A. 6. Is the Will Good if It Wills in Accord with Erroneous Reason?
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[This question is divided into ten articles, two of which are included here.]
We thus proceed to the fifth article. It seems that the will is not evil if it wills contrary to erroneous reason, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. Reason is the rule of the human will insofar as reason derives from the eternal law, as I have said.1 But erroneous reason does not derive from the eternal law. Therefore, erroneous reason is not the rule of the human will. Therefore, the will is not evil if it wills contrary to erroneous reason.
Obj. 2. The command of a subordinate official does not oblige a subject if the command happens to be contrary to the command of a higher authority, as Augustine says.2 For example, a subject is not obliged to obey if a provincial governor should command something that the emperor prohibits. But erroneous reason at times presents to the will something contrary to the command of a higher authority, namely, God, whose power is supreme. Therefore, the judgment of erroneous reason does not oblige persons to obey. Therefore, the will is not evil if it wills contrary to erroneous reason.
Obj. 3. We trace every bad will to a species of malice. But we cannot trace a will that wills contrary to erroneous reason to a species of evil. For example, if reason erroneously tells a person to fornicate, we cannot trace the person’s willing not to do so to any species of evil. Therefore, the will is not evil if it wills contrary to erroneous reason.
On the contrary, conscience simply applies one’s knowledge to actions, as I have said before.3 And knowledge belongs to the power of reason. Therefore, the will that wills contrary to erroneous reason wills contrary to conscience. But every such willing is evil, for Rom. 14:23 says: “Everything not of faith,” that is, everything contrary to conscience, “is sin.” Therefore, the will is evil if it wills contrary to erroneous reason.
I answer that to ask whether the will is evil when it acts contrary to erroneous reason is the same as to ask whether erroneous conscience {6} obliges persons to obey. This is so because conscience is in a way a judgment of reason, since conscience applies one’s knowledge to actions, as I have said in the First Part.4
And on this matter, some thinkers have distinguished three kinds of acts: some acts are indeed good by their nature, some acts morally indifferent, and some acts evil by their nature.5 Therefore, they say that there is no error in reason or conscience if reason or conscience should tell a person to do something that is good by its nature. Similarly, there is no error if reason or conscience should tell a person not to do something that is evil by its nature, for the same power of reason commands persons to do good and forbids them to do evil. But if reason or conscience should tell a person that human beings are obliged by precept to do something intrinsically evil, or that human beings are prohibited from doing something intrinsically good, the person’s reason or conscience will be in error. And reason or conscience will likewise be in error if it should tell someone that something as such morally indifferent (e.g., picking up straw from the ground) is forbidden or commanded.
Therefore, they say that reason or conscience, when it errs about morally indifferent things, whether by command or injunction, obliges one to obey, so that the will will be evil if it wills contrary to erroneous reason, and there will be sin. On the other hand, reason or conscience, when it errs by commanding something intrinsically evil, or when it errs by forbidding something intrinsically good and necessary for salvation, does not oblige persons to obey. And so the will in such cases is not evil if it wills contrary to erroneous reason or conscience.
But such an explanation is unsound. For the will that wills contrary to erroneous reason or conscience in morally indifferent matters, is somehow evil because of the will’s object, on which the will’s goodness or malice depends. And this is not because of the object’s own nature but because reason happens to understand the object as an evil to be committed or shunned. And the will’s object is what reason presents to the will, as I have said.6 Therefore, by tending toward something that reason proposes as evil, the will takes on the character of evil. And this happens both in the case of morally indifferent things and in the case of things intrinsically good or evil. For not only can morally indifferent things happen to take on the character of good or evil, but good things can likewise take on {7} the character of evil, or evil things the character of good, because reason so understands them.
For example, abstaining from fornication is good, although the will tends toward this good only insofar as reason so presents it. Therefore, if erroneous reason presents such abstinence as evil, the will tends toward it as evil. And so the will will be evil because it wills something evil, indeed not something intrinsically evil but something that happens to be evil because reason so understands it. And similarly, belief in Christ is intrinsically good and necessary for salvation, but the will tends toward that good only insofar as reason so presents it. And so the will tends toward belief in Christ as evil if reason so presents it, not because such belief is intrinsically evil, but because it happens to be evil due to the way reason understands it.
And so the Philosopher says in the Ethics that “an intemperate person is, strictly speaking, one who does not follow right reason, but those who do not follow erroneous reason are also incidentally intemperate.”7 And so we need to say without qualification that every will that wills contrary to reason, whether reason be correct or erroneous, is always evil.
Reply Obj. 1. Although the judgments of erroneous reason are not derived from God, erroneous reason nonetheless presents its judgments as true and so derived from God, who is the source of all truth.
Reply Obj. 2. The statement of Augustine is appropriate when we know that a subordinate official commands something contrary to the command of a higher authority. But if a subject were to believe that the emperor commands what the provincial governor commands, the subject would scorn the emperor’s command if the subject scorned the provincial governor’s command. And similarly, human beings would not be obliged to follow reason if they were to know that human reason commanded something contrary to God’s command, although reason would not then be completely in error. But if reason presents something to the will as God’s command, to scorn the dictate of reason would then be the same as to scorn God’s command.
