A. 3. Do Distributive and Commutative Justice Have Different Subject Matter?
[This question is divided into four articles, three of which are translated here.]
We thus proceed to the first inquiry. It seems that we inappropriately designate distributive and commutative justice species of justice, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. What harms the people cannot be a species of justice, since justice is directed to the common good. But distributing the goods of the community to many persons harms the common good of the people both because the riches of the community are thereby depleted, and because the morals of citizens are thereby corrupted. For example, Cicero says in his work On Duties: “Those who receive benefits become worse and quicker to expect to receive benefits again and again.”1 Therefore, distributing common goods does not belong to any species of justice.
Obj. 2. Acts of justice consist of rendering to others what is theirs, as I have maintained before.2 But in distributing goods, things that belonged to the community, not things that belonged to individuals, are newly distributed to individuals. Therefore, such does not belong to justice.
Obj. 3. Justice can belong to rulers or subjects, as I have maintained before.3 But distributing common goods always belongs to rulers. Therefore, such distribution does not belong to justice.
Obj. 4. “Distributive justice regards common goods,” as the Ethics says.4 But common things belong to legal justice. Therefore, distributive justice is a species of legal justice, not of particular justice.
Obj. 5. The number of things affected does not distinguish specific virtues. But commutative justice consists of rendering things to individual {124} persons, while distributive justice consists of giving things to many persons. Therefore, they are not different species of justice.
On the contrary, the Philosopher in the Ethics designates two parts of justice, and he says that “one part directs distributions, and the other part directs exchanges.”5
I answer that, as I have said,6 particular justice is directed to private persons, who are related to the political community as parts to a whole. And we can consider two relationships regarding parts. There is indeed one relationship of parts to other parts, and the relationship of one private person to another is such. And commutative justice, which consists of mutual exchanges between two persons, directs this relationship.
We consider a second relationship of a whole to its parts, and the relationship of community goods to individual persons is such. And distributive justice, which distributes common goods to individual persons proportionally, directs this relationship. And so there are two species of justice, namely, commutative and distributive justice.
Reply Obj. 1. As we praise moderation and condemn excess in the largess of private persons, so also rulers should observe moderation in the distribution of common goods, which distributive justice directs.
Reply Obj. 2. As parts and a whole are in one respect identical, so what belongs to a whole belongs in one respect to its parts. And so since common goods are distributed to individual persons, individual persons in a sense receive what is theirs.
Reply Obj. 3. The actual distribution of common goods belongs only to those in charge of the goods, but distributive justice also belongs to the subjects receiving the goods, namely, as the subjects are content with just distributions. But sometimes goods common to a household, not to the political community, are distributed, and the authority of a private person can accomplish such a distribution.
Reply Obj. 4. We specify movements by their final termini. And so it belongs to legal justice to direct the possessions of private persons to the common good, and, conversely, it belongs to particular justice to direct the common good to individual persons by distributing common goods to them.
Reply Obj. 5. We distinguish distributive and commutative justice both by the number of persons affected and by the different nature of the obligations involved. For common goods are due to individuals in one way, and private goods in another way.
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We thus proceed to the second inquiry. It seems that we do so understand their means, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. Both distributive and commutative justice are included in particular justice, as I have said.7 But we understand the mean in every part of moderation and courage in the same way. Therefore, we should understand the mean in distributive and commutative justice in the same way.
Obj. 2. The form of moral virtues consists of a mean determined by reason. Therefore, since each moral virtue has one form, it seems that we should understand the mean in both distributive and commutative justice in the same way.
Obj. 3. We understand the mean in distributive justice by considering the various excellences of persons. But we also consider the excellence of persons regarding commutative justice. For example, in the case of inflicting punishments, those who strike rulers are punished more than those who strike private persons. Therefore, we understand the mean in both distributive and commutative justice in the same way.
