A. 6. Are Christians Obliged to Obey Secular Authorities?
{173}
In ST II–II, Thomas holds: that the natural law and the divine law oblige human beings to obey other human beings (A. 1); that obedience of superiors is part of justice (A. 2); that the theological virtue of charity is greater than the natural moral virtue of obedience (A. 3); that God should be obeyed in all things (A. 4); that subjects should obey human superiors only insofar as the former are subject to the latter, and insofar as the latter command nothing contrary to what God commands (A. 5); that Christians are obliged to obey secular rulers (A. 6).
In ST II–II, Q. 60, A. 6, Thomas says that subjects are not obliged to obey laws or legal judgments unsanctioned by public authority, but he also there (ad 3) upholds the authority of spiritual superiors (bishops and pope) to issue commands in temporal affairs regarding matters subject to them. On other comments by him on church-state relations, see selections from the CS in Chapter 7.
In ST II–II, Q, 42, A. 2, Thomas bluntly calls any rebellion a mortal sin but excludes resistance against tyrants from his definition of rebellion. For a more detailed treatment by him on resistance of tyrants, see
We thus proceed to the first inquiry. It seems that one human being is not obliged to obey another, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. One should not do anything contrary to what God has ordained. But God has ordained that human beings rule themselves by their own practical reason, as Sir. 15:14 says: “God established human beings at the beginning and left them in the hands of their own practical reason.” Therefore, one human being is not obliged to obey another.
Obj. 2. If one person were obliged to obey another, the will of the latter would necessarily constitute the rule of the former’s action. But only the divine will, which is always correct, is the rule of human action. Therefore, human beings are obliged to obey no one but God.
{174} Obj. 3. The more freely rendered the service, the more acceptable it is to God. But what human beings do out of obligation is not freely rendered. Therefore, if human beings were strictly obliged to obey others regarding performance of good deeds, good deeds done out of obedience would by that very fact be rendered less acceptable to God. Therefore, human beings are not obliged to obey other human beings.
On the contrary, Heb. 13:17 says: “Obey your superiors and be subject to them.”
I answer that as natural powers cause the activities of things of nature, so also the human will causes human activities. But it was fitting that higher things of nature, by reason of the preeminent natural powers God bestowed on them, move lower things of nature. And so also it is fitting in regard to human affairs that superiors by their will, by reason of the power of authority ordained by God, move inferiors to their activities. But to cause things by reason and will is to command. And so as lower things of nature need to be subject to the causal influence of higher things of nature by reason of the natural order God established, so also regarding human affairs, inferiors are obliged by the order of natural and divine law to obey their superiors.
Reply Obj. 1. God left human beings in the hands of their practical reason because the free choice of their will and not necessity of nature, as in the case of irrational creatures, determines what they are to do, and not because it would be lawful for human beings to do whatever they wish. And as one should act by one’s practical reason in doing other things, so also one should act in obeying superiors. For Gregory says in his work Morals: “When we humbly submit to the bidding of another, we conquer our inner selves.”1
Reply Obj. 2. The divine rule is the primary will, and that rule directs all rational wills. But one rational will approximates the divine will more than another regarding the order God has established. And so the will of one human being issuing a command can be, as it were, a secondary rule for the will of another human being obeying the command.
Reply Obj. 3. We can deem things freely willed in two ways. We can consider things freely willed in one way regarding the deeds themselves, namely, that human beings are not obliged to do them. We can consider things freely willed in a second way regarding those who perform the deeds, namely, that they do them of their own free will. But deeds are rendered virtuous and praiseworthy and meritorious precisely because they are done willingly. And so, although obedience is obligatory, its merit is {175} not on that account diminished if one should obey with a ready will. And this is especially true about obeying God, who sees both external deeds and the internal will.
We thus proceed to the second inquiry. It seems that obedience is not a special virtue, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. Disobedience is contrary to obedience. But disobedience is sin in general, for Ambrose says that sin is “disobedience of the divine law.”2 Therefore, obedience is virtue in general, not a special virtue.
Obj. 2. Every special virtue is either a theological virtue or a moral virtue. But obedience is not a theological virtue, since it is not part of faith or hope or charity. Likewise, it is not a moral virtue, since it is not the mean between too much and too little. For example, the more obedient one is, the more one is praised. Therefore, obedience is not a special virtue.
Obj. 3. Gregory says in his work Morals: “The less obedience regards oneself, the more meritorious and praiseworthy it is.”3 But the more every special virtue regards oneself, the more it is praised, since virtue requires one to exercise one’s will and choice, as the Ethics says.4 Therefore, obedience is not a special virtue.
