A. 4. May One Lawfully Borrow Money Subject to the Payment of Interest?
We thus proceed to the first inquiry. It seems that it is not a sin to take interest for money lent, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. No one sins in following the example of Christ. But the Lord says of himself in Lk. 19:23: “At my coming, I might have exacted it,” namely, the money lent, “with interest.” Therefore, it is no sin to take interest for lending money.
Obj. 2. Ps. 19:8 says that “the law of the Lord is pure,” namely, in that it forbids sin. But the divine law allows some interest-taking, as Dt. 23:19–20 says: “You shall not lend money nor produce nor any other thing to your fellow countryman at interest, but you may to a foreigner.” And what is more, the divine law even promises a reward for observing the law, as Dt. 28:12 says: “You will lend to many peoples, and you yourselves will borrow from no one.” Therefore, taking interest is no sin.
Obj. 3. Civil laws specify justice in human affairs. But civil laws allow interest-taking. Therefore, interest-taking does not seem to be unlawful.
{149} Obj. 4. The evangelical counsels do not bind one under sin. But Lk. 6:35 posits among the counsels: “Lend, looking for nothing in return.” Therefore, interest-taking is not a sin.
Obj. 5. Receiving payment for something one is not obliged to do does not seem as such to be a sin. But one in the possession of money is not always obliged to lend it to a neighbor. Therefore, it is sometimes lawful for a person to accept payment for lending money.
Obj. 6. Silver coins do not differ specifically from silver vessels. But it is lawful to accept payment for silver vessels one lends. Therefore, it is also lawful to accept payment for silver coins one lends. Therefore, interest-taking as such is not a sin.
Obj. 7. A person can lawfully receive property that its owner freely gives to the person. But one who contracts a loan, freely agrees to pay interest. Therefore, the one who lends can lawfully accept interest.
On the contrary, Ex. 22:25 says: “If you should lend money to the poor people of mine who dwell with you, you shall not harass them like extortioners nor oppress them with interest.”
I answer that interest-taking for money lent is in itself unjust, since this is to sell something that does not exist, and clearly constitutes inequality, which is contrary to justice. And to prove this, we should note that there are some things whose use consists of their consumption. For example, we consume wine when we use it to drink, and we consume wheat when we use it as food. And so regarding such things, we should not reckon the value of their use separately from the value of the things themselves. Rather, we give up the things to whomever we grant their use. And so lending in such cases transfers ownership. Therefore, if one were to want to sell wine and the use of wine as two separate things, one would be selling the same thing twice, that is, selling something that does not exist. And so the seller would obviously commit a sin of injustice. And by like reasoning, one who lends wine or wheat, seeking double payment for oneself, indeed one equal to the thing lent and the other for the thing’s use, which we call interest, commits injustice.
But there are some things whose use does not consist of their very consumption. For example, one uses houses by dwelling in them, not by destroying them. And so regarding such things, one can grant another either the things or their use. For example, one may hand over ownership of a house to another but retain use of the house for a specified period of time. Or, conversely, one may grant use of a house to another but retain ownership of the house. And so human beings can lawfully both accept payments for the use of their homes and reclaim the homes at the expiration of the leases, as in the case of landlords leasing and tenants renting homes.
{150} But as the Philosopher says in the Ethics1 and the Politics,2 human beings invented money chiefly to facilitate exchanges, and so the special and chief use of money is its very consumption or alienation as it is spent in exchanges. And so accepting payment for the use of money, which we call interest, is as such unlawful. And as human beings are obliged to make restitution for other things unjustly acquired, so also are they for money received as interest.
Reply Obj. 1. We understand the interest mentioned in the cited text metaphorically to mean dividends from spiritual goods, which God demands from us because he wants us to grow in the goods received from him. And this is for our profit, not his.
