A. 9. Is Theft a More Serious Sin than Robbery?
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In ST II–II, Q. 66, Thomas explains that it is natural for human beings to possess material things (A. 1), indeed lawful for them to acquire and dispense material things, but they should be ready to share them with others in need (A. 2). He defines and distinguishes theft and robbery (AA. 3 and 4), maintains that theft is a sin (A. 5) and a mortal sin if the stolen goods have substantial value (A. 6), but holds that it is lawful to take another’s property in case of need (A. 7). Robbery cannot be committed without sin (A. 8) and is a more serious sin than theft (A. 9).
In the selections from ST II–II, Q. 77, Thomas says that it is unlawful to sell goods for more than they are worth (A. 1), but that businessmen may aim to make a moderate profit for the support of their families (A. 4).
In ST II–II, Q. 78, Thomas says that interest-taking is a sin, whether the interest is money (A. 1) or any monetarily equivalent remuneration (A. 2). But lenders at interest are not obliged to return things acquired with the interest (A. 3), and borrowers may lawfully pay interest to lenders who unlawfully charge it (A. 4).
In ST I–II, Q. 118, Thomas says that it is a sin to wish to acquire or keep more that the proper amount of material goods (A. 1), that covetousness is contrary to generosity (A. 3), and that covetousness is a sin, indeed a capital sin (A. 7).
We thus proceed to the first inquiry. It seems that the possession of external goods is not natural to human beings, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. No one should ascribe to oneself what belongs to God. But dominion over all creatures belongs uniquely to God, as Ps. 24:1 says: “The Lord’s is the earth,” etc. Therefore, the possession of goods is not natural to human beings.
Obj. 2. Basil, explaining the words of the rich man who in Lk. 12:18 said, “I shall gather all my harvest and my possessions,” says: “Tell me, {131} which goods are yours? Whence did you get them and bring them into existence?”1 But human beings can appropriately claim that things they possess by nature are their own. Therefore, human beings do not by nature possess external goods.
Obj. 3. Ambrose says in his work On the Trinity: “Dominion denotes power.”2 But human beings have no power over external things, since they cannot alter the nature of such things. Therefore, the possession of external goods is not natural to human beings.
On the contrary, Ps. 8:6 says: “You [God] have put all things under their feet,” that is, the feet of human beings.
I answer that we can consider external things in two ways. We can consider them in one way regarding their nature, which is subject only to God’s power, which all things obey at his will, not to the power of human beings. We can consider external things in a second way regarding their use. And then human beings have dominion over external things from nature, since human beings can by their powers of reason and will make use of external things for their benefit, as things made for their sake, as it were. For less perfect things exist for the sake of more perfect things, as I have maintained before.3 And the Philosopher by the latter argument proves in the Politics that the possession of external goods is natural to human beings.4 And the natural dominion over other creatures, which belongs to human beings on account of their reason (in which the image of God consists), is evident in the very creation of human beings, as Gen. 1:26 says: “Let us make human beings in our likeness and image, and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea,” etc.
Reply Obj. 1. God has the chief dominion over all things. And he in his providence has ordained some things for the material sustenance of human beings. And so human beings have dominion from nature regarding the power to use such things.
Reply Obj. 2. The rich man is criticized because he thought external goods belonged chiefly to him, as if he had not received them from another, namely, God.
Reply Obj. 3. The argument of this objection is valid about dominion over external goods regarding their nature, which indeed belongs only to God, as I have said.5
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We thus proceed to the second inquiry. It seems that individuals are not permitted to possess property as their own, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. Everything contrary to the natural law is illicit. But all things are by the natural law common possessions, and individual ownership of possessions is indeed contrary to possession by the community. Therefore, it is illicit for human beings to appropriate external goods as their own.
Obj. 2. Basil, explaining the words of the rich man in Lk. 12:18, says: “As those who come to public events ahead of time would prevent those coming later from attending, by appropriating to themselves what is ordered to common use, so the rich think that common goods they seize before others belong to them.”6 But it is illicit to prevent others from possessing common goods. Therefore, it is illicit to appropriate common goods to oneself.
