A. 6. Is There a Law of Concupiscence?
We thus proceed to the first inquiry. It seems that there is no eternal law, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. Every law is imposed on particular persons. But there was no one from eternity on whom law could be imposed, since only God was from eternity. Therefore, no law is eternal.
Obj. 2. Promulgation is an essential component of law. But there could be no promulgation from eternity, since there was no one from eternity to whom a law would be promulgated. Therefore, no law can be eternal.
Obj. 3. Law signifies the direction to an end. But nothing ordered to an end is eternal, since only the ultimate end is eternal. Therefore, no law is eternal.
On the contrary, Augustine says in his work On Free Choice: “No one with intelligence can perceive the law called supreme reason not to be immutable and eternal.”1
I answer that, as I have said before,2 law is simply a dictate of practical reason by a ruler who governs a perfect community. But supposing that God’s providence rules the world, as I maintained in the First Part,3 his reason evidently governs the entire community of the universe. And so the plan of governance of the world existing in God as the ruler of the universe has the nature of law. And since God’s reason conceives eternally, as Prov. 8:23 says, not temporally, we need to say that such law is eternal.
{17} Reply Obj. 1. Things that do not exist in themselves exist with God insofar as he foreknows and foreordains them, as Rom. 4:17 says: “And he calls nonexisting things into existence.” Therefore, the eternal conception of God’s law has the nature of an eternal law insofar as he orders that law to the governance of the world he foreknows.
Reply Obj. 2. Word and inscription promulgate law. And God promulgates his eternal law in both ways, since the Word of God and the inscription of the predestined in the Book of Life4 are eternal. But as regards the creatures who hear or read God’s law, the promulgation cannot be eternal.
Reply Obj. 3. Law signifies actively ordering things to an end, namely, that law order things to an end. And law does not signify being passively ordered to an end, that is, that law itself need be ordered to another end, except incidentally in the case of human rulers, whose end is extrinsic to themselves. And then the rulers’ laws also need to be ordered to that extrinsic end. But the end of God’s governance is God himself,5 and his law is indistinguishable from himself. And so the eternal law is not ordered to another end.
We thus proceed to the second article. It seems that there is no natural law in us, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. The eternal law sufficiently governs human beings. For Augustine says in his work On Free Choice that “the eternal law is that whereby it is right that all things be most orderly.”6 But nature does not abound in superfluities, nor is it wanting in necessities. Therefore, there is no natural law for human beings.
Obj. 2. Law orders human beings to their end regarding their actions, as I have maintained before.7 But nature does not order human actions to their end, as happens in the case of irrational creatures, which act for their ends only by natural appetites. Rather, human beings act for their end by the use of their reason and will. Therefore, there is no natural law for human beings.
Obj. 3. The freer one is, the less one is subject to law. But human beings are freer than all other animals because human beings, unlike other animals, have free choice. Therefore, since other animals are not subject to a natural law, neither are human beings.
{18} On the contrary, a gloss on Rom. 2:14, “When the Gentiles, who do not have the law, do by nature things prescribed by the law,” etc., says: “Although they do not have the written law, they have a natural law, whereby each of them understands and is conscious of good and evil.”8
I answer that, as I have said before,9 law, since it is a rule or measure, can belong to things in two ways: in one way to those who rule and measure; in a second way to those ruled and measured, since things are ruled or measured insofar as they partake of the rule or measure. But the eternal law rules and measures everything subject to God’s providence, as is evident from what I have said before.10 And so everything evidently shares in some way in the eternal law, namely, insofar as all things have inclinations to their own acts and ends from its imprint on them. But the rational creature is subject to God’s providence in a more excellent way than other things, since such a creature also shares in God’s providence in providing for itself and others. And so it shares in the eternal plan whereby it has its natural inclination to its requisite activity and end. And we call such participation in the eternal law by rational creatures the natural law. And so Ps. 4:6, after saying, “Offer just sacrifices,” asks: “Who shows us just things?” and replies: “The light of your countenance, O Lord, has been inscribed on us.” The Psalmist thus signifies that the light of natural reason whereby we discern good and evil is simply the imprint of God’s light in us. And so it is clear that the natural law is simply rational creatures’ sharing in the eternal law.