Obj. 4. Virtues differ specifically by their objects. But the object of obedience seems to be the command of a superior, and the commands of superiors seem to vary in as many ways as there are different grades of superiors. Therefore, obedience is virtue in general, including many special virtues.
On the contrary, some designate obedience part of justice,5 as I have said before.6
I answer that we define special virtues in relation to all good deeds that have a special praiseworthy character, since it belongs strictly to virtue “to make deeds good.”7 But the divinely established order of things obliges us to obey superiors, as I have shown.8 And so obeying superiors is good, since good consists of a “mode, species, and order” of being, as Augustine says in his work On the Nature of Good.9 And such an act has a special praiseworthy character from its special object.
{176} For although inferiors should evidence many things to their superiors, one of these things, the obligation of inferiors to obey the commands of superiors, is special. And so obedience is a special virtue, and its special object is a superior’s tacit or express command. For the will of a superior, howsoever the superior makes it known, is a tacit command, and the more one understands the will of a superior and by obeying it anticipates an express command, the readier the obedience seems.
Reply Obj. 1. Nothing prevents two special aspects regarding two special virtues from both being present in one and the same material object. For example, soldiers in defending a king’s fort perform courageous acts by standing fast in the face of the danger of death for the sake of a good end and acts of justice by rendering proper service to their lord. Therefore, the aspect of command, which obedience regards, accompanies some but not all acts of every virtue, since not all virtuous acts fall under precept, as I have maintained before.10 Likewise, some things pertaining to no other virtue sometimes fall under precept, as is evident in the case of things that are evil only because they are prohibited.
Therefore, obedience, if we should understand it in the strict sense as intentionally regarding the formal aspect of command, will be a special virtue, and disobedience a special sin. In this respect, obedience will require that one perform acts of justice or another virtue with the intention of carrying out a superior’s command, and disobedience will require that one actually contemn a superior’s command.
But if we should understand obedience broadly as carrying out anything that can fall under precept, and disobedience as failing to do so, with whatever intention, then obedience will be virtue in general, and disobedience will be sin in general.
Reply Obj. 2. Obedience is not a theological virtue, since its intrinsic object is not God. Rather, its intrinsic object is the command of any superior, whether the command be expressed or implied, that is, merely a word indicating a religious superior’s will, which a subject readily obeys, as Tit. 3:1 says: “Remind them to obey at a superior’s word.”
But obedience is a moral virtue, since it is part of justice, and a mean between too much and too little. And we do not consider excess of obedience regarding how much obedience there is, but regarding other circumstances, namely, as one obeys either someone that one should not, or in matters that one should not, just as I have said before about religion.11
{177} And we can say in the case of justice that there is excess in one who keeps the property of another, and deficiency in one whose property is not returned, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics.12 Just so, obedience is a mean between the excess we note regarding those who withhold proper obedience to a superior, since such persons excessively follow their own will, and the deficiency we note regarding superiors whom disobedient subjects do not obey. And so obedience in this respect will not be a mean between two evils, as I have said before about justice.13
Reply Obj. 3. Obedience, just like any virtue, should have a ready will for its proper object and not for the contrary. But the proper object of obedience is a superior’s command, which indeed comes from the will of another. And so obedience renders the will of human beings ready to carry out the will of another, namely, of the one issuing a command.
And if subjects will to carry out the things commanded for their own sake, even apart from the aspect of command, as happens in favorable matters, subjects then strive for the commanded things by their own will and seem to carry out the command because of their own will and not because of the command. But if subjects in no way intrinsically will the things commanded, which are, absolutely speaking, contrary to their will, as happens in difficult matters, then it is completely evident that subjects carry out the commanded things only because of the command. And so Gregory says in his work Morals that “obedience that partially regards oneself in favorable matters is lesser or nothing,”14 namely, in that such a subject’s will seems chiefly to strive to carry out a superior’s command in order to acquire what the subject wills, not in order to carry out the command. “But,” says Gregory,15 “obedience in hard or difficult matters is greater,” since a subject’s will strives only to carry out the command.
Still, we should understand this regarding external appearances. But in the judgment of God, who searches hearts, obedience even in favorable matters, obedience partially regarding oneself, may not be less praiseworthy on that account if, namely, an obedient subject’s will should strive no less eagerly to carry out a superior’s command.
