A. 12. Did the Moral Precepts of the Old Law Make Human Beings Just?
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We thus proceed to the first inquiry. It seems that not every moral precept of the Old Law belongs to the natural law, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. Sir. 17:9 says: “In addition, he [God] bequeathed them instruction and the law that brings life.” But we contradistinguish instruction from the natural law, since we do not learn that law. Rather, we know that law by an impulse from nature. Therefore, not every moral precept of the Old Law belongs to the natural law.
Obj. 2. The divine law is more complete than human law. But human law adds things pertaining to good morals to things belonging to the natural law. And this is evidenced by the fact that the natural law is the same for all human beings, but the things pertaining to good morals established by human law are different for different peoples. Therefore, there was a much stronger reason why the divine law should have added to the natural law things pertaining to good morals.
Obj. 3. As natural reason leads human beings to particular good morals, so also does faith. And so also Gal. 5:6 says that “faith acts through charity.” But faith is not contained in the natural law, since things belonging to faith surpass natural reason. Therefore, not every moral precept of the divine law belongs to the natural law.
On the contrary, the Apostle says in Rom. 2:14: “The Gentiles, who do not have the [Old] Law, by nature do the things belonging to the Law.” But we need to understand this about things pertaining to good morals. Therefore, all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the natural law.
I answer that moral precepts of the Old Law, as distinguished from its ceremonial precepts and its precepts governing the administration of justice, concern things that as such belong to good morals. And since we speak of human morals in relation to reason, which is the specific source of human acts, we call those morals good that are in accord with reason, and those morals bad that are not. And as every judgment of theoretical reason derives from the natural knowledge of first principles, so also every judgment of practical reason derives from certain naturally known first principles, as I have said before.1 And one can in various ways proceed from these principles to judge about different things.
{77} For example, there are some things regarding human acts so explicit that, by applying the general and first principles, we can with rather little reflection at once approve or disapprove them. And there are some things that, in order to be judged morally, require much reflection on various circumstances, which only the wise, not everyone, is qualified to study carefully. Just so, considering particular scientific conclusions belongs only to philosophers, not to everybody. And there are some things that human beings need the help of divine instruction in order to judge, as is the case regarding articles of faith.
But the moral precepts of the Old Law concern things that pertain to good morals, and such precepts are in accord with reason. And every judgment of human reason is derived from natural reason. Therefore, all the moral precepts of the Old Law evidently need to belong to the natural law, albeit in different ways.
For example, the natural reason of each person at once judges that some things as such are to be done or not to be done (e.g., “Honor thy father and thy mother,”2 “Thou shalt not kill,”3 “Thou shalt not steal”4). And such precepts belong to the natural law absolutely.
And there are some things that the wise after more careful reflection judge should be done. And these things belong to the natural law but in such a way that they need instruction, whereby the wiser teach those less wise (e.g., “Rise up at the presence of a grey head, and honor the person of the elderly,”5 and such like).
And there are some things that human reason needs divine instruction to judge, and we thereby learn about divine things (e.g., “Thou shalt not make for thyself a graven image or any likeness,”6 “Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain”7).
Reply to Objs. 1–3. And this answer makes clear the replies to the objections.
We thus proceed to the second article. It seems that the moral precepts of the Old Law do not concern all virtuous acts, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. We call observance of the precepts of the Old Law justification, as Ps. 119:8 says: “I shall observe your ways of justification.” But justification is the execution of justice. Therefore, the moral precepts of the Old Law concern only acts of justice.
{78} Obj. 2. What falls under a precept has the nature of something owed. But the nature of something owed belongs only to justice, whose particular act is to render to everyone what is owed to that person, and not to other virtues. Therefore, the moral precepts of the Old Law concern only acts of justice, not the acts of other virtues.
Obj. 3. Every law is established for the common good, as Isidore says.8 But of virtues, only justice regards the common good, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics.9 Therefore, the moral precepts of the Old Law concern only justice.
On the contrary, Ambrose says that “sin is transgression of the divine law and disobedience of the heavenly commandments.”10 But sins run contrary to all virtuous acts. Therefore, the divine law has ordinances regarding all virtuous acts.
I answer that since legal precepts are ordered to the common good, as I have maintained before,11 they need to be distinguished by different kinds of political communities. And so also the Philosopher teaches in the Politics that one kind of laws needs to be framed for a political community ruled by a king, and a different kind of laws needs to be framed for a political community where the people or some powerful persons in the community rule.12 And there is one kind of community to which human law is ordered, and another kind to which divine law is ordered.
