A. 11. Is Practical Wisdom Regarding One’s Own Good Specifically the Same as Practical Wisdom Including the Common Good?
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In ST II–II, Q. 47, Thomas argues that practical wisdom includes political wisdom, the wisdom involved in governance (A. 10), and that political wisdom differs specifically from the wisdom involved in an individual’s personal life (A. 11).
In ST II–II, Q. 50, Thomas argues that kingly (monarchical) wisdom in governance is a special kind of practical wisdom, the wisdom to govern, and the archetype of the wisdom in other forms of governance (A. 1), and that subjects need a related specific kind of wisdom, the wisdom to direct themselves to obey their rulers (A. 2).
In the selections from the treatise On Kingship, Thomas explains why it is natural for human beings to live in political communities (I, 1), and how to prevent kings from becoming tyrants and what to do with kings who do (I, 6). To complement the treatment of tyranny here, see , , in chapter 2. The latter selection, written later, complements the former.
[This question is divided into sixteen articles, two of which are translated here.]
We thus proceed to the tenth inquiry. It seems that practical wisdom extends only to governance of oneself, not to the governance of peoples, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. The Philosopher says in the Ethics that virtue related to the common good is justice.1 But practical wisdom differs from justice. Therefore, practical wisdom is not related to the common good.
Obj. 2. Those who seek and act for their own good seem to be practically wise. But those who seek communal goods often neglect their own. Therefore, the latter are not practically wise.
{198} Obj. 3. We contradistinguish practical wisdom from moderation and courage. But we seem to speak of moderation and courage only in relation to one’s own good. Therefore, we should also speak of practical wisdom in the same way.
On the contrary, the Lord says in Mt. 24:45: “Who, do you think, are the faithful and prudent servants whom the Lord will place in charge of his household?”
I answer that the Philosopher says in the Ethics that certain thinkers held that practical wisdom extends only to one’s own good, not the common good.2 And they said this because they thought it necessary for human beings to seek nothing but their own good. But this opinion is contrary to charity, which “does not seek one’s own benefit,” as 1 Cor. 13:5 says. And so also the Apostle says about himself in 1 Cor. 10:33: “Not seeking my own benefit but seeking what benefits many, that they be saved.” The opinion is also contrary to right reason, which esteems the common good as superior to one’s own.
Therefore, since it belongs to practical reason to deliberate rightly, judge, and command regarding the means to attain our requisite end, practical wisdom is evidently related both to the private good of individuals and to the common good of the people.
Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher in the cited text is speaking about moral virtue. And as we call all moral virtue related to the common good legal justice, so we call practical wisdom related to the common good political wisdom. Thus political wisdom is related to legal justice as practical wisdom, absolutely speaking, is related to moral virtue.
Reply Obj. 2. Those who seek the common good of the people also consequently seek their own good. This is true for two reasons. The first reason, indeed, is because there can be no good of one’s own apart from the common good, whether the common good of a household or a city or a kingdom. And so also Valerius Maximus says that the Romans of old “preferred to be poor in a wealthy regime than wealthy in a poor one.”3 The second reason is because human beings, since they are parts of households and political communities, need to contemplate what is good for themselves by what is practically wise regarding the good of the people. For we understand the right disposition of parts in relation to the whole of which they are parts, since, as Augustine says in his Confessions,4 “every part unbefitting the whole of which it is a part is base.”
{199} Reply Obj. 3. Even moderation and courage can be related to the common good, and so laws command things regarding acts of those virtues, as the Ethics says.5 But practical wisdom and justice, which belong to the rational part of the soul, can be more related to the common good, since universal things belong directly to that part of the soul, as individual things belong directly to the sentient part of the soul.
We thus proceed to the eleventh inquiry. It seems that practical wisdom regarding one’s own good is specifically the same as practical wisdom including the common good, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. The Philosopher says in the Ethics that “we consider political wisdom and practical wisdom the same but not the same as such.”6
Obj. 2. The Philosopher says in the Politics that “good persons and good rulers have the same virtue.”7 But political wisdom belongs most to rulers, who have such virtue as master builders have theirs. Therefore, since practical wisdom is the virtue of good persons, it seems that practical wisdom and political wisdom are the same characteristic disposition.
Obj. 3. Things ordered one to another do not differentiate habits specifically or substantially. But one’s own good, which belongs to practical wisdom in an absolute sense, is ordered to the common good, which belongs to political wisdom. Therefore, political wisdom and practical wisdom differ neither specifically nor substantially as habits.
On the contrary, political wisdom, which is ordered to the common good of a political community, and household management, which regards matters pertaining to the common good of a household or a family, and personal management, which regards matters pertaining to the good of only one person, are different fields of expert knowledge. Therefore, by like argument, practical wisdoms also differ specifically by these different subject matters.
I answer that, as I have said before,8 we distinguish species of habits by differences we note regarding the formal aspect of the habits’ objects. But we note the formal aspect of every means in relation to its end, as is clear from what I have said before.9 And so relations to different ends necessarily distinguish species of habits. But the proper good of individuals and {200} the good of families and the good of cities and kingdoms are different ends. And so the differences between these ends also of necessity specifically distinguish different kinds of practical wisdom. One kind is practical wisdom in an absolute sense, which is ordered to one’s own good; a second kind is household practical wisdom, which is ordered to the common good of a household or family; a third kind is political practical wisdom, which is ordered to the common good of a city or kingdom.
Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher means to say that political wisdom is the same as practical wisdom ordered to the common good, and not that political wisdom is the same as any practical wisdom regarding the habit’s substance. And he indeed calls political wisdom practical by reason of the general nature of practical wisdom, namely, as political wisdom consists of right reasoning about actions, and he calls political wisdom political by reason of being ordered to the common good.
Reply Obj. 2. The Philosopher in the same text says that “it belongs to good persons to be fit to rule well and to be ruled well.”10 And so the virtue of a good person includes the virtue of a ruler. But the virtue of rulers and that of subjects differ specifically, just as the virtue of men and that of women do, as he says in the same text.11
Reply Obj. 3. Even different ends ordered one to another distinguish species of habits. For example, the ends of knights, soldiers, and citizens differ specifically even though their ends are ordered one to another. And likewise, the good of individuals, although ordered to the good of the people, does not prevent such different ends causing their respective habits to differ specifically. But the habit ordered to the ultimate end is consequently more important and commands the other habits.
1EthicsV, 1 (1129b17–9).
2Ibid., VI, 8 (1142a1–2).
3Memorable Deeds and Sayings IV, 4.
4Confessions III, 8, n. 15 (PL 32:689).
5Aristotle, EthicsV, 1 (1129b19–25).
6Ibid., VI, 7 (1141b23–4).
7Politics III, 2 (1277a20–1).
8ST II–II, Q. 47, A. 5; I-II, Q. 54, A. 2, ad 1.
9ST I–II: Q. 1, introduction; Q. 102, A. 1.
10Politics III, 4 (1277b13–5).
11Ibid. (1277b20–1).