A. 6. Are All Human Affairs Subject to the Eternal Law?
{30}
We thus proceed to the first article. It seems that the eternal law is not a supreme plan in God, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. There is only one eternal law. But there are many natures of things in the mind of God, for Augustine says in his work Eighty-Three Questions that “God made each thing with its own nature2.”3 Therefore, the eternal law is not the same as the plan in his mind.
Obj. 2. It belongs to the nature of law that it be promulgated in words, as I have said before.4 But regarding divine things, we speak of the Word as person, as I maintained in the First Part,5 but we speak of the divine plan as belonging to God essentially. Therefore, the eternal law is not the same as the divine plan.
Obj. 3. Augustine says in his work On True Religion: “We perceive that there is a law superior to our minds, a law we call truth.”6 But the law superior to our minds is the eternal law. Therefore, truth is the eternal law. But the nature of truth is not the same as the nature of a plan. Therefore, the eternal law is not the same as a supreme plan.
On the contrary, Augustine says in his work On Free Choice that “the eternal law is the supreme plan that we should always obey.”7
I answer that as there preexists in every craftsman a plan for the things produced by his skill, so also there needs to exist in every ruler an orderly plan for the things his subjects ought to do. And as we call the plan for the things that a craft produces, the craft or ideal type of the things crafted, so also the plan of a ruler for his subjects’ actions has the nature of law, provided that the other conditions that I cited before regarding the nature of law8 are observed. And God in his wisdom creates all things and is related to them like a craftsman to the products of his craft, as I have {31} maintained in the First Part.9 God also governs all the actions and movements in particular kinds of creatures, as I have likewise maintained in the First Part.10 And so, as the plan of divine wisdom has the nature of a craft or type or idea because all things are created through it, so the plan of divine wisdom causing the movement of all things to their requisite ends has the nature of law. And so the eternal law is simply the plan of divine wisdom that directs all the actions and movements of created things.
Reply Obj. 1. Augustine is speaking in the cited text about ideal natures, which concern the requisite natures of particular things. And so these types have some diversity and plurality regarding their different relations to things, as I have maintained in the First Part.11 But we speak of law directing actions in relation to the common good, as I have said before.12 And we consider things in themselves diverse as one insofar as they are ordered to the common good. And so there is one eternal law, which is this orderly plan.
Reply Obj. 2. We can consider two things regarding any word, namely, the word itself and what the word expresses. For example, spoken words are utterances from the mouths of human beings, and these words express what the words signify. And mental words, which are simply the mental concepts whereby human beings express mentally the things about which they are thinking, have the same nature. Therefore, regarding divine things, we speak of the Word itself, which the Father’s understanding conceives, as the Second Person of the Trinity, and this Word expresses everything in the Father’s knowledge, whether things proper to God’s essence or things proper to each Person or things created by God, as Augustine makes evident in his work On the Trinity.13 And among other things so expressed, the Word itself also expresses the eternal law itself. But it does not follow that we speak of the eternal law as the Second Person of the Trinity, although we appropriate the eternal law to the Son because of the appropriateness of the divine plan for the Word.
Reply Obj. 3. The nature of the divine intellect is otherwise related to things than the nature of the human mind is. For things are the measure of the human mind, that is to say, we call human concepts true because they are in accord with things, not because of the concepts themselves, since “opinions are true or false because things are or are not such.”14 But the divine intellect is the measure of things, since everything has as much truth as it is modeled on the divine intellect, as I have maintained in the {32} First Part.15 And so the divine intellect is true in itself. And so its nature is truth itself.
We thus proceed to the second article. It seems that not everybody knows the eternal law, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. The Apostle says in 1 Cor. 2:11: “Only the Spirit of God knows the things proper to God.” But the eternal law is a plan in God’s mind. Therefore, no one but God knows the eternal law.
Obj. 2. Augustine says in his work On Free Choice: “The eternal law is that by which it is right that all things be most orderly.”16 But not everybody knows how all things are most orderly. Therefore, not everybody knows the eternal law.
Obj. 3. Augustine says in his work On True Religion that “human beings cannot judge regarding the eternal law.”17 But “everyone judges rightly about things one knows,” as the Ethics says.18 Therefore, we do not know the eternal law.