Reply Obj. 4. Reverence directly regards the excellence of a person, and so there are different kinds of reverence in relation to different aspects of excellence. And obedience regards a command from a preeminent person and so belongs to one and the same aspect of excellence. But since one should obey a superior’s command because of reverence for the superior’s {178} person, all obedience consequently belongs to the same species, although the causes giving rise to obedience differ specifically.
We thus proceed to the third inquiry. It seems that obedience is the greatest virtue, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. 1 Sam. 15:22 says: “Obedience is better than sacrifice.” But offering sacrifices belongs to religion, which is the most powerful moral virtue, as is evident from what I have said before.16 Therefore, obedience is the most powerful virtue.
Obj. 2. Gregory says in his work Morals: “Obedience is the only virtue that sows other virtues in our mind and preserves them when planted.”17 But causes are more powerful than their effects. Therefore, obedience is more powerful than all the other virtues.
Obj. 3. Gregory says in his work Morals: “Obedience never causes evil, although it sometimes obliges us to postpone good deeds.”18 But we postpone things only for better things. Therefore, obedience, for which we postpone the good deeds of other virtues, is better than other virtues.
On the contrary, obedience is praiseworthy because it is the product of charity. For Gregory says in his work Morals: “We should observe obedience with affectionate love, not servile fear; with love of justice, not fear of punishment.”19 Therefore, charity is a more powerful virtue than obedience.
I answer that, as sin consists of human beings adhering to transitory goods and contemning God, so, contrariwise, the merit of virtuous acts consists of human beings adhering to God and contemning created goods. But ends are more powerful than means. Therefore, if one should contemn created goods in order to adhere to God, one’s virtue is more praiseworthy because one adheres to God than because one contemns earthly goods. And so the virtues whereby one adheres to God as such, namely, the theological virtues, are more powerful than the moral virtues, whereby one contemns earthly things in order to adhere to God.
And regarding moral virtues, the more one contemns things in order to adhere to God, the more powerful the virtue. But there are three kinds of human goods that human beings can contemn for the sake of God. The lowest kind are external goods; the middle kind are goods of the body; the highest kind are goods of the soul, the chief of which is the will, namely, {179} insofar as human beings use all other goods by means of the will. And so, absolutely speaking, the virtue of obedience, which contemns one’s own will for the sake of God, is more praiseworthy than other moral virtues, which contemn other particular goods for the sake of God. And so Gregory says in his work Morals: “We rightly prefer obedience to sacrifices, since sacrifices offer up the flesh of another, but obedience offers up one’s own will.”20
And so also all other virtuous deeds are meritorious with God because they are done in order to obey God’s will. For example, if one were even to undergo martyrdom or to give away all one’s possessions to the poor, such deeds could only be meritorious if they were ordered to fulfilling God’s will, which rightly belongs to obedience. Just so, neither could such deeds be meritorious if one were to do them without charity, which cannot exist apart from obedience. For 1 Jn. 2:4–5 says: “Those who say they know God but do not keep his commandments are liars. And love of God is truly perfect in those who keep his words.” And this is so because friendship causes friends to know and will the same thing.21
Reply Obj. 1. Reverence, which shows respect and honor to superiors, generates obedience. And in this regard, different virtues include obedience, although obedience, absolutely speaking, as regards the aspect of command, is a special virtue. Therefore, insofar as reverence of religious superiors generates obedience, the former virtue includes the latter in that respect. And insofar as reverence of parents generates obedience, filial piety includes obedience in that respect. And insofar as reverence of God generates obedience, the latter virtue is included in religion and belongs to devotion, which is the chief act of religion. And so obeying God is in this respect more praiseworthy than offering sacrifices. And obeying God is also more praiseworthy because “the flesh of another is offered in sacrifices, but obedience offers up one’s own will,” as Gregory says.22
But specifically regarding the case about which Samuel was speaking, it would have been better if Saul had obeyed God than if he, contrary to God’s command, had offered the fat animals of the Amalekites in sacrifice.23
Reply Obj. 2. All virtuous acts belong to obedience insofar as they are done in response to commands. Therefore, Gregory says that obedience sows all the virtues in our mind and preserves them insofar as virtuous acts operate causally or dispositively to generate and preserve virtues.
But there are two reasons why it does not follow that obedience, absolutely speaking, has priority over all the other virtues. The first {180} reason, indeed, is because one can perform virtuous acts without adverting to the aspect of command, even though the acts fall under a command. And so if a virtue be one whose object by nature has priority over a command, we say that such a virtue by nature has priority over obedience. For example, this is clearly the case regarding the virtue of faith, which makes the supremacy of God’s authority known to us, and this authority gives him the power to command. The second reason is because the infusion of grace and virtues can precede, even temporally, every kind of virtuous act. And so obedience has neither temporal nor natural priority over all the other virtues.
