A. 13. Is Conscience a Power?
{1}
In the view of Thomas and other medieval theologians, human beings through the use of reason can know what they should or should not do. They called this moral consciousness conscience. In ST I, Q. 79, on the intellectual powers of the soul, he distinguishes conscience from synderesis, the habitual knowledge of first moral principles (A. 12), and moral consciousness about prospective action from psychological consciousness and moral consciousness about past actions (A. 13). In ST I–II, Q. 19, on good and evil acts of the will, Thomas explains why one is obliged not to act contrary to erroneous conscience (A. 5) but may not be excused if one acts in accord with erroneous conscience (A. 6).
[This question is divided into thirteen articles, two of which are included here.]
We thus proceed to the twelfth article. It seems that synderesis is a special intellectual power, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. Things that fall within one and the same classification seem to belong to one and the same genus. But a gloss of Jerome on Ez. 1:6 contradistinguishes synderesis from the irascible, concupiscible, and rational powers,1 which are particular powers. Therefore, synderesis is a particular power.
Obj. 2. Contraries belong to the same genus. But synderesis and sense appetites seem to be contraries, since synderesis always tends toward good, and sense appetites always tend toward evil. (And it is by reason of the latter tendency that the serpent symbolizes sense appetites, as Augustine makes clear in his work On the Trinity.2) Therefore, it seems that synderesis is a power, just as sense appetites are powers.
{2} Obj. 3. Augustine says in his work On Free Choice that the natural power of judgment has certain “rules and sources of virtue that are both true and invariable,”3 and we call these rules and sources of virtue synderesis. Therefore, since the invariable rules by means of which we judge belong to reason regarding its higher part, as Augustine says in his work On the Trinity,4 it seems that synderesis is the same as reason. And so it is a power.
On the contrary, “rational powers are disposed toward contraries,” as the Philosopher says.5 But synderesis is not disposed toward contraries; rather, synderesis tends only to what is good. Therefore, synderesis is not a power. For if synderesis were to be a power, it would necessarily be a rational power, since it does not exist in irrational animals.
I answer that synderesis is a characteristic disposition rather than a power, notwithstanding the fact that some thinkers held synderesis to be a power higher than reason,6 and other thinkers said that synderesis is reason itself, not as the power of reason but as human nature.7
And to prove this, we need to consider that, as I have said before,8 human reasoning, since it is a movement, progresses from an understanding of some things, namely, things known by nature without inquiry by reason, as from a fixed source. And human reasoning also terminates in understanding, since it is by naturally self-evident principles that we judge about the things we discover in the process of reasoning. Moreover, practical reason evidently reasons about practical matters just as theoretical reason reasons about theoretical matters. Therefore, as nature needs to implant in us the first principles concerning theoretical matters, so also does nature need to implant in us the first principles concerning practical matters.
But the first principles about theoretical matters, principles implanted in us by nature, do not belong to any special power but to a special characteristic disposition, which we call “the understanding of principles,” as the Ethics makes clear.9 And so the principles about practical matters, principles implanted in us by nature, likewise do not belong to a special power but to a characteristic disposition from nature, and we call this disposition synderesis. And so also we say that synderesis incites to good and complains about evil, since we progress by first principles to discovery and judge about the things we have discovered. Therefore, synderesis is clearly a characteristic disposition from nature, not a power.
{3} Reply Obj.1. We note Jerome’s classification with respect to different acts, not different powers. And different acts can belong to the same power.
Reply Obj. 2. Similarly, we note the contrariety of sense appetites and synderesis by the contrariety of acts, not the contrariety of different species belonging to the same genus.
Reply Obj. 3. Such invariable considerations are the first principles about practical matters, and there can be no error about the principles. And we attribute such considerations to reason as the power and to synderesis as the characteristic disposition. And so also do we judge by nature by both, namely, by reason and synderesis.
We thus proceed to the thirteenth article.