Reply Obj. 2. God prohibited the Jews from taking interest from their brothers, namely, their fellow Jews, and we are given to understand by this that interest-taking from any human being is absolutely evil. For we ought to consider every human being as our neighbor and brother, especially in the evangelical way of living, to which all are called. And so, without qualification, Ps. 15:5 praises “those who do not lend their money at interest,” and Ez. 18:17 praises “those who do not accept interest.” And God did not allow the Jews to take interest from foreigners as if the practice was lawful. Rather, he allowed the Jews to take interest from foreigners in order to avoid an evil, namely, lest the Jews out of greed, to which they were given, take interest from their fellow Jews, who worship the true God.
And we broadly understand the lending to foreigners promised the Jews as a reward in the cited text, “You will lend to many peoples,” etc., as lending in general. Just so, Sir. 29:7 says: “Many refused to lend” (i.e., to lend in general) but “not out of malice.” Therefore, God promises the Jews as a reward an abundance of wealth so that they may lend to others.
Reply Obj. 3. Human laws leave some sins unpunished because of the conditions of imperfect human beings, regarding whom many benefits would be prevented if all sins were to be strictly prohibited, and punishments for the sins were to be applied. And so human law allows interest-taking lest benefits for many be prevented, and not as if judging interest-taking to be in accord with justice. And so the civil law says, “By neither natural nor civil reason should things consumed in their use have a distinct usufruct,” and “The Senate did not, nor could it, create a usufruct of such things, although it established a usufruct, as it were,”3 namely, allowed interest-taking. And the Philosopher, led by natural reason, says in the Politics that “the acquisition of money by taking {151} interest is especially contrary to nature.”4
Reply Obj. 4. Human beings are not always obliged to lend, and so Christ in that respect includes lending with the counsels. But it falls under the nature of a precept that human beings should not seek profits from loans.
And Christ may call lending a counsel in contrast to the opinion of the Pharisees, who thought that any interest on loans was lawful, just as he counsels love of enemies in contrast to their opinion.
Or Christ is speaking in the citation about expecting things from human beings, not about lenders expecting profit. For we should lend and do good deeds because of hope in God, not because of hope in our fellow human beings.
Reply Obj. 5. Those under no obligation to lend can receive recompense for what they have done, and they should demand no more than that. But lenders are recompensed in accord with the equality required by justice if borrowers repay as much as they have borrowed. And so if lenders demand more for the use and enjoyment of things that have no other use than consumption of the things’ substance, they demand payment for something that does not exist. And so the demand is unjust.
Reply Obj. 6. The chief use of silver vessels is not their very consumption, and so one can lawfully sell their use and retain ownership of them. But the chief use of silver money is to be transferred from one owner to another in exchanges. And so one may not lawfully sell its use as well as wanting repayment of the money lent.
But we should note that silver vessels could have a secondary use as exchanges. And it would not be lawful to sell such use of them. And likewise, there can be a secondary use of silver money, as, for example, if one were to lend silver coins for exhibition or for deposit as security. And human beings can lawfully charge for such use.
Reply Obj. 7. Those who pay interest do not pay it freely, absolutely speaking. Rather, they do so under some necessity, since they need to borrow money, which the lenders are unwilling to lend without receiving interest.
We thus proceed to the second inquiry. It seems that one can seek some other advantage for money lent, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. Persons can lawfully protect themselves against losses. But {152} persons sometimes suffer loss because they lend money. Therefore, they may lawfully seek, or even require, something more than the money lent in order to cover the risk of loss.
Obj. 2. Everyone is in honor obliged “to recompense those who have done them a favor,” as the Ethics says.5 But those who lend money to others in need do them a favor. And so also borrowers should be grateful. Therefore, a natural obligation obliges the borrowers to make some recompense to lenders. But it does not seem unlawful to commit oneself to what the natural law obliges one. Therefore, it does not seem unlawful if those lending money require recompense from borrowers.
Obj. 3. As there is “monetary remuneration,” so there are “remuneration by praise” and “remuneration by service,” as a gloss on Is. 33:15, “Blessed are those who tear their hands away from every bribe,” says.6 But it is lawful for one to accept service or praise from another to whom one has lent money. Therefore, by like reasoning, it is lawful for one to accept any other remuneration.