Reply Obj. 3. There are two kinds of good. One is the kind that human beings are necessarily obliged to do (e.g., to love God and suchlike). And human beings should never omit such goods for the sake of obedience. But the other kind human beings are not necessarily obliged to do. And human beings should sometimes omit such good deeds for the sake of obedience, which they are necessarily obliged to observe, since they should not commit sin in order to do good deeds. And yet, as Gregory says in the same place: “Those who prohibit their subjects any one good, need to allow them many others, lest the spirit of obedient subjects completely wither if it be starved by the complete denial of all goods.”24 And so obedience and other goods can recompense the loss of one good.
We thus proceed to the fourth inquiry. It seems that one should not obey God in all things, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. Mt. 9:30–1 says that the Lord commanded two blind men he had cured: “ ‘Tell no one.’ But they, going away, broadcast the story about him throughout the region.” And yet the Gospel does not blame them for that. Therefore, it seems that we are not obliged to obey God in all things.
Obj. 2. No one is obliged to do anything contrary to virtue. But some of God’s commands are contrary to virtue. For example, God commanded Abraham to kill his innocent son (Gen. 22:2) and the Jews to steal property of the Egyptians (Ex. 11:2), which commands are contrary to justice, and Hosea to take an adulterous wife (Hos. 1:2; 3:1), which command is contrary to chastity. Therefore, one should not obey God in all things.
Obj. 3. Those who obey God conform their wills to his even in the object willed. But we are not obliged to conform our will to God’s {181} regarding everything in the object willed, as I have maintained before.25 Therefore, human beings are not obliged to obey God in all things.
On the contrary, Ex. 24:7 says: “We shall do all the things the Lord has spoken, and we shall obey him.”
I answer that as I have said before,26 the commands of superiors move obedient subjects to act, as natural agents cause things of nature to move. But as God is the primary cause of the movement of everything moved physically, so also is he the primary cause of the movement of all wills, as is evident from what I have said before.27 And so as natural necessity subjects all things of nature to God’s causal activity, so also a requirement of justice obliges all created wills to obey his commands.
Reply Obj. 1. The Lord did not tell the blind men to keep quiet about the miracle as if intending the force of God’s command to oblige them. Rather, as Gregory says in his work Morals,28 “He gave an example to his servants to imitate him, that they themselves should desire to keep their virtues hidden. And yet the disciples, contrary to their desire, would become celebrated in order that others profit by their example.”
Reply Obj. 2. God does not act contrary to nature, since “the nature of everything is what God causes in it,” as a gloss on Rom. 11:24 says.29 Rather, God causes some things contrary to the ordinary course of nature. Just so, God cannot command anything contrary to virtue, since the virtue and rectitude of a human will consist chiefly of it being conformed to God’s will and obeying his commands, although the commands are contrary to the usual way of virtue. Accordingly, therefore, God’s command to Abraham to kill his innocent son was not contrary to justice, since God is the author of life and death.
Likewise, God’s command to the Jews to take the property of the Egyptians was not contrary to justice, since all property belongs to him, and he gives it to whomever he wants.
Likewise, God’s command to Hosea to take an adulterous wife was not contrary to chastity, since God himself ordains human generation, and the means of sexual union of man and woman that God appoints is a fit means.
And so the aforementioned individuals evidently did not sin either in obeying God or in willing to obey him.
Reply Obj. 3. Although human beings are not always obliged to will what God wills, they are nonetheless obliged to will what God wants them to will. But God’s commands make the latter most known to human {182} beings. And so human beings are obliged to obey his commands in all things.
We thus proceed to the fifth inquiry. It seems that subjects are obliged to obey their superiors in all things, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. The Apostle says in Col. 3:20: “Children, obey your parents in everything.” And v. 22 adds: “Slaves, obey your earthly masters in all things.” Therefore, by like reasoning, other subjects should obey their religious superiors in all things.
Obj. 2. Religious superiors are intermediaries between God and subjects, as Dt. 5:5 says: “I [Moses] was a go-between and intermediary between God and you at that time, to declare his words to you.” But there are intermediaries only between two ends. Therefore, we should regard religious superiors’ commands as God’s commands. And so also the Apostle says in Gal. 4:14: “You received me as an angel of God, as Christ Jesus.” And he says in 1 Th. 2:13: “When you received the word of God that you heard from us, you received it as the word of God, as it truly is, and not as human words.” Therefore, as human beings should obey God in all things, so also should they obey religious superiors in all things.
