A. 12. Is Justice the Most Important Moral Virtue?
We thus proceed to the first inquiry. It seems that jurists inappropriately define justice as “the constant and perpetual will to render to others what is due them,”1 for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. The Philosopher says in the Ethics that justice is “the habit whereby human beings act justly and do so willingly.”2 But the will designates the power or its acts. Therefore, we inappropriately call justice the will.
Obj. 2. The rectitude of the will is not the will. Otherwise, if the will were to be its rectitude, then no will would be wicked. But “justice is rectitude,” as Anselm says in his work On Truth.3 Therefore, justice is not the will.
Obj. 3. Only God’s will is everlasting. Therefore, if justice is perpetual will, there will be justice only in God.
Obj. 4. Everything perpetual, since it is immutable, is constant. Therefore, it is superfluous to posit both perpetual and constant in the definition of justice.
Obj. 5. Rendering to others what is due them belongs to rulers. Therefore, if justice be rendering to others what is due them, then justice will belong only to rulers. And this conclusion is inappropriate.
Obj. 6. Augustine says in his work On the Morals of the Church that “justice is love serving God alone.”4 Therefore, justice does not render to other human beings what is theirs.
I answer that the aforementioned definition of justice is appropriate if we understand it correctly. For inasmuch as virtues are habits that are the sources of action, we need to define virtue as good action regarding the particular matter of a virtue. And justice concerns things in relation to others as its particular matter, as I shall make clear later.5 And so the definition, {106} when it speaks of “rendering to others what is their due,” touches on acts of justice in relation to the particular matter and object of justice, since Isidore says in his Etymologies: “We call human beings just because they respect what is just.”6 But for any act regarding any matter to be virtuous, the act needs to be voluntary and steadfast and enduring. For the Philosopher says in the Ethics that virtuous acts require, above all else, that “one act knowingly”; second, that one act “by choice and for a proper end”; third, that “one act steadfastly.”7 And the first point is included in the second, since “what one does in ignorance, one does involuntarily,” as the Ethics says.8 And so the will is first designated in the definition of justice in order to show that acts of justice need to be voluntary. And constancy and perpetuity are added to the definition in order to designate the steadfastness of the acts.
And so the aforementioned definition is the complete definition of justice, save that acts are substituted for the habit, which the acts specify, since we speak of habits in relation to acts. And if one were to want to put this into the proper form of a definition, one could then say that justice is the habit whereby one with a constant and perpetual will renders to others what is due them. And this is almost the same definition as the one the Philosopher gives in the Ethics when he says that “justice is the habit whereby we say that one acts justly by choice.”9
Reply Obj. 1. Will in the cited text designates acts, not the power. And writers usually define habits by acts, as, for example, Augustine says in his Commentary on the Gospel of John that the habit of faith consists of “believing what one does not see.”10
Reply Obj. 2. Justice is only the same as rectitude insofar as it causes rectitude, but it is not essentially the same. For justice is the habit whereby one acts justly and willingly.
Reply Obj. 3. We can speak of the will being perpetual in two ways. A will is perpetual in one way regarding its very act if that act perdures forever, and then only God’s will is perpetual. A will is perpetual in a second way regarding its object, namely, in that one perpetually wills to do things. And the nature of justice requires this kind of perpetual will. For example, it does not satisfy the nature of justice that one be willing in the course of conducting business to observe justice for an hour, since there scarcely exists a person who would wish to act unjustly in every matter. Rather, justice requires that human beings have a will to observe justice perpetually and in every matter.
{107} Reply Obj. 4. Since we do not understand perpetuity to mean the perpetual duration of the will’s act, it is not superfluous to add the notion of constancy to the definition of justice. As we in speaking of perpetual will denote that one has a perpetual intention to observe justice, so also we in speaking of constant will denote that one persists steadfastly in such a purpose.
Reply Obj. 5. Judges render what belongs to individuals by commanding and directing individuals, since “judges are justice-in-the-flesh, and rulers guardians of justice,” as the Ethics says.11 But subjects render to others what is due them by observing the commands and directions.
Reply Obj. 6. Love of neighbor is included in love of God, as I have said before.12 Just so, human beings’ service of God includes rendering to others what is due them.
We thus proceed to the second inquiry. It seems that justice does not always consist of relations to others, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. The Apostle says in Rom. 3:22 that “the justice of God is through faith in Jesus Christ.” But we do not speak of faith in terms of the relation of human beings to one another. Therefore, we do not speak of justice in such terms.
Obj. 2. Augustine says in his work On the Morals of the Church that it belongs to justice that human beings in serving God “rightly govern the other things subject to them.”13 But sense appetite is subject to human beings, as Gen. 4:7 says: “Your appetite [for sin] will be subject to you, and you shall master it.” Therefore, it belongs to justice to master one’s own appetites, and so there will be justice in relation to oneself.