Reply Obj. 1. The argument of this objection would be valid if the natural law were to be something different from the eternal law. But the natural law shares in the eternal law, as I have said.11
Reply Obj. 2. Every activity of reason and the will in us is derived from what exists by nature, as I have maintained before,12 since every process of reasoning is derived from first principles known by nature, and every desire of means is derived from the natural desire for our ultimate end. And so also the natural law needs first to direct our acts to their end.
Reply Obj. 3. Even irrational animals, like rational creatures, share in the eternal law in their own way. But because rational creatures share in the eternal law by using their intellect and reason, we call their participation in the eternal law law in the strict sense, since law belongs to reason, as I have said before.13 And irrational creatures do not share in the eternal law by the use of reason. And so we can call the latter participation law only by analogy.
{19}
We thus proceed to the third inquiry. It seems that there are no human laws, for the following reason:
Obj. 1. The natural law shares in the eternal law, as I have said.14 But the eternal law “renders all things most orderly,” as Augustine says in his work On Free Choice.15 Therefore, the natural law suffices for ordering all human affairs. Therefore, there is no need for human laws.
Obj. 2. Law has the nature of a measure, as I have said.16 But human reason is not the measure of things. Rather, the converse is true, as the Metaphysics says.17 Therefore, human reason can produce no law.
Obj. 3. A measure should be most certain, as the Metaphysics says.18 But dictates of human reason about things to be done are uncertain, as Wis. 9:14 says: “The thoughts of mortal human beings are fraught with fear, and our foresight uncertain.” Therefore, human reason cannot produce laws.
On the contrary, Augustine in his work On Free Choice posits two kinds of law, one kind eternal, and the other temporal, which he calls human.19
I answer that law is a dictate of practical reason, as I have said before.20 But there are similar processes of practical and theoretical reason, since both proceed from principles to conclusions, as I have maintained before.21 Therefore, we should say that we advance in theoretical reason from indemonstrable first principles, naturally known, to the conclusions of different sciences, conclusions not implanted in us by nature but discovered by exercising reason. Just so, human reason needs to advance from the precepts of the natural law, as general and indemonstrable first principles, to matters that are to be more particularly regulated. And we call such regulations devised by human reason human laws, provided that the other conditions belonging to the nature of law are observed, as I have said before.22 And so also Cicero says in his Rhetoric: “Human law originally sprang from nature. Then things became customs because of their rational benefit. Then fear and reverence for law validated things that both sprang from nature and were approved by custom.”23
Reply Obj. 1. Human reason cannot partake of the complete dictates of God’s reason but partakes of them in its own way and incompletely. And {20} so regarding theoretical reason, we by our natural participation in God’s wisdom know general principles but do not specifically know every truth, as God’s wisdom does. Just so regarding practical reason, human beings by nature partake of the eternal law as to general principles but not as to particular specifications of particular matters, although such specifications belong to the eternal law. And so human reason needs to proceed further to determine the particular prescriptions of human law.
Reply Obj. 2. Human reason as such is not the rule of things, but the first principles implanted by nature in human reason are the general rules or measures of everything related to human conduct. And natural reason is the rule and measure of such things, although not of things from nature.
Reply Obj. 3. Practical reason regards practical matters, which are particular and contingent, and does not regard necessary things, as theoretical reason does. And so human laws cannot have the absolute certainty of demonstrated scientific conclusions. Nor need every measure be unerring and certain in every respect. Rather, every measure needs to be such only to the extent possible in its kind of thing.
We thus proceed to the fourth inquiry. It seems that human beings did not need any divine law, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. The natural law is our sharing in the eternal law, as I have said.24 But eternal law is divine law, as I have said.25 Therefore, we do not need another divine law besides the natural law and the human laws derived from natural law.
Obj. 2. Sir. 15:14 says that “God left human beings in the hands of their own deliberation.” But deliberation is an act of reason, as I have maintained before.26 Therefore, God left human beings to the governance of their own reason. But the dictates of human reason are human laws, as I have said.27 Therefore, human beings do not need to be governed by another, divine law.
Obj. 3. Human nature is more self-sufficient than irrational creatures. But irrational creatures have no divine law besides the inclinations that nature implants in them. Therefore, much less should rational creatures have a divine law besides the natural law.