Obj. 3. As religious by their profession vow poverty and chastity, so also do they vow obedience. But religious are obliged to observe chastity and poverty in all respects. Therefore, they should likewise obey religious superiors in all things.
On the contrary, Acts 5:29 says: “One should obey God rather than human beings.” But the commands of religious superiors are sometimes contrary to God’s commands. Therefore, one should not obey religious superiors in all things.
I answer that, as I have said,30 as the power of natural agents necessarily causes change in things of nature, a requirement of justice causes obedient subjects to act at the command of superiors. But there are two ways in which natural agents may fail to cause things of nature to change. Such may happen in one way because the stronger power of another cause prevents change. For example, fire does not burn wood if the stronger power of water should keep the wood from burning. It may happen in a second way because of a deficient relation of the changeable thing to the cause of change, since the changeable thing is subject to the cause in one but not all respects. For example, liquids are sometimes subject to the {183} process of heating as to being heated but not as to being vaporized or destroyed.
And there are likewise two ways in which subjects may not be obliged to obey superiors in all things. This can happen in one way because of the command of a higher power. For example, a gloss on Rom. 13:2, “Those who resist bring damnation on themselves,” says: “If a provincial official should command something, is it not obvious that you should do nothing if the command runs counter to a command of the governor? Also, if the governor himself should command one thing, and the emperor another, is it not obvious that you should obey the emperor and disobey the governor? Therefore, if the emperor should command one thing, and God another, you should obey God and disobey the emperor.”31
Subjects are not obliged to obey superiors in a second way if their superiors command things regarding which the subjects are not subject to the superiors. For example, Seneca says in his work On Benefits: “One errs if one thinks that a slave’s status involves the whole human being. A slave’s better part is excluded from a master’s control. Slaves’ bodies are subject and ascribed to their masters, but slaves’ inner selves indeed belong to themselves.”32 And so human beings are obliged to obey only God, not human beings, regarding things that belong to interior acts of the will.
And human beings are obliged to obey human beings regarding external deeds that require the use of the body to perform. But human beings are obliged to obey only God, not human beings, even regarding such things insofar as the things belong to the body’s nature (e.g., things proper to sustaining the body and to begetting offspring), since all human beings are by nature equal. And so slaves are not obliged to obey their masters, nor children their parents, in regard to contracting marriage or observing virginity, or such like.
But regarding things that pertain to the disposition of their activities and of human affairs, subjects are obliged to obey their superiors insofar as the latter are constituted such. For example, soldiers are obliged to obey their commanders in military matters, slaves their masters in performing servile tasks, children their parents in matters of life training and household chores, and the like.
Reply Obj. 1. We should understand the words of the Apostle, “in everything,” to refer to things proper to the legitimate authority of parents or masters.
{184} Reply Obj. 2. Human beings are absolutely subject to God regarding all things, both internal and external. And so human beings are obliged to obey God in all things. But human beings are subject to their superiors regarding particular things in fixed ways, not regarding all things. And regarding those particular things, superiors are intermediaries between God and their subjects. And regarding other things, human beings are directly subject to God, who instructs them by the natural law or Scripture.
Reply Obj. 3. Religious promise obedience regarding observance of their congregation’s rule, which subjects them to their religious superiors. And so religious are obliged to obey their religious superiors only regarding matters that may belong to observance of the rule. And this is enough obedience for salvation. But if religious should wish also to obey in other matters, this will belong to greater perfection, provided that the things be not contrary to God’s command or profession of the rule, since the latter obedience is unlawful.
Therefore, we distinguish three kinds of obedience: one kind sufficient for salvation, namely, obedience regarding obligatory matters; a second, perfect kind, namely, obedience regarding all lawful matters; a third, indiscriminate kind, namely, obedience even regarding unlawful matters.
We thus proceed to the sixth inquiry. It seems that Christians are not obliged to obey secular authorities, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. A gloss on Mt. 17:26, “Therefore, the sons are free,” says: “If the sons of a reigning king are free in every kingdom, then the sons of the king to whom all kingdoms are subject should be free in every king-dom.”33 But faith in Christ constitutes Christians sons of God, as Jn. 1:12 says: “He gave the power to become sons of God to those who believe in his name.” Therefore, Christians are not obliged to obey secular authorities.