On the contrary, Augustine says in his work On Free Choice that “knowledge of the eternal law is imprinted on us.”19
I answer that we can know things in two ways: in one way in themselves; in a second way in their effects, which are like the things. For example, those who are not looking at the sun know it in the effects of its rays. Therefore, we should say no one except the blessed, who see God by his essence, can know the eternal law as it is in itself. But every rational creature knows it in some of its radiating effects, whether greater or lesser effects. For every knowledge of truth is a radiation and participation of eternal law, which is incommunicable truth, as Augustine says in his work On True Religion.20 For everybody knows truth to some extent, at least regarding the general principles of the natural law. But some share more and some less in knowing truth regarding other things. And so also they know more or less of the eternal law.
Reply Obj. 1. We indeed cannot know things proper to God in themselves, but such things are evident to us in their effects, as Rom. 1:20 says: “We perceive the invisible things of God when they are understood through the things he created.”
Reply Obj. 2. Although everyone knows the eternal law according to {33} one’s capacity, in the aforementioned way, no one can know it comprehensively, since its effects cannot completely reveal it. And so it is not necessary that those who know the eternal law in the aforementioned way know the whole order of things, whereby all things are most orderly.
Reply Obj. 3. Judging about things can be understood in two ways. Judging about things can be understood in one way as a cognitive power judges regarding its own object, as Job 12:11 says: “Do not ears discern words, and diners’ taste buds discern taste?” And the Philosopher in this way of judging says that “everyone judges rightly things that one knows,” namely, in judging whether a proposition is true. We can understand judging in a second way as superiors judge about subordinates by practical judgments, namely, whether subordinates should or should not be such and such. And no one can judge about the eternal law in that way.
We thus proceed to the third inquiry. It seems that not every law is derived from the eternal law, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. There is a law of concupiscence, as I have said before.21 But that law is not derived from divine law, that is, eternal law, since wisdom of the flesh, which the Apostle in Rom. 8:7 says “cannot be subject to the law of God,” belongs to the law of concupiscence. Therefore, not every law comes from the eternal law.
Obj. 2. Nothing evil can come from the eternal law, since “eternal law is that whereby it is right that all things be most orderly,”22 as I have said before.23 But some laws are evil, as Is.10:1 says: “Woe to those who make wicked laws.” Therefore, not every law comes from the eternal law.
Obj. 3. Augustine says in his work On Free Choice that “laws prescribed for ruling a people rightly permit many things that divine providence punishes.”24 But the plan of divine providence is the eternal law, as I have said.25 Therefore, not every right law comes from the eternal law.
On the contrary, divine wisdom in Prov. 8:15 says: “Kings rule by me, and lawmakers discern what is just.” But the plan of divine wisdom is the eternal law, as I have said before.26 Therefore, all laws derive from the eternal law.
I answer that law signifies a plan directing acts to an end, as I have said {34} before.27 But in the case of all interrelated causes, the power of a secondary cause needs to be derived from the power of the primary cause, since a secondary cause causes only insofar as the primary cause moves the secondary cause. And so also we perceive the same regarding all who govern, that the chief ruler communicates his plan of government to secondary administrators. For example, a king communicates his plan for the affairs of a political community by issuing commands to subordinate administrators. And also in the case of things requiring the skill of craftsmen, a master builder communicates his plan for the activities requiring those skills to subordinate craftsmen, who carry out the manual work involved. Therefore, since the eternal law is the plan of government in the supreme ruler, all plans of government in subordinate rulers need to be derived from the eternal law. But such plans of subordinate government consist of all the other laws besides the eternal law. And so all laws are derived from the eternal law insofar as they partake of right reason. And so Augustine says in his work On Free Choice that “nothing is just or lawful in earthly laws that human beings have not derived for themselves from the eternal law.”28
Reply Obj. 1. Concupiscence has the nature of law regarding human beings insofar as it is a punishment resulting from divine justice, and it is in this respect evidently derived from eternal law. But insofar as it inclines human beings to sin, it is contrary to God’s law and does not have the nature of law, as is clear from what I have said before.29
Reply Obj. 2. Human law has the nature of law insofar as it is in accord with right reason, and then it is evidently derived from eternal law. But we call human law evil insofar as it withdraws from reason. And then it has the nature of brute force rather than of law. And yet insofar as some likeness of law is preserved in an evil law because one empowered to make law ordained it, it is also in this respect derived from the eternal law. For “every ruling power is from the Lord God,” as Rom. 13:1 says.
Reply Obj. 3. We speak of human law permitting some things because it is unable to direct them, not because it approves them. But divine law directs many things that human law cannot, since more things are subject to higher causes than to lower causes. And so the fact that human law is not imposed regarding things that it cannot direct derives from the order of eternal law. But it would be otherwise if human law were to approve things that eternal law condemns. And so we conclude that human law cannot completely attain the eternal law, not that human law is not derived from eternal law.