Obj. 3. God’s justice is eternal. But nothing else has been coeternal with God. Therefore, justice does not essentially consist of the relations of human beings to one another.
Obj. 4. As actions in relation to others need to be rightly directed, so also do actions in relation to oneself. But justice rightly directs actions, as Prov. 11:5 says: “The justice of the pure directs their way.” Therefore, justice concerns both one’s actions in relation to others and one’s actions in relation to oneself.
On the contrary, Cicero says in his work On Duties that it is the nature of justice “to maintain the social relations of human beings and their common life.”14 But this signifies regard for others. Therefore, justice regards {108} only our relations to others.
I answer that, as I have said before,15 justice by its nature concerns our relations to others, since its name denotes equality. For things are equal to other things, not to themselves. And since it belongs to justice to direct human acts rightly, as I have said,16 the otherness that justice requires needs to belong to different things capable of action. And actions belong to subsistent and whole entities, not, strictly speaking, to parts and forms, or faculties. For example, we do not properly say that hands strike things, but that human beings strike things with their hands. Nor, strictly speaking, do we say that heat warms things, but that fire warms things by heating them. Nonetheless, we say metaphorically that hands strike things, and that heat warms things.
Therefore, strictly speaking, justice requires distinct individual subsistent substances and so consists only of the relations of human persons to one another. But we metaphorically understand the different sources of action in one and the same human being (e.g., reason and the concupiscible and irascible powers) as if they were different efficient causes. And so we say metaphorically that justice belongs to one and the same human being insofar as reason commands the irascible and concupiscible powers, and insofar as those powers obey reason, and generally insofar as we attribute to each part of a human being what belongs to it. And so the Philosopher in the Ethics calls this justice “metaphorical.”17
Reply Obj. 1. The justice accomplished in us by faith is the justice that makes the ungodly just. And this justice indeed consists of the proper order of the parts of the soul, as I have said before when I was treating of the justification of the ungodly.18 And this belongs to metaphorical justice, which can belong even to one living a solitary life.
Reply Obj. 2. And the foregoing makes clear the reply to the second objection.
Reply Obj. 3. God’s justice is from eternity as to his eternal will and purpose, and justice chiefly consists of this. But God’s justice is not from eternity in its effects, since nothing is coeternal with God.
Reply Obj. 4. The actions of human beings regarding themselves are sufficiently well directed if the other moral virtues rightly direct the emotions. But actions in relation to others need special direction both in relation to those causing the actions and in relation to those others. And so regarding such actions, there is a particular virtue, namely, justice.
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We thus proceed to the third inquiry. It seems that justice is not a virtue, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. Lk. 17:10 says: “When you have done all the things commanded of you, say: ‘We are useless servants; we have done what we should have done.’ ’’ But doing virtuous deeds is not useless, since Ambrose says in his work On Duties: “We speak of usefulness as the acquisition of godliness, not as the value of monetary gain.”19 Therefore, doing what one ought to do is not a virtuous deed. But doing what one ought to do is a deed of justice. Therefore, justice is not a virtue.
Obj. 2. What one does out of necessity is not meritorious. But rendering to others what is theirs, which belongs to justice, is necessary. Therefore, rendering to others what is theirs is not meritorious. But we merit by virtuous acts. Therefore, justice is not a moral virtue.
Obj. 3. Every moral virtue concerns actions. But things externally caused are things that are produced, not actions, as the Philosopher makes clear in the Metaphysics.20 Therefore, since it belongs to justice to produce an external deed that is in itself just, it seems that justice is not a moral virtue.
On the contrary, Gregory says in his work Morals that “the entire structure of good deeds arises in four virtues,”21 namely, moderation, practical wisdom, courage, and justice.
I answer that human virtues make human acts and human beings themselves good, and this indeed belongs to justice. For the actions of human beings are rendered good because they achieve the rule of reason, which correctly directs human acts. And so since justice correctly directs human actions, it evidently renders the deeds of human beings good. And Cicero says in his work On Duties: “We chiefly call human beings good by reason of their justice.”22 And so “the luster of virtue is greatest in it,” as he says in the same place.
Reply Obj. 1. When one does what one ought, one brings no useful gain to the other in relation to whom one does what one ought. Rather, one only abstains from harming the other. But one does profit oneself insofar as one does spontaneously and readily what one ought to do, which is to act virtuously. And Wis. 8:7 says that the wisdom of God “teaches sobriety and justice, practical wisdom and virtue, than which nothing is more useful for human beings,” namely, virtuous human beings, “in living well.”