For human law is ordered to a political community, which consists of human beings in relation to one another. And human beings are related to one another by external actions, whereby they are in communion with one another. And such communion belongs to the nature of justice, which, properly speaking, gives direction to a human community. And so human law lays down precepts only regarding acts of justice, and it prescribes other virtuous acts, if at all, only insofar as those acts take on an aspect of justice, as the Philosopher makes clear in the Ethics.13
But the community for which divine law provides consists of human beings in relation to God, whether in the present or the future life. And so divine law lays down precepts regarding everything that rightly orders human beings for communion with God. But human beings are united to God by their reason or mind, in which is the image of God. And so the divine law lays down precepts about everything that rightly orders human beings’ reason. And all virtuous acts bring this about. For example, intellectual virtues rightly order acts of reason, as such, and moral virtues {79} rightly order acts of reason regarding internal emotions and external actions. And so the divine law fittingly lays down precepts about the acts of every virtue. But the divine law does so in such a way that some things, without which the order of virtue, that is, the order of reason, cannot be observed, fall under the obligation of precepts, while things belonging to the well-being of complete virtue fall under the admonition of counsels.
Reply Obj. 1. Keeping the commandments of the Old Law even regarding the acts of virtues other than justice have the nature of justification, since it is just that human beings obey God, or even that everything belonging to human beings be subject to reason.
Reply Obj. 2. Justice, properly speaking, concerns what one human being owes to another, but every other virtue concerns the duty lower powers owe to reason. And by reason of such duty, the Philosopher in the Ethics speaks of justice in a metaphorical sense.14
Reply Obj. 3. What I have said about different kinds of community makes clear the reply to this objection.15
We thus proceed to the third article. It seems that we do not trace all the moral precepts of the Old Law to the Ten Commandments, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. As Mt. 22:37, 39 says, the first and chief precepts of the Old Law are: “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God” and “Thou shalt love thy neighbor.” But these two precepts are not included in the Decalogue. Therefore, not all the moral precepts of the Old Law are included in the Decalogue.
Obj. 2. We do not trace the moral precepts of the Old Law to its ceremonial precepts. Rather, we do the converse. But one of the commandments, namely, “Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath,”16 is ceremonial. Therefore, we do not trace all the moral precepts of the Old law to all the commandments of the Decalogue.
Obj. 3. The moral precepts of the Old Law concern all virtuous acts. But the Decalogue includes only precepts pertaining to acts of justice, as is evident to anyone who examines them one by one. Therefore, the Decalogue does not include all the moral precepts of the Old Law.
On the contrary, a gloss on Mt. 5:11, “Blessed are you when they have reviled you,” etc., says that Moses, after laying down the Ten {80} Commandments, explains them in particulars.17 Therefore, all the precepts of the Old Law are particulars of the Decalogue.
I answer that the Decalogue differs from the other precepts of the Old Law in that God himself is said to have laid down the Decalogue for the people but laid down the other precepts for them through Moses. And the precepts whose knowledge human beings possess from God himself belong to the Decalogue. But the precepts they can know from the first general principles with rather little reflection, as well as those divinely infused faith reveals, are such.
Therefore, two kinds of precepts are not reckoned among precepts of the Decalogue. The first kind consists of the first and general precepts, and these precepts need no further promulgation than their inscription on natural reason as self-evident, as it were (e.g., human beings should do evil to no one, and such like). And the second kind consists of the precepts that the wise by careful study discover belong to reason, since God communicates these precepts to the people through the instruction of the wise. Still, both of these kinds of precepts are included in the Decalogue, albeit in different ways. For the first and general precepts are included as first principles in proximate conclusions, and, conversely, the precepts known through the wise are included as conclusions in first principles.
Reply Obj. 1. These two precepts are first and general precepts of the natural law self-evident to human reason, whether by nature or by faith. And so all precepts of the Decalogue are traceable to these two precepts as conclusions to general first principles.
Reply Obj. 2. The commandment to observe the Sabbath is moral in one respect, namely, that human beings devote some time to divine things, as Ps. 46:10 says: “Be still and perceive that I am God.” And we reckon the commandment to observe the Sabbath among the moral precepts of the Decalogue in this respect, but not as to the appointed day, since the commandment in the latter respect is ceremonial.
Reply Obj. 3. The nature of obligation regarding virtues other than justice is more hidden than the nature of obligation regarding justice. And so we do not know the precepts regarding the other virtues as well as we know the precepts regarding acts of justice. And so acts of justice fall specifically within the commandments of the Decalogue, which are the chief elements of the Old Law.