{35}
We thus proceed to the fourth inquiry. It seems that necessary and eternal things are subject to the eternal law, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. Everything reasonable is subject to reason. But the divine will is reasonable, since it is just. Therefore, it is subject to reason. But the eternal law is the divine plan. Therefore, God’s will is subject to the eternal law. But God’s will is eternal. Therefore, eternal and necessary things are subject to the eternal law.
Obj. 2. Everything subject to a king is subject to the king’s law. But the Son “will be subject to the God and Father, since the Son will hand over the kingdom to the Father,” as 1 Cor. 15:24, 28 says. Therefore, the Son, who is eternal, is subject to the eternal law.
Obj. 3. The eternal law is the plan of divine providence. But there are many necessary things subject to divine providence (e.g., the permanence of spiritual substances and heavenly bodies). Therefore, even necessary things are subject to the eternal law.
On the contrary, necessary things cannot be disposed otherwise than they are, and so they do not need any restraint. But laws are imposed on human beings to restrain them from evil, as is evident from what I have said before.30 Therefore, necessary things are not subject to the law.
I answer that the eternal law is the plan of divine governance, as I have said before.31 Therefore, everything subject to divine governance is also subject to the eternal law, but things not subject to divine governance are not subject to the eternal law. And we can consider the distinction between the two kinds of things in regard to matters that concern us. For example, things that human beings can do are subject to human governance, but things that belong to the nature of human beings (e.g., that human beings have souls or hands or feet) are not subject to human governance. Therefore, everything belonging to created things, whether contingent or necessary, belongs to the eternal law, but things belonging to the divine nature or essence are in reality the eternal law itself and not subject to the eternal law.
Reply Obj. 1. We can speak about God’s will in two ways. We can speak about his will in one way regarding the will itself, and then his will, since it is his very essence, is the same as the eternal law and not subject to divine governance or the eternal law. We can speak of God’s will in a second way as to the things God wills regarding creatures, things indeed subject to the eternal law, since the plan for them belongs to his wisdom. {36} And we call God’s will reasonable because of these things. Otherwise, considering his will itself, we should call it the very plan.
Reply Obj. 2. God does not make the Son of God but by nature begets him. And so the Son is not subject to divine providence or the eternal law. Rather, he is the eternal law by appropriation, as Augustine makes clear in his work On True Religion.32 And we say that he is subject to the Father by reason of his human nature, and we say that the Father is greater than he in the same regard.33
Reply Obj. 3. We grant the argument of this objection, since it deals validly with created necessary things.
Reply Obj. 4.34 As the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics,35 the necessity of some necessary things is caused, and then they have from something else the fact that they cannot be otherwise than they are. And this is a most effective restraint, since we speak of restrained things being restrained insofar as they cannot do otherwise than they are disposed to do.
We thus proceed to the fifth article. It seems that contingent natural things are not subject to the eternal law, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. Promulgation belongs to the nature of law, as I have said before.36 But promulgation can be made only to rational creatures, to whom things can be declared. Therefore, only rational creatures are subject to the eternal law. Therefore, contingent natural things are not.
Obj. 2. “Things that obey reason partake of reason in some respect,” as the Ethics says.37 But the eternal law is a supreme plan, as I have said before.38 Therefore, contingent natural things, since they are completely irrational and do not in any way partake of reason, do not seem to be subject to the eternal law.
Obj. 3. The eternal law is most efficacious. But deficiencies occur in contingent natural things. Therefore, such things are not subject to the eternal law.
On the contrary, Prov. 8:29 says: “When he [God] set bounds to the sea and imposed a law on its waters not to transgress their limits.”
I answer that we should speak about the law of human beings and the eternal law, the law of God, in different ways. For the law of human beings {37} governs only rational creatures subject to human beings. And the reason for this is that law directs actions proper to those subject to another’s governance. And so, strictly speaking, one does not impose a law on one’s own actions. But all the things done regarding the use of irrational things subject to human beings are done by the actions of the very human beings causing the things done. For irrational creatures so used are acted upon by other things and do not act upon themselves, as I have maintained before.39 And so human beings cannot impose law on irrational things, however much the latter are subject to the former. But human beings can impose law on rational beings subject to them, insofar as human beings by precepts or declarations communicate to their subjects rules to govern the subjects’ actions.