{110} Reply Obj. 2. There are two kinds of necessity. One kind is the necessity of coercion, and this necessity, because it is contrary to acting willingly, takes away the character of merit. And the other kind is the necessity deriving from the obligation of precepts or the necessity of means for ends, namely, when one cannot attain a virtuous end without doing a particular deed. And the latter kind of necessity does not exclude the character of merit, since one does willingly what is necessary in the latter way. But the latter necessity excludes the glory of doing more than one’s duty, as 1 Cor. 9:16 says: “If I have preached the Gospel, this is no credit to me, since the obligation to do so was imposed on me.”
Reply Obj. 3. Justice concerns external things as to their use in relation to others, not as to their production, which belongs to skill.
We thus proceed to the fourth inquiry. It seems that justice does not inhere in the will as its subject, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. We sometimes call justice truth. But truth belongs to the intellect, not the will. Therefore, justice does not inhere in the will as its subject.
Obj. 2. Justice concerns things in relation to others. But directing things in relation to other things belongs to reason. Therefore, justice inheres in the power of reason as its subject rather than in the will.
Obj. 3. Justice is not an intellectual virtue, since it is not related to knowledge. And so we conclude that it is a moral virtue. But the subjects of moral virtues are powers that are rational by participation, that is, the irascible and concupiscible powers, as the Philosopher makes clear in the Ethics.23 Therefore, justice inheres in the irascible and concupiscible powers rather than in the will as its subject.
On the contrary, Anselm says that “justice is rectitude of the will observed for its own sake.”24
I answer that the power whose acts a virtue aims to direct rightly is the subject of the virtue. But justice is not ordered to direct any cognitive act, since we are not called just because we correctly know things. And so the subject of justice is not the intellect or reason, which is a cognitive power.
But since we are called just because we do things rightly, and the proximate sources of action are appetitive powers, justice needs to inhere in an appetitive power as its subject. And there are two kinds of appetite, namely, the will, which belongs to reason, and the sense appetites resulting from sense perceptions. And sense appetites are divided into the {111} irascible and concupiscible powers, as I maintained in the First Part.25 And rendering to others what is theirs cannot issue from a sense appetite, since sense perception does not reach far enough to be able to consider the relation of one thing to another. Rather, such consideration belongs to reason. And so justice cannot inhere in the irascible and concupiscible powers but can only inhere in the will as its subject. And so the Philosopher defines justice by acts of the will, as what I have said before makes clear.26
Reply Obj. 1. Because the will is a rational appetite, the rectitude of reason, which we call truth, when impressed on the will, retains the name of truth because of the close connection of the will to reason. And so we sometimes call justice truth.
Reply Obj. 2. The will is carried to its object after reason understands the object. And so since reason directs things in relation to other things, the will can will things in relation to others, which belongs to justice.
Reply Obj. 3. “All appetitive powers,” as the Ethics says,27 and not only the irascible and concupiscible powers, are rational by participation. For every appetitive power obeys reason, and the will is one of the appetitive powers. And so the will can be the subject of moral virtues.
We thus proceed to the fifth inquiry. It seems that justice is not virtue in general, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. Justice is classified with other kinds of virtue, as Wis. 8:7 makes clear: “She [wisdom] teaches sobriety and justice, practical wisdom and virtue.” But the general is neither the specific nor listed with the specific contained in the general. Therefore, justice is not virtue in general.
Obj. 2. We designate moderation and courage, like justice, cardinal virtues. But we do not designate moderation and courage virtue in general. Therefore, we should in no respect designate justice virtue in general.
Obj. 3. Justice is always in relation to others, as I have said before.28 But sin against one’s neighbor is not sin in general but contradistinguished from sin against oneself. Therefore, justice is likewise not virtue in general.
On the contrary, the Philosopher says in the Ethics that “justice is every virtue.”29
I answer that, as I have said before,30 justice directs human beings in relation to others. And this happens in two ways. It happens in one way {112} in relation to others individually. It happens in a second way in relation to others in general, namely, as those serving a community serve everyone in the community. Therefore, there can be justice in the strict sense in both ways. But everyone in a community is clearly related to the community as a part to the entire community. And parts belong to the whole. And so also every good of the part can be directed to the good of the whole. Therefore, we can in this respect relate the good of any virtue, whether a virtue directing human beings in relation to themselves or a virtue directing human beings in relation to other individual persons, to the common good, regarding which justice directs. And so the acts of every virtue can belong to justice insofar as justice directs human beings regarding the common good. And in this respect, we call justice virtue in general. And because it belongs to law to direct human beings regarding the common good, as I have maintained before,31 we call justice in general, in the aforementioned way, legal justice. We do so because human beings by observing justice are in accord with the law, which directs the acts of every virtue toward the common good.
Reply Obj. 1. Justice is specific and listed alongside other virtues insofar as it is a special virtue, as I shall explain later,32 and not insofar as it is virtue in general.