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We thus proceed to the eighth article. It seems that human beings can be dispensed from the commandments of the Decalogue, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. The commandments of the Decalogue belong to the natural law. But what is just by nature is wanting in some cases and can be changed, just like human nature, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics.18 But deficiencies of law in particular cases are reasons for dispensing from the law, as I have said before.19 Therefore, human beings can be dispensed from commandments of the Decalogue.
Obj. 2. As human beings are to the human laws they establish, so is God to the law he establishes. But human beings can dispense from the laws they establish. Therefore, since God established the commandments of the Decalogue, it seems that he can dispense from them. But ecclesiastical superiors take the place of God on earth, for the Apostle says in 2 Cor. 2:10: “For I have also in the person of Christ pardoned what I have pardoned, if anything, for your sakes.” Therefore, ecclesiastical superiors also can dispense from the commandments of the Decalogue.
Obj. 3. A prohibition against homicide is included in the commandments of the Decalogue. But human beings seem to dispense from this commandment. For example, the precepts of human law permit human beings such as criminals and enemies to be killed. Therefore, the commandments of the Decalogue can be dispensed.
Obj. 4. Sabbath observance is included in the commandments of the Decalogue. But there was a dispensation regarding this commandment, since 1 Mc. 2:41 says: “And they laid plans on that day, saying: ‘We shall fight against all those who will come to war against us on the Sabbath.’ “ Therefore, the commandments of the Decalogue can be dispensed.
On the contrary, Is. 24:5 reproves some because “they have changed the Law and broken the everlasting covenant.” But it seems that we should most understand this about the commandments of the Decalogue. Therefore, the commandments of the Decalogue cannot be dispensed.
I answer that, as I have said before,20 there ought to be dispensations from precepts whenever there arise particular cases in which observance of the letter of the law would be contrary to the intention of the lawmaker. And first and foremost, the intention of any lawmaker is indeed directed to the common good. And second, the intention of a lawmaker is directed {82} to the order of justice and virtue, which preserves and attains the common good. Therefore, if precepts be laid down that include the very preservation of the common good or the very order of justice and virtue, the precepts include the intention of the lawmaker and so cannot be dispensed from. For example, if a community were to have a precept that no one should subvert the commonwealth or betray the political community to its enemies, or that no one should do unjust or evil things, such precepts could not be dispensed from.
But if other precepts subordinate to the latter were to be laid down that specify particular ways to preserve the common good or the order of justice and virtue, such precepts could be dispensed from. The precepts could be dispensed from insofar as their nonobservance in particular cases would not cause prejudice to the first precepts, which include the intention of the lawmaker. For example, if a political community, to preserve the commonwealth, were to decree that citizens stand guard on each street of a besieged city, some citizens could be dispensed for the sake of a greater benefit.
And the commandments of the Decalogue include the very aim of the lawmaker, namely. God. For the commandments of the first tablet, which direct human beings in relation to God, include the very order to human beings’ common and ultimate good, that is, God. And the commandments of the second tablet include the very order of justice to be observed in human society, namely, that nothing improper be done to anyone, and that one should render to others what is their due. For we should so understand the commandments of the Decalogue. And so the commandments of the Decalogue cannot be dispensed from at all.
Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher is not speaking about the just by nature that includes the very order of justice, since the principle that justice should be observed is never wanting. But he is speaking about specific ways of observing justice, which are wanting in particular cases.
Reply Obj. 2. The Apostle says in 2 Tim. 2:13: “God remains faithful, nor can he deny his very self.” But he would deny his very self if he were to remove the very order of his justice, since he is justice itself. And so God cannot so dispense human beings that they would be permitted not to be properly related to God, or that they would be permitted not to be subject to the order of his justice regarding precepts that direct human beings in their relation to one another.
Reply Obj. 3. The Decalogue prohibits the killing of human beings insofar as such killing has the nature of being undeserved, for then the commandment includes the very nature of justice. And human law cannot make it lawful that human beings be killed undeservedly. But it is not undeserved that criminals and enemies of the commonwealth be killed. {83} And so this is not contrary to the commandment of the Decalogue, nor is such killing murder, which the commandment prohibits, as Augustine says in his work On Free Choice.21 And likewise, it is not theft or robbery, which a commandment of the Decalogue prohibits, if property is taken from one who ought to relinquish it.
