Article 2: Does a vowed crusader who dies before going on crusade still receive the full forgiveness of sins?

Article 2: Does a vowed crusader who dies before going on crusade still receive the full forgiveness of sins?

Quodlibet II

There were questions about Christ, about angels, and about human beings.

Question 1

The questions about Christ were on his passion. There were two such questions: (1) Was Christ numerically the same human being during the three days he was dead? and (2) Would any of Christ’s suffering have been enough to redeem the human race without his death?

Article 1

We turn, then, to the first question. Christ seems to have been the same human being during those three days:

1. Matthew 12 says: As Jonah was in the belly of the whale three days and three nights, so shall the Son of Man be in the heart of the earth.¹ But the only Son of Man in the heart of the earth was the Son of Man who spoke upon the earth, otherwise Christ would have been two sons. Therefore, Christ was the same human being during the three days he was dead.

2. Jonah was the same human being in the belly of the whale as he had been before. But Christ was in the heart of the earth as Jonah was in the belly of the whale. Therefore, Christ was the same human being as well.

But to the contrary: The form of the whole (which results from the composition of matter and form) is lost when the form of a part is lost. But Christ’s soul was separated from his body during the three days he was dead, and hence his humanity ceased to exist. Therefore, Christ was not numerically the same human being during the three days he was dead.

Answer: Three substances were united in Christ: body, soul, and divinity. His body and soul were united not only in one person but also in one nature. His divinity, however, could not be united in a nature with his body or his soul: as the most complete nature, divinity cannot be part of any nature. Instead, Christ’s divinity was united to his body and soul in a person. Now, at death, Christ’s soul was separated from his body; otherwise his death would not have been a true death, since death, by nature, involves the separation of the soul from the body, which is alive because of the soul. But Christ’s divinity was not separated from his body or his soul. This is clear from the Creed, which says that the Son of God was buried and descended into hell.² Since it was the body that lay in the tomb, and the soul that descended to hell, such things would not be attributed to the Son of God unless the two were joined to him in one subsisting individual or person.

So, we have two ways of talking about Christ during the three days he was dead. We can talk one way about the subsisting individual or person, and in that sense Christ was absolutely numerically the same one he had been. Or we can talk about Christ’s human nature, and in two ways. We can talk one way about his whole human nature (called humanity), and in that sense Christ was not a human being during the three days he was dead. Hence, he was neither the same human being nor a different human being, but the same subsisting individual. Or we can talk about the parts of his human nature, and in that sense Christ’s soul was completely numerically the same, since its substance was unchanged, but only the matter of his body was numerically the same; its substantial form (the soul) was not. Hence, we cannot say that his body was absolutely numerically the same. Any substantial difference keeps a thing from being absolutely the same, and living (being ensouled) is a substantial difference. Hence, dying means being destroyed, not merely being altered. And yet we cannot say that Christ’s body was absolutely different or not the same, since it was not its whole substance that was different or not the same. Therefore, we should say that his body was the same in one respect, but different in another, since its matter was the same, but its form was not.

1. So, to the first objection: “Human being” is a term for a nature, whereas “Son” is a term for a subsisting individual. Hence, Christ can be called the Son of Man more than he can be called a human being during the three days he was dead.

2. To the second objection: Christ and Jonah are not meant to be similar in every way, but only in the place they occupied. After all, Christ was dead in the heart of the earth, whereas Jonah was alive in the belly of the whale.

Article 2

We turn, then, to the second question. It seems that Christ’s other suffering would not have been enough to redeem the human race without his death:

1. In Galatians 2, the Apostle says: If justice were from the law, then Christ died in vain³—i.e., uselessly and for no reason. But if his other suffering would have been enough, then Christ died in vain, which the Apostle considers unacceptable. Therefore, Christ’s other suffering would not have been enough to redeem the human race.

2. Buying something means acquiring it at a just price. But the just price for the sin of our first parent, who sold the human race into slavery, could not have been anything but Christ’s life, which was more valuable than the lives of all human beings, which were lost by that sin, as Romans 5 says: by the sin of the first human being death came upon all.⁴ Therefore, Christ’s other suffering could not have redeemed the human race without his death.

3. In book II of his Morals, Gregory says that if Christ had not undertaken a death he did not owe, he would never have freed us from the death we did owe.⁵ Therefore, his other suffering would not have been enough to free the human race without his death.

4. At Hebrews 10, the Apostle says that Christ by one offering has perfected forever those who are sanctified,⁶ and thus there is no place for a second offering. Now, Christ clearly endured much suffering before death (hunger, exertion, being spat upon and scourged), and if that would have been enough, Christ would not have offered himself up to death. Yet he offered himself to the point of death as a sacrifice to God for our sins, as Ephesians 5 says.⁷ Therefore, Christ’s suffering would not have been enough without his death.

But to the contrary:

1. The amount of suffering or offense given to a person is a function of the person’s worth: slapping a king in the face is more offensive than slapping an ordinary person. But as a divine person, Christ is a person of infinite worth. Hence, any suffering on his part—however little—is infinite. Therefore, any of Christ’s suffering would have been enough to redeem the human race, even without his death.

2. Bernard says that the smallest drop of Christ’s blood would have been enough to redeem the human race.⁸ But Christ could have shed a drop of blood without dying. Therefore, some of Christ’s suffering could have redeemed the human race, even without his death.

Answer: Buying something requires two things: the amount to be paid and the allocation of the payment for the purchase of something. If someone pays less than a thing costs, then the thing has not been completely bought but, rather, partly bought and partly donated. For instance, if one buys a book for half the money it is worth, then one has partly bought the book and partly been given it. But even if one pays more, without allocating the payment for that purchase, one still would not have bought the book.

So, if we are talking about the amount to be paid for the redemption of the human race, then any of Christ’s suffering would have been enough to redeem the human race, even without his death, since Christ is a person of infinite worth. In that sense, the last two arguments made to the contrary are sound.

But if we are talking about the allocation of the payment, then God the Father and Christ did not allocate Christ’s other suffering for the redemption of the human race without his death, and for three reasons. First, so that the payment made to redeem the human race would not only be of infinite value, but also of the same kind, viz. so that Christ would redeem us from death by death. Second, so that Christ’s death would not only be the payment made for our redemption, but also an example of virtue, viz. so that people would not be afraid to die for the truth. These are the two reasons the Apostle gives in Hebrews 2 where he says: that through death he might destroy him who held the power of death—the first reason—and deliver those who out of fear of death were subject to slavery their whole life—the second reason.⁹ Third, so that Christ’s death would also be the sacrament of salvation, while we die to sin and to our worldly desires and affections by the power of Christ’s death. That is the reason given in 1 Peter 3: Christ died once for our sins, the just for the unjust, that he might offer us to God, put to death in the flesh, but made alive in the spirit.¹⁰ That is why Christ’s other suffering did not redeem the human race without his death.

1. So, to the first objection: Christ’s death was not allocated for the redemption of the human race for no reason, although less suffering would have been enough, as we just said.

2. To the second objection: If less suffering had been allocated by God, then Christ could have paid enough to redeem the human race not only by offering his life but by enduring any suffering, since Christ is a person of infinite worth, as we just said.

3& 4. To the third and fourth objections: Those two arguments are about Christ’s other suffering, which was not allocated for the redemption of the human race without his death.

Question 2

The next questions were about angels.

The first questions were about their composition. Then there was a question about the time of their movements.

There were two of the first questions: (1) Is an angel substantially composed of essence and existence? and (2) Is there a difference between an angelic subject and its nature?

Article 1

We turn, then, to the first question. An angel does not seem to be substantially composed of essence and existence:

1. The essence of an angel is the angel itself, since the nature of a simple thing is the simple thing itself.¹¹ So, if an angel were composed of essence and existence, then it would be composed of itself and something else, which makes little sense. Therefore, an angel is not substantially composed of essence and existence.

2. No accident is substantially composed with a substance. Yet an angel’s existence is an accident. As Hilary says in his book On the Trinity, only God’s existence is not an accident, but subsisting truth.¹² Therefore, an angel is not essentially composed of essence and existence.