Reply Obj. 2. Moderation and courage belong to sense appetites, namely, the concupiscible and irascible powers. And the objects of such powers are particular goods, just as the objects of the senses are particular things. But justice inheres in the intellectual appetite as its subject, and the object of the intellectual appetite can be good in general, which the intellect can understand. And so justice, unlike moderation and courage, can be virtue in general.
Reply Obj. 3. Things regarding oneself can be related to others, especially to the common good. And so also we can call legal justice, insofar as it is directed toward the common good, virtue in general. And we can for the same reason call injustice sin in general. And so 1 Jn. 3:4 says that “every sin is lawlessness.”
We thus proceed to the sixth inquiry. It seems that justice in general is essentially identical with all virtue, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. The Philosopher says in the Ethics that legal justice “is identical with every virtue, but their modality is not the same.”33 But things that {113} differ only in modality or conceptually do not differ essentially. Therefore, justice is essentially the same as all virtue.
Obj. 2. Any virtue that is not essentially the same as all virtue is part of virtue.34 But the aforementioned justice, as the Philosopher says in the same place, “is the whole of virtue, not part of virtue.” Therefore, the aforementioned justice is essentially the same as all virtue.
Obj. 3. Habits do not differ essentially because virtues direct their acts to higher ends. For example, the habit of moderation is essentially the same even if its acts are ordered to the divine good. But it belongs to legal justice that the acts of all virtues be ordered to a higher end, namely, the common good of the people, which surpasses the good of an individual person. Therefore, it seems that legal justice is essentially all virtue.
Obj. 4. Every good of parts can be directed to the good of the whole. And so it seems to be empty and pointless if the good of parts is not directed to the good of the whole. But what concerns virtue cannot be such. Therefore, it seems that no act could belong to any virtue that does not belong to justice in general, which directs acts toward the common good. And so it seems that justice in general is essentially the same as all virtue.
On the contrary, the Philosopher says in the Ethics: “Many are indeed capable of exercising virtue in their own regard but incapable of doing so in matters that relate to others.”35 And he says in the Politics that “the virtue of a good person and a good citizen are not absolutely the same.”36 But the virtue of a good citizen is justice in general, which directs one toward the common good. Therefore, justice in general is not the same as virtue in general, and one can possess the one without possessing the other.
I answer that we speak of things being general in two ways. We speak of things being general in one way by predication. For example, animal is something general in human beings and horses and the like. And general in this sense needs to be essentially the same as the things in which it is something general, since genera belong to the essence of their species and are part of their species’ definitions.
We speak of things being general in a second way regarding their causal power. For example, universal causes are general regarding all their effects, like the sun regarding all material substances, which its power illumines and affects. And general in this sense does not need to be essentially the same as the things in relation to which it is something general, since the essences of such causes and their effects differ.
{114} And it is the latter sense, as I have said before,37 that we say that legal justice is virtue in general, namely, insofar as legal justice directs the acts of other virtues to its end, which is to induce all other virtues by commanding them. For as we can call charity virtue in general insofar as charity directs the acts of all virtues to the divine good, so also we can call legal justice virtue in general insofar as legal justice directs the acts of all virtues to the common good. Therefore, as charity, which regards the divine good as its object, is essentially a special virtue, so also legal justice is essentially a special virtue insofar as legal justice concerns the common good as its object. And so legal justice resides chiefly and architectonically, as it were, in rulers, and secondarily and ministerially, as it were, in subjects.
But we can call any virtue legal justice insofar as that justice, indeed essentially particular but general regarding its causal power, relates virtuous acts to the common good. And in this sense, legal justice is essentially the same as all virtue, although conceptually different. And the Philosopher is speaking in this sense.38
Reply Objs. 1–2. And so the replies to objs. 1 and 2 are clear.
Reply Obj. 3. The argument of this objection is valid about legal justice in the cited sense, as we call the virtues legal justice commands legal justice.
Reply Obj. 4. Every virtue by its nature directs its acts to its peculiar end. But that a virtue be directed to a higher end, whether always or sometimes, does not belong to that virtue by its nature. Rather, another, higher virtue needs to give such direction to a higher end. And so a virtue higher and essentially distinct from every other virtue needs to direct all virtues toward the common good, and that higher virtue is legal justice.
We thus proceed to the seventh inquiry. It seems that there is no particular justice besides justice in general, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. Nothing regarding virtues is superfluous, just as there is nothing superfluous regarding nature. But justice in general suffices to direct everything in relation to others. Therefore, no particular justice is necessary.
Obj. 2. We do not distinguish special virtues by whether one or many things are involved. But legal justice directs human beings in relation to others regarding things that belong to the people, as what I have said before makes clear.39 Therefore, there is no other species of justice that {115} directs human beings in relation to others regarding matters that belong to individual persons.