Obj. 3. Ambrose says,7 and the Decretum holds8: “Let no one call one’s own what is common property.” But he calls external goods common property, as his prior remarks make clear. Therefore, it seems that no one is permitted to appropriate external goods to oneself.
On the contrary, Augustine says in his work On Heresies: “The ‘Apostolics’ have most arrogantly so designated themselves because they do not receive into their fellowship the married or those possessing their own property. (The Catholic Church likewise has very many monks and celibate clerics.)”9 But these heretics hold this view because, cut off from the church, they think that the married and possessors of property, which they themselves are not, have no hope of salvation. Therefore, it is false to say that human beings are not permitted to possess their own property.
I answer that two things belong to human beings regarding external goods. One is the power to manage and dispense external goods. And human beings are permitted to possess them as their own in that regard. And this is necessary for human life for three reasons. First, indeed, the power to manage and dispense external goods is necessary for human life because individuals are more careful in managing goods that belong to them alone than goods that are common to all or many. This is so because individuals, shunning work, leave common property to the care of others, as happens when there are many servants.
{133} Second, the power of individuals to manage and dispense external goods is necessary for human life because human affairs are conducted in a more orderly fashion if the requisite care in managing external goods be entrusted to individuals. On the other hand, there would be confusion if unspecified individuals were to manage everything.
Third, the power of individuals to manage and dispense external goods is necessary for human life because human beings content with their own property live in a condition of peace. And so we observe that quarrels arise rather frequently among those who possess goods in common and not individually.
But the use of external goods is the second thing that belongs to human beings regarding the goods. And human beings in that regard should not possess external goods as their own but as common possessions, namely, in such a way that they readily share the goods when others are in need. And so the Apostle says in 1 Tim. 6:17–8: “Teach the rich of this world to distribute and share readily.”
Reply Obj. 1. The common possession of external goods is ascribed to the natural law, not because the natural law dictates that all such goods should be possessed in common, and nothing possessed as one’s own, but because there is division of possessions by human agreement, which belongs to positive law, as I have said before,10 rather than by the natural law. And so the individual ownership of possessions is not contrary to the natural law, although the inventiveness of human reason adds this to the natural law.
Reply Obj. 2. Those who come early to public events and prepare the way for others to attend would not act illicitly, but they act illicitly if they prevent others from attending. And likewise, the rich do not act improperly if they before others take possession of property that was in the beginning common and share the property with others. But the rich sin if they indiscriminately prevent others from using the property. And so Basil says in the same place: “Why are you rich and others beggars except in order that you gain the merit of dispensing your wealth well, and that others are rewarded for their patience?”11
Reply Obj. 3. When Ambrose says: “Let no one call one’s own what is common property,” he is speaking about individual ownership in regard to the use of external goods. And so he adds: “Those who spend too much are guilty of robbery.”12
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We thus proceed to the third inquiry. It seems that secretly taking another’s property does not belong to the nature of theft, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. What lessens a sin does not seem to belong to the sin’s nature. But sinning in secret belongs to the diminution of sin, as, conversely, Is. 3:9 says about sin becoming more serious: “They like Sodom trumpeted and did not hide their sin.” Therefore, the secret taking of another’s property does not belong to the nature of theft.
Obj. 2. Ambrose says,13 and the Decretum maintains14: “It is no less a crime to take from one who has than to deny to those who have not, if you can help them and have the means.” Therefore, it is as much theft to refrain from giving property to a needy other as to take another’s property.
Obj. 3. Human beings can secretly reclaim their own property (e.g., property on deposit or property unjustly taken) from others. Therefore, it does not belong to the nature of theft that one take another’s property secretly.
On the contrary, Isidore says in his Etymologies: “We derive the word thief from the word black (i.e., dark),15 because thieves operate at night.”16
I answer that the nature of theft consists of a combination of three things. The first is characteristic of theft insofar as theft is contrary to justice, which renders to others what belongs to them. And so it is characteristic of theft that one takes something that belongs to somebody else.