Obj. 4. There is the same relation of one gift to another and of one loan to another. But it is lawful for a person to receive money from another for money given to the other. Therefore, it is lawful for a person to accept the recompense of a loan from another for money lent to the other.
Obj. 5. Those who transfer ownership of money by lending it, alienate it more than those who invest it with merchants or craftsmen. But one may lawfully accept profit from money invested with merchants or craftsmen. Therefore, one may lawfully receive profit from money lent.
Obj. 6. Lenders can obtain security for money they lend, as when borrowers give their farms or dwellings to lenders as security, and lenders could sell use of the security. Therefore, lenders may lawfully profit from money lent.
Obj. 7. By reason of loans, persons may sometimes sell their goods more dearly or buy others’ goods more cheaply, or increase the price of their goods in return for giving buyers a longer time to repay the loans, or lower the price of the goods in return for buyers repaying the loans earlier. In all of the above cases, recompense seems to be made for loans of money and not clearly unlawful. Therefore, it seems that one may lawfully look for, or even demand, an advantage from money lent.
On the contrary, among other things required of a just man, Ez. 18:17 says: “He will not exact interest or extra recompense.”
I answer that, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics,7 we consider as {153} money “things whose value money can measure.” And those who by tacit or express contract accept money for the loan of money or of anything else consumed in its very use, sin against justice, as I have said.8 And just so, therefore, those who should by tacit or express contract accept anything else whose value money can measure, likewise incur sin. But a lender does not sin if the lender should accept such a thing as a free gift, not as something required by either a tacit or express obligation. This is so because the lender could have accepted a free gift before the lender lent money, and the lender is in no worse condition by lending money.
On the other hand, a lender can lawfully demand in return for a loan the recompense of things not measured by money, for example, the friendship and love of the lender, or some such thing.
Reply Obj. 1. Lenders may without sin enter contracts with borrowers to recompense the lenders for losses that they would incur of things to which they are entitled, since such recompense is to avoid loss, not to sell the use of money. And borrowers may by taking loans avoid greater loss than lenders of the money may incur. And so borrowers out of their gains compensate lenders’ losses.
But lenders may not make contracts with borrowers to recompense the lenders for putative losses of monetary profit, since one should not sell what one does not have and can be prevented in many ways from having.
Reply Obj. 2. One can make recompense for benefits in two ways. One can indeed make recompense in one way to satisfy a debt of justice, and one may be obligated to such recompense by a fixed contract. And we measure this debt by how much benefit one receives. And so those who borrow money or any such thing whose use consists of its consumption are not obliged to repay more than they borrowed. And so to oblige them to repay more is contrary to justice.
One is obliged to make recompense for benefits in a second way to satisfy a debt of friendship, in which one weighs the affection of the benefactor in conferring the benefit more than the size of the benefit conferred. And such a debt involves no legal obligation, which introduces a coercive element that takes away the free character of the recompense.
Reply Obj. 3. If a lender by reason of money lent should look for or demand the recompense of remuneration by service or praise as the obligation of a tacit or express contract, this is the same as if the lender were to look for or demand monetary remuneration. This is so because money can measure service and words of praise, as is evident in the case of those {154} who sell their services or speech. But if a borrower gives remuneration by service or speech out of friendship, which money cannot measure, and not out of contractual obligation, the lender may lawfully accept and demand and look for such remuneration.
Reply Obj. 4. Lenders may not sell money for more than the sum lent, which borrowers are to repay, nor should lenders demand or look for anything more in recompense than friendly affection, which money does not measure, and which can give rise to freely willed loans. But an obligation to grant a future loan is inconsistent with demanding or looking for the affection of friendship, since money could also measure such an obligation. And so a borrower may lawfully lend something else to a lender at the time the lender lends money to the borrower, but the lender may not obligate the borrower to grant a future loan.