Obj. 3. Household communities are in between individual persons and the people of a political community. Therefore, if there is a particular justice in relation to individual persons besides justice in general, there should by like reasoning be a household justice to direct human beings in relation to the common good of households. And we indeed do not say this. Therefore, there is no particular justice besides legal justice.
On the contrary, on Mt. 5:6, “Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for justice,” Chrysostom says: “We call justice either virtue in general or the particular virtue contrary to avarice.”40
I answer that, as I have said before,41 legal justice is not essentially all virtue, and there need to be other virtues directly orienting human beings in regard to particular goods, in addition to legal justice, which directly orients human beings to the common good. And these other virtues can indeed be in relation to oneself or in relation to other individual persons. Besides legal justice, therefore, there should be particular virtues that direct human beings regarding themselves (e.g., the virtues of moderation and courage). Just so, besides legal justice, there should be a particular justice that directs human beings regarding things in relation to other individual persons.
Reply Obj. 1. Legal justice indeed suffices to direct human beings in their relations with others, directly regarding the common good and indirectly regarding the good of individual persons. And so there needs to be a particular justice directly orienting human beings to the good of other individual persons.
Reply Obj. 2. The common good of a political community and the individual good of individual persons do not differ only by reason of the number of persons involved. Rather, the two goods differ by a formal difference, for the nature of the common good and the nature of an individual good are different, just as the nature of a whole and the nature of parts of the whole are different. And so the Philosopher says in the Politics: “Those who say that a political community and households and the like differ only by larger or smaller, not specifically, are in error.”42
Reply Obj. 3. As the Philosopher says in the Politics,43 we distinguish household communities by three relationships, namely, “the relationship {116} of husband and wife, the relationship of fathers and children, and the relationship of master and slaves,” and one person in each of these relationships belongs to the other. And so there is no justice absolutely in relation to such a person. Rather, there is a species of justice, namely, household justice, as the Ethics says.44
We thus proceed to the eighth inquiry. It seems that particular justice has no special subject matter, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. A gloss on Gen. 2:14, “The fourth river is the Euphrates,” says: “Euphrates means fruitful. Nor does the text say through what place it flows, since justice belongs to all parts of the soul.”45 But this would not be so if justice were to have special subject matter, since any special subject matter belongs to a special power. Therefore, particular justice has no special subject matter.
Obj. 2. Augustine in his Eighty-Three Questions says that “there are four virtues of the soul whereby one lives spiritually in this life, namely, practical wisdom, moderation, courage, and justice,” and he says that the fourth, justice, “is diffused through all the others.”46 Therefore, particular justice, which is one of the four cardinal virtues, has no special subject matter.
Obj. 3. Justice sufficiently directs human beings in their relations with others. But human beings can be directed in their relations with others in everything belonging to this life. Therefore, the subject matter of justice is general, not special.
On the contrary, the Philosopher in the Ethics designates particular justice as justice particularly regarding things that belong to life in society.47
I answer that everything that reason can rightly direct is the subject matter of moral virtue, which is defined by right reason, as the Philosopher makes clear in the Ethics.48 And reason can rightly direct both internal emotions of the soul and external actions and the external things that human beings come to use. But we consider the relations of human beings to one another by their external actions and the external things that they share with one another, and we consider the rectitude of human beings in their own regard by their internal emotions. And so justice, since it is directed toward others, only concerns external actions and things {117} regarding a special objective aspect, namely, as they relate human beings to one another, and does not regard the whole subject matter of moral virtue.
Reply Obj. 1. Justice indeed belongs essentially to one part of the soul, namely, the will, which indeed induces other parts of the soul to act at the will’s command, and the will is the subject in which justice inheres. And so justice belongs to all parts of the soul as if by diffusion, not directly.
Reply Obj. 2. We understand cardinal virtues in two ways, as I have said before.49 We understand them in one way insofar as they are special virtues having fixed subject matter. We understand them in a second way insofar as they signify general modalities of virtue. And Augustine in the cited text speaks of them in the latter way. For he says that practical wisdom is “knowledge of what we should seek or shun,” moderation “restraint of the lust for fleeting pleasures,” courage “strength of soul to resist transitory trials,” justice “a love of God and neighbor overflowing to the other virtues.”50 And that is to say that justice is the common source of the whole ordering of our relations to others.
Reply Obj. 3. Internal emotions, which are part of the subject matter of moral virtue, are not as such directed toward others, which direction belongs to the nature of justice. Rather, we can direct the effects of our emotions, namely, our external actions, in relation to others. And so it does not follow that the subject matter of justice is general.
