not because it is intellective but because it virtually contains all such imperfect forms.

2. To the second objection: When the soul comes to exist in the body, it does not make the body exist as its efficient cause, but only as its formal cause. The efficient cause of its existence completes the body by giving it that form, while its disposing cause prepares for such a form by gradually giving matter forms and dispositions nearer and nearer to it. The nearer the form or disposition, the less matter resists taking on that complete form or disposition: it is easier to make fire out of air than out of water, even though each form inheres directly in matter.

3. To the third objection: Avicenna held that the forms of the elements remain actual in a mixed body.²⁹ But that is impossible, since such forms cannot inhere in the same part of matter at the same time. Thus, they have to inhere in different parts of matter, distinguished by the division of its quantity of dimensions. Hence, there will have to be more than one body existing at the same time. There cannot be a true mixture of the whole of each with each, but only the appearance of such a mixture because of tiny bits of each being put so close together.

Averroes, on the other hand, says in his comments on book III of On the Heavens that the forms of the elements are midway between accidental and substantial forms, and are subject to degrees, so that when such forms decrease and their balance is restored in a certain way, a mixture is somehow produced.³⁰ But this position is even less possible than the first. For a substantial form marks the limit of a specific kind of existence. Hence, the nature of such a form is indivisible, like the nature of a number and a shape, and it is impossible for it to increase or decrease; any addition to it or subtraction from it makes for a different kind of thing.

Instead we should say, as the Philosopher says in book I of On Generation and Corruption,³¹ that the forms of the mixable elements do not remain in a mixed body actually, but only virtually—i.e., the quality of each element retains the power of its substantial form, though decreased and restored to balance (as it were). For the quality of each element acts with the power of its substantial form, otherwise the action performed with fire’s heat would not lead to fire’s substantial form.

4. To the fourth objection: As a form, the soul is indeed a perfection. But the soul is a particular, not a universal. That is why its coming to exist perfects one thing in such a way that another thing is destroyed.

Article 2

We turn, then, to the second question. It seems that people without grace can prepare themselves for grace by their natural free will alone:

1. Proverbs 16 says: It belongs to man to prepare the soul.³² But a thing has the power to do what belongs to it to do. Therefore, human beings have the power to prepare themselves for grace; they do not need the help of grace to do so.

2. In his book On the Fall of the Devil, Anselm says that people lack grace, not because God does not want to give it to them but because they do not want to accept it.³³ Hence, if they wanted to accept it, they could do so. Therefore, if they want to, people can prepare themselves for grace without outside help.

3. Now, someone said that for people to accept grace, they need the grace of an external motivator to help them. But to the contrary: People can be moved to conversion not only by good things but also by sins. After seeing someone commit an egregious sin, for instance, people can turn back to God out of their horror over sin. But God does not cause sin. Therefore, people can prepare themselves for grace without God’s help.

But to the contrary:

1. We are prepared for grace by being turned back to God. But for that we need the help of God’s grace. As Lamentations 4 says: Convert us, O Lord, to you, and we shall be converted.³⁴ Therefore, human beings need the help of God’s grace to prepare themselves for grace.

2. Thinking is the only way for people to prepare themselves for anything. But for that they need the help of God’s grace. As 2 Corinthians 3 says: Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves as from ourselves.³⁵ Therefore, we need the help of God’s grace to prepare ourselves for grace.

Answer: In answering this question we need to beware of the error of Pelagius, who held that human beings could fulfill the commandments of the law and merit eternal life by their own free will. He thought that people only needed God’s help to know what they ought to do, as the Psalm says: Teach me to do your will.³⁶ But this seemed like too little, since in that case only our knowledge would come from God, while the charity with which we fulfill the commandments of the law would come from ourselves. So, later Pelagians held that people’s good works are begun by the people themselves when they accept the faith by their own free will, but their good works are then completed by God. Yet preparation is about the beginning of good works. Hence, saying that human beings can prepare themselves for grace without the help of God’s grace involves the error of the Pelagians. It also contradicts the Apostle, who says in Philippians 1: He who has begun a good work in you will complete it.³⁷

Therefore, human beings need the help of grace, not only to merit reward but also to prepare themselves for grace, although the two needs differ. For people merit reward with their acts of virtue not merely by doing something good, but by doing it well, which requires a certain disposition, as it says in book II of the Ethics.³⁸ Thus, meriting reward requires the grace of a disposition. But people do not need a further disposition to prepare themselves to receive such a disposition, since that would go on forever. Instead, they need God to help them with external motivators, which happens when God’s providence provides people with occasions for salvation such as preaching, good examples, and sometimes even sickness and suffering. But people also need God’s help to move them inwardly, which happens when God moves their hearts to good from within. As Proverbs 21 says: The heart of kings is in the hand of God, and he turns it wherever he wills.³⁹

The Philosopher proves that such help is necessary in a chapter of On Good Fortune.⁴⁰ For people act by will, but the source of will is choice, and the source of choice is deliberation. Yet if we ask how people begin deliberating, we cannot say that their deliberation results from deliberation, since that would go on forever. Hence, there must be an external source that moves people’s minds to deliberate about things to do; and it must be something better than the human mind. Thus, it is not a heavenly body, which is inferior to our intellective power; rather, it is God, as the Philosopher concludes in the same place. Hence, just as every movement of lower bodies that are not always moving has its source in the motion of the heavens, so every movement of lesser minds has its source in God who moves them.

Therefore, people cannot prepare themselves for grace or do anything good without God’s help.

1. So, to the first objection: It belongs to human beings to prepare themselves for grace by their free will, but that does not mean that they do not need God’s help to do so. It belongs to fire to heat, for instance, but that does not mean that fire does not need the motion of the heavens to do so.

2. To the second objection: God moves everything in its own way. Hence, God moves some things with necessity, but moves rational creatures with freedom, since the power of reason is related to opposite things.⁴¹ Thus, God moves the human mind to good, but in such a way that people can still resist being so moved. That is how God causes people to prepare themselves for grace. Yet their lack of grace is not caused by God, but by human beings themselves. As that verse of Hosea 13 says: Your destruction is your own, O Israel: your help is only from me.⁴²

3. To the third objection: Although God does not cause sin, God still arranges for sin to serve as an occasion for some people’s salvation.

Article 3

We turn, then, to the third question. It seems that the first human beings in the state of innocence did not love God more than everything else, including themselves:

1. Loving God that way is most meritorious. But the first human beings did not have the wherewithal to do anything meritorious in the state of innocence, as it says in the Sentences, book II, distinction 24.⁴³ Therefore, the first human beings in that state did not love God more than themselves and everything else.