Reply Obj. 5. Lenders of money transfer ownership of the money to borrowers. And so the borrowers possess the money at their own risk and are obliged to repay all of it. And so lenders should not demand more. But those who invest their money with merchants or craftsmen by way of a partnership do not transfer ownership of their money to the merchants or craftsmen. Rather, investors retain ownership of their invested money, so that merchants carry on their business, and craftsmen their craft, with risk to the investors. And so investors may lawfully seek to share the profits from the business, as the profits partially belong to them.
Reply Obj. 6. If borrowers give as security for the money lent them things whose use money can measure, lenders should calculate use of the things toward the repayment of what they have lent. Otherwise, if lenders should want the free use of the things in addition to repayment, it is just as if they were to accept money for their loans. And this is to take interest, unless the things were perhaps such as friends usually grant the use of without charge, as is clearly the case with borrowed books.
Reply Obj. 7. Persons evidently take interest if they sell their goods on credit more dearly than the goods’ just price, since such credit has the nature of a loan. And so everything demanded in exchange for such credit beyond the just price is like a charge on the loan, which belongs essentially to interest-taking.
Likewise, if buyers should want to buy goods by prepaying more cheaply than the goods’ just price, this is the sin of interest-taking, since such prepayment has the nature of a loan, the charge for which is the reduction on the just price of the goods purchased. But if sellers should want to offer reductions on the just price in order to get their money sooner, they do not commit the sin of interest-taking.
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We thus proceed to the third inquiry. It seems that persons are obliged to return all of their profits from money obtained as interest, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. The Apostle says in Rom. 11:16: “If the root is holy, so are the branches.” Therefore, by like reasoning, if the root is poisoned, so are the branches. But the root of profits from money obtained as interest was interest-taking. Therefore, everything acquired from money obtained as interest is interest-taking. Therefore, one is obliged to return every such thing.
Obj. 2. A decretal on interest-taking says: “Property accruing from interest-taking should be sold, and the proceeds turned over to those from whom they were extorted.”9 Therefore, by like reasoning, everything else accruing from money obtained as interest should be returned.
Obj. 3. The goods people buy with money obtained as interest belong to them by reason of the money they paid for the goods. Therefore, they do not have a greater right to the goods they purchased than they have to the money they used to pay for the goods. But people are obliged to return money obtained as interest. Therefore, they are also obliged to return things they acquired with such money.
On the contrary, one can lawfully keep what one has lawfully acquired. But one sometimes lawfully acquires things with money obtained as interest. Therefore, one can lawfully keep such things.
I answer that, as I have said before,10 there are some things whose use consists of their very consumption, things that the laws allow no separate right to use and enjoy.11 And so if lenders should have extorted such things (e.g., money, wheat, wine, and the like) by taking interest, they are obliged to return only what they took, since anything they obtain out of such things is the fruit of their human effort, not the fruit of the things. A possible exception is if a borrower, in losing part of his property, should suffer loss by the lender’s retention of the property, since the lender is then obliged to recompense the harm to the borrower.
And there are some things whose use does not consist of their consumption (e.g., homes and farms and the like), and there is a separate right to enjoy and use such things. And so if lenders should have extorted the home or farm of another, they are obliged to return both the home or {156} farm and the fruits derived therefrom, since the latter are the fruits of things owned by the other, and so due to the other.
Reply Obj. 1. A root has not only the nature of matter, as money obtained as interest does, but it also has somewhat the nature of an efficient cause, since it brings nourishment. And so there is no analogy.
Reply Obj. 2. Property acquired from interest-taking belongs to those who bought the property, not to those who paid the interest. But those who paid the interest have a claim on such property or other goods of the interest-taker. And so the law does not command that the property be ascribed to those who paid the interest, since the property is perhaps worth more than the interest they paid. Rather, the law commands that the property be sold, and the proceeds be repaid to the borrower, namely, by the amount of the interest paid.
Reply Obj. 3. Things acquired from interest money indeed belong to those acquiring them, with the interest money as the acquisition’s instrumental cause, but with the acquirers’ own efforts as the acquisition’s chief cause. And so those who acquire things from interest money have more right to the things obtained from the interest money than they do to the interest money itself.
