A. 7. Is Covetousness a Capital Sin?
[This question is divided into eight articles, three of which are translated here.]
We thus proceed to the first inquiry. It seems that covetousness is not a sin, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. We call covetousness love of money, namely, in that covetousness consists of the desire for money, by which we can understand all external goods. But desiring external goods is not a sin, since human beings by nature desire such things both because external things are subject to human beings, and because they sustain human life (for which reason we also refer to external goods as the substance of a human person). Therefore, covetousness is not a sin.
Obj. 2. Every sin is either against God or against neighbor or against oneself, as I have maintained before.1 But covetousness is not, strictly speaking, a sin against God, since covetousness is neither contrary to religion nor contrary to the theological virtues, which direct human beings toward God. Nor is covetousness a sin against oneself, since the latter kind of sin, properly speaking, belongs to gluttony and sexual lust, about which the Apostle says in 1 Cor. 6:18: “Fornicators sin against their own body.” Likewise, covetousness seems to be no sin against neighbor, since human beings by keeping their own property commit no injury against others. Therefore, covetousness is no sin.
Obj. 3. Things that come from nature are not sins. But covetousness results from old age and any disability, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics.2 Therefore, covetousness is not a sin.
{159} On the contrary, Heb. 13:5 says: “Let your way of life be without avarice and satisfied with what you have.”
I answer that in everything in which good consists of a proper measure, evil necessarily results by having more or less than that measure. And in every means to an end, good consists of the proportion of the means to the end, since means are necessarily commensurate to ends (e.g., medicine to health), as the Philosopher makes clear in the Politics.3 And external goods have the nature of utility for our end, as I have said.4 And so the human good in their regard necessarily consists of a proportion, namely, when human beings seek to possess external goods in the measure that they are necessary for their state of life. And so sin consists of seeking more than this measure, namely, when one wishes either to acquire or keep more than the proper measure. And this belongs to the nature of covetousness, which is defined as “the immoderate desire to possess.”5 And so covetousness is clearly a sin.
Reply Obj. 1. The desire for external things is natural to human beings insofar as those things are for the sake of the human end. And so such desire is without sin insofar as it stays within the measure understood from the nature of the human end. But covetousness exceeds this measure. And so covetousness is a sin.
Reply Obj. 2. Covetousness can signify lack of moderation regarding external things in two ways. Covetousness signifies lack of moderation in one way directly, regarding the acquisition or retention of external things, namely, that human beings acquire or keep more of them than they ought. And in this way, there is sin directly against neighbor, since one human being cannot have too many external riches without another having too little, as many cannot simultaneously possess earthly goods.
Covetousness signifies lack of moderation in a second way regarding internal desires that one has for riches, as, for example, that one immoderately loves or desires riches, or immoderately takes pleasure in them. And then human beings sin against themselves, since their desires are thereby misdirected. (But their bodies are not thereby disordered, as their bodies would be by sins of the flesh.)
And so there is sin against God, as all mortal sins are, since human beings by mortal sin contemn the eternal good for the sake of an earthly good.
Reply Obj. 3. Reason, which is the governing power in human nature, should rule natural inclinations. And so the elderly, although they more covetously seek assistance because of their natural weakness, as all the {160} poor seek to have their need alleviated, are not excused from sin if they exceed the proper measure of reason regarding riches.
We thus proceed to the third inquiry. It seems that covetousness is not contrary to generosity, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. On Mt. 5:6, “Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for justice,” Chrysostom says that there are two kinds of justice, one general and the other special, and that covetousness is contrary to the latter justice.6 And the Philosopher says the same in the Ethics.7 Therefore, covetousness is not contrary to the virtue of generosity.
Obj. 2. The sin of covetousness consists of human beings going beyond the measure regarding possessions. But justice establishes such a measure. Therefore, covetousness is directly contrary to justice, not to the virtue of generosity.
Obj. 3. Generosity is a virtue in between two contrary vices, as the Philosopher makes clear in the Ethics.8 But covetousness has no juxtaposed contrary vice, as the Philosopher makes clear in the Ethics.9 Therefore, covetousness is not contrary to generosity.
On the contrary, Eccl. 5:10 says: “The covetous are not satisfied with the money they have, and lovers of riches will enjoy no fruit from their riches.” But not being satisfied with one’s money and inordinately loving one’s riches are contrary to generosity, which adheres to the mean in desiring riches. Therefore, covetousness is contrary to generosity.
I answer that: covetousness in two ways signifies lack of moderation regarding riches. Covetousness signifies lack of moderation in one way directly, regarding the very acquisition and retention of riches, namely, that one acquires money beyond one’s due by taking or keeping the goods of another. And then covetousness is contrary to justice. And Ez. 22:27 understands covetousness in this sense when it says: “Her [Jerusalem’s] rulers dwell in her like wolves preying on the people in order to shed blood and to pursue profit greedily.”