2. Loving God that way is the human mind’s greatest preparation to receive grace. Yet the first human beings are not supposed to have had any grace in the state of innocence; they only had natural endowments. Therefore, they did not love God more than themselves and everything else.

3. Nature is bent back on itself,⁴⁴ since it turns everything it loves back toward itself. But a cause is even more so than its effect.⁴⁵ Therefore, the first people naturally loved themselves more than God, and thus did not love God more than everything else.

But to the contrary: If they did not love God more than themselves, then they either loved God less than themselves or just as much as themselves. Either way, it follows that human beings took pleasure in themselves without referring themselves to God. But taking pleasure in oneself leads to the perversion of sin, as Augustine teaches.⁴⁶ So, then the first human beings would have already been perverted by sin in the state of innocence, which is impossible. Thus, it follows that they loved God more than everything else.

Answer: If human beings were created in a state of grace, as can be gathered from what Basil and Augustine say,⁴⁷ then this question does not apply. For those in a state of grace obviously have charity, and thus love God more than themselves.

But since it was possible for God to create human beings in a state of pure nature, it is worth considering just how far natural love could extend.

Some people say that in a state of pure nature human beings or angels would naturally love God with the love of concupiscence more than they love themselves, since they would desire to enjoy God more, as the greater and more pleasant good. But, they say, human beings would naturally love themselves with the love of friendship more than they love God. For the love of concupiscence refers to the way we love things that we want to use or enjoy, like wine or something of that sort. But the love of friendship refers to the way we love a friend whose good we want.

But this position is untenable. For natural love is a natural inclination with which God naturally endows us, and God does not make anything perverse. Hence, it is impossible for any natural inclination or love to be perverse. But it is perverse for people to love themselves with the love of friendship more than they love God. Hence, such love cannot possibly be natural.

Therefore, it is natural for human beings and angels to love God more than everything else, including themselves—and not just natural for them but for every creature, since they are all capable of love, either through their senses or by nature. For natural inclinations are easiest to recognize in things that act naturally without rational deliberation: each thing in nature acts as it is naturally apt to act.⁴⁸ Now, we see that every part has a natural inclination to act for the good of the whole, even to its own danger or detriment. We see this, for instance, when a man puts up his hand to protect his head from a sword, since the health of the whole body depends upon the head. Hence, it is natural for each part in its own way to love the whole more than itself. Thus, from this natural inclination, and from their political virtue, good people risk their lives for the common good. Yet God is clearly the common good of the whole universe and of all its parts. Hence, each creature in its own way loves God more than itself. Those without senses do so by nature; brute animals do so through their senses; and rational creatures do so with an intellectual love called delight.

1. So, to the first objection: Loving God as the source of all existence is a matter of natural love. Yet loving God as the object of blessedness is a matter of gracious love, which is meritorious. But, anyway, it is not necessary to maintain the Master’s opinion that human beings in the state of innocence lacked the grace needed to merit anything.

2. To the second objection: People can make more or less use of the natural love they have for God over everything else. When they make the most use of it, such love is the best preparation for grace.

3. To the third objection: A thing’s nature inclines it to do two things: move and act. Its natural inclination to move is bent back on itself. Fire, for instance, moves upward to preserve itself. But a thing’s natural inclination to act is not bent back on itself. Fire does not act to generate fire for its own sake, but for the good of what it generates (its form), and also for the common good (the preservation of its species). Clearly, then, it is not universally true that every natural love is bent back on itself.

Question 5

The next questions touched on goods of grace. The first questions were about such goods themselves. The second were about sins, the opposite of such goods.

The first questions about goods of grace related to everyone, the second related to clerics, and the third related to religious.

The questions relating to everyone were about the two parts of repentance. The first was about contrition: (1) Should a contrite person prefer being in hell to sinning? The rest were about confession.

Article 1

We turn, then, to the first question. It does not seem that a contrite person ought to prefer being in hell to sinning:

1. The punishment of hell is eternal and unrelievable. But a person can always be freed from sin by repentance. Therefore, a person ought to prefer sinning to being in hell.

2. The punishment of hell includes guilt (one of the punishments of hell is a worm—i.e., the gnawing of one’s guilty conscience), whereas guilt does not include the punishment of hell. Therefore, guilt should be chosen over the punishment of hell.

But to the contrary: In his book On Likenesses, Anselm says that a person ought to choose being innocent in hell over being guilty in heaven, since an innocent person would not feel hell’s punishments and a guilty person would not enjoy heaven’s glory.⁴⁹

Answer: In general, a contrite person ought to prefer suffering any sort of punishment to sinning, since contrition is impossible without charity, which rejects all sin. Charity also makes people love God more than themselves. Now, sinning involves acting against God, while being punished involves suffering something against oneself. Hence, charity requires a contrite person to choose any punishment over the guilt of sin.

But a person does not have to consider this or that specific punishment. In fact, it would be foolish to concern oneself or others with such particular punishments. Just as enjoyable things are more attractive when considered in particular rather than in general, frightening things are clearly more terrifying when considered in particular. Moreover, there are some people who do not fall into lesser temptations but would perhaps fall into greater ones. For instance, a person might be able to hear about adultery without falling into lust, and yet would be more affected by considering each individual allurement. Again, a person who would not turn back from dying for Christ might draw back after considering each particular way of dying. Hence, considering such particulars leads people into temptation and provides an occasion for sin.

1. So, to the first objection: Of itself, the guilt of mortal sin is unending as well; it can only be relieved by the mercy of God. Moreover, the divine good that sin opposes outweighs the created natural good that punishment opposes far more than an unending punishment outweighs a temporal sin.

2. To the second objection: The gnawing of one’s conscience is not guilt itself but, rather, a result of guilt. Hence, it can occur without guilt, as when one’s conscience is mistaken about a past action. For instance, one might come to believe that one’s previous action was impermissible, when in fact it was permissible, and one thought it was permissible while doing it.

Question 6

The next three questions were about confession: (1) Is it sufficient for people to make a written confession or is a spoken confession required? (2) Do people have to confess at the first opportunity or can they wait until Lent? and (3) Should a parish priest believe his parishioners who claim to have confessed to another priest, and give them the Eucharist, or not?

Article 1

We turn, then, to the first question. It seems sufficient for people to make a written confession:

Confession is required in order to reveal sin. But sin can be revealed with written words as well as with spoken ones. Therefore, it is sufficient to make a written confession.