And so when the children of Israel at the command of God took away the spoils of the Egyptians,22 there was no theft, since the spoils were due the Israelites by reason of God’s judgment. Likewise, Abraham, when he agreed to kill his son,23 did not consent to murder, since it was proper that Isaac be killed at the command of God, who is the Lord of life and death. God himself is the one who inflicts death on all human beings, just and unjust, for the sin of our first parent, and human beings will not be murderers if they should by divine authority execute God’s judgment, just as God is not a murderer. And likewise, Hosea, having sexual intercourse with a fornicating wife or an adulterous woman,24 is not an adulterer or fornicator, since he had intercourse with a woman who was his by the command of God, who is the author of the institution of marriage.
Therefore, the commandments of the Decalogue, regarding the nature of justice that they include, cannot be changed. But specifications applying the commandments to particular acts, namely, specifications whether this or that be murder, theft, or adultery, are indeed variable. The specifications sometimes change only because of divine authority, namely, regarding matters that God alone instituted, such as marriage and the like. The specifications also sometimes change because of human authority, as in matters committed to the jurisdiction of human beings. For in this but not every respect, human beings take the place of God.
Reply Obj. 4. The cited way of thinking was an interpretation of the commandment rather than a dispensation. For we should not understand that those who do deeds necessary for the human weal violate the Sabbath, as the Lord proves in Mt. 12:3–5.
We thus proceed to the ninth article. It seems that the way of virtue does fall under command of the law, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. The way of virtue consists of persons doing just deeds justly, and brave deeds bravely, and the like regarding other virtues. But Dt. 16:20 commands: “You shall carry out just deeds justly.” Therefore, {84} the way of virtue falls under command of the law.
Obj. 2. What belongs to the lawmaker’s intention falls most under the law’s command. But the lawmaker chiefly aims to make human beings virtuous, as the Ethics says.25 And it belongs to the virtuous to act virtuously. Therefore, the way of virtue falls under command of the law.
Obj. 3. Properly speaking, the way of virtue seems to consist of acting willingly and with pleasure. But this falls under command of the divine law, for Ps. 100:2 says: “Serve the Lord in gladness,” and 2 Cor. 9:7 says: “Do not act out of sadness or necessity, for the Lord loves a cheerful giver.” And a gloss on the latter says: “Do cheerfully the good you do, and then you act well. But if you act with sadness, the good is done from you, not by you.”26 Therefore, the way of virtue falls under command of the law.
On the contrary, one can act in a virtuous way only if one should possess a virtuous habit, as the Philosopher makes clear in the Ethics.27 But anyone transgressing the command of a law deserves punishment. Therefore, if the way of virtue falls under command of the law, one without a virtuous habit would deserve punishment no matter what he or she does. But this is contrary to the aim of the law, which strives to induce human beings to virtue by habituating them to good deeds. Therefore, the way of virtue does not fall under command of the law.
I answer that commands of the law have the power to compel compliance, as I have said before.28 Therefore, what the law compels falls directly under command of the law. And the law compels compliance by fear of punishment, as the Ethics says,29 since that for which legal punishment is inflicted falls strictly under command of the law. And the divine law and human law are differently disposed in regard to ordaining punishment. For legal punishment is inflicted only for things regarding which lawmakers have the power to judge, since the law punishes by passing sentence. And human beings, who lay down human laws, have the power to judge only regarding external acts, since “human beings perceive sensibly perceptible things,” as 1 Sam. 16:7 says. But only God, who lays down the divine law, has the power to judge regarding interior movements of the will, as Ps. 7:9 says: “God scrutinizes our desires and emotions.”
Therefore, we should accordingly say that both divine law and human law concern the way of virtue in one respect, that the divine law but not human law concerns the way of virtue in another respect, and that neither {85} the divine law nor human law concerns the way of virtue in a third respect.
And the way of virtue consists of three things, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics.30 And the first of these is whether one acts knowingly. And both the divine law and human law judge this, since one does accidentally what one does unknowingly. And so both the divine law and human law deem deeds worthy of punishment or pardon depending on the person’s knowledge or ignorance.
The second consideration is whether one acts willingly, that is, by choice and by choosing to do something for its own sake. And we thereby signify two interior movements, namely, of willing and intending, about which I have spoken before.31 And only the divine law, not human law, judges these two interior movements. For human law does not punish one who wants to kill and does not, but the divine law does, as Mt. 5:22 says: “Those who are angry with their brother will be liable to judgment.”