But to the contrary: In the Book on Causes, it says that an intelligence (which we call an angel) has an essence and existence.¹³

Answer: There are two ways to attribute something to a thing: essentially, and by participation. Light, for instance, is attributed to an illuminated body by participation, but if there were a separate light, then it would be attributed to that light essentially. Accordingly, existing is attributed essentially to God alone, since God’s existence is subsistent and absolute existence, whereas existing is attributed to every creature by participation, since no creature is its own existence but, rather, a thing that has existence. This compares to the way that God is called good essentially, since God is goodness itself, while creatures are called good by participation, since they have goodness. For each thing is good to the extent that it exists. As Augustine says in book I of On Christian Doctrine, to the extent that we are, we are good.¹⁴ Now, whenever something is attributed to a thing by participation, there must be something else there besides what is participated. Hence, in the case of every creature, the creature that has existence is other than the existence it has. That is just what Boethius says in his book On the Hebdomads: in the case of everything short of the first thing, what exists is other than its existence.¹⁵

Realize, however, that there are two ways to participate in something. One way is to participate in it as something included in the substance of the participator, which is how a species participates in a genus. But no creature participates in existence that way. For a thing’s substance only includes what its definition contains, and no creature’s definition contains existing, since that is not a genus or a specific difference. Hence, creatures participate in existence as something not included in their essence. That is why the question “Does it exist?” differs from the question “What is it?” And since everything outside a thing’s essence is called an accident, the existence relevant to the question “Does it exist?” is an accident. Hence in his comments on book V of the Metaphysics, the Commentator calls the proposition “Socrates exists” an accidental predication insofar as it indicates the existence of a thing or the truth of a proposition, although it is true that the word “existent” indicates the thing that has this existence, thus signifying the essence of the thing and dividing into the ten categories.¹⁶ Nevertheless, the word is not used univocally, since it does not apply to every existence with the same notion; it applies essentially to substances and differently to the rest.

Therefore, an angel is composed of essence and existence, but it is not composed of them like parts of a substance, but like a substance and something adhering to a substance.

1. So, to the first objection: Sometimes things joined together give rise to a third thing. Body and soul, for instance, constitute humanity, and thus a human being. Hence, a human being is composed of body and soul. Yet sometimes things joined together do not result in a third thing, but merely a composite notion. The notion of a white human being, for instance, resolves into the notion of a human being and the notion of white. In such cases, the thing is composed of itself and something else. A white thing, for instance, is composed of the thing that is white and whiteness.

2. To the second objection: Existence is an accident, not because it is accidental to a substance but because it is the actuality of every substance. Hence, God, who is his own actuality, is his own existence.

Article 2

We turn, then, to the second question. An angelic subject seems the same as its nature:

1. In the case of things composed of matter and form, the subject differs from its nature, since the subject adds individual matter to the nature of its kind. But that cannot be the case with an angel, if an angel is not composed of matter and form. Therefore, an angelic subject does not differ from its nature.

2. Now, someone said that an angelic subject differs from its nature because a subject is thought of as a thing that has existence, while a nature is not. But to the contrary: Existence is not contained in the definition of a nature, and thus would not be contained in the definition of a subject or individual, if a subject or individual could be defined. Therefore, existence does not differentiate a subject from its nature, and hence there is no way for an angelic subject to differ from its nature.

But to the contrary: Every created subject is constituted by its nature. But nothing can be constituted by itself. Therefore, no created subject can be the same as its nature.

Answer: In order to understand this question, we need to consider what a subject is and what a nature is. Nature can mean different things, but at least in one sense nature refers to the substance of a thing, as it says in book V of the Metaphysics,¹⁷ where substance means what a thing is, its essence or whatness. So, in the sense of nature that we are referring to here, the term for a thing’s nature signifies what its definition signifies. Hence in his book On Two Natures, Boethius says that a nature is whatever a specific difference informs,¹⁸ since a specific difference completes a definition. A subject, on the other hand, is a singular in the category of substance, which is called a subsisting individual or first substance.

Now, since we are more familiar with sensible substances composed of matter and form, let us first see how a subject and its essence or nature are related in their case.

Some people say that the form of a part and the form of the whole (called an essence or nature) are really the same thing, and only have different notions: it is called the form of a part insofar as it makes matter actually exist, and called the form of the whole insofar as it constitutes a specific kind of thing. A human being’s form, for instance, is called a soul insofar as it perfects matter, but called humanity insofar as it constitutes a specifically human kind of thing. And that means that in the case of things composed of matter and form, the subject’s nature is a part of it, since the subject is an individual composed of matter and form, as we said.

But this position seems false. As we said, a thing’s nature or essence is what its definition signifies. Yet the definition of natural things signifies not only their form but also their matter, as it says in book VI of the Metaphysics.¹⁹ Nor can it be said that a natural thing’s definition contains matter as something not included in its essence. Only an accident is defined by reference to something not included in its essence, viz. its subject, which is why an accident has an essence incompletely, as it says in book VI of the Metaphysics.²⁰ So, in the case of things composed of matter and form, their essence or nature is not only their form but is composed of their matter and form.

Granted that a natural subject or individual is composed of matter and form, we still need to consider whether it is the same as its essence or nature. The Philosopher raises this question in book VII of the Metaphysics, where he asks whether each thing and its essence are the same.²¹ He answers that in the case of things spoken of essentially, the thing and its essence are the same, but in the case of things spoken of accidentally, they are not the same. So, a human being is the same as the essence of a human being, since “human being” just signifies “two-footed walking animal.” But a white thing is not completely the same as the essence of white, which is signified by the term “white,” since “white” just signifies a quality, as it says in the Categories,²² while a white thing is a substance that has whiteness.

Accordingly, therefore, whenever something can apply to a thing and yet is not included in the definition of its nature, the thing and its essence, or the subject and its nature, are different. For a nature only signifies what is included in the definition of that specific kind of thing. But a subject possesses more than what pertains to the definition of its kind, since other things apply to it as well. Hence, a subject is signified as a whole, while a nature or essence is signified as a formal part. God is the only case where nothing applies to the thing besides its essence, since God’s essence is God’s existence, as we have said. Hence, in God’s case, the subject and its nature are completely the same. But in the case of an angel, they are not completely the same, since something applies to an angel besides what is included in the definition of its kind. For an angel’s existence is outside its essence or nature, and other things apply to it as well, all of which pertain to the angelic subject, not to its nature.

1. So, to the first objection: Things composed of matter and form are not the only case where something applies to a thing besides the essence of its kind. That is also the case with spiritual substances, which are not composed of matter and form. In each case, therefore, the subject is not completely the same as its nature.

But this happens differently in each case. For there are two ways for something to apply to a thing besides its nature. One way is when something falls outside the definition signifying a thing’s essence, and yet still designates or determines the essential principles of the thing. This is how being rational, for instance, applies to an animal. Rationality is not included in the definition of an animal, but it still determines the essence of an animal. Thus, rationality becomes essential to a human being, and is therefore included in its definition. Something applies to a thing besides its nature in another way when it is not included in the thing’s definition, and does not determine its essential principles either. That is how whiteness, for instance, applies to a human being.

So, in the case of things composed of matter and form, something applies to them besides the nature of their kind in both ways. For the nature of a human being includes being composed of body and soul, but the determination of a human being’s body and soul lies outside the nature of its kind. Their determination applies to a human being insofar as a human being is composed of this body and this soul, which applies essentially to this human being. For if this human being could be defined, its definition would include being composed of this body and this soul, just as the definition of a human being in general includes being composed of body and soul. And much else applies to things composed of matter and form besides their nature, yet without determining their essential principles either.

But in the case of created immaterial substances, something certainly applies to them besides the nature of their kind, as we have said. Yet nothing that applies to them determines the essence of their kind. For the nature of such things is not individuated by matter, but in itself, since such forms are naturally incapable of being received in any matter. Just in itself, then, their nature lacks the ability to be multiplied or attributed to more than one thing. Yet such forms are not their own existence. Hence, something applies to them besides the nature of their kind, viz. existence itself, and other things that are attributed to the subjects, not their nature. That is why in their case, the subject is not completely the same as its nature.

2. To the second objection: Not everything that applies to a thing besides the nature of its kind has to determine its essence, and thus be included in its definition, as we have said. So, even though existence is not included in the definition of a subject, it still pertains to the subject, not to the definition of its nature. Hence, in every case where a thing is not its own existence, the subject clearly differs from its nature.

To the objection made to the contrary: Even in the case of things composed of matter and form, the nature is not said to constitute the subject because of the nature being one thing and the subject another. (That would be the case on the opinion of those who hold that the nature of each kind of thing is only its form, which constitutes the subject as a whole.) Instead, the nature is said to constitute the subject because of their way of being signified. For the nature is signified as a part, as we explained, while the subject is signified as a whole; the nature is signified as constituting the subject, which is signified as thus constituted.

Question 3

Article 1

The next question was about Augustine’s view of the time through which God moves spiritual creatures: Is it the same as the time that measures the movement of bodily things?