But to the contrary: Romans 10 says: Confession with the mouth leads to salvation.⁵⁰

Answer: Confession is something sacramental. Just as baptism requires something of the minister (washing and pronouncing words) and something of the person receiving the sacrament (the intention to be washed), the sacrament of penance requires the priest to give absolution with specific words, and requires penitents to submit to the Church’s keys and reveal their sins by confessing them. Hence, revealing one’s sins is necessary for the sacrament, and no one can dispense with it, just like the necessities of baptism.

But revealing one’s sins with spoken words is not necessary for the sacrament, otherwise no one could ever experience the effect of the sacrament without confessing orally, even in case of great need, which is obviously false. If people are mute or cannot confess with spoken words, it is sufficient for them to confess in writing or even by nodding their head. But even in case of great need, people can only be baptized with water, since water is necessary for the sacrament.

Since the Church demands it, however, those with the ability to do so ought to make a spoken confession, not only because confessing orally makes one more ashamed (so that those who sin orally can be cleansed orally) but also because all the sacraments use ordinary things. Baptism uses water for its sacramental washing, for instance, since people ordinarily wash with water, and the Eucharist makes use of bread, since bread is ordinary food. Hence, the sacramental revealing of one’s sins calls for spoken words, since that is what people ordinarily use to express their thoughts directly.

But notice that the sacrament of penance does not leave a mark like baptism; it only gives the grace of the forgiveness of sins. Yet such forgiveness cannot be obtained by sinning, and it is a sin to violate the Church’s commands. Hence, those who do what is necessary for the sacrament of baptism, but not all that the Church demands, receive the sacrament’s mark, but not its effect, while in the case of penance such people receive nothing at all.

The arguments made earlier on both sides are not very compelling. Things cannot be revealed as directly with written words as with spoken ones, and the verse Confession with the mouth leads to salvation is not about the confession of sins, but about the profession of faith.

Article 2

We turn, then, to the second question. It seems that people can defer confession until Lent:

1. People cannot go wrong by obeying the commands of the Church. But the Church demands that people confess their sins once a year. Therefore, it is not a sin for people to wait until the end of the period that the Church requires.

2. Penance is a necessary sacrament, like baptism. But it is not a sin for catechumens to defer baptism until Holy Saturday. By the same token, therefore, it is not a sin for people to defer confession until Lent.

3. Contrition is more necessary than confession, since confession without contrition is never sufficient for salvation, whereas contrition without confession sometimes is. Now, people in a state of sin do not have to immediately be contrite and thereby cured of sin, otherwise they would be sinning at each and every subsequent moment. Therefore, contrite people do not have to immediately confess, as though it would be a sin to do otherwise.

But to the contrary: Spiritual diseases need to be healed more than bodily diseases. But people with bodily diseases put themselves at risk by not seeking the cure of medicine as quickly as possible, and are thus guilty of negligence. Therefore, it is an even greater sin for people to defer confession, the cure for the spiritual disease of sin.

Answer: It is praiseworthy for sinners to confess their sins at their earliest convenience, since the sacrament of penance gives people the grace to resist sin more firmly.

But some people say that sinners have to confess at the first opportunity; it is a sin for them to defer. Yet that contradicts the very nature of a positive commandment, which of course always obligates, but only applies to certain times and places. Now, the time to fulfill the commandment about confession seems to be when people are faced with a situation in which they need to have confessed, as when they approach the point of death, for instance, or need to receive communion or holy orders, or something else that requires people to be prepared and cleansed by confession. Hence, it is a sin for people to fail to confess when they are faced with such a situation and have a suitable opportunity to do so. Moreover, all the faithful are bound by a command of the Church to receive holy communion at least once a year, especially during the celebration of Easter. That is why the Church requires all the faithful to confess once a year, when the time for receiving the Eucharist approaches.

Strictly speaking, therefore, it is permissible to defer confession until that time. But it can end up being impermissible if a situation that calls for confession arises, or if one defers confession out of contempt. Yet such deferral can be meritorious as well, if confession is deferred in order to be made more prudently or devoutly during the holy season.

Hence, we grant the first arguments.

To the objection made to the contrary: Bodily diseases always get worse unless they are cured by medicine (unless they happen to be cured naturally). But the disease of sin is cured by contrition. Hence, the two cases are not analogous.

Article 3

We turn, then, to the third question. It seems that a parish priest should not believe his parishioners who claim to have confessed to another priest, and give them the Eucharist on that basis:

1. Those who were not contrite beforehand often become contrite while confessing. But a priest ought to lead his parishioners to as much good as he can. Therefore, it seems a priest ought to demand that his parishioners always confess to him.

2. Proverbs 27 says to the pastor of a church: Be careful to know the look of your flock.⁵¹ But there is no better way for him to do so than by hearing their confessions. Therefore, a parish priest ought to make his parishioners confess to him.

But to the contrary: If parishioners confessed to their priest, they could say whatever they wanted and he would believe them. So, he ought to believe them when they say they confessed to someone else.

Answer: In the judicial context, people are believed when they testify against themselves, but not when they testify in their own favor. In the context of penance, however, people are believed when they testify both in favor and against themselves. Hence, we need to make a distinction among the impediments that keep people from receiving the Eucharist. If the impediment relates to the judicial context—e.g., excommunication—a priest does not have to believe parishioners he knows to have been excommunicated, unless he is sure that they have been absolved. But if the impediment relates to the context of penance—viz. sin—then a priest does have to believe them, and it is unjust for him to deny the Eucharist to those who claim to have confessed and to have been absolved by someone with the power to absolve them given his own apostolic authority or the authority of his bishop.

1. So, to the first objection: The good received while confessing was received during the confession that the parishioners say they made, if what they say is true. If what they say is false, then by the same token what they say while confessing could be false. Furthermore, no one has the authority to make people confess a sin that they already confessed to someone with the power to absolve them. For, as we have said, confessing sins is something sacramental, and thus subject to divine, not human, authority.

2. To the second objection: A spiritual pastor ought to be careful to know the look of his flock by examining their external life. He cannot investigate more carefully by hearing their confessions; he has to believe what they say to him.

Question 7

The next two questions related to clerics. The first was about a church’s office: (1) If a cleric has prebends in two churches with different offices on the same day, is he bound to say each office? The second was about studying theology: (2) Should a man forgo the study of theology to pursue the salvation of souls, even if he has an aptitude for teaching others?

Article 1

We turn, then, to the first question. A cleric in such a situation seems bound to say each office:

1. The burden ought to correspond to the benefit. Therefore, a cleric with the benefit of prebends in two churches ought to bear the burden of each by saying the office of each church.