And the third consideration is whether one has the power to act firmly and consistently and does so. And such firmness, properly speaking, belongs to habits, namely, that one act by reason of ingrained habit. And in this respect, the way of virtue does not fall under command of the law, whether the divine law or human law. For example, neither human beings nor God punish as transgressors of the law those who give requisite honor to their parents but do not have the habit of filial piety.
Reply Obj. 1. The way one performs just acts falling under command of the law is that the deeds be done according to the ordinance of the law, not that they be done by reason of the habit of justice.
Reply Obj. 2. The intention of a lawmaker concerns two things. One is indeed what lawmakers strive to induce by legal commands, and this is virtue. And the second is what lawmakers intend legal commands to impose, and this is what leads or disposes citizens to virtue, that is, virtuous acts. For the end of precepts and what precepts lay down are not the same thing, just as ends and means are not the same in regard to other things.
Reply Obj. 3. It falls under a command of the divine law that we perform virtuous acts ungrudgingly, since those who act begrudgingly act unwillingly. And to act with pleasure, that is, joyfully or cheerfully, falls under the command of the law in one respect, namely, insofar as pleasure results from love of God and neighbor, which falls under the command of the law. But to act with pleasure does not fall under the command of the law in another respect, namely, insofar as habits result in pleasure, since “pleasure in deeds is evidence that persons have become habituated,” as {86} the Ethics says.32 For acts can be pleasurable either because of their end or because of suitable habits.
We thus proceed to the tenth article. It seems that the way of charity does fall under command of the divine law, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. Mt. 19:17 says: “If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments.” And it seems from this that keeping the commandments suffices to lead human beings into life. But good deeds do not suffice to lead human beings into life unless the deeds are done out of charity. For 1 Cor. 13:3 says: “If I have distributed all my goods to feed the poor, and if I have delivered my body to be burned, it profits me nothing if I should not have charity.” Therefore, the way of charity is included in what the law commands.
Obj. 2. It belongs strictly to the way of charity that everything be done for God. But this falls under command of the law, for the Apostle says in 1 Cor. 10:31: “Do everything for the glory of God.” Therefore, the way of charity falls under command of the law.
Obj. 3. If the way of charity does not fall under command of the law, then one can fulfill commands of the law without possessing charity. But what can be done without charity can be done without grace, which always accompanies charity. Therefore, one can fulfill commands of the law without grace. But this is the error of Pelagius, as Augustine makes clear in his work On Heresies.33 Therefore, the way of charity is included in what the law commands.
On the contrary, those who do not keep the commands of the law commit mortal sin. Therefore, if the way of charity falls under command of the law, then those who do anything otherwise than out of charity commit mortal sin. But those who do not possess charity do not act out of charity. Therefore, those who do not possess charity commit mortal sins in their every deed, however good the deed is by its nature. But this conclusion is improper.
I answer that there have been conflicting views on this matter. For example, some have said that the way of charity is absolutely under command of the law.34 Nor is it impossible to keep this command if one does not possess charity, since such people can dispose themselves so that God infuses charity in them. Nor does a person commit mortal sin whenever {87} the person does something by its nature good, since the command that one act out of charity is an affirmative precept and morally obliges only when one possesses charity, not at all times. And others have said that the way of charity does not at all fall under command of the law.
And both of these opinions are true in some respect. For we can consider acts of charity in two ways. We can consider them in one way insofar as they are acts of charity as such. And they in this respect fall under commands of the law that lay down specific commands (e.g., “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God,”35 and “Thou shalt love thy neighbor”36). And the first opinion is true in this respect. For it is not impossible to observe these precepts, which concern acts of charity, since human beings can dispose themselves to possess charity and can exercise charity after they have possessed it.
We can consider acts of charity in a second way insofar as they are the way of acts of other virtues, that is, as acts of other virtues are ordered to charity, which is “the purpose of commands,” as 1 Tim. 1:5 says. For I have said before that the intended end is a formal modality of acts ordered to the end.37 And the second opinion, that the way of charity does not fall under the command of the law, is true in this respect, that is to say, that the commandment “Honor thy father”38 only commands that one honor one’s father, not that one honor one’s father out of charity. And so those who honor their fathers, even if they do not possess charity, do not become transgressors of the precept to honor one’s father, although they are transgressors of the precept regarding acts of charity. And they deserve punishment because of the latter transgression.
Reply Obj. 1. The Lord said: “If you wish to enter into life, keep all the commandments,” not: “If you wish to enter into life, keep one commandment.” And the commandment to love God and neighbor is included in the commandments.