On the contrary, David petitioned God to lay out the law before him, saying in Ps. 119:33: “Teach me the law, O Lord, in the way of your statutes.”
{21} I answer that in addition to the natural law and human laws, divine law was necessary to give direction to human life. And there are four reasons for this:
First, indeed, law directs our acts in relation to our ultimate end. And human beings, if they were indeed ordered only to an end that did not surpass the proportion of their natural ability, would not, regarding reason, need to have any direction superior to the natural law and human laws derived from the natural law. But because human beings are ordered to the end of eternal blessedness, which surpasses their proportional natural human capacity, as I have maintained before,28 God needed to lay down a law superior to the natural law and human laws to direct human beings to their end.
Second, because of the uncertainty of human judgment, especially regarding contingent and particular matters, different persons may judge differently about various human actions, and so even different and contrary laws result. Therefore, in order that human beings can know beyond any doubt what they should do or should not do, a divinely revealed law, regarding which error is impossible, was needed to direct human beings in their actions.
Third, human beings can make laws regarding things they are able to judge. But human beings can judge only sensibly perceptible external acts, not hidden internal movements. And yet human beings need to live righteously regarding both kinds of acts in order to attain complete virtue. And so human laws could not prohibit or adequately order internal acts, and divine law needed to supplement human laws.
Fourth, human laws cannot punish or prohibit all evil deeds, as Augustine says in his work On Free Choice.29 This is because in seeking to eliminate all evils, one would thereby also take away many goods and not benefit the common good necessary for human companionship. Therefore, in order that every evil be forbidden and punished, there needed to be a divine law forbidding all sins.
And Ps. 19:7 touches on these four reasons when it says: “The law of the Lord is pure,” that is, permitting no sinful wickedness; “converting souls,” since it directs both external and internal acts; “the Lord’s faithful witness” because of its certain truth and rectitude; “offering wisdom to the little ones,” since it orders human beings to a supernatural and divine end.
Reply Obj. 1. The natural law partakes of the eternal law in proportion to the capacity of human nature. But human beings need to be directed in {22} a higher way to their ultimate supernatural end. And so God gives an additional law that partakes of the eternal law in a higher way.
Reply Obj. 2. Deliberation is an inquiry, and so deliberation needs to advance from some principles. And it does not suffice that it advance from first principles implanted by nature, that is, precepts of the natural law, for the aforementioned reasons.30 Rather, other principles, namely, precepts of divine law, need to be supplied.
Reply Obj. 3. Irrational creatures are not ordered to higher ends than those proportioned to their natural powers. And so the argument of the objection is inapplicable.
We thus proceed to the fifth article. It seems that there is only one divine law, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. There is one set of laws of one king in one kingdom. But the whole human race is related to God as one king, as Ps. 47:7 says: “God is king of all the earth.” Therefore, there is only one divine law.
Obj. 2. Every law is ordered to the end the lawmaker intends regarding those subject to the law. But God intends one and the same thing regarding all human beings, as 1 Tim. 2:4 says: “He wills all human beings to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth.” Therefore, there is only one divine law.
Obj. 3. The divine law seems to approximate the eternal law, which is one, more than the natural law does, as the revelation of grace is higher than the knowledge of nature. But there is one natural law for all human beings. Therefore, much more is there one divine law for them.
On the contrary, the Apostle says in Heb. 7:12: “Since the priesthood has been transferred, the law needed to be changed.” But the priesthood is twofold, namely, the priesthood of Leviticus and the priesthood of Christ, as Heb. 7:11 says. Therefore, there are two divine laws, namely, the Old Law and the New Law.
I answer that division causes number, as I said in the First Part.31 And we distinguish things in two ways: in one way as things are altogether specifically different (e.g., horses and oxen); in a second way as the complete and the incomplete in the same species (e.g., adults and children). And it is in the latter way that we distinguish divine law into the Old and the New Law. And so the Apostle in Gal. 3:24–5 compares the condition {23} of the Old Law to that of a child subject to a tutor, and the condition of the New Law to an adult no longer subject to a tutor.