2. If a cleric benefits more from one church, which happens to have a much longer office to recite, it seems just for him to bear the greater burden by saying the longer office. So, it is not his choice: he either ought to say both offices, or he ought to say the office of the church with the larger benefice.

But custom was cited to the contrary.

Answer: Assuming that he is allowed (viz. by a dispensation) to have prebends in two churches, realize that the cleric who receives a prebend in a church has two obligations: one to God (to render God the praises due for blessings received) and one to the church giving him the stipend.

Now, the obligation to the church falls under the stewardship of the church’s leaders. Hence, the duty to the church ought to be fulfilled in the way required, either by the cleric (if the prebend requires him to live there) or by his vicar (if that meets the church’s requirements and customs). The duty to God, however, ought to be fulfilled by the cleric himself. But it does not matter to God which psalms and hymns are used to praise God. It does not matter, for instance, whether the cleric says for vespers The Lord said to my Lord or Praise the Lord, you children,⁵² except to the extent that one ought to follow the traditions of the majority. And since he only owes God the praises of one person, it is enough for such a cleric to say the office once in the custom of either church.

But if his choice of office is to be reasonable, it seems he ought to say the office of the church where he has the greater rank. If he is a deacon in one church, for instance, but a simple canon in the other, then he ought to say the office of the church where he is a deacon. If he is a simple canon in both churches, however, then he ought to say the office of the greater church, even if he happens to have a richer prebend in the lesser church: such temporal considerations are of no importance compared to spiritual matters. But if the two churches are equal, and he is absent from both, then he can choose whichever office he prefers. If he is present at one of the churches, however, then he ought to conform himself to the people he lives with there.

That makes the response to the objections clear.

Article 2

We turn, then, to the second question. It seems to be a sin for a man who can devote his attention to the salvation of souls to spend his time studying theology:

1. The last chapter of Galatians says: While we have time, let us do good.⁵³ And there is no greater loss than that of time.⁵⁴ Therefore, a man should not waste his time studying and put off devoting his attention to the salvation of souls.

2. Those who are perfect ought to do the better thing. But religious are perfect. Therefore, religious have the greatest obligation to forgo studying to pursue the salvation of souls.

3. It is worse to stray from the moral path than from a footpath. But superiors are bound to call back their subordinates who stray from a footpath. Much more, then, are they bound to call back those who stray from the moral path. Yet those who forgo doing what is better have gone astray. Therefore, superiors ought to make their subordinates forgo studying and pursue the salvation of souls.

But custom was cited as an argument to the contrary.

Answer: There are two ways to compare things: absolutely and in a specific case. Now, there is no reason why something better, absolutely speaking, should not be less choiceworthy in a specific case. For instance, philosophizing is better than making money, absolutely speaking, but when necessary, making money is more worthy of choice.⁵⁵ A precious stone is more valuable than a loaf of bread, but during a famine the bread would be chosen instead. As Lamentations 4 says: They have traded their precious things for food to revive their souls.⁵⁶

Notice, however, that with any product, the designer of the product (the architect) is better, absolutely speaking, than the manual laborer who produces it according to the other’s design. Hence, with the construction of buildings, the designer of the building is paid more—in spite of not doing any manual labor—than the manual laborers who cut the wood and carve the stones. Now, in the case of our spiritual edifice, the manual laborers (so to speak) are those who seek the salvation of particular souls by administering the sacraments, for example, or by doing other particular things of that sort. And the principal architects (so to speak) are the bishops, who direct the laborers and decide how they ought to fulfill the duties of their office. That is why they are called bishops—i.e., overseers.

Yet teachers of theology are like principal architects as well, since they investigate and teach others how they ought to go about saving souls. Absolutely speaking, therefore, teaching theology is better than devoting particular attention to the salvation of this or that soul. It is also more meritorious, if it is done with good intentions. Hence in 1 Corinthians 1, the Apostle says of himself: Christ did not send me to baptize, but to preach the gospel,⁵⁷ even though baptizing does more for the salvation of souls. And in 2 Timothy 2, the Apostle says: Entrust these things to faithful men, who will be fit to teach others as well.⁵⁸ Even reason itself shows that it is better to teach the truths of salvation to those who can benefit both themselves and others rather than to the simple who can only benefit themselves.

In a specific case of great need, however, both bishops and teachers ought to set aside the duties of their own office and pursue the salvation of particular souls.

1. So, to the first objection: No time is lost by those who do what is better by teaching theology or who prepare themselves to do so by studying.

2. To the second objection: A person can be called perfect in two senses: in one sense because the person has perfection, and in another sense because the person is in a state of perfection. Now, a person’s perfection consists in charity, which unites the person to God. Hence Genesis 17 says of the love of God: Walk before me and be perfect.⁵⁹ And after the Lord says Love your enemies in Matthew 5,⁶⁰ he concludes about the love of neighbor: Be therefore perfect.⁶¹ But a person is in a state of perfection by having a solemn obligation to do something connected to perfection. Now, there are two ways for something to be connected to the perfection of charity. One way is by being a preamble and preparation for perfection, as with poverty, chastity, and so on, which withdraw people from the cares of this world and free up more of their time for the things of God. Such preparations are therefore more like aids to perfection. That is why when Jerome explains the words of Peter, Behold we have left everything and have followed you,⁶² he says that it was not enough for Peter to say, Behold we have left everything, but he added what is perfect: and have followed you.⁶³ Hence, all those who practice voluntary poverty and chastity have this preparation for perfection, but are not yet in a state of perfection until they take on the obligation to be poor and chaste by a solemn profession. For a person is said to be in a state because of something solemn and perpetual, as is clear with the states of freedom and marriage and so on.

Another way for something to be connected to the perfection of charity is by being its effect, as when one takes on the care of souls. For it is a matter of perfect charity to be moved by the love of God to forgo the sweetness of the contemplative life that one loves most, and to take on the occupations of the active life in order to seek the salvation of one’s neighbors. Hence, all who are moved by such love to pursue their neighbor’s salvation have this effect of perfection, but are not in a state of perfection unless they are bishops, who undertake the care of souls with a solemn consecration. Archdeacons and parish priests have certain duties entrusted to them, but it is not as if that puts them in a state of perfection. Thus, only religious and bishops are perfect in the sense of being in a state of perfection. That is why religious are made bishops, but not made archdeacons or common priests.

