Article 2: If you know your neighbor has sinned, is it a mortal sin for you to report him to his superior immediately?
Quodlibet XI
There were questions about God, about angels, and about human beings.
The questions about God were on God’s infinity, knowledge, and predestination.
Question 1
Article 1
The question about God’s infinity was: Is being everywhere proper to God alone?
It seems not:
1. There is a number in things that are numbered. But all the parts of the universe are numbered. Hence, there is a number in all the parts of the universe, which therefore seems to be everywhere. Thus, being everywhere is not proper to God alone.
2. A universal is everywhere and always. But God is not a universal. Therefore, being everywhere and always is not proper to God alone.
3. Spiritual substances surpass bodily ones. But being everywhere applies to bodily substances, since only bodily things can be properly assigned a place. Much more, then, does being everywhere apply to spiritual substances. Hence, being everywhere does not seem to be proper to God alone.
4. An earthly king’s excellence involves the ability to govern his kingdom even while absent. But God is more excellent than any king. Hence, God’s excellence seems to involve the ability to govern the whole universe or any part of it while absent. Therefore, it does not seem proper to God to be everywhere.
5. Some things are said to be near God, while others are said to be far from God (the farther things are, the more corruptible they are). Yet if God were everywhere, then nothing could be said to be near or far from God. Therefore, it seems that God is not everywhere.
6. Suppose that all the workings of the world were one continuous body. That body would then be everywhere. Therefore, being everywhere is not proper to God alone.
But to the contrary: Ambrose proves that the Holy Spirit is God because the Holy Spirit is everywhere.1 But Ambrose’s argument would have no force if being everywhere were not proper to God alone. Yet his argument does have force. Therefore, being everywhere is proper to God alone.
Answer: We say that spiritual things are present in a place not because they touch it with their extension but because they touch it with their power. So, our talk of the place in which a spiritual thing is present has to be based on the nature of that thing’s power. Now, God’s power is infinite. This infinity is clear from two things. First, God surpasses not only those creatures that exist, that have existed, and that will exist, but also all those that can be imagined. So, God is present not only in those creatures that exist, that have existed, and that will exist, but also in those that can be imagined to exist. Second, God’s power is at work at one and the same time in everything, at the same time and in every single thing in its own way. Thus, properly speaking, being everywhere applies to God alone. Improperly, however, being everywhere applies to other things as well.
Hence, we have to distinguish between the way that God is everywhere and the way that being everywhere applies somehow to other things. For we say that such things are everywhere, but they are only present in those things that exist at present, whereas God is present not only in those things that exist but also in past, future, and imaginary things. Likewise, other things are not everywhere as though it were one place, but, rather, many places, whereas God is everywhere in such a way that God is present in each thing and in the whole of things. For God’s power has an effect not only on what is common to the whole universe but also on what is proper to each particular thing. Hence, God is present in everything as one place and as many places, which is the proper meaning of being everywhere.
Since only God is everywhere in that sense, being everywhere is proper to God alone.
1. So, to the first objection: A number is not in things that are numbered as in a place, but as an accident in a subject. Moreover, even though one number has a unique existence in all the things that are numbered, it is not present in each thing, since it is not the number of each thing. Furthermore, a number is not entirely one; it is a sort of plurality. But God is present in things by God’s power, and is at work in every single one of them, as we have said.
2. To the second objection: We say that a universal is everywhere and always more in a negative sense than in an affirmative sense. When we say that a universal is everywhere and always, we do not mean that it is present in every place and at every time; rather, we mean that it abstracts from the things that determine a determinate place and time. And, anyway, universals do not subsist.
3. To the third objection: Spiritual substances surpass bodily substances by the superior excellence of their nature, not by their power to act. Indeed, we see that many spiritual substances have determinate bodies in which to act, as the rational soul has the human body. Hence, the analogy does not hold.
4. To the fourth objection: Not being everywhere in the kingdom is a shortcoming of an earthly king due to the limitations of his nature. But God is unlimited, and hence everywhere. Even if God were not everywhere, God would still govern everything by divine justice. So, for an earthly king, not being everywhere is a shortcoming, and governing while absent is excellent. But God is everywhere and governs everything.
5. To the fifth objection: The nearness and farness of creatures from God is not a matter of their place but, rather, of their similarity and dissimilarity. Things more similar to God are said to be nearer to God, while things less similar are said to be farther from God.
6. To the sixth objection: Even supposing that all the workings of the world were one continuous body, that still would not allow us to imagine its being everywhere, but only in one place. For the thing in which it was present would then count as one place, and hence it would not touch any particular thing whose nature involved being everywhere.
Question 2
Article 1
The question about God’s knowledge was: Does God know evil by means of good?
It seems not:
1. Knowing one thing by means of another is a defective way of knowing. But God’s knowledge cannot be defective. Therefore, it seems that God does not know evil by means of good.
2. Knowing one thing by means of another is a discursive way of knowing. But God does not know things discursively. Therefore, since knowing evil by means of good involves knowing one thing by means of another, it seems that God does not know evil by means of good.
3. God knows everything God knows by means of the divine essence. But evil is not an effect of God’s essence, nor is it the opposite of God’s essence, as Augustine says.2 Therefore, it seems that God does not know evil by means of good.