And the second is characteristic of the nature of theft insofar as we distinguish theft from sins against the person like murder and adultery. And so it is characteristic of theft to regard possessions. For if one should take what belongs to another as a part of the other rather than as a possession (e.g., amputating the limb of another) or as an associated person (e.g., abducting the daughter or wife of another), such does not, strictly speaking, have the character of theft.
The third difference, namely, that one takes possession of another’s property secretly, completes the nature of theft. And so the special nature of theft consists of taking another’s property secretly.
Reply Obj. 1. Secrecy indeed sometimes causes sin. For example, secrecy causes sin if one uses secrecy in order to sin, as happens in fraud {135} and deception. And secrecy in this way constitutes rather than diminishes the species of a sin. And such is the case with theft.
Secrecy is in another way the circumstance of a sin. And then secrecy lessens a sin both because it is a sign of shame, and because it removes scandal.
Reply Obj. 2. Keeping property belonging to another has the same nature of harm as taking another’s property. And so we also understand keeping such property to be included in the sin of unjust taking.
Reply Obj. 3. Nothing prevents something belonging absolutely to one person from belonging to another in a particular respect. For example, entrusted goods indeed belong absolutely to depositors, but the goods in respect to their security belong to those entrusted with the goods. And stolen goods belong to thieves in respect to the goods’ detention, not absolutely.
We thus proceed to the fourth inquiry. It seems that theft and robbery are not specifically different sins, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. Theft and robbery differ by whether they are done secretly or openly. For theft signifies secret taking, and robbery coercive and open taking. But other kinds of sins do not differ specifically by whether they are committed secretly or openly. Therefore, theft and robbery do not differ specifically.
Obj. 2. Ends specify moral actions, as I have said before.17 But theft and robbery have the same end, namely, possession of another’s goods. Therefore, theft and robbery do not differ specifically.
Obj. 3. As one steals material things in order to possess them, so one abducts women in order to take pleasure with them. And so also Isidore says in his Etymologies that “we say that an abductor corrupts a woman, and that an abducted woman is corrupted.”18 But we call it abduction whether one carries off an abducted woman publicly or secretly. Therefore, we say that one carries off the possessions of another whether one does so publicly or secretly. Therefore, theft and robbery do not differ.
On the contrary, the Philosopher in the Ethics distinguishes theft from robbery, designating theft as secret and robbery as coercive.19
I answer that theft and robbery are sins contrary to justice, since their perpetrators commit injustice against others. And “no one suffers {136} injustice willingly,” as the Ethics proves.20 And so theft and robbery have the nature of sin because the taking of goods is involuntary regarding those from whom the goods are taken. But we speak of things being involuntary in two ways, namely, by reason of ignorance or by reason of coercion, as the Ethics maintains.21 And so robbery has one sinful character, and theft another. And so they differ specifically.
Reply Obj. 1. We do not note the sinful character of other kinds of sin by reason of things being involuntary, as we do regarding the sins contrary to justice. And so there are different species of sin where things are involuntary in essentially different ways.
Reply Obj. 2. The remote ends of robbery and theft are the same, but this does not suffice to make robbery and theft specifically the same, since the two sins have different proximate ends. For robbers want to take things using their power, while thieves want to take things using their cleverness.
Reply Obj. 3. The abduction of a woman cannot be secret regarding the woman who is abducted. And so also the character of abduction still remains regarding the women against whom such violence is committed even if the abduction should be hidden from the others from whom she is abducted.
We thus proceed to the fifth inquiry. It seems that theft is not always a sin, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. God commands no sin, for Sir. 15:21 says: “He [God] commanded no one to act wickedly.” But God commanded theft, for Ex. 12:35–6 says: “The children of Israel did as the Lord had commanded Moses, and they despoiled the Egyptians.” Therefore, theft is not always a sin.