And as human beings by their declarations imprint an inner source of action on other human beings subject to them, so also God imprints on all the things of nature the sources of their own activities. And so we say in this respect that God commands the whole of nature, as Ps. 148:6 says: “He established an ordinance, and it will not pass away.” And all movements and actions of the whole of nature are also in this respect subject to the eternal law. And so irrational creatures, as directed by divine providence, not by understanding God’s commands, are subject to the eternal law in a different way than rational creatures are.
Reply Obj. 1. The imprint of inner sources of activity is to natural things as promulgation of law is to human beings, since the promulgation of law imprints on human beings a source that directs their actions, as I have said.40
Reply Obj. 2. Irrational creatures do not partake of human reason, nor do they obey it, but they partake of God’s reason by obeying it. For the power of God’s reason extends to more things than the power of human reason does. And as members of the human body are moved at the command of human reason but do not partake of reason, since they do have any cognition subordinated to reason, so also God causes the movements of irrational creatures, which are not on that account rational.
Reply Obj. 3. Deficiencies that occur in things of nature, although outside the order of particular causes, are not outside the order of universal causes, and especially of the first cause, that is, God, whose providence nothing can escape, as I have said in the First Part.41And because the eternal law is the plan of divine providence, as I have said,42 so deficiencies of things of nature are subject to the eternal law.
{38}
We thus proceed to the sixth article. It seems that not all human affairs are subject to the eternal law, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. The Apostle says in Gal. 5:18: “If the Spirit guides you, you are not under the law.” But righteous human beings, who are children of God by adoption, are led by the Spirit of God, as Rom. 8:14 says: “Those led by the Spirit of God are children of God.” Therefore, not every human being is under the eternal law.
Obj. 2. The Apostle says in Rom. 8:17: “The wisdom of the flesh is the enemy of God, since that wisdom is not subject to the law of God.” But there are many human beings in whom wisdom of the flesh dominates. Therefore, not all human beings are subject to the eternal law, that is, the law of God.
Obj. 3. Augustine says in his work On Free Choice that “the eternal law is the means whereby the wicked merit unhappiness, and the virtuous a blessed life.”43 But human beings already blessed or already damned are not in a condition to merit. Therefore, such human beings are not subject to the eternal law.
On the contrary, Augustine says in The City of God: “Nothing is in any way withdrawn from the laws of the most high creator and lawgiver, who administers the peace of the universe.”44
I answer that there are two ways in which things are subject to the eternal law, as is evident from what I have said before:45 one way as things partake of the eternal law in a conscious way; a second way by acting and being acted upon as things partake of the eternal law by reason of causes acting on them. And irrational creatures are subject to the eternal law in the second way, as I have said.46 But because rational natures, along with what is common to all creatures, have something proper to them as rational, they are consequently subject to the eternal law in both ways. This is because they know the eternal law in some regard, as I have said,47 and each rational creature has an inclination from nature toward things consonant with the eternal law. For “we are by nature equipped to possess virtues,” as the Ethics says.48
But both ways are indeed incomplete and in some regard destroyed in the wicked, in whom both the natural inclination to virtue is perverted by vicious habits, and the natural knowledge of goodness is darkened by {39} emotions and sinful habits. And both ways are more complete in the virtuous, since knowledge of faith and of wisdom is added to their natural knowledge of goodness, and the inner causal activity of grace and virtue is added to their natural inclination toward goodness.
Therefore, the virtuous are completely subject to the eternal law, as they always act in accord with it. And the wicked are indeed incompletely subject to the eternal law regarding their own actions, as they incompletely recognize and incompletely incline to goodness. But what their actions lack is proportionately supplemented by what they undergo, namely, as they suffer what the eternal law dictates for them insofar as they fail to do what befits the eternal law. And so Augustine says in his work On Free Choice: “I think that the righteous act subject to the eternal law.”49 And he says in his work On Catechizing the Uneducated that “God knows how to supply the inferior parts of his creation with the most suitable laws, by the just wretchedness of souls that abandon him.”50
Reply Obj. 1. We can understand the words of the Apostle in two ways. We can understand them in one way as we understand to be under the law those who are subject to the obligations of the law against their will, as if pinned down by a weight. And so a gloss on the cited text says that “those are under the law who abstain from evil deeds out of fear of the punishment that the law threatens, not out of the love of justice.”51 And in this sense, spiritual human beings are not under the law, since they willingly fulfill the obligations of the law by the charity that the Holy Spirit pours into their hearts.