We thus proceed to the ninth article. It seems that justice does, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. The Philosopher says in the Ethics that “moral virtue concerns pleasure and anguish.”51 But pleasure (i.e., delight) and anguish are emotions, as I have maintained before when I treated of emotions.52 Therefore, justice, as a moral virtue, concerns emotions.
Obj. 2. Justice directs actions rightly in relation to others. But we can direct such actions rightly only if we direct our emotions rightly, since disordered actions in relation to others result from disordered emotions. For example, adultery results from sexual lust, and theft from excessive love of money. Therefore, justice concerns emotions.
Obj. 3. Legal justice concerns relations to others in the same way that particular justice does. But legal justice concerns emotions. Otherwise, it {118} would not comprehend all virtues, some of which obviously concern emotions. Therefore, justice concerns emotions.
On the contrary, the Philosopher says in the Ethics that justice concerns actions.53
I answer that two things make clear the answer to this question. One, indeed, is the very subject of justice, that is, the will, whose movements or acts are not emotions, as I have maintained before.54 Rather, we call only movements of sense appetites emotions. And so justice does not concern emotions, as do moderation and courage, which belong to the irascible and concupiscible sense appetites.
The second thing making clear the answer to this question regards the subject matter of justice. For justice concerns our relations with others. But our internal emotions are not directly related to others. And so justice does not concern emotions.
Reply Obj. 1. Not every moral virtue concerns pleasure and anguish as its subject matter. For example, courage concerns timidity and temerity. But every moral virtue is directed to pleasure and anguish as consequent ends. For the Philosopher says in the Ethics: “Pleasure and anguish are the chief end regarding which we say that everything such-and-such is evil, and everything such-and-such good.”55 And pleasure and anguish belong to justice in the latter way, since “a just person rejoices in just actions,” as the Ethics says.56
Reply Obj. 2. External actions are in one respect in between external things, which are the subject matter of external actions, and internal emotions, which are the sources of external actions. And there may sometimes be deficiency in one extreme without deficiency in the other extreme. For example, one might steal the possession of another out of a desire to harm the other rather than a desire to possess the thing. Or, conversely, one might covet the possession of another without wanting to steal it. Therefore, it belongs to justice to direct actions rightly insofar as external things are the objects of the actions, but it belongs to other virtues, which concern emotions, to direct actions rightly insofar as the actions arise out of emotions. And so justice prohibits stealing the property of another as contrary to the equality that should be established regarding external things, while generosity prohibits stealing as a consequence of excessive desire of riches. But external actions are specified by the external things that are their objects, not by internal emotions. Therefore, strictly speaking, external actions are the subject matter of justice rather than of other moral virtues.
{119} Reply Obj. 3. The common good is the end of individual persons living in a political community, as the end of a whole is the end of each of its parts. But the end of an individual person is not the end of another. And so legal justice, which is directed to the common good, rather than particular justice, which is directed to the good of another individual person, can comprehend internal emotions, whereby human beings are in one respect disposed regarding themselves. But legal justice more importantly comprehends other virtues regarding their external actions, namely, insofar as “law commands us to perform courageous, moderate, and kind actions,” as the Ethics says.57
We thus proceed to the tenth inquiry. It seems that the mean of justice is not a real mean, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. All the species of a genus retain the nature of the genus. But the Ethics defines moral virtue as “a habit of the will consisting of the mean that reason determines in relation to ourselves.”58 And so there is likewise in justice a mean of reason, not a real mean.
Obj. 2. There is no taking too much or too little regarding things that are absolutely good, and so there is no mean regarding them, as there evidently is in the case of virtues, as the Ethics says.59 But justice concerns absolutely good things, as the Ethics says.60 Therefore, there is no real mean in justice.
Obj. 3. We say that there are means of reason rather than real means in the case of other virtues because we understand those means in relation to different persons, since what is too much for one person is too little for another, as the Ethics says.61 But we observe the same in the case of justice, for we inflict more punishment on one who strikes a ruler than on one who strikes a private citizen. Therefore, justice likewise has a mean of reason, not a real mean.
On the contrary, the Philosopher in the Ethics designates the mean of justice by an arithmetic proportion,62 and such a mean is a real mean.
I answer that, as I have said before,63 other moral virtues concern emotions, whose right direction we consider only in relation to the very human beings to whom the emotions belong, namely, as one recoils or {120} desires as one should in different circumstances. And so we understand the mean of such virtues only in relation to the virtuous person and not by the relation of one thing to another. And so there is only a mean determined by reason in relation to ourselves in those virtues. But the subject matter of justice consists of external actions insofar as they or the things used have the proper relation to other persons. And so the mean of justice consists of the equivalence of an external thing to an external person. But equality is a real mean between greater and lesser, as the Metaphysics says.64 And so justice has a real mean.
Reply Obj. 1. The real mean of justice is also a mean of reason. And so justice retains the nature of moral virtue.