Reply Obj. 3. Whenever reason understands something to be evil, reason understands it under some aspect of evil, for example, evil because contrary to God’s command, or because of scandal, or for some such reason. And then we trace such a bad will to such a species of evil.
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We thus proceed to the sixth article. It seems that the will is good if it wills in accord with erroneous reason, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. As a will that wills contrary to reason tends toward what reason judges to be evil, so a will that wills in accord with reason tends toward what reason judges to be good. But the will is evil if it wills contrary to reason, even erroneous reason. Therefore, the will is good if it wills in accord with reason, even erroneous reason.
Obj. 2. A will is always good if it is in accord with God’s commands and the eternal law. But the understanding of reason, even erroneous reason, presents the eternal law and God’s commands to us. Therefore, the will is good even if it wills in accord with erroneous reason.
Obj. 3. The will is evil when it wills contrary to erroneous reason. Therefore, if the will be also evil when it wills in accord with erroneous reason, it seems that the will is evil whenever the person willing reasons erroneously. And so such human beings will be caught in a dilemma and necessarily sin, and this is inappropriate. Therefore, the will is good when it wills in accord with erroneous reason.
On the contrary, the will of those who killed the Apostles was evil. And yet the will of those killers was in accord with erroneous reason, as Jn. 16:2 says: “The hour is coming, and then all those who kill you will think that they are offering service to God.” Therefore, the will can be evil when it wills in accord with erroneous reason.
I answer that, as the previous question is the same as to ask whether an erroneous conscience obliges persons, so the present question is the same as to ask whether an erroneous conscience excuses persons. But the present question depends on what I previously said about ignorance. For I have previously said that ignorance sometimes causes and sometimes does not cause things to be involuntary.8 And acts have moral good and evil insofar as they are voluntary, as is evident from what I have previously explained.9 Therefore, the ignorance that causes things to be involuntary evidently takes away the character of moral good and evil, while the ignorance that does not cause things to be involuntary evidently does not take away that character. I have also said before that the ignorance that is in any way voluntary, whether directly or indirectly, does not cause things to be involuntary.10 And I call that ignorance directly voluntary toward which acts of the will tend. And I call that ignorance indirectly voluntary that is {9} due to negligence, in that persons do not will to know what they are obliged to know, as I have said before.11
Therefore, if reason or conscience should err voluntarily, whether directly or due to negligence (in that persons err about things they are obliged to know), then such an error of reason or conscience does not excuse from evil the will that wills in accord with the reason or conscience erring in this way. But if the error that causes something to be involuntary comes from ignorance of a particular circumstance without any negligence on the person’s part, then such an error of reason or conscience excuses the person. And so the person’s will is not evil when it wills in accord with erroneous reason. For example, if erroneous reason should tell a man that he ought to have intercourse with someone else’s wife, the will in accord with such an erroneous reason is evil, since the error springs from ignorance of God’s law, which he is obliged to know. But if his reason should err in thinking that the woman lying with him is his wife, and he should will to have intercourse with her when she seeks from him the right of a wife to intercourse with her husband, his will is excused and so is not evil. This is because the error springs from ignorance of the circumstance. And such ignorance excuses the person and causes the evil deed to be involuntary.
Reply Obj. 1. As Denis says in his work On the Divine Names,12 “an uncorrupted cause causes good, and single defects cause evil.” And so for us to call evil things toward which the will inclines, it suffices either that the things be evil by their nature, or that we understand them to be evil. But for the things to be good, they need to be good in both ways.
Reply Obj. 2. The eternal law cannot err, but human reason can. And so the will is not always correct when it wills in accord with human reason, nor is such a will always in accord with the eternal law.
Reply Obj. 3. As unsuitable consequences necessarily result from unsuitable antecedents in the case of syllogistic arguments, so unsuitable consequences necessarily result from unsuitable suppositions in the case of moral matters. For example, supposing that persons seek vainglory, they will sin whether they on that account do or omit to do what they are obliged to do. And yet they are not caught in a dilemma, since they can abandon their evil intention. And similarly, supposing an error of reason or conscience that springs from inexcusable ignorance, evil in the will necessarily results. And yet persons so erring are not caught in a dilemma, since they can draw away from their error, because their ignorance is voluntary and can be overcome.
1ST I–II, Q. 19, A. 4.
2Sermons to the People, sermon 62, c. 8 (PL 38:421).
3ST I, Q. 79, A. 13.
4Ibid.
5St. Bonaventure, Commentary on the Sentences II, dist. 39, a. 1, q. 3; Alexander of Hales, Summary of Theology II–II, n. 388.
6ST I–II, Q. 18, A. 3.
7EthicsVII, 9 (1151a29—b4).
8ST I–II, Q. 6, A. 8.
9ST I–II, Q. 19, A. 2.
10ST I–II, Q. 6, A. 8.
11Ibid.
12On the Divine Names 4 (PG 3:729).