Now, it is true that those who are perfect ought to do what is better, if “perfect” refers to people called perfect because of having the perfection of charity. For such people are bound by an internal law, which binds them by inclination. Hence, they ought to do as much as the limit of their perfection binds them to do. But if “perfect” refers to people called perfect because of being in a state of perfection, such as religious and bishops, then it is not true that they ought to do what is better. Bishops only have an obligation to do as much as their accepted role of governing involves, and religious only have an obligation to do what their profession of solemn vows binds them to do; otherwise their obligations would be infinite. Nature, art, and every law has its set limits.

Yet even if it were true that those who are perfect always ought to do what is better, that would be irrelevant to this question, as what we have said makes clear.

3. To the third objection: Although superiors are bound to call their subordinates back from every evil, they are not bound to lead them to do everything better. Even so, this third argument, like the others, has no bearing on this question.

Question 8

The next two questions related to religious: (1) Is a religious bound to obey his superior by revealing a secret entrusted to him in confidence? (2) Is he bound to obey him by revealing his knowledge of a brother’s secret fault?

Article 1

We turn, then, to the first question. A religious seems bound to obey a superior who commands him to reveal a secret entrusted to him in confidence:

A religious is bound to obey his superior by a solemn profession, but is only bound to keep a secret by a simple promise. Therefore, he has a greater duty to obey his superior than to keep a secret.

But to the contrary: Bernard says: What is done for the sake of charity does not militate against charity.⁶⁴ But a religious makes a vow to obey his superior for the sake of charity. Therefore, obeying his superior does not militate against charity, which requires him to keep his neighbor’s secret.

Answer: As Bernard says in his book On Precept and Dispensation,⁶⁵ obedience is satisfied when a religious obeys his superior about things related to the rule, either directly (the things written in the rule) or indirectly (things that can be brought under the rule, such as helping his brothers or being punished for his sins and so on). Yet obedience is perfect when a religious obeys in absolutely everything, as long as it is not against the rule or against God’s law. Obeying a superior in matters against the rule or against God’s law is rash and impermissible obedience. So, to answer this question, we need to consider whether a religious is permitted to reveal a secret entrusted to him in confidence.

But we need to distinguish two kinds of secrets. One kind is impermissible to keep, like a secret that endangers those that one has an obligation to protect. Hence oaths of fidelity require people to reveal such secrets to their lords. Therefore, a religious is obligated to disclose such a secret to his superior on command, even if he promised not to reveal it. As Isidore says: In the case of evil promises, break faith (unless the secret happened to be heard in confession, in which case it can never be revealed).⁶⁶ But another kind of secret can be kept without thereby sinning. And a religious is under no obligation to disclose such a secret to a superior who orders him to do so, if it was entrusted to him in confidence. Indeed, breaking such confidence is a sin.

So, to the first objection: The obligation to uphold matters of faith and charity (which derives from natural law and from the promises made at baptism) is far more solemn than the obligation that derives from professing the religious life.

Article 2

We turn, then, to the second question. A religious seems bound to reveal the secret fault of another brother to a superior who commands him to do so:

As Jerome says, the faults of one should not be hidden at the expense of many.⁶⁷ But a superior presumably wants to know of one brother’s fault for the good of them all. Therefore, a religious ought to reveal another brother’s fault to a superior who commands him to do so.

But to the contrary: Gregory says that even if we sometimes ought to forgo certain goods for the sake of obedience, we never ought to do anything evil for the sake of obedience.⁶⁸ But it seems evil to damage a person’s reputation by exposing the person’s hidden fault. Therefore, we should not do so for the sake of obedience.

Answer: A religious superior presides over a chapter like a court, and can therefore command and oblige his subordinates to reveal things to him for the reasons that an ecclesiastical judge can require sworn testimony in court.

Notice, however, that there are three different ways of responding to crimes: with a denunciation, an inquisition, and an accusation.

A denunciation aims to correct the offender, and hence should be preceded by fraternal correction. As the Lord commands in Matthew 18: First correct him between you and him alone; then if he will not listen, do so in the presence of two or three witnesses; finally tell the church.⁶⁹ For charity requires one to spare a brother as much as possible. Hence, one first ought to try to correct a brother’s conscience without harming his reputation by admonishing him in private. Then, one ought to do so with two or three others present. Finally, one should disregard his reputation and seek to correct his conscience by telling the Church. This whole process looks to the sinner’s conscience: if he found himself publicly exposed from the start, he would become shameless and more obstinate in his sin.

An inquisition, however, ought to be preceded by some bad rumor, whereas an accusation ought to be preceded by an inscription, which obligates the accuser to make recompense. For an inquisition and an accusation both aim to punish the sinner for the sake of the common good.

So, if the accuser obligated to make recompense appears in chapter, a superior can demand a confession of the truth for him to examine, just as an ecclesiastical judge requires sworn testimony. Likewise, after some bad rumor, a superior can use commands to seek the truth from his subordinates, who are bound to obey him.

But if only a denunciation is made, a religious is under no obligation to reveal a brother’s fault to a superior who commands him to do so, unless he sees that the brother was not corrected by that prior warning. In fact, it would be a sin for him to do so at his superior’s command, since he has a greater duty to obey the gospel than his superior. It would be an even greater sin for a superior to lead his subordinate to pervert the order of the gospel.

So, to the first objection: If the sin is in the past, and the person has been corrected by a secret admonition, or there is some hope that the person will be corrected thereby, then (until the opposite is found) many people cannot be at risk. But if the sin is in the future, and many people are in spiritual or bodily danger, then the objection is sound. For in that case there is no need to wait to admonish the person secretly; the danger must be addressed immediately. Hence the Lord does not say: if your brother intends to sin against you—in the future—but rather, if your brother has sinned against you—in the past.⁷⁰

Question 9

The next four questions related to sin: (1) Is sin some sort of entity? (2) Is swearing falsely by God a more serious sin than murder? (3) Is it a sin to violate a papal decree out of ignorance? and (4) Is it a mortal sin for a monk to eat meat?

Article 1

We turn, then, to the first question. Sin does not seem to be an entity of some kind:

John 1 says: Without him was made nothing⁷¹—i.e., sin. But an entity cannot be called nothing. Therefore, sin is not an entity of some kind.

But to the contrary: If sin were not some sort of entity, then it would have to be a pure privation. But a pure privation—e.g., death or darkness—does not admit of degrees. Yet if sin did not admit of degrees, then one sin would be no worse than another, which is unacceptable.

Answer: Sin, especially that of transgression, is a disordered act. As an act, therefore, sin is some sort of entity, but its disorder is a privation, which is why sin is called nothing.

That makes the reply to the objections clear.