It seems so:

1. Augustine never distinguishes such times, nor does any philosopher. Therefore, it seems mistaken to distinguish them.

2. Everything that exists is one insofar as it exists. So, if there is not one time, but many, then one time will not exist, which is unacceptable. Therefore, there must only be one time.

But to the contrary:

1. The time that measures bodily changes is the numbering of the first heaven’s motion, as the Philosopher says in book IV of the Physics.²³ But the time through which angels move is unrelated to that motion. Therefore, their time differs from the time of bodily things.

2. Perpetual and destructible things have nothing in common but words, as it says in book X of the Metaphysics.²⁴ But angels are perpetual, while bodies are destructible. Therefore, they do not share the same time.

Answer: As Augustine says in book XI of The City of God, there would not have been any time, if there had not been any creation to change and move . . . time results from this change . . . in which things that cannot exist simultaneously come and go one after another.²⁵ That is why the Philosopher says in book IV of the Physics that time has to be discussed in terms of change: for time is the numbering of change with a before and after.²⁶

Thus, all the changes that can be measured with one measure have one time, and if there are changes that cannot be measured with one measure, then they must have different times. But a measure and what it measures are of the same kind, as it says in book X of the Metaphysics.²⁷ Clearly, then, things of the same kind can all share the same measure, while things of different kinds cannot. Now, all continuous changes are commensurable and to that extent belong to one kind. Hence, they can all share one measure, for they are all measured by the simplest change of their kind, viz. the fastest motion of the first heaven.²⁸ Hence, all continuous changes can share one time. Of course, such time is a numbering, and hence might appear to be the numbering of discrete things. Yet it is not just a numbering,²⁹ but the numbering of these continuous things, viz. changes, which makes it continuous as well. Just saying “ten,” for instance, refers to something discrete, but “ten yards of fabric” refers to something continuous. Now, discrete and continuous things cannot share one measure, since they belong to different kinds precisely insofar as they are measurable. So, if there are noncontinuous changes, their time has to be different from the time that measures continuous changes.

Now, when Augustine says that spiritual creatures move through time but not through space,³⁰ the movement of spiritual creatures that he is talking about is clearly not a continuous change but, rather, a kind of discrete variation. For he says that the mind moves through time by either remembering what it had forgotten, or learning what it did not know, or wanting what it did not want.³¹ And since time only gets its continuity from the change it measures, such time is clearly not continuous, and hence differs from the time of bodily things.

1. So, to the first objection: Augustine differentiates the times by the difference between the changes.

2. To the second objection: Things are one in the way that they exist and are said to be. Things said to be of the same general kind are one in genus, and things said to be of the same specific kind are one in species, but they are not one in number. Hence, it does not follow that if there are many human beings, then there will not be one human being, and if there are many times, then there will not be one time.

Question 4

The next questions were about human beings. The first touched on virtues, the second on sins, and the third on punishments.

The questions on virtues related to both divine and human matters. Three of the questions related to divine matters. The first was about faith: (1) Would people have been bound to believe Christ if he had not performed visible miracles? The second was about the sacrament of faith: (2) Should the children of Jews be baptized against their parents’ will? The third was about the tithes owed to ministers of the sacraments: (3) Can custom excuse people from having to pay tithes?

Article 1

We turn, then, to the first question. It seems that people would not have been bound to believe Christ if he had not performed visible miracles:

1. It is a sin for people not to do what they are bound to do. But it would not have been a sin for people not to believe Christ if he had not performed visible miracles. As Christ himself says in John 15: If I had not done works among them that no one else has done, they would not have sin.³² According to Augustine, he is talking about the sin of unbelief.³³ Therefore, people would not have been bound to believe Christ if he had not performed miracles.

2. Only the legislator or the legislator’s superior can change a law. But Christ proclaimed things that seemed to abolish the Old Law, like his claim that food does not make one unclean or that work is allowed on the Sabbath. So, unless he had proven that he was the legislator, Christ would not have had to be believed. But he could only have proven that with miracles, since the Old Law was given after many miracles. Therefore, Christ would not have had to be believed if he had not performed miracles.

But to the contrary:

1. People have a greater obligation to believe the First Truth than to believe visible signs. But even if Christ had not performed any miracles, he was still the First Truth, since he was true God. Therefore, Christ still would have had to be believed, even if he had not performed any miracles.

2. The grace of union is greater than the grace of adoption that makes one pleasing to God. But miracles are not even enough to prove that someone has the grace that makes one pleasing to God. As Matthew 7 says, to those who say to Christ at judgment: Lord . . . we have done many miracles in your name, he will respond: I never knew you.³⁴ Much less, then, are miracles enough to prove that someone has the grace of union. So, if people would not have been bound to believe Christ without miracles, they would not have been bound to believe him when he said that he was God even with miracles, which is obviously false.

Answer: People are not bound to do anything beyond their power except in the way made possible for them. Now, believing is beyond people’s natural power, and hence is a gift of God. As the Apostle says in Ephesians 2: By grace you have been saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God.³⁵ And as he says in Philippians 1: It has been granted to you . . . not only to believe in him, but also to suffer for him.³⁶ Therefore, people are bound to believe as God helps them to believe.

Now, God helps people to believe in three ways. The first way is an inner calling. As John 6 says: Everyone who has heard and learned from the Father comes to me.³⁷ And Romans 8 says: Those whom he predestined, he also called.³⁸ The second way is outward preaching and teaching. As the Apostle says in Romans 7: Faith comes through hearing, and hearing through the word of Christ.³⁹ The third way is outward miracles. Hence 1 Corinthians 14 says that signs are given for unbelievers,⁴⁰ viz. to call forth their belief.

So, even if Christ had not performed visible miracles, there still would have been other ways of drawing people to belief, which they would have been bound to accept. For people were bound to believe the authority of the law and the prophets, and they were bound not to resist their inner calling. As Isaiah says of himself in Isaiah 50: The Lord opened my ear, and I did not object, I have not turned back.⁴¹ Whereas Acts 7 says of others: You have always resisted the Holy Spirit.⁴²

1. So, to the first objection: The inner prompting that drew people ought to be counted among the works done by Christ. As Gregory says in a homily, Christ drew Mary Magdalene inwardly with mercy, and received her outwardly with compassion.⁴³ His teaching ought to be counted among his works as well. As Christ himself says: If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin.⁴⁴

2. To the second objection: Christ could show that he was the legislator not only by performing miracles, but also by the authority of scripture and by an inner prompting.

1. To the first objection made to the contrary: The inner prompting by which Christ was able to make himself known without outward miracles relates to the power of the First Truth, which illuminates and teaches people inwardly.

2. To the second objection made to the contrary: Visible miracles were done by God’s power in order to confirm the truth of the faith. Hence the last verse of Mark says that the apostles preached everywhere, while the Lord worked with them and confirmed their words with the signs that followed.⁴⁵ But miracles were not always done to prove that the one performing them had grace. That is why it is possible for someone to perform miracles without having the grace that makes one pleasing to God. But it is not possible for someone proclaiming false teachings to perform true miracles, which can only be done by God’s power. For in that case, God would be a false witness, which is impossible. So, since Christ said that he was the Son of God and equal to God, the miracles that he performed confirm this teaching of his. That is how the miracles that Christ performed showed that he was God. And even though Peter performed the same or even greater miracles, they did not show that he was God; rather, they too showed that Christ was God. For Peter did not preach himself but, rather, Jesus Christ as God.

Article 2

We turn, then, to the second question. It seems that children of Jews should be baptized against their parents’ will:

1. The marriage bond is greater than the right of parental authority, since human beings can dissolve the right of parental authority (as when a son is freed from his family), but not the marriage bond. As Matthew 19 says: What God has joined together, let no man put asunder.⁴⁶ Even so, unbelief dissolves the marriage bond. As the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 7: But if the unbeliever departs, so be it; a brother or sister is not bound in that case.⁴⁷ And canon law says that if an unbelieving spouse will not live together without insult to the creator, then the other spouse is not obligated to live together.⁴⁸ Much more, then, does unbelief eliminate the right of parental authority. Therefore, unbelieving Jews do not have the right of parental authority over their children, and hence their children can be baptized against their will.

2. We have a greater obligation to rescue people from the danger of eternal death than from the danger of temporal death. Now, it would be a sin not to help someone we see in danger of temporal death. But the children of Jews and of other unbelievers are in danger of eternal death if they are left to their parents to form them in their own unbelief. Therefore, it seems they ought to be taken from them, baptized, and taught the faith.

3. The children of servants are servants under the authority of their lords. But Jews are servants of kings and princes, and hence so are their children. Therefore, kings and princes have the authority to do what they want with the children of Jews, and hence there is nothing wrong with baptizing them against their parents’ will.