We can understand the words of the Apostle in a second way as we say that the deeds of human beings led by the Holy Spirit are deeds of the Spirit rather than deeds of the human beings. And so since the Holy Spirit, like the Son, is not subject to the law, as I have said before,52 such deeds, as they belong to the Holy Spirit, are as a result not under the law. And the Apostle attests to this, saying in 2 Cor. 3:17: “Where there is the Spirit of the Lord, there is freedom.”
Reply Obj. 2. Wisdom of the flesh cannot be subject to the law of God regarding resulting actions, since that wisdom inclines human beings to actions contrary to his law. But it can be subject to the law of God regarding what human beings undergo as a result, since it deserves to suffer punishment by the law of divine justice.
{40} Nonetheless, wisdom of the flesh does not so dominate in any human being that the whole goodness of nature is destroyed. And so human beings retain an inclination to do the things that belong to the eternal law. For I have maintained before that sin does not take away the whole goodness of nature.53
Reply Obj. 3. The same cause preserves things when they reach their end and inclines them to it. For example, the weight of heavy things causes them to rest in lower places and to be moved there. And so we should say that, as the eternal law causes persons to merit blessedness or wretchedness, so the same law causes them to be preserved in blessedness or wretchedness. And both the blessed and the damned are in this way subject to the eternal law.
1In ST I, Q. 15, A. 2, Thomas uses ratio to signify God’s “idea” of the order of the whole universe. This “idea” in connection with creation evidently constitutes a plan, and we translate ratio in this context accordingly.
2Each kind of thing has a proper nature or essence. Both Augustine and Thomas use ratio to signify the natures or essences of things as “ideas” in God’s mind. Cf. ST I, Q. 15, A. 2. Also see
3Eighty-Three Questions, q. 46, n. 2 (PL 40:30).
4ST I–II: Q. 90, A. 4; Q. 91, A. 1, ad 2.
5ST I, Q. 34, A. 1.
6On True Religion 30 (PL 34:147).
7On Free Choice I, 6, n. 15 (PL 32:1229).
8ST I–II, Q. 90.
9ST I, Q. 14, A. 8.
10ST I, Q. 103, A. 5.
11ST I, Q. 15, A. 2.
12ST I–II, Q. 90, A. 2.
13On the Trinity X V, 14 (PL 42:1076).
14Aristotle, Categories 4 (2a7–8).
15ST I, Q. 16, A. 1.
16On Free Choice I, 6, n. 15 (PL 32:1229).
17On True Religion 31 (PL 34:148).
18Aristotle, Ethics I, 3 (1094b27–1095a2).
19On Free Choice I, 6, n. 15 (PL 32:1229).
20On True Religion 31 (PL 34:147).
21ST I-II, Q. 91, A. 6.
22Augustine, On Free Choice I, 6, n. 15 (PL 32:1229).
23ST I-II, Q. 93, A. 2, obj. 2.
24On Free Choice I, 5, n. 13 (PL 32:1228).
25ST I–II, Q. 93, A. 1.
26Ibid.
27ST I–II, Q. 90, AA. 1, 2.
28On Free Choice I, 6, n. 15 (PL 32:1229).
29ST I–II, Q. 91, A. 6.
30ST I–II, Q. 92, A. 2.
31ST I–II, Q. 93, A. 1.
32On True Religion 31 (PL 34:147).
33Jn. 14:28.
34This reply qualifies the argument in the section On the contrary.
35MetaphysicsV, 5 (1015b10–5).
36ST I–II, Q. 90, A. 4.
37Aristotle, Ethics I, 13 (1102b25–28).
38ST I–II, Q. 93, A. 1.
39ST I–II, Q. 1, A. 2.
40In the body of the article.
41ST I, Q. 22, A. 2.
42ST I–II, Q. 93, A. 1.
43On Free Choice I, 6, n. 15 (PL 32:1229).
44The City of God XIX, 12 (PL 41:640).
45ST I–II, Q. 93, A. 5
46Ibid.
47ST I–II, Q. 93, A. 2.
48Aristotle, Ethics II, 1 (1103a25–6).
49On Free Choice I, 15, n. 31 (PL 32:1238).
50On Catechizing the Uneducated 18 (PL 40:333).
51Glossa ordinaria, on Gal. 5:18 (PL 114:584); Peter Lombard, Glossa, on Gal. 5:18 (PL 192:158–9).
52ST I–II, Q. 93, A. 4, ad 2.
53ST I–II, Q. 85, A. 2.