Reply Obj. 2. That one love God with one’s whole heart is included in the commandment of charity, to which commandment it belongs to relate everything to God. And so human beings can fulfill the precept of charity only by relating everything to God. Therefore, those honoring their parents are morally obliged to do so out of charity by force of the commandment “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart,”39 not by force of the commandment “Honor thy parents.”40 And although these are two commandments that do not oblige at all times, they can oblige at different times. And so one may fulfill the precept about honoring one’s {88} parents without transgressing the precept about omitting the way of charity.
Reply Obj. 3. Human beings cannot keep all the commandments of the law unless they fulfill the precept of charity, which is not done without grace. And so what Pelagius said, that human beings fulfill the law without grace, is impossible.
We thus proceed to the eleventh article. It seems that we do not appropriately mark out other moral precepts of the Law besides the Decalogue, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. The Lord says in Mt. 22:40: “The whole law and the prophets depend on the two precepts of love.” But the Ten Commandments explain these two precepts. Therefore, there need not be other moral precepts.
Obj. 2. We distinguish moral precepts from ceremonial precepts and precepts governing the administration of justice, as I have said.41 But specifying general moral precepts belongs to ceremonial precepts and precepts governing the administration of justice, and general moral precepts are included in, or even presupposed by, the Decalogue, as I have said.42 Therefore, it is inappropriate that there be other moral precepts besides the Decalogue.
Obj. 3. Moral precepts concern every kind of virtuous act, as I have said before.43 Therefore, as the Old Law lays down moral precepts pertaining to worship, generosity, mercy, and chastity, in addition to the Decalogue, so also should the Old Law have laid down precepts pertaining to other virtues (e.g., courage, sobriety, and the like). But we do not find such in the Old Law. Therefore, we do not appropriately mark out in the Old Law other moral precepts besides the Decalogue.
On the contrary, Ps. 19:8 says: “The law of the Lord is spotless, converting souls.” But other moral precepts added to the Decalogue also preserve human beings from the stain of sin and convert their souls to God. Therefore, it also belonged to the Old Law to lay down other moral precepts.
I answer that, as is clear from what I have said before,44 ceremonial precepts and precepts governing the administration of justice derive their force only from their institution, since it did not seem to matter whether things should be done in this way or that before the precepts were instituted. But {89} moral precepts have efficacy from the very dictates of natural reason even if the precepts were never laid down in the Old Law. And there are three classes of moral precepts. For some moral precepts are most certain and so evident to reason that they need no promulgation. For example, such are the commandments to love God and neighbor, and the like, as I have said before,45 and these commandments are the ends of the commandments, as it were. And so no one’s reason can judge erroneously about them. And some moral precepts are more specific, and everyone, even ordinary people, can at once easily perceive their reasonableness. And yet they need to be promulgated, since human reason in a few instances may be led astray regarding them. And such are the commandments of the Decalogue. And there are some moral precepts whose reasonableness is evident only to the wise but not so evident to everyone. And these are the moral precepts added to the Decalogue, precepts laid down by God for the people through Moses and Aaron.
But because evident things are the sources for knowing things that are not evident, we trace the moral precepts added to the Decalogue to the commandments of the Decalogue46 as corollaries. For example, the First Commandment of the Decalogue prohibits worship of strange gods, and precepts are added thereto prohibiting things ordered to the worship of idols. Thus Dt. 18:10 relates: “Let there be among you none who would purify their sons and daughters by fire, nor let there be any wizard or witch, nor let anyone consult fortune-tellers or diviners, nor let anyone seek truth from the dead.”
And the Second Commandment prohibits perjury. And Lev. 24:15–6 adds a prohibition of blasphemy thereto, and Dt. 13:1–11 adds a prohibition of false teaching.
And all the ceremonial precepts are added to the Third Commandment.
And the precept about honoring the elderly, as Lev. 19:32 says, “Rise in the presence of a hoary head, and honor the person of the elderly,” is added to the Fourth Commandment about honoring one’s parents. And more generally, all the precepts prescribing that we show respect to our betters and kindness to our equals or inferiors are added to that commandment.
{90} And there is a prohibition of hate or any violence against our neighbor, as Lev. 19:16 says, “You shall not stand against the blood of your neighbor,” and there is also a prohibition of hatred of one’s brother, as Lev. 19:17 says, “You shall not hate your brother in your heart.” These prohibitions are added to the Fifth Commandment, which concerns the prohibition of homicide.