4. In book III of On the Soul, the Philosopher says that an intellect that is always actual does not know privations.3 But the divine intellect is always actual. Therefore, etc.
5. Everything known is known by means of its likeness existing in the knower. But there is no likeness of evil in God. Therefore, God does not know evil by means of any good existing in God.
But to the contrary: Augustine says that evil is known by its opposition to goodness.4
Answer: Each thing is known properly by knowing its proper notion. Now, some knowable things have an independent proper notion. A human being and a stone, for instance, have a proper notion that does not depend on anything else. Yet other knowable things do not have an independent proper notion but, rather, one that depends on something else. This is the case with relations, privations, and negations, whose notion depends on their relationship to something else. The notion of blindness, for example, is not independent but, rather, dependent, because of its relationship to sight, of which blindness is the privation. Now, God knows all things in their proper notions. Hence, I say that when things have an independent proper notion, God knows them independently rather than by means of something else. But when things have a dependent proper notion with a relationship to other things, God knows them in their relationship to the things on which they depend.
Now, the notion of evil is not independent but, rather, dependent, because of its opposition to created good. Therefore, God knows evil in its relationship to created good, viz. by means of its opposition to that good.
1. So, to the first objection: Knowing one thing by means of another is a defective way of knowing things with an independent notion, but not things whose notion is related to something else, as we just said.
2. To the second objection: Discursive knowledge involves knowing one thing by means of another thing known independently. But knowing one thing by means of another thing to which it is related is not discursive knowledge, and that is how evil is known.
3. To the third objection: Although evil is not the opposite of the divine essence, it is the opposite of an effect of the divine essence. For the uncreated good does not have any evil opposed to it. Rather, evil is opposed to the good effects caused by the uncreated good, and is known by its opposition to those effects.
4. To the fourth objection: That argument applies to an intellect that knows things by correspondence and by means of their species. But God does not know things that way, since God knows all things by means of the divine essence.
5. To the fifth objection: Although there is no likeness of evil in God, there is a likeness of the opposite of evil (created good) in God as its cause. Thus, God knows good in itself, and evil by means of good.
Question 3
Article 1
The question about predestination was: Does predestination impose necessity?
It seems so:
1. A predestined person is saved no matter what. But that would only be the case if a predestined person were saved necessarily. Therefore, predestination seems to impose necessity.
2. In Romans 9, the Apostle says: It is not a matter of will or effort, but of the mercy of God.5 Thus, whatever salvation a human being has seems to depend solely upon the predestination of God, not upon anything else. Hence, predestination seems to impose necessity.
But to the contrary: Augustine says: He who created you without you will not justify you without you.6
Answer: Predestination is certain, and yet it does not impose necessity. In fact, there are three things to consider about predestination. Two of them are presupposed by predestination—namely God’s foreknowledge and God’s love (i.e., God’s will to save the predestined). The third is predestination itself, which is just God’s directing the things that God loves to the end that God wants for them. Thus, each of these three things is certain, and yet does not impose necessity.
It is clear that God’s foreknowledge is certain. For God knows things in a more noble way than we do. Our knowledge is in time, and hence our awareness of things is based on the nature of time—past, present, and future. Thus, we know past things as past, present things as present, future things as future, and naturally so. But God’s knowledge is above time and measured only by eternity. Hence, God does not know things as they are in time, but as they are in eternity—i.e., present to God, whether they are necessary or contingent. Thus, God knows all things as present in God’s own present. And since our intellect knows present things with certainty, much more does God know all things present to God with certainty. Yet that does not put any necessity upon the things that God knows. To see why not, compare the certainty of a person standing at a high point looking down at a line of travelers on a road, who only see what is present to them. Such certainty does not impose any necessity upon those travelers because the person standing at the high point sees them all as present, even though some of them are past (those behind), some are present (those directly across), and some are future (those in front).
It is also clear that God’s will is certain, and yet does not impose necessity. For God’s will is the effecting and perfecting cause of all things, since the Lord does whatever he wills.7 God’s perfecting and effecting is clear from the fact that God not only moves and causes things but also gives them a certain way of causing things as well. Moreover, God gives each thing a determinate way of producing its own effects. Since God wants the universe to contain both necessary and contingent things, God has created some causes with the gift of producing effects necessarily, and others with the gift of producing them contingently. Hence, God not only wants this or that effect to exist but also to exist in a certain way—namely contingently or necessarily. For instance, God wants Peter not only to run but to run contingently. Likewise, God wants this or that human being to be saved, but in a way that does not destroy their free choice. Hence, there are two causes of Peter or Martin’s salvation. One is God’s will, which is certain; the other is their free choice, which is contingent. And the same goes for other things: their contingency results from their proximate cause, while their certainty or necessity results from their first cause. Hence, the first cause of things—God’s will—is certain even about contingent things. Yet that certainty does not impose any necessity upon the things themselves, since God wants them not only to exist but to exist in a certain way—namely necessarily or contingently, as we just said.