Reply Obj. 2. We can speak of absolutely good in two ways. We can speak of it in one way as good in every way, as, for example, virtues are good in every way. And then we do not understand means and extremes regarding things absolutely good.
We can speak of absolutely good in a second way because something is absolutely good, namely, by its nature, although it could become evil by misuse, as is evidently the case regarding riches and honors. And we can understand excess, defect, and mean in such things in relation to human beings, who can use them either well or ill. And it is in this sense that we say that justice concerns absolutely good things.
Reply Obj. 3. Injury inflicted on a ruler and injury inflicted on a private citizen are different things. And so each type of injury needs to be rectified by different kinds of punishment. And this pertains to a real distinction and not merely a distinction of reason.
We thus proceed to the eleventh inquiry. It seems that acts of justice do not consist of rendering to others what is theirs, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. Augustine in his work On the Trinity assigns “succoring the needy” to justice.65 But in succoring the needy, we render to them what belongs to ourselves, not what belongs to them. Therefore, acts of justice do not consist of rendering to others what is theirs.
Obj. 2. Cicero says in his work On Duties that “beneficence, which we can call kindness and generosity,” belongs to justice.66 But it belongs to generosity to give to others what is one’s own, not what belongs to others. {121} Therefore, acts of justice do not consist of rendering to others what is theirs.
Obj. 3. It belongs to justice both to give things in a proper way and to prohibit injurious actions like murder, adultery, and other such things. But rendering to others what is theirs seems to belong only to giving things. Therefore, the statement that acts of justice consist of rendering to others what is theirs does not sufficiently denote the acts.
On the contrary, Ambrose says in his work On Duties: “Justice consists of rendering to others what is theirs, of not laying claim to the property of another, of disregarding one’s own benefit in order to respect common equity.”67
I answer that, as I have said,68 the subject matter of justice consists of external actions insofar as the order of justice equates them or the things they use to other persons. But we say that what is due others in equal proportion belongs to them. And so the proper act of justice consists only of rendering to others what is theirs.
Reply Obj. 1. Other, secondary virtues (e.g., mercy, generosity, and the like) are joined to justice, which is a cardinal virtue, as I shall explain later.69 And so we attribute succoring the needy, which belongs to mercy or gratitude, and generous beneficence, which belongs to generosity, to justice as the chief virtue on which they are founded.
Reply Obj. 2. The foregoing makes clear the reply to obj. 2.
Reply Obj. 3. The Philosopher says in the Ethics that we by extension call everything excessive in matters of justice gain, just as we call everything deficient in such matters loss.70 And we do so because justice is first and more commonly practiced in voluntary exchanges of things (e.g., buying and selling), regarding which we use the words gain and loss in the strict sense. And the words are then extended to everything regarding which there can be a matter of justice. And the same reasoning applies to rendering to others what is theirs.
We thus proceed to the twelfth inquiry. It seems that justice is not the most important moral virtue, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. It belongs to justice to render to others what is theirs. But it belongs to generosity to give to others what is one’s own, and this is more virtuous. Therefore, generosity is a greater virtue than justice.
Obj. 2. Only something more worthy adorns something else. But {122} “magnanimity is the adornment” of justice and “of all virtues,” as the Ethics says.71 Therefore, magnanimity is more excellent than justice.
Obj. 3. Virtue concerns “the difficult” and “the desirable,” as the Ethics says.72 But courage concerns more difficult things than justice does, namely, “the risk of death,” as the Ethics says.73 Therefore, courage is more excellent than justice.
On the contrary, Cicero says in his work On Duties: “Justice has the greatest virtuous splendor, and we call human beings good by reason of it.”74
I answer that if we should be speaking of legal justice, justice is clearly the most important moral virtue, since the common good surpasses the individual good of individual persons. And so the Philosopher says in the Ethics: “Justice seems to be the most distinguished virtue, and neither the evening nor the morning star is so wonderful.”75
But even if we should be speaking of particular justice, justice is the most important moral virtue for two reasons. And we can understand the first reason in regard to the subject in which justice inheres, namely, in that justice inheres in the more excellent part of the soul, that is, the rational appetite, the will. But other moral virtues inhere in sense appetites, to which emotions, the subject matter of those virtues, belong.
We understand the second reason regarding the object. For we praise other moral virtues only by reason of virtuous persons themselves. But we praise justice insofar as virtuous persons are related rightly to others, and so justice is in one respect the good of others, as the Ethics says.76 And so the Philosopher says in the Rhetoric: “The greatest virtues are necessarily those that are the most worthy in the eyes of others, since virtue is beneficent power. People most honor the brave and the just because courage benefits others in time of war, and justice benefits others both in war and in peace.”77
Reply Obj. 1. Generous persons, although they give from what is theirs, do so as they consider their own virtuous good. But just persons give to others what belongs to others as just persons consider the common good. Moreover, one observes justice toward all, but generosity cannot be extended to everyone. And, again, generosity, where one gives from one’s own possessions, is founded on justice, which upholds the right of owners to their possessions.