Obj. 2. Those who find things that do not belong to them seem to commit theft if they retain those things. But this seems to be permitted by natural justice, as the jurists say.22 Therefore, it seems that theft is not always a sin.
Obj. 3. Those who take things that belong to them do not seem to sin, since they do not act against justice or take away its reciprocity. But one commits theft even if one should secretly take one’s property in the care or custody of another. Therefore, it seems that theft is not always a sin.
{137} On the contrary, Ex. 20:15 says: “Thou shalt not steal.”
I answer that if one should consider the nature of theft, one would find that it has two aspects of sin. First, theft is indeed sinful because it is contrary to justice, which renders to all persons what is their due. And then theft is contrary to justice because it consists of taking another’s goods. Second, theft is sinful because of the deception or fraud that a thief commits when he takes possession of another’s property secretly and almost treacherously. And so every theft is clearly a sin.
Reply Obj. 1. It is not theft for someone to take the goods of another, whether secretly or openly, in execution of a court order, since a judge has authorized the former to take the goods. And so it was much less theft when the children of Israel took the spoils of the Egyptians at the command of the Lord, who decreed this in compensation for the afflictions that the Egyptians without cause inflicted on the Israelites. And so Wis. 10:19 says pointedly: “The just took the spoils of the wicked.”
Reply Obj. 2. We should make distinctions about found things. For there are some things that were never in the possession of anyone (e.g., precious stones and jewels found on the seashore), and finders are allowed to keep them.23 And the argument is the same regarding long buried treasures that belong to no one, unless civil laws require the finder to give half to the owner of the field, if the treasure happens to lie in the field of another.24 And so Mt. 13:44, in the Gospel parable on the finding of treasure in a field, says that the finder bought the field, as if to have the right to possess the whole treasure.
And there are some things found near the possessions of others. And then one does not commit theft if one should take such things, intending not to keep them but to return them to their owner, who does not consider them abandoned. And likewise, finders do not commit theft in keeping things for themselves if the things should have been abandoned, and the finders so believe.25 In all other cases, the finder of such things does commit the sin of theft.26 And so Augustine says in a homily,27 and the Decretum maintains28: “If you have found and not returned something, you have stolen it.”
Reply Obj. 3. Those who covertly reclaim their goods on deposit with another, burden the one with whom they deposited the goods, since the latter is obliged to return the goods or demonstrate that the goods are unharmed. And so they clearly sin and are obliged to relieve the burden of the one with whom they deposited the goods.
{138} But those who covertly reclaim their goods in the custody of another unjustly indeed do not sin because they burden the one holding the goods, and so they are not obliged to restore anything or make any recompense. Still, they sin against justice in general when they usurp for themselves the right to reclaim their goods without recourse to legal procedures. And so they are obliged to make satisfaction to God and to endeavor to allay any scandal to neighbor if such has arisen from their behavior.
We thus proceed to the sixth inquiry. It seems that theft is not a mortal sin, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. Prov. 6:30 says: “There is no great sin if one has committed theft.” But every mortal sin is a great sin. Therefore, theft is not a mortal sin.
Obj. 2. Mortal sin deserves the punishment of death. But the Old Law inflicts the punishment of indemnity, not the punishment of death, for theft, as Ex. 22:1 says: “If one has stolen an ox or a sheep, one shall repay five oxen for each one stolen, and four sheep for each one stolen.” Therefore, theft is not a mortal sin.
Obj. 3. One can commit theft in small as well as large matters. But it seems inappropriate that one be punished by eternal death for the theft of a small thing (e.g., a needle or a pen). Therefore, theft is not a mortal sin.
On the contrary, God’s judgment condemns no one except for mortal sin. But God condemns persons for theft, as Zech. 5:3 says: “This is the curse that pours over the face of the earth, that every thief is condemned as it is written on the scroll.” Therefore, theft is a mortal sin.