It is likewise clear that predestination is certain, and yet does not impose necessity. For God’s moving or directing or plan to direct a thing to an end (which is what predestination is) is done in accordance with the nature and order of causes created by God. Now, whenever there are two ordered causes, one of which is necessary and the other of which is contingent, their effect is always contingent. And predestination involves two causes, one of which is necessary (God) and the other of which is contingent (free choice). Thus, the effect of predestination must be contingent. Hence, predestination is certain, since God knows and wills this or that person to reach such an end. But predestination’s certainty does not impose any necessity, since God wants to direct them to such an end by their free will.
1. So, to the first objection: The fact that a predestined person is saved no matter what is a function of the certainty of God’s predestination. Yet that certainty is not absolute but, rather, conditional: if the person is predestined, then the person is saved necessarily, but that is not absolutely necessary.
2. To the second objection: What the Apostle says there should not be taken to mean that our own will or effort is unnecessary but, rather, that the first source of our good actions is not ourselves but, rather, the mercy of God infusing grace into us. Yet our good actions must still have some source in us as well.
Question 4
Article 1
The question about angels was: Do they move in an instant?
It seems so:
1. An angel’s changes are obviously simpler than any bodily changes. But some bodily changes occur in an instant, such as illumination and the like. Much more, then, does an angel move in an instant.
2. The noblest creature calls for the noblest motion. But the noblest motion is one that occurs in an instant. Therefore, the noblest creature (an angel) calls for such motion.
But to the contrary: Every motion has a before and after, and the before and after of motion is the numbering of time. Hence, every motion takes time. Therefore, no motion occurs in an instant, not even an angel’s.
Answer: Every change involves two endpoints, which cannot exist simultaneously. Hence, it is impossible for any motion or change to occur in an instant in the sense that one and the same instant contains both endpoints.
In the case of bodily things, however, note that there are two possible ways for the two endpoints of their motion or change to be related.
One way is for there to be one instant when the last endpoint first exists, and another instant when the first endpoint last exists. And since there is an intervening time between any two instants,8 it follows that the change from one such endpoint to the other passes through time. Hence, such a change occurs in time, not in an instant. But this only happens when there is some midpoint between the change’s two endpoints, as there is, for instance, between white and black and between being here and being there.
But some changes have no midpoint between their endpoints, as there is no midpoint, for instance, between white and not white, between fire and not fire, and between dark and light. For there is no midpoint between affirmation and negation, just as there is no midpoint between privation and form in a determinate subject. Hence, in the case of such changes, even though there is an instant when the last endpoint first exists, there is no instant when the first endpoint last exists. If there were such an instant, then it would follow (since there is an intervening time between any two instants) that neither endpoint exists at the time between those two instants. Yet that is impossible, since such points have no midpoint whatsoever between them. Hence, since the instant when the last endpoint first exists is the endpoint of that time, we have to say that the first endpoint takes that whole previous time. And since there is no intervening time between time itself and the instant that is its endpoint, the passage from one such point to the other does not occur in time, but in that first instant when the first endpoint ceases to exist and the last endpoint begins to exist. Hence changes of this sort are called instantaneous, and include illumination, generation, and corruption. But such changes must themselves be the endpoints of continuous changes existing in time. For the time when the first endpoint last exists is the measure of a certain change, by which its subject reaches that last endpoint. Alteration, for instance, disposes matter for form, and locomotion brings a luminous body to the position where it illuminates. Accordingly, generation and corruption are called the endpoints of that alteration, and illumination is called the endpoint of that locomotion.
Thus, bodily changes take two forms, but an angel’s motion cannot take either of them. For an angel’s motion involves an angel’s power making different contacts with different places. Yet these contacts are not continuous, and consequently an angel’s motion is not continuous. Hence, the time that properly measures an angel’s motion is not continuous, since the continuity of time depends on the continuity of motion, as shown in book IV of the Physics (we cannot say that an angel’s motion is measured by the continuous time from the numbering of the motion of the heavens, since an angel’s motion does not depend on the motion of the heavens). Consequently, an angel’s motion is measured by a certain time in which instants follow one another without continuity. For time is not continuous because it is a numbering but, rather, because it is the numbering of a continuous motion. Therefore, the two endpoints of an angel’s motion do not exist in two instants with an intervening time between them, nor does one of its points exist in time while the other exists in an instant that ends that time. Rather, its two endpoints exist in two instants with no intervening time between them. Accordingly, we have to say that an angel’s motion occurs in time, but in another sort of time than the time in which bodily changes occur.
1. So, to the first objection: What we just said shows that an angel’s changes are simpler than any bodily changes. They are simpler than changes with two endpoints existing in two instants with an intervening time between them, since there is no intervening time between the two instants of an angel’s motion. They are also simpler than changes with one endpoint existing in a whole continuous time, since that one point of theirs exists in an indivisible instant, and yet without an intervening time there either. And since an angel’s changes are simpler, it follows that they are nobler as well.
2. That makes the reply to the second objection clear.
Question 5
The next questions were about human beings. Some were about the parts of human nature, some about the sacraments of grace, and some about human life.
There were two questions about the parts of human nature: one about the soul, and one about the body.
Article 1
The question about the soul was: Are the sensitive and intellective soul one and the same substance?