Covetousness in a second way signifies lack of moderation regarding internal desires for riches, as, for example, when one loves or desires riches too much, or takes too much pleasure in them, even if one does not {161} want to steal the goods of another. And covetousness in this way is contrary to generosity, which moderates such desires, as I have said.10 And 2 Cor. 9:5 so understands covetousness: “Let them [the brethren] prepare for this promised blessing as if ready for a blessing and not as if for covetousness.” And a gloss on that text adds: “Namely, lest they regret what they have given and give little.”11
Reply Obj. 1. Chrysostom and the Philosopher are speaking about covetousness in the first way. But the Philosopher calls covetousness in the second way lack of generosity.12
Reply Obj. 2. Justice, properly speaking, establishes the measure to be observed as a matter of legal obligation in acquiring and retaining riches, namely, that human beings should not take or keep the property of another. But generosity, indeed, chiefly establishes the measure of reason regarding internal desires for possessions, and so regarding the external acquisition, retention, and spending of money insofar as such actions result from such internal desires. Generosity establishes this measure by looking to the nature of moral obligation, which one considers by the rule of reason, and not to the nature of legal obligation.
Reply Obj. 3. Covetousness as contrary to justice has no juxtaposed contrary vice, since such covetousness consists of having more than one ought to have in justice, and having less than one ought to have, the contrary, has the nature of punishment rather than sin. But covetousness as contrary to generosity has the juxtaposed contrary vice of prodigality.
We thus proceed to the seventh inquiry. It seems that covetousness is not a capital sin, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. Covetousness is contrary to generosity as the mean and to prodigality as the other extreme. But generosity is not a chief virtue, nor is prodigality a capital sin. Therefore, we should also not designate covetousness a capital sin.
Obj. 2. As I have said before,13 we call sins capital sins if they have chief ends to which the ends of other sins are ordered. But such does not belong to covetousness, since riches have the nature of a means to an end, not of an end, as the Ethics says.14 Therefore, covetousness is not a capital sin.
{162} Obj. 3. Gregory says in his work Morals: “Covetousness sometimes arises out of pride, sometimes out of fear. For example, some, when they think they lack things necessary for their expenses, let their minds turn to coveting. And others are incited to covet other people’s property when they desire to seem more powerful.”15 Therefore, covetousness is the product of other sins rather than itself a capital sin with respect to other sins.
On the contrary, Gregory in his work Morals includes covetousness in the list of capital sins.16
I answer that, as I have said before,17 we call sins capital if other sins arise from them by reason of the capital sins’ ends, since human beings proceed to do many things, whether good or evil, because they will very desirable ends. But the most desirable end is blessedness or happiness, which is the ultimate end of human life, as I have said before.18 And so the more things partake of the conditions of happiness, the more desirable they are. And one of the conditions of happiness is that one be self-sufficient. Otherwise, happiness as the ultimate end would not satisfy the desire for it. But riches especially promise self-sufficiency, as Boethius says in his work On the Consolation of Philosophy.19 And the reason why, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics,20 is that “we use money as a unit of exchange to buy every kind of material thing.” And Eccl. 10:19 says that “everything is at the service of money.” And so covetousness, which consists of the desire for money, is a capital sin.
Reply Obj. 1. Reason accomplishes virtue, and the inclinations of sense appetites accomplish vice. But reason does not chiefly belong to the same genus as sense appetites. And so the chief vices need not be contrary to the chief virtues. And so, although generosity is not a chief virtue, since it does not regard a chief good of reason, covetousness is nonetheless a chief vice, since it regards money, which has a leading role regarding material goods, for the reason I mentioned.21
And prodigality is not ordered to any chiefly desirable end. Rather, prodigality seems to result from lack of reasoning. And so the Philosopher says in the Ethics that a prodigal person is called a fool rather than a knave.22
{163} Reply Obj. 2. Money is indeed ordered to other things as its end, but it in one respect includes all material things virtually insofar as it is useful for acquiring them. And so it has an analogy to happiness, as I have said.23
Reply Obj. 3. Nothing prevents a capital sin from sometimes arising from other sins, as I have said, provided that it itself generally and frequently gives rise to other sins.24
1ST I–II, Q. 72, A. 4.
2Ethics IV, 1 (1121b13–16).
3Politics I, 3 (1257b25–30).
4ST: I–II, Q. 2, A. 1; II–II, Q. 117, A. 3.
5Hugh of St. Victor, On the Sacraments II, part 13, c. 1 (PL 176:526).
6Homilies on the Gospel of Matthew, homily 15, n. 3 (PG 57:227).
7Ethics: V, 1 (1129b27–9); V, 2 (1130a14–6).
8Ibid.: II, 7 (1107b8–16); I V, 1 (1119b22–8).
9Ibid., I V, 1 (1121b1–3).
10ST II–II, Q. 117: A. 2, ad 1; A. 3, ad 3; A. 6.
11Peter Lombard, Glossa, on 2 Cor. 9:5 (PL 192:62).
12Ethics II, 7 (1107b13–6).
13ST I–II, Q. 84, AA. 3, 4.
14Aristotle, Ethics I, 5 (1096a5–10).
15Morals XV, 25, n. 30 (PL 75:1096).
16Ibid., XXXI, 45, n. 88 (PL 76:621).
17See n. 13, supra.
18ST I–II, Q. 1, A. 8, On the contrary.
19On the Consolation of Philosophy III, prose 3 (PL 63:732).
20EthicsV, 5 (1133b10–14).
21In the body of the article.
22Ethics IV, 1 (1121a25–27).
23In the body of the article.
24ST II–II, Q. 36, A. 4, ad 1.