Article 2

We turn, then, to the second question. Swearing falsely by God seems to be a more serious sin than murder:

1. Bernard says that neither God nor human beings can dispense from the commandments of the first tablet, and only God, not human beings, can dispense from the commandments of the second tablet.⁷² That implies that it is more serious to sin against the commandments of the first tablet than to sin against the commandments of the second tablet. But swearing falsely by God is against a commandment of the first tablet, which says: You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain.⁷³ Whereas murder is against a commandment of the second tablet: You shall not kill.⁷⁴ Therefore, swearing falsely by God is a more serious sin than murder.

2. It is more serious to sin against God than to sin against a human being. But swearing falsely by God is a sin against God, whereas murder is a sin against a human being. Therefore, swearing falsely by God is a more serious sin than murder.

But to the contrary: The punishment is proportional to the guilt. But the punishment for murder is harsher than the punishment for swearing falsely by God. Therefore, murder is the more serious sin.

Answer: As the Apostle says in Hebrews 6: Men swear by one greater than themselves, and an oath of confirmation puts an end to all their disputes.⁷⁵ But it would be pointless for an oath to end the dispute in a murder case if murder were more serious than swearing falsely by God. For, presumably, a person who had committed the greater sin of murder would not be afraid to incur the lesser guilt of swearing falsely by God. Hence, the very fact that oaths are taken in every case involving sin shows clearly that swearing falsely by God ought to be considered the greatest sin—and for good reason, since swearing falsely in God’s name is like a denial of God’s name. Hence, the sin of swearing falsely by God comes second after idolatry, as the order of the commandments shows. Even among the gentiles oaths were most honored, as it says toward the beginning of the Metaphysics.⁷⁶

Hence, we grant the first arguments.

To the objection made to the contrary: In the case of human judgment, the amount of punishment does not always correspond to the amount of guilt. Sometimes a greater punishment is inflicted for a lesser sin, when a lesser sin risks greater harm to people. In the case of divine judgment, however, a more serious sin is always punished more harshly. Hence, in order to show the seriousness of idolatry and swearing falsely by God, after giving the first commandment You shall not adore them or serve them, Exodus 21 then adds: I am the Lord your God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children.⁷⁷ And after saying You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain, it adds: For the Lord will not hold him guiltless who takes the name of his Lord in vain.⁷⁸

Article 3

We turn, then, to the third question. Violating a papal decree out of ignorance does not seem to be a sin:

1. As Augustine says, sin is so voluntary, that if it is not voluntary, then it is not a sin.⁷⁹ But ignorance makes an act involuntary, as it says in book III of the Ethics.⁸⁰ Therefore, an act done out of ignorance is not a sin.

2. By law, a lord can reclaim his appointed servant after a set time. But the time ought to be calculated from when the appointment is known, not from when it is made.⁸¹ Therefore, the obligation of a papal decree begins to bind only when it is known.

But to the contrary: Ignorance of the law does not excuse one from sin.⁸² But a papal decree gives a law. Therefore, ignorance does not excuse one from the sin of violating a papal decree.

Answer: When ignorance is the cause of action, it makes the act involuntary, and thus always excuses one from sin, unless the ignorance is itself a sin. Now, ignorance is itself a sin when it is ignorance of what one can and should know. Yet everyone in their own way should know about a papal decree. Hence, if one is ignorant of the decree due to negligence, one is not excused from the sin of violating it. But if there is a sufficient reason why one could not have known about it (being in jail, for instance, or in a foreign country that the decree did not reach, or something like that), then such ignorance excuses one, and it is not a sin to violate the papal decree.

That makes the reply to the objections clear.

Article 4

We turn, then, to the fourth question. It seems to be a mortal sin for a monk to eat meat:

1. A canon on consecration says that monks ought not to eat meat, and if they do so, they ought to be jailed.⁸³ But such punishment is only inflicted for mortal sin. Therefore, it is a mortal sin for monks to eat meat.

2. It is a mortal sin to break a vow. But monks are bound by a vow to keep the rule of blessed Benedict, which says that monks are to abstain from meat.⁸⁴ Therefore, it is a mortal sin for monks to eat meat.

But to the contrary: Mortal sin is never allowed due to sickness. But a monk is allowed to eat meat due to sickness. Therefore, it is not a mortal sin for a monk to eat meat.

Answer: Nothing in itself is a mortal sin for monks or any religious that is not a mortal sin for anyone else, unless it contradicts an obligation they took on with the vows they professed. But something can happen to be a sin for them (because of scandal or something) that would not be a sin for anyone else.

Hence, we need to consider what religious bind themselves to do when they profess their vows. If religious professed a vow to keep the rule, then they would seem obligated by their vow to do every single thing in the rule, and thus doing otherwise would be a mortal sin. But then the religious state would be a trap for mortal sin, which religious could hardly or never avoid. So, the holy fathers who established the religious orders, not wanting to set a trap for damnation, but to offer people a way of salvation, gave the profession of vows a form free of danger.

The order of preaching friars, for instance, has the safest and securest form of profession, which is not a promise to keep the rule but, rather, obedience according to the rule.⁸⁵ Hence, their vow binds them to do the things commanded in the rule, and to do what their superior commands them to do according to the tenor of the rule. But other things that are not commanded in the rule do not fall directly under their vow, and hence not doing them is not a mortal sin.

Blessed Benedict decided that a monk’s profession would not be a promise to keep the rule but, rather, the conversion of his life according to the rule,⁸⁶ which is to say that he would lead his life according to the rule. Doing otherwise would mean either breaking the commands in the rule or showing contempt for the rule by refusing to lead his whole life according to the rule. But not everything in the rule is a command. Some things are warnings or counsels, while others are arrangements or customs, such as No one is to talk after compline.⁸⁷ And such customs in the rule lack the force of commands, since no superior who establishes a custom intends to do so by a command forever binding under pain of mortal sin: for a superior is like a living rule. Hence, it would be silly to think that it was a mortal sin for a monk to break silence after compline, unless he happened to do so against the command of his superior or out of contempt for the rule.

Now, abstaining from meat is not set down in blessed Benedict’s rule as a command but, rather, as a custom. Hence, a monk who eats meat is not for that reason guilty of mortal sin unless he does so out of disobedience or contempt.

1. So to the first objection: That punishment is inflicted upon the monk who defiantly and disobediently eats meat.

2. To the second objection: Eating meat does not break a monk’s vow, except when he does so out of disobedience or contempt.