It seems not:
1. The sensitive soul is drawn out of the potentiality of matter, whereas the intellective soul is a result of creation. Therefore, they are not the same substance.
2. One and the same substance cannot move in opposite directions at the same time. But our senses and reason move in opposite directions at the same time. As the Apostle says: But I see another law in my members fighting against the law in my mind, etc.9 Therefore, the sensitive and rational soul are not one and the same substance.
3. Something corruptible and something incorruptible are obviously not the same kind of thing, and hence are not numerically the same thing either. But the sensitive soul is corruptible, whereas the intellective soul is incorruptible. Therefore, the sensitive and intellective soul are not numerically the same thing, and hence are not the same substance.
4. The sensitive soul is something we have in common with brute animals. But in the case of brute animals, the sensitive soul is drawn out of the potentiality of matter. Therefore, it is not the same as the intellective soul, which is a result of creation.
But to the contrary: One complete thing has one source of its completion.10 But the human body is one complete thing. Therefore, the soul (the source of its completion) must be one.
Answer: There are two opinions about the hierarchy of forms.
One is the opinion of Avicebron and some of his followers,11 who say that the hierarchy of genera and species—substance, body, living body, animal—corresponds to distinct substantial forms added one on top of the other. So, they say that one substantial form makes something a mere substance, then another makes it a body, then another makes it a living body, then another makes it an animal, then another makes it a human being. And the same goes for the substantial forms of other things.
But this position is impossible. A substantial form is what makes something into a particular thing, giving it the substantial existence of that thing. Hence, only the first form would be a substantial form, since only it would give the thing its substantial existence and make it into a particular thing. All the other forms after it would be accidental additions, which would not give the thing its existence, absolutely speaking, but its existence as such and such. Hence, the loss and gain of such forms would not be generation and corruption, but merely alteration. Thus, Avicebron’s position cannot possibly be true. The same goes for its application to the powers of the soul. Only the first power (the vegetative) would be the thing’s substantial form, making it into a particular thing; the rest would be accidental additions, which is completely false.
Instead, such forms are related as the complete and the incomplete. One form just makes a body exist—nothing else. Another more complete form gives it both existence and life at a certain level of life. Another form gives it all that plus sensation. Hence, the last form is clearly more complete than the previous ones, and relates to them as the more complete to the more incomplete. As such, the last form virtually contains everything that the previous forms contain. Accordingly, therefore, the sensitive and intellective soul both have one and the same essence, but the intellective soul relates to the sensitive soul as the complete to the incomplete. Here is a sign that the sensitive and intellective soul in particular have one essence. If the powers of the soul were not all rooted in one essence, then one power would never interfere with another, nor would one overflow into another. Again, since our intellect lacks a determinate bodily organ to mediate the performance of its activities, why would it even be united to the body unless it had the same essence as the sensitive soul?
Clearly, then, the sensitive and intellective soul have the same essence, but are related as the complete and the incomplete, as we just said.
1. So, to the first objection: The sensitive soul is drawn out of the potentiality of matter in the case of brute animals, but not in our case. Instead, our sensitive soul is a result of creation, since its essence is the essence of the rational soul, which is a result of creation.
2. To the second objection: There is nothing impossible about one and the same thing moving in opposite directions with different powers or parts of itself. So, even though our sensitive and intellective souls are one and the same substance, they can still move in opposite directions with their different parts or powers. Our senses, for instance, can move toward their proper objects while our reason moves toward those at which it aims.
3. To the third objection: Although an incorruptible thing is not the same as a corruptible one, an incorruptible thing can still have something in common with a corruptible one, which is the case with the rational soul: the soul’s substance is incorruptible, but it still contains something (the sensitive soul) which it has in common with a corruptible thing.
4. To the fourth objection: Given the kind of thing we are in general, we have our sensitive soul in common with brute animals. But given the specific kind of thing we are, our human sensitive soul differs from that of brute animals, as it differs from that of donkeys, and horses, and cows. For each specific kind of animal has a correspondingly different sensitive soul. Hence, a human being’s sensitive soul does not have to be drawn out of the potentiality of matter just because a brute animal’s sensitive soul is drawn out of it. For a human being’s sensitive soul belongs to a higher kind of thing, and is a result of creation, as we have said.
Question 6
Article 1
The next question about the body was: Will the numerically same body rise again?
It seems not:
1. As the Philosopher says in the Topics, being numerically the same means having the same characteristic property, accidents, and definition.12 At the resurrection, however, our bodies will not have the same characteristic property: now they are capable of laughter, but then they will not be. Nor will they have the same accidents: now they are white, curly-haired, musical, and so on, but then they will not be. Nor will they have the same definition: now they are defined as mortal, but then they will not be mortal. Therefore, it seems that the numerically same body will not rise again.
2. Having the identical matter makes something numerically the same. But the body that rises will not have the identical matter as the body now, since many of its forms will be replaced. Therefore, the numerically same body will not rise again.
3. In his book On the Soul, the Philosopher says that a statue that has been destroyed is not numerically the same as one that is remade out of the same bronze.13 For the same reason, the body that is corrupted now will not be numerically the same as the one that rises.