It seems that conscience is a power, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. Origen says that conscience is “the correcting spirit and companion teacher of the soul whereby the soul is dissociated from evil and clings to good.”10 But spirit designates a power of the soul. And this power is either the very power of the mind, as Eph. 4:23 says: “Be renewed in the spirit of your minds,” or the very power of imagination, which is also why we call the sight of imagination “spiritual,” as Augustine makes clear in his Commentary on the Book of Genesis.11 Therefore, conscience is a power.
Obj. 2. Only powers of the soul are subjects of sin. But conscience is a subject of sin, since Tit. 1:15 says of certain individuals that “their minds and consciences are defiled.” Therefore, it seems that conscience is a power.
Obj. 3. Conscience needs to be either an act or a characteristic disposition or a power. But conscience is not an act, since conscience would thereby not always abide in human beings. Nor is conscience a characteristic disposition, for conscience would thereby be many things rather than one thing, since many cognitive characteristic dispositions guide us in practical matters. Therefore, conscience is a power.
On the contrary, conscience can be laid aside, but a power cannot be. Therefore, conscience is not a power.
I answer that conscience, properly speaking, is an act, not a power. And this is evident both from the meaning of the word and from the things that we in our ordinary way of speaking attribute to conscience. For conscience, according to the proper meaning of the word, signifies {4} the relation of knowledge to something else, since we define con-science as knowledge with something else. But acts connect knowledge to things. And so it is clear from the meaning of the word that conscience is an act.
And the same conclusion is evident from the things that we attribute to conscience. For we say that conscience bears witness, morally obliges or stirs to action, and accuses or disquiets or reproves. And all of these things result from connecting some knowledge of ours to what we do. And this connection arises in three ways. It arises in one way as we recognize that we have or have not done something, as Eccl. 7:23 says: “Your conscience knows” that you have “very often” spoken evil “of others.” And we accordingly say that conscience bears witness. In a second way, we connect our knowledge to something as we by our conscience judge that we should or should not do something. And we accordingly say that conscience incites to action or morally obliges. In a third way, we connect our knowledge to something as we by our conscience judge that we have or have not done something worthily. And we accordingly say that conscience excuses, or accuses and disquiets. But all three of these ways clearly result from the actual connection of knowledge to what we do. And so, properly speaking, conscience designates an act.
Nevertheless, because characteristic dispositions are the sources of acts, we sometimes apply the word conscience to the initial characteristic dispositions from nature, namely, synderesis. For example, Jerome in a gloss on Ez. 1:6 calls conscience synderesis,12 and Basil calls it “the natural power of judgment,”13 and Damascene calls it “the law of our intellect.” For we customarily designate causes and effects by one another.14
Reply Obj. 1. Because conscience is an utterance of the mind, we call conscience spirit insofar as we equate spirit and mind.
Reply Obj. 2. We do not say that conscience has defilement as a subject, but we say that conscience has defilement as something known belongs to knowledge, namely, as one knows that one is defiled.
Reply Obj. 3. Although acts in themselves do not always abide, they nonetheless abide in their causes, which are powers and characteristic dispositions. But all the characteristic dispositions that shape conscience, however many, still have their efficacy from one that is primary, namely, the characteristic disposition of first principles. And we call this characteristic disposition synderesis. And so we sometimes in a special way call this characteristic disposition conscience, as I have said before.15
1Commentary on the Book of Ezekiel, on 1:6 (PL 25:22).
2On the Trinity XII, 12 and 13 (PL 42:1007, 1009).
3On Free Choice II, 10 (PL 32:1256).
4On the Trinity XII, 2 (PL 42:999).
5Metaphysics IX, 2 (1046b4–7).
6E.g., William of Auxerre, Golden Summary II, tr. 2, c. 1.
7E.g., Alexander of Hales, Summary of Theology I–II, n. 418.
8ST I, Q. 79, A. 8.
9Aristotle, EthicsVI, 6 (1140b31–1141a8).
10Commentary on the Letter to the Romans II, on 2:15 (PG 14:893).
11Commentary on the Book of Genesis XII, 7 and 24 (PL 34:459, 475).
12See n. 1, supra.
13Homily on the Beginning of the Book of Proverbs (PG 31:405).
14On Orthodox Faith IV, 22 (PG 94:1200).
15In the body of the article.