A. 2. Do We Suitably Designate Legal Acts?
We thus proceed to the first inquiry. It seems that it does not belong to law to make human beings good, for the following reasons:
{27} Obj. 1. Virtue makes human beings good, since “virtue makes those possessing it good,” as the Ethics says.1 But human beings have virtue only from God, since he “produces virtue in us apart from our efforts,”2 as I have said before regarding the definition of virtue.3 Therefore, it does not belong to law to make human beings good.
Obj. 2. Law benefits human beings only if they obey law. But goodness causes human beings to obey law. Therefore, human beings first need goodness in order to obey law. Therefore, law does not make them good.
Obj. 3. Law is ordered to the common good, as I have said.4 But some ill disposed regarding their own good are well disposed regarding what belongs to the common good. Therefore, it does not belong to law to make human beings good.
Obj. 4. Some laws are tyrannical, as the Philosopher says in the Politics.5 But a tyrant strives for his own good, not the good of his subjects. Therefore, it does not belong to law to make human beings good.
On the contrary, the Philosopher says in the Ethics that it is “the will of every lawmaker to make human beings good.”6
I answer that, as I have said before,7 law is simply a ruler’s dictate of reason that governs his subjects. And the virtue of every subject is to be duly subject to the ruler. Just so, we perceive that the virtue of the irascible and concupiscible powers consists of being duly obedient to reason. And accordingly, “the virtue of every subject consists of being duly subject to the ruler,” as the Philosopher says in the Politics.8 And every law is ordained to be obeyed by those subject to it. And so it evidently belongs to law to induce subjects to their requisite virtue. Therefore, since virtue makes those possessing it good, the proper effect of law is consequently to make its subjects good, either absolutely or in some respect. For if the aim of the lawmaker strives for real good, that is, the common good regulated by divine justice, law consequently makes human beings absolutely good. But if the aim of lawmakers is set upon what is not absolutely good but what is useful or desirable for themselves or contrary to divine justice, then law makes human beings relatively, not absolutely, good, namely, in relation to such a regime. So also does good belong to things in themselves evil. For example, we speak of a good robber, since he acts suitably to accomplish his end.
Reply Obj. 1. There are two kinds of virtue, namely, acquired virtues and infused virtues, as is evident from what I have said before.9 And habitual action contributes something to both but in different ways. For habitual action causes acquired virtue, disposes persons to receive infused virtue, and preserves and augments infused virtues already possessed. And because laws are laid down to direct human actions, law makes human beings good as much as their actions conduce to virtue. And so also the Philosopher says in the Politics that “lawmakers make subjects good by habituating them to good deeds.”10
Reply Obj. 2. People do not always obey law out of the perfect goodness of virtue. Rather, they sometimes indeed obey law out of fear of punishment and sometimes only out of dictates of reason, which cause virtue, as I have maintained before.11
Reply Obj. 3. We weigh the goodness of any part in relation to the whole to which it belongs. And so also Augustine says in his Confessions that “every part is base that is in discord with the whole to which it belongs.”12 Therefore, since every human being is part of a political {28} community, no human being can be good unless rightly related to the common good. Nor can a whole be rightly constituted except by parts rightly related to it. And so the common good of a political community can be rightly disposed only if its citizens, at least those to whom its ruling belongs, are virtuous. But it suffices as regards the good of the community that other citizens be virtuous enough to obey the commands of the law. And so the Philosopher says in the Politics that “the virtue of a ruler and that of a good man are the same, but the virtue of any ordinary citizen and that of a good man are not.”13
Reply Obj. 4. A tyrannical law, since it is not in accord with reason, is not a law, absolutely speaking. Rather, it is a perversion of law. And yet such a law strives to make citizens good inasmuch as it partakes of the nature of law. For it only partakes of the nature of law insofar as it is a ruler’s dictate for his subjects and strives to make them duly obedient, that is, to make them good in relation to such a regime, not absolutely good.