4. Human beings belong more to God, who gives them their souls, than to their natural parents, who give them their bodies. Therefore, it does not seem unjust for the children of Jews to be taken from their natural parents and consecrated to God in baptism.

5. Baptism is more effective for salvation than preaching, since baptism immediately removes the stain of sin and the guilt deserving of punishment, and opens the door to heaven. But the one who does not preach is to blame for the danger arising from the lack of preaching, as Ezekiel 3 and 33 say of the one who sees the sword coming and does not sound the trumpet.⁴⁹ So, if the children of Jews are damned because of lacking baptism, those who could have baptized them will be much more to blame for the sin of not having baptized them.

But to the contrary: No one should be harmed.⁵⁰ But Jews would be harmed by having their children baptized against their will, since they would lose the right of parental authority over their children once they became believers.⁵¹ Therefore, their children should not be baptized against their will.

Answer: The custom of the Church has the greatest authority and always ought to be followed in every case. Even the teaching of Catholic doctors gets its authority from the Church. Hence, we ought to rely more on the custom of the Church than on the authority of Augustine or Jerome or any other doctor. But the Church has never had the custom of baptizing the children of Jews against their parents’ will, even though in the past there have been many powerful Catholic rulers on good terms with holy bishops (as Constantine was with Silvester, and Theodosius with Ambrose, and so on) who would not have failed to obtain the right to do so if it were consonant with reason. So, it seems dangerous to introduce the novel claim that the children of Jews can be baptized against their parents’ will, contrary to the custom observed in the Church thus far.

There are two reasons why this is dangerous. The first is that such baptisms are a danger to the faith. If children without the ability to use reason receive baptism, then once they are old enough, their parents could easily get them to abandon what they received in ignorance, which would be to the detriment of the faith.

The second reason is that such baptisms are contrary to natural justice. Children naturally belong to their parents.⁵² At first, in their mother’s womb, they are not distinguished from the body of their parents. Afterward, outside the womb, but before they can exercise free will, they remain in their parents’ charge, like a kind of spiritual womb.⁵³ Before children are able to use reason, they are no different from nonrational animals in what they do. Hence, just as by civil law or the law of nations cows or horses belong to their owners, who can use them as their own tools however they wish, so too by natural law children are in their parents’ charge before they have the ability to use reason. Hence, it is contrary to natural justice for children still unable to exercise free will to be taken from their parents or to have anything done to them against their parents’ will. Once they begin to use free will, however, children become their own and are able to make their own decisions in matters of divine or natural law. Then they can be brought to the faith—not by coercion, but by persuasion—and can accept the faith and consent to be baptized even against their parents’ will, but not before they are able to use reason. Hence the children of the ancients are said to have been saved by the faith of their parents,⁵⁴ which means that parents are responsible for the salvation of their children, especially before they are capable of using reason.

1. So, to the first objection: In the case of the marriage bond, each spouse has the ability to use free will, and can accept the faith against the other’s will. But that is irrelevant to children without the ability to use reason. The analogy only holds after they have the ability to use reason, if they want to convert.

2. To the second objection: No one should be rescued from temporal death by breaking civil law. If a person is condemned to death by a judge, for example, no one should use violence to rescue the person. Hence, no one should break the natural law, which puts children in their parents’ charge, in order to rescue them from the danger of eternal death.

3. To the third objection: Jews are servants of their lords by civil law, which does not negate natural law or divine law.

4. To the fourth objection: Human beings are directed to God through reason, by which God can be known. Hence, before children have the ability to use reason, they are naturally directed to God through the reason of their parents, who are naturally in charge of them. Thus, parents determine how their children relate to the things of God.

5. To the fifth objection: The danger arising from a lack of preaching only threatens those entrusted with the duty to preach. Hence Ezekiel first said: I have made you a watchman for the children of Israel.⁵⁵ But the duty to provide the children of unbelievers with the sacraments of salvation falls to their parents. Hence, they are the ones threatened by the danger of missing the sacraments, if their children are deprived of salvation.

Article 3

We turn, then, to the third question. It seems that custom can free people from the legal obligation to pay tithes:

Taking tithes is more significant than not paying them. But in some places it is customary for soldiers to take tithes, which the Church tolerates. Much more, then, can custom free people from the obligation to pay tithes, which they are then not bound to pay.

But to the contrary: The divine law is not abolished by being uncustomary. Yet tithes are required by divine law. Therefore, the duty to pay tithes is not abolished by being uncustomary, and hence people are bound to pay tithes, contrary custom notwithstanding.

Answer: The requirements of positive law are abolished by being uncustomary, but those of natural law or of divine law can never be abolished by being uncustomary: no custom could make it permissible to steal or commit adultery. So, in order to answer this question, we need to consider whether paying tithes is required by divine law or by positive human law.

The divine law is contained in the Old and New Testaments. There does not appear to be any commandment about paying tithes given in the New Testament, by which I mean the gospel or the apostolic teaching itself. Matthew 23 says something about paying tithes: You ought to have done these things, without failing to do those.⁵⁶ And in Luke 18 the Pharisee says: I pay tithes on all that I possess.⁵⁷ But both verses seem to relate more to the state under the Old Law; they are not formulating a requirement of the New Law.

The Old Testament had three kinds of commandments: moral, judicial, and ceremonial. The moral commandments are the ones inherent to natural reason, which bind people at all times. For instance, Honor your father and mother, You shall not commit adultery, You shall not steal, and the like.⁵⁸ The judicial commandments are the ones for issuing judgments in a court of law. For example, if a man steals one sheep, he shall return four.⁵⁹ But such commandments are not inherent to natural reason: natural reason does not dictate that the person who steals one sheep should return four rather than three or five. Instead, such commandments are determinations of moral commandments. Natural reason dictates that the person who steals should be punished, but just what that punishment shall be is determined by a judicial commandment. The ceremonial commandments are the ones related to the requirements for divine worship, and were established to prefigure future things. For instance, the offering of the Passover lamb prefigured the sacrifice of Christ.

Hence, we need to determine whether the commandment to pay tithes is a moral, judicial, or ceremonial commandment. If it is a moral commandment, then it binds everyone at all times, notwithstanding any contrary custom. But natural reason does not seem to dictate that people give the ministers of God a tenth, rather than a ninth or an eleventh part of their fruits. Yet if it is a judicial commandment, then no one is bound to pay tithes, since no one is bound to issue judgments in accordance with the judgments written in the Old Law, which were specific to that population, given its particular circumstances; the same judgments would not do for everyone. But if it is a ceremonial commandment, then not only would it not bind anyone but also keeping it would lead to sin. It would be a sin to offer a Passover lamb: after the truth has come, its figures cease.

So, we should say what the ancient teachers said. Some commandments of the law are purely moral; for instance, You shall not kill, You shall not steal.⁶⁰ Others are purely ceremonial, such as circumcision and the offering of the Passover lamb. But some commandments are a mix: moral in one respect and ceremonial in another. The commandment to keep holy the Sabbath, for instance, is moral with respect to the need to set aside a time for rest and leisure for the things of God, as natural reason dictates; but that the seventh day should be set aside was determined by God in order to prefigure something, and in that respect it is ceremonial. Accordingly, therefore, the commandment to pay tithes is moral in one respect, since those who keep their time free to serve God on behalf of the whole people should be supported with stipends from the people, just as those who serve in public office are supported by the people. This is how the commandment is issued in the New Testament. In Matthew 7, the Lord says: The worker deserves his food.⁶¹ And in 1 Corinthians 9, the Apostle says: The Lord ordained that those who preach the gospel should live by the gospel, and those who serve at the altar should live by the altar.⁶² But with respect to the determination of the number ten, the commandment is not a requirement of natural law and hence is not a moral commandment. It is either a ceremonial commandment, and thus prefigures something about Christ, or it is a judicial commandment fit for that particular population, who had so many ministers of God that such a tax was necessary to support them.

Therefore, the general requirement to provide the ministers of God with the necessities of life is a moral commandment of divine law and of natural law. But it falls to each ruler with the power to make laws to determine this general natural law by positive law: for positive law just is the determination of natural law. For instance, natural law requires evildoers to be punished, but just what that punishment shall be is determined by positive law. Now, since the Church has the power to make laws about things relating to the worship of God, a statute of the Church can determine the amount to be given by the people to the ministers of God. In order to harmonize the Old and New Testaments, the Church has established that the amount under the Old Testament is to be maintained under the New. Hence, everyone is bound to tithe, whether they want to or not. But the Church could require a greater or lesser amount, if there were some reason to do so. For example, an eighth or a twelfth could be required, just as a tenth is now.