I answer that, as I have said before,29 mortal sin is contrary to charity, which brings spiritual life to the soul. And charity indeed consists chiefly of love of God and secondarily of love of neighbor, to which wishing and doing good to neighbor belong. But human beings in committing theft inflict harm on their neighbor in the neighbor’s goods, and human society would collapse if human beings were to steal from one another promiscuously. And so theft, because contrary to charity, is a mortal sin.
Reply Obj. 1. The cited text says that theft is not a great sin for two reasons. First, indeed, theft is not a great sin because of a necessity that induces someone to steal, and such necessity lessens or totally eliminates moral fault, as I shall show later.30 And so the text immediately adds: “For the thief steals to satisfy his hungry spirit.” Second, the text says theft is not a great sin in comparison to the guilt incurred by adultery, which is {139} punished by death.31 And so Prov. 6:31–2 adds regarding the thief: “The thief will repay sevenfold, but the adulterer will lose his soul.”
Reply Obj. 2. The punishments of this life are more medicinal than retributive, since retribution against sinners is reserved to God’s righteous judgment. And so judgment in this life inflicts the punishment of death only for mortal sins that cause irreparable harm or have a terrible deformity, not for every mortal sin. And so present judgment does not inflict the punishment of death for theft, which causes reparable loss, unless a grave circumstance makes the theft more serious. For example, such is evidently the case with sacrilege, that is, the theft of something sacred; with peculation, that is, the theft of common property, as Augustine makes clear in his Commentary on the Gospel of John32; with abduction, that is, the theft of a human being, for which one is punished by death, as Ex. 21:16 makes clear.
Reply Obj. 3. Reason understands slight matters as if they are nothing. And so human beings do not consider themselves harmed regarding very little things, and those who take such things can presume that the taking is not contrary to the will of those who own the things. And persons can be excused from mortal sin inasmuch as they take very little things covertly. But if they should intend to steal and cause harm to neighbor, there can be mortal sin even regarding such very little things, just as there can be by consent only in a plan to do evil.
We thus proceed to the seventh inquiry. It seems that one is not permitted to steal out of necessity, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. Penances are imposed only on sinners. But a decretal on thefts says: “If one should out of the necessity of hunger or lack of clothing steal food, clothing, or beast, the person shall do penance for three weeks.”33 Therefore, one may not lawfully steal out of necessity.
Obj. 2. The Philosopher says in the Ethics that “some things by their very name involve wickedness,” and he includes theft therein.34 But things evil as such cannot become good because of a good end. Therefore, no one can lawfully steal in order to alleviate one’s necessity.
Obj. 3. Human beings should love their neighbor as themselves. But one may not lawfully steal in order to assist a neighbor by giving the {140} neighbor alms, as Augustine says in his work Against Lying.35 Therefore, one also may not lawfully steal to alleviate one’s own necessity.
On the contrary, all things are common property in cases of necessity. And so it does not seem to be a sin if one takes the property of another, since necessity has made the property common.
I answer that prescriptions of human law cannot derogate from natural or divine law. But the natural order established by divine providence has ordered inferior things to alleviate the necessity of human beings. And so the division and appropriation of material things, which proceeds from human law, does not preclude that such things should alleviate the necessity of human beings. And so the natural law requires that superfluous things in one’s possession be used for the sustenance of the poor. And so Ambrose says,36 and the Decretum maintains37: “It is the bread of the hungry that you withhold; it is the garments of the naked that you hide away; the money you bury in the ground is the ransom and freedom of the unfortunate.” But because many persons are in need, and the same things cannot assist everybody, the dispensing of one’s own goods is committed to each individual, so that each may out of them assist those in need.
Still, if the necessity is so pressing and clear that one has an immediate need of things at hand (e.g., when personal danger threatens, and there is no other way to avoid it), then one may lawfully alleviate one’s necessity with the goods of another, whether one takes the goods openly or secretly. Nor does this, properly speaking, have the character of theft or robbery.
Reply Obj. 1. The decretal is talking about cases in which there is no pressing necessity.