On the contrary, the Philosopher says in the Ethics that we understand the mean in distributive justice by “geometric proportionality,”8 and the mean in commutative justice by “arithmetic proportionality.”9
I answer that, as I have said,10 distributive justice allots things to private persons insofar as what belongs to a whole belongs to its parts. And the greater the importance parts have in a whole, the greater, indeed, is the distribution allotted to the parts. And so regarding distributive justice, the more important the persons in a political community, the more common goods are allotted to them. And we indeed gauge the importance of persons in aristocratic regimes by the standard of virtue, of persons in oligarchic regimes by the standard of wealth, of persons in democratic regimes by the standard of freedom, and of persons in other regimes in other ways.
And so we do not understand the mean in distributive justice by the proportion of things to things. Rather, we understand that mean by the proportion of things to persons, namely, in such a way that as one person surpasses another, so also the goods allotted to one person surpass the goods allotted to another. And so the Philosopher says that such a mean is by “geometric proportionality,” wherein we consider equality proportionally, not quantitatively. This is as if we should say that three is to two {126} as six is to four, since the proportion in each case is one and a half to one, and the greater number in each couplet is one-and-a-half times the lesser number. But the difference between the greater and lesser numbers in the two couplets is not quantitatively equal, since six exceeds four by two, and three exceeds two by one.
But in exchanges, things are rendered to individual persons because of things received from them. And this is most apparent in buying and selling, regarding which we first notice the character of commutation. And so the things exchanged need to be equal, so that one should restore to another as much as one is enriched by what belongs to the other. And then there is equality by an arithmetic mean, which we note by equal differences from the mean. For example, five is the mean between six and four, since six exceeds the mean by one, and the mean exceeds four by one. Therefore, if each party to an exchange started off with five, and one party received one of the other party’s five, the one receiving will have six, and the other will be left with four. Therefore, there will be justice if both are brought back to the mean, so that the one with four receives one from the other with six, and the one with six gives one to the other with four, since both parties will then have five, which is the mean.
Reply Obj. 1. In other moral virtues, we understand the mean as one of reason, not a real mean. But we understand the mean in justice as a real mean. And so we understand the mean of justice in different ways according to real differences.
Reply Obj. 2. The general form of justice is equality, in which distributive and commutative justice agree. But there is equality in distributive justice by geometric proportionality, and equality in commutative justice by arithmetic proportionality.
Reply Obj. 3. In acting and being acted upon, the status of persons makes a real, quantitative difference. For example, there is a greater injustice if one strikes a ruler than if one strikes a private person. And so we consider the status of persons as such in distributive justice, and we consider the status of persons in commutative justice insofar as such status causes real differences.
We thus proceed to the third inquiry. It seems that distributive and commutative justice have the same subject matter, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. Different subject matter causes different virtues, as is evidently the case with moderation and courage. Therefore, if distributive and commutative {127} justice have different subject matter, it seems that they are not included in the same virtue, namely, justice.
Obj. 2. The distribution of common goods, which belongs to distributive justice, consists of “riches or honors or whatever other things can be distributed among members of the political community,” as the Ethics says.11 And there are also exchanges of such things between one person and another, exchanges that belong to commutative justice. Therefore, distributive and commutative justice do not have different subject matter.
Obj. 3. If there be one subject matter of distributive justice and another of commutative justice because they differ specifically, there should be different subject matter wherever there is specific difference. But the Philosopher designates only one species of commutative justice,12 which nonetheless has several kinds of subject matter. Therefore, it does not seem that these species of justice, distributive and commutative, have several kinds of subject matter.