Clearly, then, no contrary custom can free people from the obligation to pay tithes, since this obligation is based on divine law and on natural law. Hence, people are always bound to pay tithes, if the Church collects them, contrary custom notwithstanding. And in places where it is customary to pay tithes, custom itself demands the tithes, so to speak. Hence, it would be a sin not to pay them. But in places where it is not customary to pay tithes, if the Church does not ask for them, then the Church would seem to relinquish them by ignoring them. That is why it is not a sin for people in those places not to pay tithes. It is too harsh to say that all the people of Italy and of the eastern regions are damned for not paying tithes. We have proof of this in the Apostle. The people he preached to owed him the necessities of life, which he did not collect. Yet it was not a sin for them not to give them, otherwise he would have done them wrong by not collecting them, especially since he says in Acts 20: I did not shrink from declaring to you every counsel of God.⁶³ But the Apostle did not collect what he was owed in order to avoid putting an obstacle in the way of the gospel, as he says.⁶⁴ Hence, it would not be good for Church leaders to demand tithes in places where paying them is not customary, if they have good reason to believe that doing so would cause scandal.

So, to the first objection: Soldiers who take tithes in some places do not have the right to do so: that is a spiritual right of the ministers of God, and hence cannot be had by laypeople. But with the Church’s permission, the temporal things that are rightfully due to the Church can be given to soldiers for services rendered to the Church. Likewise, the Church can relinquish the fruits owed as tithes, but that does not relinquish the right to collect tithes or eliminate the duty to pay them.

Question 5

The next questions on virtues related to human matters.

There were two such questions: (1) Are children bound to obey their natural parents even in matters of indifference? and (2) Is a seller bound to tell a buyer about a defect in the item sold?

Article 1

We turn, then, to the first question. Children seem bound to obey their natural parents in everything:

1. Deuteronomy 21 says: If a man has a stubborn and rebellious son, who will not listen to the commands of his father or mother . . . the people of the city shall stone him.⁶⁵ But such a punishment would not be inflicted unless disobedience were a grave sin. Therefore, children are bound to obey their natural parents in everything.

2. In Colossians 3, the Apostle says: Children, obey your parents in everything.⁶⁶

3. Although positive moral commandments do not apply to all times, it is still never permissible to act against them. But honoring one’s parents is a positive moral commandment. Hence, it is never permissible to disrespect one’s parents, which would happen if one did not obey their commands. Therefore, children are bound to obey their parents in everything.

But to the contrary: Spiritual fathers do not deserve less obedience than natural fathers, but more, as the Apostle says in Hebrews 12.⁶⁷ Yet not even spiritual fathers have to be obeyed by their subordinates in matters of indifference: religious profess a vow of obedience, but they are only bound to obey their superiors according to the rule, as Bernard says in his book On Precept and Dispensation.⁶⁸ Therefore, children are not bound to obey their natural parents in matters of indifference.

Answer: Superiors deserve obedience, but the obedience they deserve only extends as far as their right of authority extends. Now, the first right of authority that natural fathers have over their children is in domestic affairs. For the father of a family rules over a house like a king over a kingdom. Hence, just as a king’s subjects are bound to obey the king in matters related to the government of the kingdom, so too children and other members of the household are bound to obey the father of the family in matters related to the running of the house. The second right of authority is in moral instruction. Hence in Hebrews 12, the Apostle says: We have had natural fathers to discipline us and we respected them.⁶⁹ For fathers owe their children not only nourishment but also instruction, as the Philosopher says.⁷⁰ Therefore, children are bound to obey their natural fathers in such matters, but not in others.

1. So, to the first objection: Moses is talking about the command of a father giving moral instruction. Hence he says in the same place: He refuses to listen to our admonitions, spending his time in revelry, debauchery, and indulgence.⁷¹

2. To the second objection: The Apostle says that children should obey their parents in everything⁷²—i.e., to which their right of authority extends.

3. To the third objection: It is not disrespectful not to obey a command in matters in which one is not bound to obey.

Article 2

We turn, then, to the second question. A seller does not seem bound to tell a buyer about a defect in the item sold:

1. Under civil law, buyers and sellers are allowed to deceive each other. But no deception would be possible if a seller had to tell a buyer about a defect in the item sold. Therefore, a seller is not bound to do so.

2. Now, someone said that the law concerns the realm of legal disputes, not the realm of conscience, which is what we are discussing now. But to the contrary: In book II of the Ethics, the Philosopher says that the intention of the legislator is to make citizens good.⁷³ So, whatever the laws permit is not contrary to virtue, and thus not contrary to conscience either.

But to the contrary:

1. Under civil law, someone who sells a sick animal is liable for damages. Therefore, a seller is bound to tell a buyer about a defect in the item sold.

2. In his book On Duties, Cicero says that a good man has the duty to tell a buyer why an item might be sold for less.⁷⁴ But a defect in the item is such a reason why. Therefore, a seller is bound to tell a buyer about a defect in the item sold.

Answer: Some things relate to the human good, which we are still not bound to do. For instance, generously giving our goods to a friend relates to the human good, but we are still not bound to do so. Yet other things relate to the human good, which we are bound to do—namely giving people what is just. For it is an act of justice to give people their due. So, every seller is bound to make a just sale, but not a generous sale for less than a just price. Now, justice is a kind of equality, as it says in book V of the Ethics.⁷⁵ Hence, a just sale is made when the price paid to the seller equals the worth of the item sold, while an unjust sale is made when the price does not equal the item’s worth and instead the seller is paid more. So, if the defect in the item makes it worth less than the price charged for it by the seller, then the sale would be unjust, and it would be a sin to hide the item’s defect. But if the defect does not make the item worth less than the price charged for it—perhaps the seller lowered the price because of the defect—then it would not be a sin to remain silent about the item’s defect, since the sale would not be unjust. It might even be costly to mention the defect, since the buyer might want to have the item for even less than the price it is worth. Of course, it would be generous to overlook the personal cost and do what the buyer wants, but the seller is not bound to do that.

1. So, to the first objection: That reference to the law does not mean that it is permissible in itself for a seller to deceive a buyer or vice versa. Saying that something is permitted by law just means that it is not punished under the law. That is how divorce, for instance, was permitted under the Old Law.

2. To the second objection: The demands of the law lead toward perfect virtue, but acts of perfect virtue are not commanded by human law. Rather, human law forbids grave sins, so that after people have been drawn away from evil they can gradually cultivate the virtues themselves. But it permits lesser sins by not punishing them, since it is not easy to find many people without such faults. Yet the deception between buyers and sellers is just such a sin, since most people want to buy low and sell high, as Augustine says in his book On the Trinity.⁷⁶

1. To the first objection made to the contrary: That means when the sickness of the beast makes it worth less than it was sold for.

2. To the second objection made to the contrary: Cicero says that a good man would not remain silent about a defect in the item sold, because a good man would not deceive anyone. But it is not deceptive to remain silent about a defect that does not make the item worth less than the price paid for it.

Question 6

The next questions were about sins.

There were two such questions: (1) Is it a sin to desire to be a superior? and (2) Is it a sin for a preacher to have his eye on temporal things?

Article 1

We turn, then, to the first question. It seems to be a sin to desire to be a superior:

1. It must be a sin to desire something that did not exist in the state of integral nature, but only in the state of corrupted nature. Yet superiority did not exist in the state of integral nature; it only began to exist after sin, when it was said to the woman: you shall be under your husband’s power.⁷⁷ Therefore, it is a sin to desire to be a superior.

2. Our desire should be for things related to the state of future glory. But in the future all superiority shall cease, as a gloss on 1 Corinthians 15 says.⁷⁸ Therefore, it is a sin to desire to be a superior.

But to the contrary: 1 Timothy 5 says: Let the priests who rule well be considered worthy of double honor.⁷⁹ But it is not a sin to desire something deserving of double honor, which only virtue deserves.⁸⁰ Therefore, it is not a sin to desire to be a superior.

Answer: Augustine answers this question in book XIX of The City of God, where he says that it is inappropriate to desire the superior position necessary for a people to be ruled, even if it is administered appropriately.⁸¹

The reason is that the one who desires to be a superior is either proud or unjust. For it is unjust to want more honor or power or any other such good, unless one is worthy of more, as it says in book V of the Ethics.⁸² But it is proud and presumptuous to judge oneself worthier to be a superior than everyone else whose superior one would be. Clearly, then, anyone who desires to be a superior is either unjust or proud.

That is why no one ought to become a superior out of a desire to do so, but only because of the judgment of God. As Hebrews 5 says: No one takes the honor upon himself, but he that is called by God, as Aaron was.⁸³ Nevertheless, it is permissible to desire to be worthy of being a superior, or to do the works of a good superior, which are deserving of honor.