4. Human beings are human beings by virtue of their humanity, and one human being is one human being by virtue of one humanity. Yet there are two humanities in the body we have now and in the one that will rise, since death destroys the form of the whole. Therefore, there are two human beings, and hence it seems that the numerically same bodies will not rise again.
But to the contrary: Job says: I shall be clothed again in my skin, and in my flesh I will see God. Whom I myself shall see, etc.14
Answer: In order for something to be numerically the same, its essential principles have to be identical. Hence, whenever an individual’s essential principles vary, its identity necessarily varies as well. Now, the parts of an individual’s nature constitute its essential principles. Matter and form, for instance, are essential principles of things. So, if an individual’s accidents vary and change, while its essential principles remain, the individual itself will remain the same. Now, a human being’s essential principles are body and soul, which both remain, since the same soul and the same body will rise again. Therefore, the numerically same human bodies will rise again.
1. So, to the first objection: That argument is based on a misreading of the passage it cites. The passage does not say that being numerically the same means having the same characteristic property and the same accidents now and later; it says that being numerically the same means being the same as what has the accidents and the same as what has the characteristic property—i.e., the same as the subject that has the accidents, characteristic property, and definition—not having the same accidents, the same characteristic property, and one and the same definition. So, the argument has clearly misread the text.
Granting the argument’s own reading, however, one should reply as follows. As for their individuating accidents, viz. their dimensions, our glorified bodies will indeed have them. They will also have the same characteristic property of laughter. As Job says: Your mouth shall be filled with laughter and your lips with rejoicing.15 As for their definition, even though they will rise immortal, they will not lose their natural mortality, since our human nature (which will be there) is mortal in and of itself.
2. To the second objection: Having the same matter makes something numerically the same. But it is not bare matter that does so; that is not the source of numerical identity. Rather, one and the same matter, insofar as its dimensions make it determinate, makes something numerically the same. Hence, in spite of so many forms being replaced in the matter of the body that rises, the body will still rise with the same dimensions and with the same essential principles.
3. To the third objection: Augustine says the opposite.16 According to him, if a statue is remade from the same bronze, it is numerically the same. Even so, I should point out that there are two ways to divide artifacts into genera and species: either by their matter or by their form. Of course, natural things are divided into genera and species by their form alone, since their forms are substantial forms. But since the forms of artifacts are accidental forms, they have to be sorted into genera and species by their matter. So, if we consider a statue as the member of a genus or species by its matter, then I say that the same statue is indeed remade. But if we consider it as the member of a genus or species by its form, then I say that the same statue is not remade but, rather, a different one, since each have different forms. Yet that is not the case with the body, since it will have the same form.
4. To the fourth objection: There are not two humanities in the body that is corrupted and the body that rises; there is just one, since its essential principles do not change but, rather, remain the same.
Question 7
There were three questions about the sacraments of grace. The first was about the sacrament of confirmation, the second about the sacrament of the Eucharist, and the third about the sacrament of marriage.
Article 1
The first question was: Should only a bishop confer the sacrament of confirmation, or should someone else do so as well?
It seems that not only a bishop can confer the sacrament of confirmation but a priest can do so as well:
1. Confirmation obviously confers spiritual grace, and the conferral of such grace should be managed in a way that avoids its being prevented. Yet its conferral is quite often prevented by the absence of bishops, since they are not present everywhere. Therefore, it should be conferred by the ministry of priests, who are present everywhere.
2. The sacraments were established to be beneficial, and hence should be conferred in a way that benefits everyone. But it does not benefit everyone for only a bishop to confer this sacrament (which gives the strength of the Holy Spirit), since not everyone has access to a bishop. Therefore, priests should do it, so that everyone can enjoy its benefits.
3. The sacrament of baptism is obviously greater than the sacrament of confirmation. But any priest can confer baptism. Much more, then, can any priest confer confirmation.
But to the contrary: There is the custom of the Church.
Answer: The proper minister of the sacrament of confirmation is a bishop. Both reason and authority prove this.
Reason does so because the purpose of confirmation is to bestow a certain perfection on people by giving them the strength of the Holy Spirit so that they can bravely and steadfastly profess and proclaim the faith before kings and princes.17 Hence confirmation is administered on the forehead, so that we will not be afraid or embarrassed to proclaim and defend the faith before all. Now, as Dionysius says, the hierarchy performs three actions: cleansing, illuminating, and perfecting.18 Cleansing is proper to deacons, illuminating is proper to priests (and consists largely in the Eucharist), and perfecting is proper to bishops. Hence, all the sacraments that bestow perfection are for a bishop to administer. These include holy orders, consecrating virgins and sacred vessels, and confirmation. Therefore, no one but a bishop can confer the sacrament of confirmation.
The authority of sacred scripture makes this clear as well. For confirmation takes the place of the laying on of hands, which only the apostles could do. Hence the laying on of hands could not be done by Philip, who preached the word of the Lord in Samaria. Instead, when the apostles in Jerusalem heard that Samaria had received the word of the Lord, they sent them Peter and John.19 And later it says: Then they laid hands upon them, etc.20 Hence, since bishops are the successors of the apostles, only bishops should confer the sacrament of confirmation.