Reply Obj. 2. Using the property of another taken in a case of extreme necessity does not have the character of theft, properly speaking. This is because such necessity makes one’s own what one takes to support one’s life.
Reply Obj. 3. One can also in cases of like necessity secretly take the property of another in order to assist a neighbor in such need.
We thus proceed to the eighth inquiry. It seems that one can commit robbery without sin, for the following reasons:
{141} Obj. 1. Warriors take spoils by force of arms, and this seems to belong to the nature of robbery, as I have said before.38 But warriors are permitted to take spoils from the enemy, for Ambrose says in his work On Abraham: “When a conqueror has acquired spoils of war, it befits military discipline that everything be set aside for the king,”39 namely, for him to distribute. Therefore, robbery is lawful in some cases.
Obj. 2. One is permitted to take from others property that does not belong to them. But property in the possession of unbelievers does not belong to them. For Augustine says in a letter to a Donatist: “You call yours things that you do not justly possess, and the laws of earthly kings require that you forfeit them.”40 Therefore, it seems that believers could lawfully rob from unbelievers.
Obj. 3. Earthly rulers forcibly exact many goods and services from their subjects, and this seems to partake of the nature of robbery. But it is grievous to say that rulers sin in this regard, since almost all rulers would then be condemned. Therefore, robbery is lawful in some cases.
On the contrary, one can offer sacrifices and oblations to God from things lawfully acquired. But one cannot do so from the fruits of robbery, as Is. 61:8 says: “I, the Lord, love justice and hate robbery in connection with sacrifices.” Therefore, one may not lawfully take anything by robbery.
I answer that robbery signifies the use of force and coercion to take from others property that belongs to them, and this is contrary to justice. But no human being can exercise coercion except by public authority. And so those who forcibly take things from others, if the former be private persons not exercising public authority, act unlawfully and commit robbery, as robbers evidently do.
But public authority is committed to rulers in order that they may safeguard justice. And so they are permitted to use force and coercion only in the course of justice, whether in wars against enemies or in punishing civilian criminals. And property taken by such force does not have the nature of robbery, since the taking is not contrary to justice. On the other hand, if, contrary to justice, some in the exercise of public authority forcibly take the property of others, such persons act unlawfully and commit robbery and are obliged to make restitution.
Reply Obj. 1. We need to make a distinction about the spoils of war. For if those who despoil the enemy wage just war, things forcibly acquired in the war become theirs. And this does not have the character of robbery. And so they are not obliged to make restitution. But those engaging in just {142} war could, in taking spoils, sin by covetousness or wicked intention, namely, if they wage war chiefly for the spoils and not for the sake of justice. For Augustine says in his sermon on the Lord’s words that “it is a sin to wage war for the sake of booty.”41
On the other hand, if those taking spoils should be engaged in an unjust war, they commit robbery and are obliged to make restitution.
Reply Obj. 2. Some unbelievers unjustly possess their property insofar as the laws of earthly rulers command forfeiture of the property. And so public, not private, authority can forcibly take the property from those unbelievers.
Reply Obj. 3. If rulers exact from their subjects what is due them in justice in order to maintain the common good, even if the rulers use force, there is no robbery. But if rulers unduly exact things by force, it is robbery. And so Augustine says in The City of God: “If justice is taken away, what are kingdoms but massive robberies? And what are robberies but petty kingdoms?”42 And Ez. 22:27 says: “Her [Jerusalem’s] rulers are in her midst like wolves ravishing their prey.” And so also rulers, like robbers, are obliged to make restitution. And the more dangerously and the more extensively rulers act against public justice, of which they are constituted the guardians, the more seriously do they sin than robbers.
We thus proceed to the ninth inquiry. It seems that theft is a more serious sin than robbery, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. Theft has fraud and deception in addition to the taking of property that belongs to another, and robbery does not. But fraud and deception as such have the nature of sin, as I have maintained before.43 Therefore, theft is a more serious sin than robbery.
Obj. 2. Shame is fear about a wicked act, as the Ethics says.44 But human beings are more ashamed about theft than about robbery. Therefore, it seems that theft is a more wicked sin than robbery.
