A. 4. Is It Lawful in Business to Sell Goods for More than One Paid for Them?
[This question is divided into four articles, two of which are translated here.]
We thus proceed to the first inquiry. It seems that one can lawfully sell goods for more than they are worth, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. Civil laws specify justice in the exchanges of human life. But these laws allow buyers and sellers to deceive one another,1 which indeed happens by sellers selling goods for more than they are worth, and by buyers buying goods for less than they are worth. Therefore, it is lawful to sell goods for more than they are worth.
Obj. 2. Common human practices seem to be natural and no sin. But Augustine relates in his work On the Trinity that everybody accepted the comment of a certain jester: “You want to buy cheaply and sell dearly.”2 And the saying of Prov. 20:14, “Every buyer says, ‘I am ruined, I am {144} ruined,’ and will gloat when he has walked off,” agrees with the jester’s comment. Therefore, one may lawfully sell goods more dearly and buy goods more cheaply than they are worth.
Obj. 3. It seems lawful for one to do by mutual agreement what one should do by requisite virtue. But the Philosopher says in the Ethics that in the case of friendships of utility, those who have received benefits from friends should make proportional recompense to the friends,3 and the benefits received sometimes indeed exceed the value of the goods given. For example, one may have great need of a particular thing, whether to avoid danger or to gain an advantage. Therefore, in sales contracts, one may lawfully sell goods for more than they are worth.
On the contrary, Mt. 7:12 says: “Do to others what you wish others to do for you.” But no one wishes that others sell goods to oneself more dearly than the goods are worth. Therefore, no one should sell goods to others more dearly than the goods are worth.
I answer that it is completely sinful to use fraud in order to sell goods for more than their just price, since sellers thereby deceive, and cause loss to, their neighbors. And so also Cicero says in his work On Duties: “There should be no deception in contractual affairs; sellers will not set up false bidders, nor buyers suborn those who bid against them.”4
But absent fraud, we can speak about buying and selling in two ways. We can speak about buying and selling in one way absolutely. And buying and selling in this respect seems to have been established for the common benefit of both parties, namely, each party needs something belonging to the other, as the Philosopher makes clear in the Politics.5 But things established for the common benefit of both parties should not burden one party more than the other. And so the equality of the goods exchanged should be the basis of contracts between the parties. But we measure the worth of goods useful to human beings by the price paid for them, and money was invented for that purpose, as the Ethics says.6 And so if either the price exceeds the worth of the goods, or if, conversely, the goods exceed the price, the equality required by justice is absent. And so selling goods more dearly or buying goods more cheaply than they are worth is in itself unjust and illicit.
We can speak of buying and selling in a second way insofar as the buying and selling accidentally benefits one party and disadvantages the other. For example, such would be the case if one party has great need of a particular thing, and the other would suffer without it. And the just price in {145} such a case will be related both to the goods that are sold and the loss that sellers incur by the sale. And so one could sell such goods for more than they are worth in themselves, although not for more than they are worth to the owner.
And if the buyer benefits greatly from the goods received from the seller, and if the seller suffers no loss by being without the goods, the latter should not raise the price. The seller should not raise the price because the benefit accruing to the buyer does not come from the seller but results from the condition of the buyer, and no one can sell to another what is not one’s own, although one could charge another for the loss one suffers. But buyers who are greatly benefited from the goods received from sellers can of their own free will pay the sellers something extra, and this belongs to the buyer’s virtue.
Reply Obj. 1. As I have said before,7 human laws are enacted for the whole people, among whom there are many who lack virtue, and not only for the virtuous. And so human law could not prohibit everything contrary to virtue. And it is enough for human law to prohibit things destructive of human society and to consider other matters as licit because it does not punish them, not because it would approve them. Therefore, the law considers buying and selling as licit and does not punish it if, without fraud, the seller overcharges for his goods, or the buyer underpays for them, unless the difference be too much, for even human law then requires restitution. For example, human law requires restitution if one should be cheated by more than half of the amount of the just price.8 But divine law lets nothing contrary to virtue go unpunished. And so divine law reckons buying and selling illicit whenever buyers or sellers do not observe the equality required by justice. And those who gain more than they should are obliged to recompense those who have suffered more loss than they should, if the loss be significant. And I make this qualification because the just price of goods sometimes consists of a rough estimate and is not exactly fixed, so that a slight addition or subtraction does not seem to take away the equality required by justice.
Reply Obj. 2. Augustine says in the same place: “The jester, whether by reflecting about himself or by his experience of others, believed that everybody wishes to buy cheaply and sell dearly. But since this is indeed sinful, everyone has the power to acquire the justice that resists and conquers this inclination.”9 And he gives the example of a person who paid a slight price for a book because of the seller’s ignorance of the just price. And so such a common desire is clearly sinful, not natural. And so it is {146} common to the many people who walk on the broad road of sin.
Reply Obj. 3. We chiefly consider the equality of goods regarding commutative justice. But we consider the equality of utility in friendships of utility. And so one should in such friendships recompense another in proportion to the benefit one receives. But in buying, one should recompense the seller in proportion to the value of the goods bought.