Nevertheless, simple priests have a dispensation to do some things that bestow a certain perfection, such as conferring minor orders and the like. There could be such a dispensation for confirmation as well. Without a dispensation, however, no one but a bishop should confer such a sacrament.
1. So, to the first objection: Not all the sacraments that confer spiritual grace can be administered by a priest. Hence, even though the sacrament of confirmation confers spiritual grace, it is not for a priest to administer. Compare how the sacrament of holy orders confers spiritual grace and yet is reserved exclusively for bishops to administer because of the perfection it bestows. The same is true of the sacrament of confirmation. And there is no question of its being prevented, since people can go to the cities where bishops are present.
2. That makes the reply to the second objection clear.
3. To the third objection: The sacrament of baptism has a greater necessity, but not a greater perfection. Hence, because of its necessity, any Christian—not just priests—can baptize in a critical moment of need, and in places where priests are scarce, as long as the form of the sacrament is maintained. But since confirmation is not as necessary, and since it bestows a certain perfection (as we have said), it is reserved for those who are greater, namely bishops.
Question 8
There were two questions on the sacrament of the Eucharist. The first was about people excluded from its consecration because of fornication. The second was about people excluded from taking part in the sacrament because of excommunication.
Article 1
The first question was: Can one attend the mass of a priest who is a fornicator without sinning mortally?
It seems that no one could attend his mass without committing mortal sin: The Church has commanded under pain of anathema that no one should attend the mass of a priest who is a fornicator. But it is a mortal sin to violate such a command of the Church. Therefore, it is a mortal sin for one to attend the mass of such a priest.
But to the contrary: Attending the mass of a priest who is a fornicator is tolerated in many places throughout the world.
Answer: To answer this question we need to consider how evil something is in itself because of natural law, and how evil something is because of positive law.
Now, it is a sin for any priest to celebrate mass in a state of mortal sin. Hence, if it were clear to me that a priest was in a state of mortal sin, and I invited him to celebrate mass, I would sin mortally myself. This is a matter of natural law, since the invitation would be prompting him to commit mortal sin.
But positive law adds more: I would sin mortally not only if I invited him to celebrate mass but also if I attended his mass. This addition was established as a punishment for the fornicating priest. But realize that this does not apply to just any fornicating priest, only to known fornicators. And, properly speaking, known fornicators are those who have been declared known fornicators by a judgment of the Church.21 Hence, when a priest has been declared a known fornicator by a judgment of the Church, no one should attend his mass; doing so is a mortal sin.
To the objection made to the contrary: Even if prelates tolerate it, that still does not excuse one for attending the mass of a priest who is a fornicator. For their tolerance is either due to negligence or to the evil failure of such prelates, who will not dare to correct others since they have done so much that needs correcting themselves, or sometimes because they are just scared to correct them. Hence, their toleration is no excuse.
Article 2
The second question was: Is it a mortal sin to speak, eat, or associate with excommunicated people?
It seems so:
1. Many masters of the decrees and many great men say that it is.22
2. It is a mortal sin to go against a command of the Church. But the Church commands that no one speak or eat with excommunicated people. Therefore, it is a mortal sin to do so.
3. A certain decree says that when the supreme pontiff was asked if one could associate with excommunicated people, he said that one should not even do so in order to avoid death, and the reason he gave was that doing so is a mortal sin.23 Therefore, it seems to be a mortal sin for one to associate in any way with excommunicated people.
But to the contrary: We see many great men eat, drink, or associate with excommunicated people. But they would not do so at all if it were a mortal sin.
Answer: Excommunication separates people from the community of believers, but not from the community of human beings, except incidentally, insofar as separation from the human community happens to be involved in separation from the community of believers. So, I say, one can associate or consort with excommunicated people either directly or indirectly. One does so directly in matters of faith. Now, it is a mortal sin for anyone to consort with excommunicated people directly, which can happen in three ways. First, I can consort with such people in divine matters—by praying for them, for instance, or attending mass with them—or in other spiritual matters. Second, I can consort with such people out of contempt for a command of the Church. It is a mortal sin for anyone to consort with excommunicated people out of such contempt. Third, one can associate with such people in their crime and its trial. On the other hand, one consorts with such people indirectly in human matters, such as talking, eating, and all the other things that human life involves. This is not a mortal sin, but a venial one, unless it is done out of contempt, as we said.
1. So, to the first objection: The opinion of the experts on the decrees is not true. On this question they are following and giving greater weight to human law, but greater weight should be given to divine law than to human law. Thus, the opposite opinion is better.
2. To the second objection: Consorting directly with excommunicated people goes against a command of the Church and is a mortal sin. But consorting indirectly with them does not go against a command of the Church; it merely goes beyond it. Yet that is not a mortal sin, but a venial one. Realize, then, that some things are evil in themselves and cannot be done without sinning. One such thing is consorting with excommunicated people in matters relevant to the excommunication, which therefore cannot be done without sinning. But some things are merely occasions of evil, which can be done without committing mortal sin. One such thing is speaking or eating with excommunicated people.