Obj. 3. The more people a sin harms, the more serious it seems to be. But theft can inflict harm on both the mighty and the lowly, while robbery can inflict harm only on the weak, over whom force can be exercised. Therefore, it seems that theft is a more serious sin than robbery.
On the contrary, laws punish robbery more severely than theft.
{143} I answer that, as I have said before,45 robbery and theft have the nature of sin because of the unwillingness of those from whom things are taken, unwillingness through ignorance in the case of theft, and unwillingness through force in the case of robbery. But force makes things more involuntary than ignorance does, since force is more directly contrary to the will than ignorance is. And so robbery is a more serious sin than theft.
And there is another reason, since robbery both inflicts loss on another regarding the other’s goods and borders on insult and injury to the other’s person. And the latter outweighs the fraud and deception that belong to theft.
Reply Obj. 1. And so the reply to obj. 1 is clear.
Reply Obj. 2. Human beings who cling to material things boast more about external power, which robbery evidences, than about internal power, which sin destroys. And so they are less ashamed about robbery than about theft.
Reply Obj. 3. Although theft can harm more people than robbery can, robbery can inflict greater harms than theft can. And so robbery is also for this reason more detestable.
1Homily 6, on Lk. 12:18, n. 7 (PG 31:276).
2Actually, On Faith I, 1, n. 7 (PL 16:530).
3ST I–II, Q. 64, A. 1.
4Politics I, 3 (1256b7–8).
5In the body of the article.
6Homily 6, on Lk. 12:18, n. 7 (PG 31:276).
7Sermon 81, on Lk. 12:18 (PL 17:593–4).
8Gratian, Decretum I, dist. 47, c. 8.
9On Heresies 40 (PL 42:32).
10ST I–II, Q. 57, AA. 2, 3.
11See n. 6, supra.
12See n. 7, supra.
13Sermon 81, on Lk. 12:18 (PL 17:593–4).
14Gratian, Decretum I, dist. 47, c. 8.
15The Latin word for thief is fur, and the Latin word for dark is furvus.
16Etymologies X, n. 107 (PL 82:378).
17ST I–II: Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, A. 6.
18Etymologies X, n. 237 (PL 82:392).
19EthicsV, 2 (1131a6–9).
20Ibid., 11 (1138a12).
21Ibid., III, 1 (1009b35–1110a1).
22See the reply to obj. 2 and its notes (nn. 23–6, 28).
23Cf. Justinian, Digest I, title 8, c. 3.
24Cf. Justinian, Institutes II, title 1, n. 39.
25Cf. ibid., II, title 1, n. 47.
26Justinian, Digest XLI, title 1, c. 8.
27Sermon 178, c. 8 (PL 38:965).
28Gratian, Decretum II, cause 14, q. 5, c. 6.
29ST: I–II, Q. 72, A.5; II–II, Q. 59, A. 4.
30ST II–II, Q. 66, A. 7.
31Cf. Lev. 20:10; Dt. 22:22.
32Commentary on the Gospel of John, on Jn. 12:6, tr. 50, n. 10 (PL 35:1762).
33Gregory IX, DecretalsV, title 18, c. 3.
34Ethics II, 6 (1107a9–17).
35Against Lying 7, n. 18 (PL 40:528).
36Sermon 81, on Lk. 12:18 (PL 17:593–4).
37Gratian, Decretum I, dist. 47, c. 8.
38ST II–II, Q. 66, A. 4.
39On Abraham I, 3, n. 17 (PL 14:427).
40Letter 93, to the Donatist Vincent, c. 12, n. 50 (PL 33:345).
41Sermon 82, on the Lord’s words, n. 1 (PL 39:1904).
42The City of God IV, 4 (PL 41:115).
43ST II–II, Q. 55, AA. 4, 5.
44Aristotle, Ethics IV, 9 (1128b11–2, 22–3).
45ST II–II, Q. 66, A. 4.