And we note the perfection and imperfection of the two Laws by three things belonging to the divine law, as I have said before.32 For in the first place, it belongs to any law to be directed to the common good as its end, as I have said before.33 And this common good can be of two kinds. It may be a sensibly perceptible and earthly good, and the Old Law was directly ordered to such a good. And so the people were invited at the very institution of the Old Law to occupy the earthly kingdom of the Canaanites.34 Or the common good may be an intelligible and heavenly good, and the New Law orders human beings to such a good. And so Christ at the very outset of his preaching invited human beings to the kingdom of heaven, saying: “Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand.”35 And so Augustine says in his work Against Faustus that “the Old Testament contains promises of temporal things and so is called old, but the promise of eternal life belongs to the New Testament.”36
Second, it belongs to the divine law to direct human acts regarding the order of righteousness. And the New Law surpasses the Old Law in this respect by ordering internal spiritual acts, as Mt. 5:20 says: “Unless your righteousness exceeds that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you will not enter the kingdom of heaven.” And so there is the saying that “the Old Law stays our hand, the New Law stays our spirit.”37
Third, it belongs to the divine law to induce human beings to observe the commandments. And the Old Law indeed accomplished this by fear of punishments, while the New Law accomplishes this by love, which the grace of Christ, foreshadowed in the Old Law and conferred in the New Law, pours into our hearts. And so Augustine says in his work Against Adimantus, Disciple of Mani that “there is a little difference between the Law and the Gospel, namely, the difference between fear and love.”38
Reply Obj. 1. As the head of a household issues different commands to children and adults, so also the one king, God, in his one kingdom gave one law to human beings still imperfect and another more perfect law to those already led by the former law to a greater capacity for divine things.
{24} Reply Obj. 2. Only Christ could save human beings, as Acts 4:12 says: “There is no other name given to human beings wherein we should be saved.” And so a law completely leading all human beings to salvation could be given only after the coming of Christ. But a law containing rudiments of salvific righteousness needed to be given beforehand to the people from whom Christ was to be born, in order to prepare them to receive him.
Reply Obj. 3. The natural law directs human beings by certain general precepts in relation to which both the perfect and the imperfect are the same, and so the natural law is one and the same for everyone. But divine law also directs human beings regarding particular matters, for which the perfect and the imperfect are not similarly disposed. And so there needed to be two divine laws, as I have already said.39
We thus proceed to the sixth article. It seems that there is no law of concupiscence, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. Isidore says in his Etymologies that “law is based on reason.”40 But concupiscence is not based on reason. Rather, concupiscence deviates from reason. Therefore, concupiscence does not have the nature of law.
Obj. 2. Every law obliges, so that we call those who do not observe it transgressors. But concupiscence does not render persons transgressors because they do not follow its inclinations. Rather, concupiscence renders persons transgressors if they do. Therefore, concupiscence does not have the nature of law.
Obj. 3. Law is ordered to the common good, as I have maintained before.41 But concupiscence does not incline us to the common good. Rather, concupiscence inclines us to private good. Therefore, concupiscence does not have the nature of law.
On the contrary, the Apostle says in Rom. 7:23: “I perceive another law in my bodily members repugnant to the law of my mind.”
I answer that law belongs essentially to those who rule and measure and, by participation, to the ruled and measured, as I have said before.42 And so we call every inducement or order in things subject to law law by participation, as is evident from what I have said before.43 But in things subject to law, there can be inducements from the lawmaker in two ways. There are inducements in one way insofar as lawmakers directly induce {25} their subjects to things and, sometimes, different subjects to different actions. And we can accordingly speak of one law for soldiers and another law for merchants. There are inducements in a second way insofar as lawmakers indirectly induce their subjects to things, namely, insofar as lawmakers by depriving subjects of some office transfer them to another position in society and to another law, as it were. For example, if a soldier should be discharged from the army, he will be transferred to the law governing farmers or merchants.
Therefore, God, the lawmaker, subjects different creatures to different inducements, so that what is in one way law for one kind of creature, is in another way contrary to law for another kind of creature. This is as if I should say that ferocity is in one way the law for dogs but in another way contrary to the law for sheep or other meek animals. Therefore, it is the law for human beings, which is allotted by God’s order according to their condition, that they act according to reason. And this law was indeed so effective in our first condition that nothing outside reason or contrary to reason could come upon Adam surreptitiously. But when Adam withdrew from God, he fell subject to the impulses of his sense appetites. And this also happens in particular to each human being the more the individual has withdrawn from reason, so that the individual in a way resembles beasts, who are carried away by the impulses of their sense appetites. Just so, Ps. 49:20 says: “Human beings, although they were in a condition of honor, did not understand; they have been paired with mindless beasts and became like them.”