3. To the third objection: We should prefer death not only to mortal sin but also to venial sin. For sin, precisely as sin, is never choiceworthy. If it were choiceworthy, then it would never be a sin, and hence I would not sin by doing it. That is why one cannot argue against associating with excommunicated people on the grounds that doing so is a mortal sin and that anyone who does so sins mortally. For even if it were a venial sin, still no one should associate with such people, although it would not be a mortal sin to do so.
Or one should say that the decree referred to is meant to be about consorting directly with excommunicated people.
Question 9
There were two questions on marriage. The first was about bewitchment. The second was about impotence.
Article 1
The first question was: Does bewitchment impede marriage?
It seems not:
God’s work is stronger than the devil’s work. But marriage is God’s work, whereas bewitchment is the devil’s work. Therefore, marriage is stronger than bewitchment, and hence cannot be impeded by it.
But to the contrary: A demon’s power is greater than a human being’s power. But even a human being can impede marriage. Therefore, a demon can do so as well.
Answer: Marriage is like a sort of contract. Through marriage one gives the power over one’s body to another for the purposes of uniting in the flesh. Now, there is no such thing as a contract to do the impossible, since people cannot obligate themselves to do the impossible. Hence, when one obligates oneself to unite in the flesh through marriage, but it is impossible for one to do so, the marriage is null and void. But notice the two ways that an impediment can make it impossible for one to unite in the flesh. The impediment can either arise after the marriage has been consummated or before. If it arises after, then the marriage has already been consummated and can never be dissolved. But if it arises before, then the marriage has not yet been consummated and can be dissolved. And realize that these kinds of impediments are either permanent or temporary. If they are permanent, then they impede marriage forever, but if they are only temporary, then they only impede marriage temporarily, rather than forever—as long as each impediment arose beforehand.
As for bewitchment, some people deny that it is even real. But that is because they are unbelievers and suppose that demons are nothing but people’s imagination: people just imagine them, and are enchanted by their own terrifying imagination. But the Catholic faith holds that demons are real and can impair people’s activities and prevent them from uniting in the flesh.
Thus, if impediments of this kind arise beforehand and are permanent, then they impede marriage forever.
So, to the first objection: Not just marriage, but even the devil himself is God’s work. Yet some of God’s works are stronger than others and can impede them with their greater strength. Hence, since the devil is stronger than marriage, there is no reason he cannot impede marriage.
Article 2
The second question was: Does impotence impede marriage?
It seems not:
Elderly people are impotent, and yet they contract marriage.
But to the contrary: People cannot obligate themselves to do the impossible. But it is impossible for an impotent person to unite with anyone in the flesh. Hence, if such a person takes on the obligation to do so, the contract will be null and void.
Answer: Impotence impedes marriage for the same reason that bewitchment does, since both involve the same impossibility. But there is a difference between being impotent and being bewitched. An impotent man is absolutely incapacitated with all women, whereas a bewitched man is incapacitated as well, but only with one woman, not with all of them. For bewitchment affects how a man sees one particular woman: a demon’s influence makes him dread and detest that woman, and he flees and refuses her out of dread. Thus, impotence and bewitchment impede marriage in different ways. Impotence impedes marriage by leaving a man with no hope of ever contracting marriage, if it impedes him from marrying one woman (hence, if his impotence ever disappeared, his first marriage would have to be restored). Hence, impotence dissolves a marriage contract and prevents marriage from being contracted. But a bewitched man is only impeded from marrying one particular woman, and is therefore permitted to marry someone else (as is the woman). Hence, bewitchment dissolves a marriage contract, but does not prevent marriage from being contracted, as we have said.
So, to the first objection: Elderly people are only impotent with respect to the generation of offspring, not the act of generation itself. Since they can still unite in the flesh, their marriage is not dissolved. But the impotence that completely impedes uniting in the flesh dissolves marriage, as we have said.
Question 10
Some of the questions on human life were about the relationship to one’s neighbor, and some were about the relationship to the things that people use.
The questions on the relationship to one’s neighbor were about fraternal correction. There were two such questions.
Article 1
The first question was: Should you correct your brother or neighbor in public or in private?
It seems that you should do so privately:
1. Matthew 18 says: If your brother sins against you, go and correct him between you and him alone.24 Therefore, it seems that an offending brother should be corrected privately.
But to the contrary:
1. 1 Timothy 5 says: Rebuke the sinner before all.25
2. Some religious constitutions require people to be corrected publicly.
Answer: This sort of correction ought to be given out of charity. That is why it is called fraternal correction. Hence, fraternal correction has to be ordered as charity itself is ordered. Now, the order of charity requires you to prefer the common good to your neighbor’s good, and to seek the good of your neighbor’s conscience and reputation. But when both cannot be had together, it requires you to seek the good of your neighbor’s conscience.