To the objection made to the contrary: That argument is ineffective. It works for things that are evil in themselves (murder, adultery, etc.), since such things are impermissible for everyone, both the healthy and the sick. But it does not work for things that are evil because of being forbidden, since such things can be forbidden to the healthy but not to the sick.

Question 10

The next two questions touched on goods of glory. Both were about glorified bodies: (1) Is it naturally possible for a glorified body to be with another body in the exact same place? and (2) Could that happen miraculously?

Article 1

We turn, then, to the first question. It seems naturally possible for a glorified body to be with another body in the exact same place:

1. If it is impossible for a glorified body to be with another body in the exact same place, that is either because of its density or thickness or because of its dimensions. But it is not because of its density or thickness, since the glorified body will be spiritual, as the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 15.⁸⁸ Yet it is not because of its dimensions either. For things touch when their extremities come together.⁸⁹ So, one natural body’s point must be together with another body’s point, and its line with another body’s line, and its surface with another body’s surface. For the same reason, one body must be with another body. Therefore, it is not naturally impossible for a glorified body to be together with another body in the exact same place.

2. In his comments on book VIII of the Physics, the Commentator says that parts of air and water partly interpenetrate each other because they are partly of a spiritual nature.⁹⁰ But glorified bodies will be wholly spiritual, as was just said. Therefore, it will be possible for them to interpenetrate other bodies completely and thus be together with them in the exact same place.

But to the contrary: Glorification does not destroy a thing’s nature, and it is naturally impossible for the human body in its current state to be together with another body in the exact same place. Hence, it will be impossible for it to do so after being glorified.

Answer: It is clearly impossible for the human body in its current state to be with another body in the exact same place. So, if a unique characteristic bestowed upon the glorified body made it naturally possible for it to be with another body in the exact same place, that bestowed characteristic would have to remove whatever makes it impossible for the human body in its current state to be with another body in the exact same place. Hence, we need to consider what makes that impossible.

Some people say that it is a certain density or thickness of the body, which will be removed by an endowment of glory they call subtlety. But that makes no sense. There is no such density or thickness. For what could it be? It could not be a quality, since there is no quality whose removal could make it possible for a body to be with another body in the exact same place. Nor could it be matter or form (the parts of a body’s essence), otherwise the essence of the human body would not remain whole in glory, which is heretical.

So, it must just be the dimensions of bodily matter that make it impossible for one body to be with another body in the exact same place. For what is essentially such and such must be the cause of other things being such and such, and having a distinct position belongs primarily and essentially to a thing’s dimensional quantity, which is defined as quantity with a position.⁹¹ Hence, an individual’s parts have their distinct positions because they are subject to dimensions. And just as dimensions distinguish the various parts of one body in various parts of one place, so dimensions also distinguish various bodies in various places: an actual division of bodily matter makes for two bodies, while its potential for division makes for two parts of one body. Hence the Philosopher says in book IV of the Physics that just as putting a wooden cube in water or air would displace that much water or air, so even its separated dimensions would displace an equal amount of a supposed void.⁹²

But glory does not remove the body’s dimensions. Hence, I say that it remains naturally impossible for the glorified body to be with another body in the exact same place, no matter what unique characteristic is bestowed upon it.

1. So, to the first objection: As we just said, it is impossible for the human body in its current state to be with another body in the exact same place. But that is not because of any thickness or density to be removed by glory (the Apostle contrasts the spiritual body with the natural body in its need for food, as Augustine says,⁹³ not in its density or thickness). Rather, it is because of the body’s dimensions.

The objection to this explanation is counted among sophistical arguments by the Philosopher in book VI of the Physics.⁹⁴ For a point, a line, and a surface belong to a body, not to a place. Hence, even if the extremities of bodies that touch each other come together, that does not make it possible for multiple bodies to be in the exact same place.

2. To the second objection: As the Commentator says in the same passage, the interpenetration of air and water results from their compression, and a spiritual power is attributed to them because they are so thin.⁹⁵ Yet it would be a mistake to say that glorified bodies are like wind and air in this respect, as Gregory makes clear in book XIV of his Morals.⁹⁶

Article 2

We turn, then, to the second question. There does not seem to be any possible way for a glorified body to be together with another body in the exact same place:

1. Two bodies relate to two places as one body relates to one place. So, by commutativity, two bodies relate to one place as one body relates to two places. But there is no possible way for one body to be in two places. Therefore, there is no way for two bodies to be in one place.

2. If there were two bodies in one place, they would take up two points at two ends of that place. But then between those two points there would be two straight lines on those two bodies existing in the exact same place, which is impossible. Therefore, it is impossible for two bodies to be in the exact same place.

But to the contrary: Christ came in to the disciples through closed doors, as John 20 says.⁹⁷ But that would not be possible unless his body had been together with the body of the doors in the exact same place. Therefore, it is possible for a glorified body to be together with another body in the exact same place.

Answer: As we just said, their dimensions make it impossible for two bodies to be in the exact same place, since bodily matter is distinguished by its dimensions, and dimensions are distinguished by their position. Nevertheless, as the first cause of everything, God can keep effects in existence without their proximate causes. Hence, just as God keeps accidents in existence without a subject in the sacrament of the altar, God can keep bodily matter and its dimensions distinct without having a different position. Miraculously, therefore, it is possible for two bodies to be in the exact same place. Hence the saints say that Christ’s body came out through the closed womb of the Virgin and came in through closed doors by the power of God.⁹⁸ Likewise, I say that it will be possible for the glorified body, which will be made like Christ’s glorious body,⁹⁹ to be with another body in the exact same place, not because of any created power bestowed upon it but by God’s power alone helping and making it happen. The shadow of Peter’s body healed the sick, for instance, not because of any created power bestowed upon it, but by God’s power helping and performing the miracle.¹⁰⁰

1. So, to the first objection: Commutativity applies as follows. The third relates to the fourth (e.g., four to six) as the first relates to the second (e.g., two to three). So, by commutativity, the second relates to the fourth (i.e., three to six) as the first relates to the third (i.e., two to four). Hence, the argument should have gone as follows: Two bodies relate to two places as one body relates to one place. Therefore, one place relates to two places as one body relates to two bodies. But that does not imply that if it is impossible for one body to be in two places, then it is impossible for two bodies to be in one place. For one body being located in two places entails a contradiction, since a place is by nature the boundary of the thing located in it, and a boundary marks the area outside of which there is nothing of the thing. Hence, it is impossible for a thing located in one place to be in another place. If we suppose that a thing is in two places, then it follows that it is outside the place it is in, in which case it is both located there and not located there. This is not a problem for the body of Christ, however, since it is not present in the sacrament of the altar by being located there, but by transubstantiation.