Reply Obj. 2. Magnanimity increases the goodness of justice insofar as the former adds to the latter virtue. But magnanimity without justice would not have any virtuous character.
{123} Reply Obj. 3. Courage concerns more difficult things but not better things, since it is useful only in time of war, while justice is useful both in peace and in war, as I have said.78
1Justinian, Digest I, title 1, c. 10.
2EthicsV, 1 (1129a7–11).
3On Truth 12 (PL 158:480).
4On the Morals of the Church 15 (PL 32:1322).
5ST II–II, Q. 58, AA. 2, 8.
6Etymologies X, n. 125 (PL 82:380).
7Ethics II, 4 (1105a31—b5).
8Ibid., III, 1 (1109b35–1110a1).
9Ibid., V, 5 (1134a1–3).
10Commentary on the Gospel of John, tr. 40, n. 9 (PL 35:1690).
11Aristotle, EthicsV, 4 (1132a21–5); V, 6 (1134b1–2).
12ST II–II, Q. 25, A. 1.
13On the Morals of the Church 15 (PL 32:1322).
14On Duties I, 7.
15ST II–II, Q. 57, A. 1.
16ST I–II: Q. 60, A. 2; Q. 61, A. 3; Q. 113, A. 1.
17EthicsV, 11 (1138b5–14).
18ST I–II, Q. 113, A. 1.
19On Duties II, 6, n. 23 (PL 16:109).
20Metaphysics IX, 8 (1050a30—b2).
21Morals II, 49, n. 76 (PL 75:592).
22On Duties I, 7.
23Ethics I, 13 (1102b30).
24On Truth 12 (PL 158:482).
25ST I, Q. 81, A. 2.
26ST II–I, Q. 58, A 1, obj. 1.
27See n. 23, supra.
28ST II–II, Q. 58, A. 2.
29EthicsV, 1 (1130a9–10).
30ST II–II, Q. 58, A. 2.
31ST I–II, Q. 90, A. 2.
32ST II–II, Q. 58, A. 7.
33EthicsV, 1 (1130a12–3).
34Ibid. (1130a9–10).
35Ibid. (1129b33–1130a1).
36Politics III, 2 (1277a22).
37ST II–II, Q. 58, A. 5.
38See obj. 1.
39ST II–II, Q. 58, AA. 5, 6.
40Homilies on the Gospel of Matthew, homily 15 (PG 57:227).
41ST II–II, Q. 58, A. 6.
42Politics I, 1 (1252a7–10).
43Ibid., 2 (1253b6–8).
44Aristotle, EthicsV, 6 (1134b8–9).
45Glossa ordinaria, on Gen. 2:14 (PL 113:87).
46Eighty-Three Questions, q. 61, n. 4 (PL 40:51).
47EthicsV, 2 (1130b31–3).
48Ibid., II, 6 (1107a1–2).
49ST I–II, Q. 61, AA. 3, 4.
50See n. 46, supra.
51Ethics II, 3 (1104b8–9).
52ST I–II: Q. 23, A. 4; Q. 31, A. 1; Q. 35, A. 1.
53EthicsV, 1 (1129a3–5).
54ST I–II: Q. 22, A. 3; Q. 59, A. 4.
55Ethics VII, 11 (1152b2–3).
56Ibid., I, 8 (1099a18–21).
57Ibid., V, 1 (1129b19–25).
58Ibid., II, 6 (1106b36–1107a2).
59Ibid. (1107a22–7).
60Ibid., V, 1 (1129b5–6).
61Ibid., II, 6 (1106a36—b7).
62Ibid., V, 4 (1132a1–7, 25–30).
63ST II–II, Q. 58, A. 2, ad 4; A. 8; I–II, Q. 60, A. 2.
64Aristotle, Metaphysics X, 5 (1056a18–24).
65On the Trinity XIV, 9 (PL 42:1046).
66On Duties I, 7.
67On Duties I, 24 (PL 16:57).
68ST II–II, Q. 58, AA. 8, 10.
69ST II–II, Q. 80.
70EthicsV, 4 (1132b11–20).
71Ibid., I V, 3 (1124a1–4).
72Ibid., II, 3 (1105a9–13).
73Ibid., III, 6 (1115a24–27).
74On Duties I, 7.
75Ethics V, 1 (1129b27–9).
76Ibid. (1130a3–8).
77Rhetoric I, 8 (1366b3–7).
78At the conclusion of the body of the article.