We thus proceed to the second article. It seems that we do not suitably designate legal acts to consist of “commanding, forbidding, permitting, and punishing,”14 for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. “Every law is a general precept,” as the Jurist says.15 But giving a command is the same as laying down a precept. Therefore, the other three things are superfluous.
Obj. 2. The effect of law is to induce subjects to good, as I have said before.16 But counsel concerns a higher good than precept concerns. Therefore, counsel belongs more to law than precept does.
Obj. 3. As punishment spurs human beings to good deeds, so also do rewards. Therefore, as we reckon punishment an effect of law, so also should we reckon reward.
Obj. 4. A lawmaker aims to make human beings good, as I have said before.17 But those who obey law only out of fear of punishment are not good, since “although some do good out of servile fear, which is fear of punishment, they do not do it rightly,” as Augustine says.18 Therefore, it does not seem to belong to law to punish.
On the contrary, Isidore says in his Etymologies: “Every law either permits something (e.g., that a brave man may ask for a reward) or prohibits {29} something (e.g., that no one is permitted to seek marriage with a consecrated virgin) or punishes something (e.g., that murderers be beheaded).”19
I answer that as statements are dictates of reason by declaring things, so also laws are dictates of reason by commanding things. But it belongs to reason to lead us from some things to other things. And so, as reason in the case of demonstrative sciences leads us to assent to conclusions from certain first principles, so also reason leads us to assent to legal precepts from knowledge of certain things.
And legal precepts concern human actions, which law directs, as I have said before.20 And there are three kinds of human acts. For as I have said before,21 some human acts are good by their nature, that is, virtuous. And laws are supposed to prescribe or command such acts, since “laws command every kind of virtuous act,” as the Ethics says.22 And some human acts are evil by their nature, that is, vicious. And laws are supposed to forbid such acts. And some human acts are morally indifferent by reason of their kind. And laws are supposed to permit such acts. And we can call all slightly good or slightly evil human acts morally indifferent.
But fear of punishment is what law makes use of to induce obedience, and we in this respect posit punishment as an effect of law.
Reply Obj. 1. As desisting from evil partakes of the nature of good, so also prohibitions partake of the nature of precept. And so, understanding precept broadly, we call every law a precept.
Reply Obj. 2. Counseling is not a peculiar function of law. Rather, counseling falls also within the competence of private persons, who are without competence to establish law. And so also the Apostle, in proposing to give a counsel, says in 1 Cor. 7:12: “I, not the Lord, make this statement.” And so we do not posit counseling among the effects of law.
Reply Obj. 3. Anyone is competent to bestow rewards, but only administrators of law, under the authority of which punishments are inflicted, are competent to punish. And so we posit only punishments, not rewards, as legal acts.
Reply Obj. 4. By beginning to become habituated to avoid evil deeds and to do good deeds out of fear of punishment, persons are sometimes brought to behave in such a way with pleasure and of their own will. And so law even by inflicting punishments induces human beings to be good.
1Aristotle, Ethics II, 6 (1106a15–6).
2Cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences II, dist. 27, c. 5.
3ST I–II, Q. 55, A. 4.
4ST I–II, Q. 90, A. 2.
5Politics III, 6 (1282b12).
6Ethics II, 1 (1103b3–4).
7ST I–II, Q. 90: A. 1, ad 2; AA. 3, 4.
8Politics I, 5 (1260a20–4).
9ST I–II, Q. 63, A. 2.
10Actually, Ethics II, 1 (1103b3–4).
11ST I–II, Q. 63, A. 1.
12Confessions III, 8 (PL 32:689).
13Politics III, 2 (1277a20–3).
14Justinian, Digest I, title 3, law 7.
15Ibid., I, title 3, law 1.
16ST I–II, Q. 92, A. 1.
17Ibid.
18Against the Two Letters of Pelagius II, 9, n. 21 (PL 44:586).
19Etymologies V, 19 (PL 82:202).
20ST I–II: Q. 90, AA. 1, 2; Q. 91, A. 4.
21ST I–II, Q. 18, A. 8.
22Aristotle, EthicsV, 1 (1129b19–23).