We thus proceed to the fourth inquiry. It seems that it is not lawful to sell goods for more than one paid for them, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. On Mt. 21:5, Chrysostom says: “Those who buy goods in order to sell them, entire and unaltered, at a profit, are the sellers cast out of the temple of God.”10 And Cassidorus, commenting on Ps. 71:15, “Since I do not know scholarly ways,” or “business” according to another version,11 says the same: “What else is business,” he says, “than wanting to buy goods more cheaply and to sell them more dearly?”12 And he adds: “The Lord cast such merchants out of the temple.” But persons are cast out of the temple only because of some sin. Therefore, such business is sinful.
Obj. 2. It is contrary to justice for anyone to sell goods for more than they are worth or to buy them for less than they are worth, as is clear from what I have said before.13 But businessmen who sell goods for more than they paid for them must have either bought the goods for less than they are worth or sold the goods for more than they are worth. Therefore, businessmen cannot do this without committing sin.
Obj. 3. Jerome says: “Shun like a plague a businessman cleric, who from being poor has become rich, and from being a nobody has become a celebrity.”14 But business seems to have been prohibited to clerics only because of its sinfulness. Therefore, it is sinful for businessmen to buy goods more cheaply and sell them more dearly.
On the contrary, Augustine on Ps. 71:15, “Since I do not know scholarly ways,” says: “The businessman greedy to acquire blasphemes over his losses, lies and perjures himself over the prices of goods. But these sins belong to the person, not to the profession, which can be carried on {147} without those sins.”15 Therefore, business as such is not unlawful.
I answer that it is proper for businessmen to engage earnestly in trade. And there are two ways of trading goods, as the Philosopher says in the Politics.16 One way is indeed quite natural and necessary, namely, that people exchange goods for other goods, or goods for money, to satisfy the needs of life. And such exchanges are not, strictly speaking, proper to businessmen. Rather, such exchanges belong to household managers or statesmen, who have charge of providing households or political communities with the goods necessary to sustain life. The second kind of exchange is one of money for money, or goods for money, in order to make a profit, not in order to satisfy the needs of life. And this business indeed seems to belong strictly to businessmen.
And according to the Philosopher,17 the first kind of exchange is praiseworthy, since it is devoted to satisfying natural needs. But he rightly condemns the second kind of exchange, since it as such is devoted to satisfying the desire for profit, and such desire knows no bounds and always strives for more. And so business, absolutely speaking, is wicked, since it does not essentially signify a worthy or necessary objective.
But profit, the aim of business, although it does not essentially signify anything worthy or necessary, does not essentially signify anything vicious or contrary to virtue. And so nothing prevents gain from being ordered to a necessary or even worthy end. And then business becomes lawful. For example, one may order a moderate business profit to support one’s family or even to help the needy. Or one may engage in business for public advantage, namely, lest one’s country lack necessary goods, and seek profit as payment for one’s labor, not as an end.
Reply Obj. 1. We should understand the words of Chrysostom about business insofar as a businessman constitutes the ultimate end in profit, and this seems chiefly to be the case when one sells unaltered goods more dearly. For if one should sell altered goods more dearly, one seems to receive pay for one’s labor. And one could also lawfully strive for the profit for the sake of a necessary or worthy end and not as the ultimate end, as I have said.18
Reply Obj. 2. Not everybody who sells goods more dearly than the person paid for them is a businessman. Rather, only one who buys goods in order to sell them more dearly is a businessman. And if one buys goods in order to possess them and not in order to sell them, and should want {148} later for some reason to sell them, such a person is not a businessman even though he sells the goods more dearly than he paid for them. For one can lawfully do this, either because one has improved the goods, or because a different place or time has affected the price of the goods, or because of the danger that one incurs in moving the goods from one place to another or in having another do so. And neither the buying nor the selling involved is unjust.
Reply Obj. 3. Clerics should abstain both from things that as such are evil and from things that have the appearance of evil. And the latter indeed happens in business both because business is ordered to earthly gain, which clerics should despise, and because businessmen commit frequent sins, since “businessmen are only with difficulty drawn away from sins of the lips,” as Sir. 26:28 says. And there is another reason, in that business engages the spirit too much in worldly cares and so draws it away from spiritual cares. And so the Apostle says in 2 Tim. 2:4: “No one fighting for God entangles oneself in worldly businesses.”
Nevertheless, clerics may lawfully engage in the first kind of exchange, which is ordered to satisfying the needs of life, by buying or selling goods.
1Justinian, Code I V, title 44, laws 8, 15.
2On the Trinity XIII, 3 (PL 42:1017).
3EthicsVIII, 13 (1163a16–23).
4On Duties III, 15.
5Politics I, 3 (1257a6–9).
6Aristotle, EthicsV, 5 (1133a29–31).
7ST I–II, Q. 96, A. 2.
8Justinian, Code IV, title 44, law 8.
9See n. 2, supra.
10Pseudo-Chrysostom, Incomplete Work on the Gospel of Matthew, homily 38 (PG 56:840).
11The Septuagint.
12Expositions on the Psalms, on Ps. 71:15 (PL 70:500–1).
13ST II–II, Q. 77, A. 1.
14Letter 52, to Nepotian, n. 5 (PL 22:531).
15Narrations on the Psalms, on Ps. 71, c. 1, n. 17 (PL 36:886).
16Politics I, 3 (1257a19—b10).
17Ibid. (1258a38—b8).
18In the body of the article.