A. 2. Do We Appropriately Designate Political Wisdom Part of Practical Wisdom?
[This question is divided into four articles, two of which are translated here.]
We thus proceed to the first inquiry. It seems that we should not designate kingly wisdom in governance a species of practical wisdom, for the following reasons:
{201} Obj. 1. Kingly wisdom in governing is ordered to maintaining justice, since the Ethics says that “the ruler is the guardian of justice.”1 Therefore, kingly wisdom in governing belongs to justice rather than to practical wisdom.
Obj. 2. The Philosopher says in the Politics that a kingdom is one of six kinds of regime.2 But we do not understand the other five kinds of regime, namely, aristocracy, polity (also called timocracy), tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy, to signify species of practical wisdom. Therefore, neither should we understand kingdom to signify kingly wisdom in governance as a species of practical wisdom.
Obj. 3. Lawmaking belongs both to kings and other rulers and even to the people, as Isidore makes clear.3 But the Philosopher in the Ethics designates lawmaking part of practical wisdom.4 Therefore, it is inappropriate to substitute kingly wisdom in governance for lawmaking.
On the contrary, the Philosopher says in the Politics that “practical wisdom is the special virtue of rulers.”5 Therefore, there should be a special practical wisdom consisting of kingly wisdom in governance.
I answer that, as is clear from what I have said before,6 ruling and commanding belong to practical wisdom, and so there is the special character of practical wisdom wherever there is the special character of governance and command in human affairs. But those responsible for ruling both themselves and the perfect community of a city or kingdom clearly have the special and complete character of governance. For the more extensive governance is, extending to many matters and achieving a higher end, the nearer perfect governance is. And so practical wisdom in its special and most complete character belongs to kings, who have authority to rule cities or kingdoms. And so we designate kingly wisdom in governance a species of practical wisdom.
Reply Obj. 1. Everything proper to moral virtue belongs to practical wisdom to direct. And so also we posit the right reasoning of practical wisdom in the definition of moral virtue, as I have said before.7 And so also carrying out justice, since justice is ordered to the common good and belongs to the office of king, needs the guidance of practical wisdom. And so those two virtues, practical wisdom and justice, belong most to kings, as Jer. 23:5 says: “The king will rule and be wise, and he will decide cases and execute justice on the earth.” But because direction belongs more to kings, and execution more to subjects, we designate kingly wisdom in {202} governance a species of practical wisdom, which directs justice, rather than a species of justice, which executes practical wisdom.
Reply Obj. 2. Kingdom is the best regime, as the Ethics says.8 And so we should designate kingdoms rather than other regimes as the political species of practical wisdom. But we should designate kingdoms as the political species of practical wisdom so as to include under kingdoms all the other good regimes, but not the bad regimes, which are contrary to virtue and so do not belong to practical wisdom.
Reply Obj. 3. The Philosopher designates kingly wisdom in governance from the chief activity of kings, namely, lawmaking. And although law-making belongs to rulers other than kings, it belongs to the others only insofar as they partake of kingly governance.
We thus proceed to the second inquiry. It seems that we do not designate political wisdom part of practical wisdom, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. Kingly wisdom in governing is part of political practical wisdom, as I have said.9 But we should not contradistinguish parts from the whole of which they are parts. Therefore, we should not designate political wisdom a separate species of practical wisdom.
Obj. 2. Different objects distinguish different species of habit. But what kings need to command, and what subjects need to execute, have the same object. Therefore, we should not designate political wisdom, insofar as it belongs to subjects, a different species of practical wisdom from kingly wisdom in governing.
Obj. 3. Every subject is an individual person. But every individual person can direct himself or herself adequately by practical wisdom in general. Therefore, we should not designate another species of practical wisdom, a species called political.
On the contrary, the Philosopher says in the Ethics: “The part of practical wisdom that regards the political community is indeed the architectonic practical wisdom of lawmaking, but the part that regards individual situations has the general name political wisdom.”10
{203} I answer that masters by their commands induce their slaves11 to act, and rulers their subjects. But masters and rulers do so otherwise than causes induce irrational and inanimate things to act. For irrational and inanimate things, since they do not enjoy mastery of their activity by the exercise of free choice, do not induce themselves to act. Rather, other things induce them to act. And so their right governance resides only in the other things causing their actions, not in themselves. But other human beings by issuing commands induce slaves or any human subjects to act in such a way that the slaves or subjects proceed to act by the exercise of free choice. And so slaves and subjects need to have a right governance whereby they direct themselves to obey those in charge. And the species of practical wisdom called political belongs to this right governance.
Reply Obj. 1. As I have said,12 kingly wisdom in governing is the most complete kind of practical wisdom. And so the practical wisdom of subjects, which falls short of the practical wisdom of kings in governing, keeps the general name of practical wisdom that we call political. Just so, in logic, convertible terms that do not signify the essence of something keep the general name logical property.
Reply Obj. 2. Different aspects of objects specifically differentiate habits, as is evident from what I have said before.13 But kings indeed consider the same prospective actions from a more universal aspect than subjects do when they obey, since many subjects in carrying out various duties obey the same king. And so kingly wisdom in governing is related to the political wisdom of which we are speaking as a master builder’s skill is related to the skills of construction workers.
Reply Obj. 3. Human beings direct themselves in relation to their own good by practical wisdom in general, but in relation to the common good by the political wisdom of which we are speaking.
1Aristotle, EthicsV, 6 (1134b1–2).
2Politics III, 5 (1279a32—b10).
3Etymologies II, 10, n. 1 (PL 82:130); V, 10 (PL 82:200).
4EthicsVI, 8 (1141b25–9).
5Politics III, 4 (1277b25–6).
6ST II–II, Q. 47, AA. 8, 12.
7ST II–II, Q. 47, A. 5, obj. 1; I-II, Q. 58, A. 2, ad 4.
8Aristotle, EthicsVIII, 10 (1160a35–6).
9ST II–II, Q. 48.
10Ethics VI, 7 (1141b24–9). Aristotle refers to the separate functions in Greek city-states of establishing basic laws and of applying those laws to individual cases. City founders did the former, and citizens in general assembly did the latter. We make a similar distinction in modern times, for example, between zoning laws and zoning variances, although select boards rather than town meetings provide for the latter.
11See .
12ST II–II, Q. 50, A. 1.
13ST II–II, Q. 47, A. 5; I–II, Q. 54, A. 2.