Given these considerations, I think that a bodily or spiritual sin that tends to harm a great many people should be revealed immediately, since (as was just said) the order of charity gives greater weight to the common good than to your neighbor’s good, whether of reputation or of conscience. But when there is no risk of many people being harmed, then you ought to guard the good of both your neighbor’s conscience and reputation by correcting him privately between the two of you. But if he does not accept your correction, then the order of the gospel requires you to take someone else with you, or even to report him to the Church. Nevertheless, this order should be followed in such cases: if the sin is public, it should be corrected publicly, and if it is private, it should be corrected privately. Hence it says: If your brother sins against you—i.e., if only you know about it—etc.26 That is about private sin. But about public sin it says: Rebuke the sinner—viz. the public one—before all.27
1. That makes the reply to the first objection on both sides clear.
2. To the second objection made to the contrary: Those religious constitutions adopted that requirement for sins that tend to endanger and harm the religious society and community, which is when that requirement ought to be met.
Article 2
The second question was: If you know your neighbor has sinned, is it a mortal sin for you to report him to his superior immediately?
It seems so:
1. It is a mortal sin to violate the order of the gospel. But immediately reporting your neighbor to his superior violates the order of the gospel. Therefore, it is a mortal sin.
But to the contrary:
1. Many great men immediately denounce their neighbor to his superior. But they would not do so at all if it were a mortal sin.
2. Superiors not only look to the past but also to the future. Hence, reporting your neighbor to them does not seem to be a mortal sin.
Answer: What the Lord says in Matthew 18 about fraternal correction should be taken like the other things he says about human actions, and ought to be followed as charity dictates. Hence, they have to be applied to the right circumstances, like his other sayings.
Now, realize that the law affords three ways of responding to crimes. One way is with an inquisition, which is for public sins, and should only be done in response to public outcry. The other ways are with a denunciation and an accusation, which are for private sins. Responding with an accusation requires signing an inscription that obligates the accuser to make recompense. Since an accusation aims at the good of the state as its end, it can be made in public or in private, whichever one prefers. Responding with a denunciation requires fraternal admonition first. For a denunciation aims at the improvement of one’s neighbor, and thus the order of fraternal correction ought to be followed.
So, should you denounce your brother to his superior immediately after you learn that he has sinned? In these cases, I think we need to distinguish between the various characteristics that a superior and his subordinate might have. If I know that my brother will take correction from me well, then I should not denounce him to his superior. But if I see that it would be better coming from his superior, and if his superior is pious, wise, spiritual, and does not have any ill will or hatred toward his subordinate, then it is permissible to denounce him to his superior. But in that case, I would not be telling the Church, since I would not be telling the superior in his role as superior but, rather, as a person well suited to correct and improve my neighbor. Even so, it is not possible to make a general judgment on this question, since the characteristics of a superior and his subordinate can vary. Sometimes a superior might hate his subordinate, or a subordinate might not take his superior’s correction well. Hence, this is the rule to follow: in all these cases charity should be preserved, and what seems best and most expedient should be done. If you intend your neighbor’s improvement, and you preserve the good of charity as much as possible, then it is not a sin for you to denounce him. But if you denounce him out of wickedness, in order to embarrass or belittle him, then it is a mortal sin for you to accuse or denounce him.
1. So, to the first objection: Immediately reporting your neighbor to his superior does not violate a commandment of the gospel if you recognize the right circumstances and judge that doing so is most expedient. For in that case you are not telling the Church but, rather, a well-suited person, as we have said. Therefore, it is not a mortal sin.
1. To the first objection made to the contrary: Even great men would sin mortally if they denounced their neighbor to his superior or to any other person for a reason other than the one intended by the commandment to do so.
2. To the second objection made to the contrary: If you report your neighbor’s sin to his superior as a precaution for the future or in pursuit of something that seems expedient for his improvement, then it is not a sin. But if you tell his superior or his friend out of wickedness, then it is a mortal sin. Yet if you tell someone out of carelessness, and it does not lead to a bad reputation or to any criticism of your offending neighbor, then it is not a mortal sin, although you still acted carelessly.28
1 Rather, Peter Lombard, Sentences I, d.37, n. 5.
2 Cf. Augustine, The City of God XII, 2.
3 Rather, Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul III, 25. Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul III, 6 (430b20–26).
4 Cf. Augustine, On Two Souls, c. 10.
5 Romans 9:16.
6 Cf. Augustine, Sermon 170, 9.
7 Psalms 134:6.
8 Aristotle, Physics VI, 3 (234a7–8 & 10).
9 Romans 7:23.
10 A common adage.
11 Cf. Avicebron, Fountain of Life III, 48.
12 Aristotle, Topics I, 7 (103a23–31).
13 This is not found in Aristotle.
14 Job 19:26–27.
15 Job 8:21.
16 Augustine, Enchiridion, c.23, 89. Cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences IV, d.44, c. 2, n. 3.
17 William of Auxerre, Golden Summa IV, tr. 6, c. 1.
18 Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, c. 5, 3.
19 Acts 8:14.
20 Acts 8:17.
21 Decretals III, tit. 2, c. 10.
22 E.g., Raymond of Penyafort, Summa on Penance III, tit. 33.
23 Pope Innocent III, cited by Raymond of Penyafort, Summa on Penance III, tit. 33.
24 Matthew 18:15.
25 1 Timothy 5:20.
26 Matthew 18:15.
27 1 Timothy 5:20.
28 The Latin text is incomplete here. There should have followed some questions about the things that people use, as Aquinas said in the prologue to Question 10.