That makes the reply to the last objection clear.

The first two arguments are not true counterproofs, since it is permissible to desire things that did not exist in the state of innocence and will not exist in the state of glory, such as subordination, repentance, and the like. Moreover, in a certain sense superiority did exist in the state of innocence, and will exist in the state of glory, viz. superiority in the sense of rank and of governing or ruling, though not in the sense of forced servitude.

Article 2

We turn, then, to the second question. It seems to be a sin for a preacher to have his eye on temporal things:

Luke 12 says: Seek first the kingdom of God—i.e., eternal things, the gloss says—and all these things will be given to you as well—i.e., even without you seeking them, the gloss says.⁸⁴ Therefore, it is not permissible for a preacher to have his eye on earthly things.

But to the contrary: 1 Corinthians 9 says: The one who plows should plow in hope, viz. of earthly wages, the gloss says.⁸⁵ Therefore, it is permissible for a preacher (being discussed there) to have his eye on earthly things.

Answer: There are two ways to have one’s eye on earthly things. One way is to look to them as a reward or payment. But it is not permissible for a preacher to have his eye on earthly things in this way, since that would mean selling the gospel. The other way is to look to them as a stipend for the necessities of life. And it is permissible for a preacher to have his eye on earthly things in this way. As the gloss of Augustine on the verse Let the priests who rule well of 1 Timothy 5 says: It is necessary to receive the means to live, and charitable to provide them. But that is not selling the gospel. If they were selling it, they would be selling a great thing for cheap. So, let them receive the necessities of life from the people, and the reward for their stewardship from the Lord.⁸⁶

That makes the reply to the objections clear.

Question 7

The next questions were about punishments for sins. The first were about punishments themselves. The second were about their forgiveness.

There were two of the first questions: (1) Can the separated soul be affected by bodily fire? and (2) If two individuals deserve the same amount of punishment, can one remain in purgatory longer than the other?

Article 1

We turn, then, to the first question. It seems that the separated soul cannot be affected by bodily fire:

1. As the Philosopher says, what makes no contact has no effect.⁸⁷ But bodily fire cannot touch the soul separated from the body, since the separated soul lacks bodily extremities, and things only touch when their extremities come together.⁸⁸ Therefore, the separated soul cannot be affected by bodily fire.

2. Things that can be affected by one another can be turned into one another. But the soul cannot be turned into bodily fire, nor bodily fire turned into the soul. Therefore, the soul cannot be affected by bodily fire.

3. Bernard says that nothing burns in hell except one’s own will.⁸⁹ But one’s own will is something spiritual, and hence cannot serve as the matter for bodily fire. Therefore, the soul separated from the body cannot be affected by bodily fire.

But to the contrary: The last verse of Isaiah says: Their fire shall not be quenched.⁹⁰

Answer: There are a number of ways to take “being affected.” Taken one way, “being affected” has the general meaning of receiving. That is how sensing and thinking are ways of being affected. When the soul is united to the body, it is affected this way by bodily things as it senses and thinks about them. But whether the soul can also be affected this way by bodily things when it is separated from the body is another question. Some people hold that the soul separated from the body (and even angels) can acquire knowledge from sensible things. Yet even if this opinion were true, being affected by sensing and thinking is still a matter of being perfected, not of being punished, except perhaps incidentally when one senses or thinks of something disagreeable to one’s own will; considered in itself, however, sensing or thinking is not a form of punishment. Taken another way, “being affected” has a specific meaning based on the opposition between an agent and the recipient of its action. We are affected this way when something happens to us against our nature or will. That is how sickness and sadness are ways of being affected.

Now, there are two ways of being affected like this. One way is by receiving an opposing form. For instance, water is affected this way by fire when fire heats it and decreases its own natural quality as a result. But the separated soul cannot be affected this way by bodily fire, since it cannot be heated or dried or changed by the form or by any of the qualities of bodily fire. The other way of being affected like this occurs whenever something is kept from following its own impulse or inclination. For instance, we say that a falling stone is affected when it is kept from going down, or that a man is affected when he is bound or detained and unable to go where he wants. This is the way that the soul can be affected by bodily fire, which somehow binds it, as Augustine says in book XXI of The City of God.⁹¹

Now, it is not against a spirit’s nature to be bound by a body, since we see that the soul is naturally bound to the body in order to give it life. Even demons can be bound by certain images or other things through the power of higher demons invoked with black magic. Much more, then, can a spirit be bound by bodily fire through the power of God, not to give it life, but to receive its punishment, as Augustine says.⁹²

But nothing can bind a thing stronger than itself by its own power. Hence, no body can bind a spirit stronger than itself except through a higher power. That is why fire is said to affect the separated soul, not by its own power but, rather, as an instrument of God’s retributive justice.⁹³

1. So, to the first objection: Fire touches the soul, not by a contact of extension, which applies to its quantitative extremities, but by a contact of power—yet not its own power, but the power it has as an instrument of divine justice.

2. To the second objection: That argument applies to being affected by receiving an opposing form.

3. To the third objection: One’s own will is said to burn in hell because it merits the burning.

Article 2

We turn, then, to the second question. If two individuals deserve the same amount of punishment, it seems that one cannot be freed from purgatory sooner than the other:

1. Judgment after death is not made by human beings, but by God, who judges according to truth, as Romans 2 says.⁹⁴ But it would be against the truth of that judgment for one individual to suffer greater sensible pain than another if they both deserve the same amount of punishment. And having to wait for glory is an even greater punishment than sensible pain. As Chrysostom says in his comments on Matthew, to be deprived of the vision of God is a greater punishment than any sensible pain.⁹⁵ Therefore, if two individuals deserve the same amount of punishment, one cannot wait for glory longer while the other is freed from purgatory sooner.

2. According to Augustine, evil refers to what does harm, and it does harm because it deprives one of good.⁹⁶ But having to wait for glory deprives one of the greatest good—viz. the uncreated good—and is thus the greatest evil, which leads to the conclusion of the first argument.

But to the contrary:

1. In book IV, distinction 45 of the Sentences, the Master says that the beneficiary of more suffrages is freed from the punishments of purgatory sooner.⁹⁷ Now, even if two individuals deserve the same amount of punishment, one may still happen to be the beneficiary of more suffrages than the other. Therefore, one can be freed from purgatory sooner.

2. At the end of the world some individuals will still be in need of cleansing, but they will not wait for glory as long as those in need of cleansing who went to purgatory earlier, since the interval between their death and resurrection will be shorter, as Augustine says.⁹⁸ By the same token, therefore, if two individuals are in need of the same amount of cleansing now, one can wait for glory less than the other, and thus be freed from purgatory sooner.

Answer: The answer to this question depends upon the effect of suffrages. Do suffrages only benefit the individual for whose freedom they are offered, or do they benefit others as well?

Some people say that suffrages do not benefit the one any more than the others; indeed, they may even benefit the others more, if they are better disposed to receive the benefit of such suffrages.⁹⁹ As an example, they point out that lighting a candle for a rich person in a room gives light to all those in the room, and perhaps even more to the others, if their eyesight is stronger.¹⁰⁰ On this opinion, if two individuals are held in purgatory for the same amount of guilt, one cannot be freed sooner than the other.

But I do not think this opinion is true. The reason is that the suffrages of one individual can be of benefit to another, and in two ways. One way is by the union of charity. For all those with charity are like one body. Thus, the good of one extends to all, just as the hand serves the whole body, as does every bodily member. Hence, the good done by one individual is of benefit to anyone with charity. As the Psalm says: I share with all those who fear you and keep your commandments.¹⁰¹ The other way is by the intention to transfer one’s act to another. For example, if one person pays the debt of another, the result is the same as if the other had paid it. Now, a good work is of benefit in the first way as a matter of merit, whose root is charity. But the work of one individual is of benefit to another in the second way as a matter of satisfaction. For one individual can make satisfaction for another given the intention to do so. That is the kind of benefit involved in suffrages, which are offered to free people from the debt of punishment.

As a matter of satisfaction, therefore, suffrages are only of benefit to those for whom they are offered. In that sense, if many suffrages are offered for one individual, that individual is freed from the punishments of purgatory sooner than the others for whom they are not offered, even if they bear the same amount of guilt. Nevertheless, the suffrages offered for one individual are of benefit to all, to the extent that all who know about them rejoice in the charity of the good works done out of charity. In that sense, such suffrages are of even more benefit to those for whom they are not offered, if their charity is greater.