And there is a precept prohibiting prostitution, as Dt. 23:17 says, “There will be no prostitute among the daughters of Israel nor whoremonger among the sons of Israel,” and there is also a precept prohibiting the sin against nature, as Lev. 18:22–23 says, “You shall not have sexual intercourse with a fellow male or any beast.” These precepts are added to the Sixth Commandment, which concerns the prohibition of adultery.
And there is a precept prohibiting interest-taking, as Dt. 23:19 says, “You shall not lend to your brother at interest,” and there is a prohibition against fraud, as Dt. 25:13 says, “You shall not put different weights in your sack.” And more generally, there are all the precepts that pertain to prohibiting trickery and robbery. These precepts are added to the Seventh Commandment, which prohibits theft.
And there is a prohibition against passing false judgment, as Ex. 23:2 says, “Nor shall you depart from the truth by yielding to the judgment of the majority,” and there is a prohibition of lying, as Ex. 23:7 says, “You shall avoid lying.” And there is a prohibition of detraction, as Lev. 19:16 says, “You shall not be a detractor or scandalmonger among the people.” These prohibitions are added to the Eighth Commandment, which concerns the prohibition of false testimony.
And no other precepts are added to the last two commandments, since these commandments prohibit all evil coveting without exception.
Reply Obj. 1. The commandments of the Decalogue are directed to the love of God and neighbor by reason of the clear nature of the obligations, but other precepts are so directed by reason of their less evident nature.
Reply Obj. 2. Ceremonial precepts and precepts governing the administration of justice specify commandments of the Decalogue by force of the precepts’ institution and not by force of an inclination from nature, as the additional moral precepts do.
Reply Obj. 3. Legal precepts are ordered to the common good, as I have said before.47 And virtues directing us in relation to others pertain directly to the common good, and likewise the virtue of chastity, inasmuch as the reproductive act promotes the common good of the species. Therefore, {91} the commandments of the Decalogue and the precepts added thereto are laid down regarding those virtues. And regarding acts of courage, commanders exhorting troops in a war undertaken for the common good give the troops commands, as Dt. 20:3 makes clear when priests are commanded to say: “Do not be afraid, do not retreat.” Likewise, the prohibition of acts of gluttony is committed to paternal admonition, since such acts are contrary to the good of the household. And so Dt. 21:20 says in the person of parents: “He contemns listening to our admonitions, he wastes himself in extravagances and lusts and feasting.”
We thus proceed to the twelfth article. It seems that the moral precepts of the Old Law made human beings just, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. The Apostle says in Rom. 2:13: “For those who observe the Law will be made just, and those who merely listen to the Law have not been.” But we call those who fulfill the precepts of the Law observers of the Law. Therefore, fulfilling the precepts of the Law made human beings just.
Obj. 2. Lev. 18:5 says: “Keep my laws and judgments, and human beings, if they do so, will thereby have life.” But human beings have spiritual life by being just. Therefore, fulfilling the precepts of the Law made human beings just.
Obj. 3. The divine law is more efficacious than human law. But human law makes human beings just, since there is a justice in fulfilling precepts of that law. Therefore, precepts of the Law made human beings just.
On the contrary, the Apostle says in 2 Cor. 3:6: “The letter of the Law kills.” But as Augustine says in his work On the Spirit and Letter of the Law,48 we also understand the statement of the Apostle to refer to the moral precepts of the Law. Therefore, the moral precepts of the Old Law did not make human beings just.
I answer that we properly and primarily predicate health of what possesses health, and secondarily of what signifies or preserves health. Just so, we primarily and properly predicate justification of the very process that makes human beings just, and we can secondarily and improperly, as it were, predicate justification of what signifies justice or disposes to justice. And the precepts of the Old Law evidently made human beings just in the latter two respects, namely, inasmuch as the precepts disposed human beings to the justifying grace of Christ, and the precepts also signified {92} that grace. This is so because, as Augustine says in his work Against Faustus,49 “the life of that people foretold and prefigured Christ.”
But if we should speak of justification in the strict sense, then we need to note that we can understand justice as habitual or actual, and we accordingly speak of justification in two ways. We indeed speak of justification in one way as human beings who acquire the habit of justice become just. And we speak of justification in a second way as human beings perform just deeds, so that justification in this respect is simply the execution of justice. And we can understand justice, like other virtues, as either acquired or infused, as is evident from what I have said before.50 And deeds indeed produce the acquired virtue of justice, but God himself by infusing his grace produces the infused virtue of justice. And the latter justice is the true justice about which we are now speaking, regarding which one is called just with God, as Rom. 4:2 says: “If works of the Law made Abraham just, he has reason to boast, but not with God.” Therefore, the moral precepts of the Old Law, which concern human acts, could not produce such justice. And so the moral precepts could not make human beings just by producing such justice.