2. To the second objection: It is impossible for there to be two mathematical lines between two points, since there is no conceivable reason for them to be distinct except their position. It is naturally impossible for there to be two natural lines between two points as well. Miraculously, however, it is possible, since there is still another reason for the two lines to be distinct: their different bodily subjects, which are preserved by God’s power even without having different positions.

¹ Gregory, Dialogues II, 35.

² Ibid.

³ Gregory, Morals XVIII, 54, 90.

⁴ Ordinary Gloss on Exodus 33:20.

⁵ John 1:18.

⁶ Ordinary Gloss on John 1:18.

⁷ Wisdom 9:15.

⁸ Augustine, Literal Commentary on Genesis XII, 27. Cf. 2 Corinthians 12:3.

⁹ Gregory, Dialogues II, 35.

¹⁰ Psalms 35:10.

¹¹ Rather, Bede, Commentary on Luke, Homily I, 3. Cf. Ordinary Gloss on Luke 1:32.

¹² Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics V, 15 (1021a26–b3).

¹³ Cf. note 11 of this Quodlibet.

¹⁴ Cf. Luke 23:46.

¹⁵ John 19: 30.

¹⁶ Matthew 27:50; Mark 15:37; Luke 23:46.

¹⁷ John 19:30.

¹⁸ Mark 15:39.

¹⁹ A common adage.

²⁰ Aristotle, Physics VI, 6 (237a17–237b9).

²¹ Aristotle, Physics VI, 10 (241a8–9).

²² Augustine, Literal Commentary on Genesis VIII, 20.

²³ Genesis 2:7.

²⁴ Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, 12 (1037b10–27).

²⁵ Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics VIII, 3 (1043a32–1044a2).

²⁶ Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul II, 3 (414b19–31).

²⁷ Rather, Cyril of Alexandria, Against the Errors of the Greeks, c. 27.

²⁸ Cf. Augustine, The City of God XIII, 24.

²⁹ Cf. Avicenna, Physics I, 6; Metaphysics VIII, 2.

³⁰ Cf. Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Heavens III, 67; Commentary on Aristotle’s On Generation and Corruption I, 90.

³¹ Cf. Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption I, 10 (327a30–328b22).

³² Proverbs 16:1.

³³ Cf. Anselm, On the Fall of the Devil, c. 3.

³⁴ Lamentations 5:21.

³⁵ 2 Corinthians 3:5.

³⁶ Psalms 142:10.

³⁷ Philippians 1:6.

³⁸ Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II, 4 (1105a17–b12).

³⁹ Proverbs 21:1.

⁴⁰ Cf. Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics VIII, 2 (1248a15–29).

⁴¹ A common adage.

⁴² Hosea 13:9.

⁴³ Cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences II, d.24, c. 2.

⁴⁴ A common adage.

⁴⁵ Cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, 2 (72a29).

⁴⁶ Cf. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine I, 22, 21; Peter Lombard, Sentences I, d.1, cc. 1–3.

⁴⁷ See Quodlibet I, q.4, a.1, ad 1. Cf. Albert, Commentary on the Sentences II, d.3H, a.12.

⁴⁸ Cf. Aristotle, Physics II, 8 (199a10).

⁴⁹ Cf. On Likenesses, c. 191; Eadmer, The Life of St. Anselm III, 2, 22.

⁵⁰ Romans 10:10.

⁵¹ Proverbs 27:23.

⁵² Psalms 109 or 112.

⁵³ Galatians 6:10.

⁵⁴ Seneca, Letters to Lucilius I, 2.

⁵⁵ Aristotle, Topics III, 2 (118a10–11).

⁵⁶ Lamentations 1:11.

⁵⁷ 1 Corinthians 1:17.

⁵⁸ 2 Timothy 2:2.

⁵⁹ Genesis 17:1.

⁶⁰ Matthew 5:44

⁶¹ Matthew 5:48.

⁶² Matthew 19:27.

⁶³ Jerome, Commentary on Matthew III.

⁶⁴ A common adage attributed to Bernard by William of Auxerre and Albert the Great. Cf. William of Auxerre, Golden Summa III, tr. 50, c. 2, q.1; Albert, Commentary on the Sentences III, d.39K, a.7.

⁶⁵ Cf. Bernard, On Precept and Dispensation, cc. 4–6.

⁶⁶ Isidore, Synonyms II, 58.

⁶⁷ Rather, Origen, Commentary on the Book of Joshua, Homily VII, 6.

⁶⁸ Gregory, Morals XXXV, 14, 29.

⁶⁹ Cf. Matthew 18:15–17.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ John 1:3.

⁷² Cf. Bernard, On Precept and Dispensation, c. 3.

⁷³ Exodus 20:7.

⁷⁴ Exodus 20:13.

⁷⁵ Hebrews 6:16.

⁷⁶ Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics I, 3 (983b33).

⁷⁷ Rather, Exodus 20:5.

⁷⁸ Exodus 20:7.

⁷⁹ Cf. Augustine, On True Religion, xiv, 27.

⁸⁰ Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III, 1 (1110b18–1111a21).

⁸¹ Cf. Raymond of Penyafort, Summa on Canon Law, cur. X; Summa on Penance III, tit. 17.

⁸² A common adage.

⁸³ Cf. Decretum III, d. v, c. 32.

⁸⁴ The Rule of St. Benedict, c. 36.

⁸⁵ Cf. Ancient Constitutions of the Order of Preachers.

⁸⁶ The Rule of St. Benedict, c. 58.

⁸⁷ Ibid., c. 42.

⁸⁸ 1 Corinthians 15:44–46.

⁸⁹ Aristotle, Physics VI, 1 (231a22–23).

⁹⁰ Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics VIII, 82.

⁹¹ Cf. Aristotle, Categories, c. 6 (4b21–22 & 5a15–37).

⁹² Cf. Aristotle, Physics IV, 8 (216a26–b2).

⁹³ Cf. Augustine, Literal Commentary on Genesis XII, 6.

⁹⁴ Cf. Aristotle, Physics VI, 1 (231a21–b18).

⁹⁵ Cf. Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics VIII, 82.

⁹⁶ Cf. Gregory, Morals XIV, 56, 72.

⁹⁷ Cf. John 20:19.

⁹⁸ Cf. Augustine, Sermon 258, 2; Homilies on the Gospel of John, Homily 121, 4; Gregory, Forty Homilies on the Gospels, Homily 2, 26.

⁹⁹ Cf. Philippians 3:21.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Acts 5:15.

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