1. So, to the first objection: Since it does not involve turning away from God, venial sin does not itself deserve the punishment of being deprived of the vision of God, either permanently or temporarily. Incidentally, however, such individuals are temporarily kept from the vision of God, because as long as they deserve any punishment, they cannot enjoy the greatest happiness, which consists of the vision of God. But judgment is about the punishment deserved by sin itself, not the incidental punishment that happens to follow from it.

2. That makes the reply to the second objection clear.

1. We grant the first argument made to the contrary.

2. We grant the second argument made to the contrary as well. But those who are still alive at the end of the world will have little need of cleansing, since they will have been purged by the preceding tribulations. And the harshness of their shorter punishments will make up for the lengthier punishments of others.

Question 8

The next questions were about the forgiveness of sins.

There were two such questions: (1) Is sin against the Holy Spirit unforgiveable? and (2) Does a vowed crusader who dies before going on crusade still receive the full forgiveness of sins?

Article 1

We turn, then, to the first question. Sin against the Holy Spirit does not seem to be unforgiveable:

The Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit have the same dignity and majesty. But sin against the Son is not unforgiveable. As Matthew 12 says: Whoever speaks a word against the Son of Man will be forgiven.¹⁰² Therefore, sin against the Holy Spirit is not unforgiveable.

But to the contrary: The same verse says: Whoever speaks a word against the Holy Spirit will not be forgiven either in this age or in the age to come.¹⁰³

Answer: There have been three ways of understanding sin against the Holy Spirit.

Teachers prior to Augustine took sin against the Holy Spirit to mean speaking blasphemy against the Holy Spirit or the Spirit’s works, or even against the divinity of God the Father or the Son, since the Father and the Son are both a spirit in the common sense of the term (as John 4 says: God is spirit¹⁰⁴); and they took sin against the Son of Man to mean blasphemy against Christ in his human nature.¹⁰⁵ Now, the Jews sinned against Christ in both ways. They sinned against him in the first way by attributing the miracles that he performed by the Holy Spirit and by the power of his divinity to the prince of demons. And they sinned against him in the second way when they said: Behold the man is a glutton, a drunkard, and a friend of tax collectors, as Matthew 11 says.¹⁰⁶ Hence, the second blasphemy is considered forgivable, since the Jews had an excuse, given the weakness of the flesh they saw in Christ. But the first blasphemy is considered unforgiveable, since they had no excuse, given that they saw clear indications of the Holy Spirit and of divinity. That is why Chrysostom says that those who persevered in this blasphemy were not forgiven in this age or in the age to come, since they were punished for it by the Romans in this age, and will suffer for it in hell in the age to come.¹⁰⁷

But Augustine says that, as the charity of the Father and the Son, it is the Holy Spirit who forgives sins.¹⁰⁸ So, the one who sins or blasphemes or speaks against the Holy Spirit in thought, word, or deed is the one who does this unrepentantly until death, and thus never receives the forgiveness of sins. But then it is obvious that sin against the Holy Spirit is not forgiven in this age or in the age to come.

Recent teachers have said that the Father is power, the Son is wisdom, and the Holy Spirit is goodness; hence, sins of weakness are sins against the Father, sins of ignorance are sins against the Son, and sins of set wickedness are sins against the Holy Spirit.¹⁰⁹ Now, ignorance and weakness excuse one from sin either wholly or partially. Hence, they say that sin against the Father and the Son is forgiven, since the culpability for it is either wholly lacking or lessened. But wickedness does not excuse one from sin; it makes it worse. Hence, sin against the Holy Spirit is not forgiven either wholly or partially, because there is nothing excusable about it to lessen the culpability for it. So, if such sin is ever forgiven, that has more to do with the mercy of God who forgives—and can even cure incurable diseases—than with how forgivable the sin is.

That makes the reply to the objections clear.

Article 2

We turn, then, to the second question. A vowed crusader who dies before going on crusade still seems to receive a plenary indulgence for his sins:

1. Benefiting from an indulgence requires true repentance and the confession of sins, as the pope’s letter states.¹¹⁰ But a vowed crusader who passes away before going on crusade meets these specific requirements of the letter for receiving a plenary indulgence for sins. Therefore, such a crusader receives a plenary indulgence.

2. Only God forgives the guilt of sin. So, when the pope grants a plenary indulgence for sins, it does not apply to their guilt, but to all their punishments. Hence, a man who vows to go on crusade in the way specified by the pope’s letter will not suffer any punishments for his sins, and will therefore ascend immediately to glory, having received the full forgiveness of sins.

But to the contrary:

1. In book XV of On the Trinity, Augustine says that removing the weapon is not the same as healing the wound, for the weapon of sin is removed by the forgiveness of sin, but the wound is healed by the restoration of the image of God, which is restored by works of satisfaction.¹¹¹ Yet a vowed crusader who passes away before going on crusade has not done any work to restore the image of God. Hence, his wound has not yet been healed, and thus he cannot enter immediately into glory before suffering the punishments of purgatory.

2. Every priest uses these words: I absolve you from all your sins.¹¹² So, if a dying crusader ascended to glory, then so would anyone else absolved by a priest, which is unacceptable.

Answer: To see the answer to this question, recall what we have said: the work of one individual can make satisfaction for another given the intention of the one performing it.¹¹³ Now, Christ shed his blood for the Church, and he did and endured many other things, whose value is infinite, given his worth as a person. Hence Wisdom 8 says that she is an infinite treasure to men.¹¹⁴ Likewise, all the saints had the intention to do and suffer everything for God in order to benefit not only themselves but the whole Church. Thus, the head of the universal Church is the steward of this whole treasury. Hence the Lord gave Peter the keys to the kingdom of heaven, as Matthew 16 says.¹¹⁵ So, when it is beneficial or necessary for the Church, the head of the Church can share this infinite treasure with any individual who has charity, which makes one a member of the Church. And he can share as much of that treasure as he sees fit, whether that be the whole forgiveness of sins or only a certain amount. For then the suffering of Christ and of the saints is applied to that individual as if the individual had suffered sufficiently to make satisfaction for the forgiveness of the sin, which is what happens when one person makes satisfaction for another, as we have said.

Now, three things are required for an individual to benefit from such an indulgence. First, the reason for it must be either for the honor of God or the benefit or need of the Church. Second, the one who grants it must have the authority to do so, which belongs first to the pope, and then to those who receive the ordinary or entrusted (i.e., delegated) power to do so from him. Third, the one who wants to receive the indulgence must be in a state of charity. All three requirements are indicated in the pope’s letter: an acceptable reason is indicated, since it is for aid to the Holy Land; the authority is indicated, since it invokes the authority of the apostles Peter and Paul and of the pope himself; and the recipient’s charity is indicated, since it says that it is for all who truly repent and confess their sins.¹¹⁶ It does not add “and make satisfaction,” since an indulgence takes the place of satisfaction, although it does not excuse one from having to repent and confess one’s sins.

So, to answer the question: If the pope’s letter grants an indulgence specifically to those who vow to go on crusade to aid the Holy Land, then a vowed crusader immediately gains the indulgence, even if he passes away before going on crusade. For in that case the reason for the indulgence is not going on crusade but, rather, vowing to go. But if the letter grants an indulgence specifically to those who go on crusade, then a vowed crusader who dies before going on crusade does not gain the indulgence, since he does not satisfy the reason for the indulgence.

1. So, to the first objection: In the second case just described, the vowed crusader who passes away fails to satisfy the very first requirement—namely the reason for the indulgence.

2. To the second objection: Only God forgives guilt as an authority, but priests also do so as ministers, since they administer the sacraments for the forgiveness of sins, viz. baptism and penance. Nevertheless, an indulgence does not extend to the forgiveness of guilt, since it is not sacramental. Hence, such power does not come from holy orders, but from rightful authority: even those who are not priests can grant an indulgence if they have been entrusted with the power to do so. Thus, all his punishments are forgiven if the man satisfies the reason for the indulgence, but not otherwise.

1. To the first objection made to the contrary: Satisfaction is punitive as an act of retributive justice and remedial as part of a sacrament. So, an indulgence takes the place of satisfaction insofar as it is punitive, since the punishment that one person endured is applied to another as if the other had endured it, thereby eliminating the debt of punishment. But it does not take the place of satisfaction insofar as it is remedial, since there still remain the propensities to sin left by prior sin, which require the work of satisfaction to heal. So, while vowed crusaders are still alive, they should be advised not to neglect works of satisfaction, which will help preserve them from future sins, even though their debt of punishment is totally eliminated and requires no further work, since the work of Christ’s passion is sufficient. But after they have died, they have no need of such preservation; they only need to be freed from their debt of punishment.