And if we should understand justification to mean the execution of justice, then all the precepts of the Old Law made human beings just in one way or another. For example, the ceremonial precepts in general indeed included justice as such, namely, insofar as they were observed for the worship of God, although those precepts in particular included justice as such only because the divine law so specified. And so we say that such precepts made human beings just only by the devotion or the obedience of those carrying out the precepts.
And the moral precepts and the precepts governing the administration of justice, either in general or in particular, included matter pertaining to justice as such. And the moral precepts included matter pertaining to justice as such regarding general justice, that is, “all virtue,” as the Ethics says.51 And the precepts governing the administration of justice pertain to particular justice, which concerns the interactions of human life that transpire among human beings in their relations to one another.
Reply Obj. 1. The Apostle in the cited text understands justification to mean the execution of justice.
Reply Obj. 2. The cited text says that the human beings who fulfilled the precepts of the Law had life thereby in that they did not incur the penalty of death that the Law inflicted on transgressors. And the Apostle in Gal. 3:12 quotes the passage in this sense.
{93} Reply Obj. 3. The precepts of human law make human beings just by acquired justice, and we are presently speaking only about justice with God, not about acquired justice.
1ST I–II, Q. 94, AA. 2, 4.
2Ex. 20:12; Dt. 5:16.
3Ex. 20:13; Dt. 5:17.
4Ex. 20:15; Dt. 5:19.
5Lev. 19:32
6Ex. 20:4; Dt. 5:8.
7Ex. 20:7; Dt. 5:11.
8Etymologies II, 10 (PL 82:131); V, 21 (PL 82:203).
9EthicsV, 1 (1130a3-5).
10On Paradise 8 (PL 14:292).
11ST I–II, Q. 90, A. 2.
12Politics IV, 1 (1289a11–25).
13EthicsV, 1 (1129b12–25).
14Ibid., V, 11 (1138b5–14).
15In the body of the article.
16Ex. 20:8; Dt. 5:12.
17Glossa ordinaria, on Mt. 5:11 (PL 114:90).
18EthicsV, 7 (1134b28–9).
19ST I–II: Q. 96, A. 6; Q. 97, A. 4.
20Ibid.
21On Free Choice I, 4, n. 9 (PL 32:1226).
22Ex. 12:35–6.
23Gen. 22:1–12.
24Hos. 1:2–11.
25Aristotle, Ethics II, 1 (1103b3–6).
26Glossa ordinaria, on 2 Cor. 9:17 (PL 114:564); Peter Lombard, Glossa, on 2 Cor. 9:17 (PL 192:63).
27Ethics II, 4 (1105a17–21); V, 8 (1135b24).
28ST I–II, Q. 90, A. 3, ad 2.
29Aristotle, Ethics X, 9 (1179b11–8).
30Ibid., II, 4 (1105a31—b5).
31ST I–II, QQ. 8, 12.
32Aristotle, Ethics II, 3 (1104b3–9).
33On Heresies 88 (PL 42:47–8).
34E.g., Albert the Great, Commentary on the Sentences III, dist. 36, a. 6.
35Dt. 6:5.
36Lev. 19:18.
37ST I–II, Q. 12: A. 1, ad 3; A. 4, ad 3.
38Ex. 20:12; Dt. 5:16.
39Dt. 6:5.
40Ex. 20:12; Dt. 5:6.
41ST I–II, Q. 99, A. 3.
42ST I–II, Q. 100, A. 3.
43ST I–II, Q. 100, A. 2.
44ST I–II, Q. 99, A. 3.
45ST I–II, Q. 100, A. 3; A. 4, ad 1.
46Thomas follows the Vulgate numbering and division of the commandments. What the Vulgate enumerates as the First Commandment, the King James Version enumerates as the First and Second Commandments, and what the Vulgate enumerates as the Ninth and Tenth Commandments, the King James Version enumerates as the Tenth Commandment.
47ST I–II, Q. 90, A. 2.
48On the Spirit and Letter of the Law 14 (PL 44:215).
49Against Faustus XXII, 24 (PL 42:417).
50ST I–II, Q. 63, A. 4.
51Aristotle, EthicsV, 1 (1129b30–1).