On the contrary, the Ethics says that “one species of justice directs distributions, and another directs exchanges.”13
I answer that, as I have said before,14 justice concerns certain external actions, namely, distributions and exchanges. These actions concern the use of externals, whether things or persons or even deeds. Actions indeed concern the use of things, as when one either takes away or restores to another the other’s property. And actions concern the use of persons, as when one does an injustice to the very person of a human being (e.g., by striking or insulting a person) or shows respect for a person. And actions concern the use of deeds, as when one justly requires a deed of another or performs a service to another. Therefore, if we should understand as the subject matter of distributive and commutative justice the things external actions use, the two species of justice have the same subject matter. For things can be both distributed from common goods to individuals and exchanged from one individual to another. And there are distributions of laborious tasks and payments for the tasks.
But if we should understand as the subject matter of both kinds of justice the chief actions themselves whereby we use persons, things, and deeds, then there is different subject matter in each. For distributive justice directs the distributions of common goods, and commutative justice directs the exchanges that we can observe between two persons.
And some of the latter actions are involuntary, and some voluntary. And actions are involuntary when one uses the possessions or the person or the {128} deeds of another against the other’s will. And this indeed sometimes happens secretly by fraud and sometimes openly by coercion. And in either case, the offense may be against the property or the proper person or the associate of another. In the case of offenses against the property of another, we call it theft if one takes it secretly, and robbery if one takes it openly.
And in the case of offenses against the proper person of another, the offense may regard either the very substance or reputation of the other. If the offense be against the substance of others, then one secretly harms others by deceitfully killing or striking or poisoning them, or one openly injures others by killing or imprisoning or striking or maiming them publicly. And if the offense be against the reputation of others, one indeed secretly harms others by false witness or detraction or the like, whereby one takes away the reputation of others, or one openly harms others by bringing charges against them in courts of law or shouting insults at them.
And if the offense be against an associate of others, one harms others in the person of their wives by adultery, usually in secret, or in the person of others’ slaves when one induces the latter to leave their master. And these things can also be done openly. And like reasoning applies to other associated persons, and one can commit offenses against them in all the injurious ways that one can against the principal person. But adultery and inducing slaves to leave their masters are, strictly speaking, offenses against the wives and slaves. Nonetheless, inducing slaves to leave their masters is related to theft, since slaves are a form of property.
And we speak of voluntary exchanges when one voluntarily transfers one’s property to another. And if one alienates one’s property to another without the other incurring debt, as in the case of gifts, this is an act of generosity, not of justice. But voluntary transfers of property belong to justice insofar as they partake of the nature of debt, and this indeed happens in three ways. It happens in one way when one alienates one’s property in exchange for other property, as in buying and selling.
Voluntary transfers of property partake of the nature of debt in a second way when one lends one’s property to another, granting the use of the property to the other, with an obligation to return it. And if one indeed grants the use of one’s property without compensation, we call such transfers usufruct regarding productive property, or simply borrowing and lending in the case of nonproductive property (e.g., money, dining utensils, and the like). And if one grants the use of one’s property in return for compensation, we call such transfers leasing or renting.
In a third way, one transfers one’s property to another, with the other incurring an obligation to return it, in order to preserve the property and not for the other’s use, as in the case of deposits, or in order to guarantee {129} fulfillment of an obligation, as when one pledges one’s property as security for oneself or another.
And all such actions, whether voluntary or involuntary, have the same nature of obtaining the mean by equal recompense. And so all these actions belong to the same species of justice, namely, commutative justice.
Reply Objs. 1–3. The answer makes clear the replies to the objections.
1On Duties II, 15.
2ST II–II, Q. 58, A. 2.
3ST II–II, Q. 58, A. 6.
4Aristotle, EthicsV, 4 (1131b27–32).
5Ibid., 2 (1130b31–3).
6ST II–II, Q. 58, A. 7.
7ST II–II, Q. 61, A. 1.
8EthicsV, 3 (1131b32–1132a7).
9Ibid. (1131a30—b15).
10ST II–II, Q. 61, A. 1.
11Aristotle, EthicsV, 2 (1130b31–33).
12Ibid. (1131a1).
13Ibid. (1130b31–1131a1).
14ST II–II, Q. 58, AA. 8, 10.