2. To the second objection made to the contrary: Those words of the priest, I absolve you from all your sins, are not about their punishment but, rather, about their guilt, which his ministry is dedicated to absolve. Yet some of a person’s guilt cannot be absolved without all of it being absolved, whereas punishments can be forgiven wholly or partially. Punishments are partially forgiven by sacramental absolution, but are only wholly forgiven at certain times by the special grace of an indulgence, as when the Lord says to the woman caught in adultery in John 8: Nor will I condemn you. Go and sin no more.¹¹⁷

¹ Matthew 12:40.

² Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on the Apostle’s Creed, a.4 & a.5.

³ Galatians 2:21.

⁴ Romans 5:21.

⁵ Gregory, Morals III, 14, 27.

⁶ Hebrews 10:14.

⁷ Ephesians 5:2.

⁸ Rather, Nicholas of Clairvaux, Sermon on the Exaltation of the Holy Cross. Cf. Bernard, Sermons on the Song of Songs, Sermon 22, 7.

⁹ Hebrews 2:14–15.

¹⁰ 1 Peter 3:18.

¹¹ Avicenna, Metaphysics V, 5.

¹² Hilary, On the Trinity VII, 11.

¹³ Book on Causes, Prop. 8 (9).

¹⁴ Augustine, On Christian Doctrine I, 32, 35.

¹⁵ Boethius, On the Hebdomads, c. 3. Cf. Boethius, On the Trinity, c. 2.

¹⁶ Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics V, 14.

¹⁷ Aristotle, Metaphysics V, 4 (1015a10–11).

¹⁸ Boethius, Treatise Against Eutyches and Nestorius, c. 1.

¹⁹ Aristotle, Metaphysics VI, 1 (1025b28–1026a7). Cf. Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics VI, text 2.

²⁰ Aristotle, Metaphysics VI, 2 (1026b21).

²¹ Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, 6 (1031a15–16).

²² Aristotle, Categories, 5 (3b19).

²³ Aristotle, Physics IV, 14 (223b21–23).

²⁴ Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics X, 9–10 (1058b26–1059a14); Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics X, 26.

²⁵ Augustine, The City of God XI, 6.

²⁶ Aristotle, Physics IV, 11 (219b1–2).

²⁷ Aristotle, Metaphysics X, 1 (1053a24–25).

²⁸ Aristotle, Metaphysics X, 1 (1053a8–12).

²⁹ Aristotle, Physics IV, 11 & 14 (219a10–14, 220a24–26, & 223a29–b12). Cf. Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics IV, 99, 108, & 132.

³⁰ Cf. Augustine, Literal Commentary on Genesis VIII, 20–26.

³¹ Augustine, Literal Commentary on Genesis VIII, 20.

³² John 15:24.

³³ Cf. Augustine, Homilies on the Gospel of John, Homily 89, 1–4.

³⁴ Matthew 7:22–23.

³⁵ Ephesian 2:8.

³⁶ Philippians 1:29.

³⁷ John 6:45.

³⁸ Romans 8:30.

³⁹ Rather, Romans 10:17.

⁴⁰ Cf. 1 Corinthians 14:22.

⁴¹ Isaiah 50:5.

⁴² Acts 7:51.

⁴³ Gregory, Forty Homilies on the Gospels, Homily 33, 2.

⁴⁴ John 15:22.

⁴⁵ Mark 16:20.

⁴⁶ Matthew 19:6.

⁴⁷ 1 Corinthians 7:15.

⁴⁸ Decretum II, C. xxviii, q.2, c. 2.

⁴⁹ Ezekiel 33:6. Cf. Ezekiel 3:18.

⁵⁰ A common adage.

⁵¹ Cf. Ordinary Gloss on the Decretum II, C. xxviii, q.1, c. 11.

⁵² Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics V, 8 (1134b10–11) & VIII, 12 (1161b18).

⁵³ Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VIII, 10 (1160b25).

⁵⁴ Peter Lombard, Sentences IV, d.1, c. 8.

⁵⁵ Ezekiel 3:17. Cf. Ezekiel 33:7.

⁵⁶ Matthew 23:23.

⁵⁷ Luke 18:12.

⁵⁸ Exodus 20:12, 14, & 15.

⁵⁹ Cf. Exodus 22:1.

⁶⁰ Exodus 20:13 & 15.

⁶¹ Rather, Matthew 10:10.

⁶² Cf. 1 Corinthians 9:13–14.

⁶³ Acts 20:27.

⁶⁴ Cf. 1 Corinthians 9:12.

⁶⁵ Deuteronomy 21:18 & 21.

⁶⁶ Colossians 3:20.

⁶⁷ Cf. Hebrews 12:9.

⁶⁸ Bernard, On Precept and Dispensation, c. 4, 10.

⁶⁹ Hebrews 12:9.

⁷⁰ Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VIII, 11 (1161a16–17).

⁷¹ Deuteronomy 21:20.

⁷² Cf. Colossians 3:20.

⁷³ Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II, 1 (1103b3–5).

⁷⁴ Cicero, On Duties III, xii, 50–xvii, 72.

⁷⁵ Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics V, 1 (1129a34–b1).

⁷⁶ Augustine, On the Trinity XIII, 3, 6.

⁷⁷ Genesis 3:16.

⁷⁸ Ordinary Gloss on 1 Corinthians 15:24.

⁷⁹ 1 Timothy 5:17.

⁸⁰ Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics IV, 3 (1123b35).

⁸¹ Augustine, The City of God XIX, 19. Cf. Quodlibet V, q.11, a.2, ad s.c.

⁸² Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics V, 3 (1131a25–26).

⁸³ Hebrews 5:4.

⁸⁴ Luke 12:31; Ordinary Gloss on Luke 12:31; Interlinear Gloss on Luke 12:31.

⁸⁵ 1 Corinthians 9:10; Interlinear Gloss on 1 Corinthians 9:10.

⁸⁶ Ordinary Gloss on 1 Timothy 5:17. Cf. Augustine, Sermons on the Old Testament, Sermon 46, 5.

⁸⁷ Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption I, 6 (322b24–26).

⁸⁸ Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption I, 6 (323a10–11).

⁸⁹ Bernard, Sermon Three on the Resurrection of the Lord, 3.

⁹⁰ Isaiah 66:24.

⁹¹ Cf. Augustine, The City of God XXI, 10.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Albert, On the Resurrection II, q.10, a.5; Commentary on the Sentences IV, d.44F, a.37 & d.44G, a.40.

⁹⁴ Romans 2:2.

⁹⁵ John Chrysostom, Homilies on Matthew, Homily 23 (24), 7.

⁹⁶ Augustine, On the Morals of the Manicheans, 3, 5; Enchiridion, 4, 12.

⁹⁷ Cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences IV, d.45, c. 4.

⁹⁸ Cf. Augustine, The City of God XX, 20.

⁹⁹ E.g., Praepositinus, Summa Theologiae IV (On the Sacraments and Last Things); Peter Cantor, Summa on the Sacraments and Counsels of the Soul III, 357.

¹⁰⁰ Praepositinus, Summa Theologiae IV (On the Sacraments and Last Things).

¹⁰¹ Psalms 118:63.

¹⁰² Matthew 12:32.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ John 4:24.

¹⁰⁵ According to Aquinas, these teachers include Athanasius, Hilary, Ambrose, Jerome, and Chrysostom. Cf. Aquinas, Questions on Evil, q.3, a.14; Commentary on Romans, c.2, l.1; Summa Theologiae II–II, q.14, a.1 & a.3.

¹⁰⁶ Matthew 11:19.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. John Chrysostom, Homilies on Matthew, Homily 41 (42), 3.

¹⁰⁸ Augustine, On the Words of the Lord, 11 = Sermon 71, xii, 18 to xiii, 22.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Hugh of St. Victor, On the Love of the Bridegroom for the Bride; Peter Lombard, Sentences II, d.43, c.1, n.11; Richard of St. Victor, On the Spirit of Blasphemy; William of Auxerre, Golden Summa II, tr. 14, cc. 1–2; Albert, Commentary on the Sentences II, d.43, a.1; Bonaventure, Commentary on the Sentences II, d.43, a.1.

¹¹⁰ Cf. Pope Urban IV, Cum negotium crucis (October 23, 1263).

¹¹¹ Rather, Augustine, On the Trinity XIV, 17, 23.

¹¹² Cf. Aquinas, On the Form of Absolution.

¹¹³ Cf. Quodlibet II, q.7, a.2.

¹¹⁴ Rather, Wisdom 7:14.

¹¹⁵ Matthew 16:19.

¹¹⁶ Pope Urban IV, Cum negotium crucis (October 23, 1263).

¹¹⁷ John 8:11.

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