Obj. 2. Rom. 7:4 says: “The body of Christ made you dead to the law,” and the text is speaking about the divine law of the Old Testament. But human law, which subjects human beings to secular authorities, is a lesser law than the divine law of the Old Testament. Therefore, much more are human beings, by being constituted members of the body of Christ, freed from the law of subjection that binds them to secular rulers.
{185} Obj. 3. Human beings are not obliged to obey robbers, who use force against them. But Augustine says in The City of God: “If justice is absent, what are kingdoms but large-scale robberies?”34 Therefore, since the secular power of rulers is very often unjustly exercised or unjustly usurped, it seems that Christians need not obey secular rulers.
On the contrary, Tit. 3:1 says: “Warn them to be subject to rulers and authorities.” And 1 Pet. 2:13–4 says: “For the sake of God, be subject to every human creature, whether to kings as supreme rulers or to governors as the rulers’ deputies.”
I answer that faith in Christ is the source and cause of justice, as Rom. 3:22 speaks of “the righteousness of God through faith in Jesus Christ.” And so faith in Christ confirms rather than takes away the order of justice. But the order of justice requires that subjects obey their superiors, since stability in human affairs could not otherwise be maintained. And so faith in Christ does not excuse the faithful from being obliged to obey secular rulers.
Reply Obj. 1. As I have said before,35 the servitude that subjects one human being to another belongs to the body, not to the soul, which remains free. But now, in the condition of this life, the grace of Christ frees us from deficiencies of the soul, not from those of the body, as the Apostle makes clear about himself in Rom. 7:25: “I serve God’s law with my reason, but I serve the law of sin with my flesh.” And so those whom grace makes children of God are freed from the spiritual servitude of sin but not from bodily servitude, which holds them bound to their earthly masters, as a gloss on 1 Tim. 6:1, “Let all under the yoke of slavery,” etc., says.36
Reply Obj. 2. The Old Law prefigures the New Testament and so had to cease when the truth of the New Testament came into force. But there is no comparison between the Old Law and human law, which subjects human beings to other human beings. And yet the divine law also obliges human beings to obey human beings.
Reply Obj. 3. Human beings are obliged to obey secular rulers insofar as the order of justice requires. And so if secular rulers have usurped power and have no just authority, or if secular rulers command unjust things, subjects are not obliged to obey them, except, perhaps incidentally, in order to avoid scandal or danger.
1Morals XXXV, 14, n. 28 (PL 76:765).
2On Paradise 8, n. 39 (PL 14:292).
3Morals XXXV, 14, n. 30 (PL 76:766).
4Aristotle, Ethics II, 4 (1105a31—b5).
5E.g., William of Auvergne, On Virtues and Morals 12.
6ST II–II, Q. 80, A.1, obj. 3.
7Aristotle, Ethics II, 6 (1106a15–23).
8ST II–II, Q. 104, A. 1.
9On the Nature of Good 3 (PL 42:553).
10ST I–II: Q. 96, A. 3; Q. 100, A. 2.
11ST II–II, Q. 81, A. 5, ad 3.
12EthicsV, 4 (1132a10–2, b11–2).
13ST II–II, Q. 58, A. 10, ad 2.
14Morals XXXV, 14, n. 30 (PL 76:766).
15Ibid.
16ST II–II, Q. 81, A. 6.
17Morals XXXV, 14, n. 28 (PL 76:765).
18Ibid., n. 29 (PL 76:766).
19Ibid., n. 32 (PL 76:768).
20Ibid., n. 28 (PL 76:765).
21Cf. Cicero, On Friendship 17.
22Morals XXXV, 14, n. 28 (PL 76:765).
231 Sam. 15:23, 26.
24Morals XXXV, 14, n. 29 (PL 76:766).
25ST I–II, Q. 19, A. 10.
26ST II–II, Q. 104, A. 1.
27ST I–II, Q. 9, A. 6
28Morals XIX, 23, n. 36 (PL 76:120).
29Glossa ordinaria, on Rom. 11:24 (PL 114:508); Peter Lombard, Glossa (PL 191:1488).
30ST II–II, Q. 104, AA. 1, 4.
31Peter Lombard, Glossa, on Rom. 13:2 (PL 191:1505).
32On Benefits III, 20.
33Glossa ordinaria, on Mt. 17:25 (PL 114:145).
34The City of God IV, 4 (PL 41:115).
35ST II–II, Q. 104, A. 5.
36Glossa ordinaria, on 1 Tim. 6:1 (PL 114:631); Peter Lombard, Glossa (PL 192:375).