Therefore, in other animals, the very inclinations of sense appetites, which we call concupiscence, indeed directly have the nature of law in an absolute sense, although in the way we can speak of law in such things. And in human beings, such inclinations of sense appetites do not have the nature of law. Rather, they are deviations from the law of reason. But since divine justice stripped human beings of original justice and the full force of reason, the very impulses of sense appetites that impel human beings have the nature of law, since such impulses are a punishment and the result of divine law depriving human beings of their dignity.
Reply Obj. 1. The argument of this objection is valid regarding concupiscence considered as such, as it inclines us to evil. For concupiscence does not have the nature of law in this way, as I have said,44 but has the nature of law insofar as it results from the justice of divine law. This is as if we were to say that the law allows nobles to be put to servile work because of their misdeeds.
{26} Reply Obj. 2. The argument of this objection is valid regarding law as a rule or measure. For those deviating from the law are thus constituted transgressors of the law. But concupiscence is not a law in this sense. Rather, concupiscence is a law by a participation, as I have said before.45
Reply Obj. 3. The argument of this objection is valid about concupiscence as to its own inclinations but not as to its origin. And yet if we were to consider the inclinations of sense appetites as they exist in other animals, then the inclinations are ordered to the common good, that is, the preservation of nature specifically and individually. And this is also true regarding human beings insofar as their sense appetites are subject to reason. But we are talking about concupiscence insofar as it departs from the order of reason.
1On Free Choice I, 6, n. 15 (PL 32:1229).
2ST I–II, Q. 90: A. 1, ad 2; AA. 3–4.
3ST I, Q. 22, AA. 1, 2.
4Cf. ST I, Q. 24, A. 1.
5Cf. ST I: Q. 22, A. 1; Q. 103, A. 2.
6On Free Choice I, 6, n. 15 (PL 32:1229).
7ST I-II, Q. 90, A. 2.
8Glossa ordinaria, on Rom. 2:14 (PL 114:476); Peter Lombard, Glossa, on Rom. 2:14 (PL 191:1345).
9ST I–II, Q. 90, A. 1, ad 1.
10ST I–II, Q. 91, A. 1.
11In the body of the article.
12ST I–II, Q. 10, A. 1.
13ST I–II, Q. 90, A. 1.
14ST I–II, Q. 91, A. 2.
15On Free Choice I, 6, n. 15 (PL 32:1229).
16ST I–II, Q. 90, A. 1.
17Aristotle, Metaphysics X, 1 (1053a31—b3).
18Ibid.
19On Free Choice I, 6 and 15 (PL 32:1229, 1238).
20ST I–II, Q. 90, A. 1, ad 2.
21Ibid.
22ST I–II, Q. 9, AA. 2, 3, 4.
23Rhetoric II, 53.
24ST I–II, Q. 91, A. 2.
25ST I–II, Q. 91, A. 1.
26ST I–II, Q. 14, A. 1.
27ST I–II, Q. 91, A. 3.
28ST I–II, Q. 5, A. 5.
29On Free Choice I, 5 (PL 32:1228).
30In the body of the article.
31ST I, Q. 30, A. 3.
32ST I–II: Q. 90, A. 2; Q. 90, A. 3, ad 2; Q. 91, A. 4.
33ST I–II, Q. 90, A. 2.
34Ex. 3:8–17.
35Mt. 4:17.
36Against Faustus IV, 2 (PL 42:217–8).
37Cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences III, dist. 40, c. 1.
38Against Adimantus, Disciple of Mani 17 (PL 42:159). The “little difference” alludes to the fact that the Latin word for fear (timor) has one more letter than the Latin word for love (amor).
39In the body of the article.
40EtymologiesV, 3 (PL 82:199).
41ST I–II, Q. 90, A. 2.
42ST I–II: Q. 91, A. 2; Q. 90, A. 1, ad 1.
43Ibid.
44In the body of the article.
45Ibid.