We thus proceed to the fourth inquiry. It seems one may not lawfully borrow money subject to the payment of interest, for the following reasons:
Obj. 1. The Apostle says in Rom. 1:32: “Both those who commit sins, and those who approve of others committing sins, deserve to die.” But those who borrow money at interest approve the sin of interest-takers and offer them an occasion of sin. Therefore, the borrowers of money at interest themselves also sin.
Obj. 2. For no earthly advantage should one offer another any occasion of sin, since this belongs to the nature of intentional or intrinsic scandal, which is always a sin, as I have said before.12 But those who seek to borrow at interest expressly offer lenders an occasion of sin. Therefore, no earthly advantage excuses borrowers at interest from sin.
Obj. 3. There seems to be no less occasional necessity to deposit one’s money with lenders who take interest than to borrow at interest from them. But depositing money with lenders who take interest seems to be completely unlawful, as it would be unlawful to deposit one’s sword with {157} a madman, to hand over a maiden to a libertine, or to give food to a glutton. Therefore, it is also unlawful to borrow at interest from lenders.
On the contrary, those who suffer injury, do not sin, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics.13 And so justice is not a mean between two vices, as he says in the same work.14 But those who lend at interest sin insofar as they cause injustice to borrowers at interest. Therefore, borrowers at interest do not sin.
I answer that it is in no way lawful to induce human beings to sin, but it is lawful to use another’s sin for good, since even God uses all sins for some good by drawing good out of every evil, as Augustine says in his Enchiridion.15 And so when Publicola asked him whether it would be lawful to use the oath of a man who swore by false gods—something obviously sinful because it gives divine reverence to false gods, he gave this reply: “Those who for good rather than evil use the truthfulness of another who swears by false gods associate themselves with the other’s praiseworthy promise to tell the truth, not with the other’s sin of swearing by false gods.”16 But one would sin if one were to induce another to swear by false gods.
So also in the matter under discussion, we should say that it is in no way lawful to induce lenders to lend at interest. But it is lawful to borrow at interest from those who are ready to lend at interest and make a practice of doing so, for the sake of some good, namely, to alleviate the need of the borrower or the need of another. Just so, one who falls into the hands of robbers may lawfully reveal his goods, in the taking of which the robbers sin, in order not to be killed. An example is that of the ten men who said to Ishmael, “Don’t kill us, since we have stores in our fields,” as Jer. 41:8 says.
Reply Obj. 1. Borrowers at interest make use of the sin of lenders at interest but do not approve their sin. And borrowers approve the lenders’ lending, which is good, not the lenders’ acceptance of interest.
Reply Obj. 2. Borrowers of money at interest offer lenders an opportunity to lend, not the opportunity for them to take interest, and lenders at interest themselves, out of the wickedness of their hearts, seize the opportunity to sin. And so there is passive scandal by the lenders at interest, and there is no active scandal by would-be borrowers at interest. And yet a would-be borrower in need should not refrain from borrowing at interest because of such passive scandal, since the latter results from the lenders’ wickedness, not the public’s weakness or ignorance.
{158} Reply Obj. 3. If one were to entrust one’s money to a lender of money at interest who has no other sources of money to lend, or to entrust one’s money to a lender of money at interest with the intention that the lender thereby profit more handsomely, the depositor would be giving the lender the material with which to sin. And so also the depositor would be participating in the sin. But if, in order to keep one’s money safer, one should entrust it to a lender of money at interest who has other sources of money to lend, the depositor uses the sinner for good and does not himself sin.
1EthicsV, 5 (1133a20–1).
2Politics I, 3 (1257a35–41).
3Justinian, Institutes II, title 4, n. 2.
4Politics I, 3 (1256b7–8).
5Aristotle, EthicsV, 5 (1133a4–5).
6Glossa interlinearis, on Is. 33:15.
7Ethics IV, 1 (1119b26–7).
8ST II–II, Q. 78, A. 1.
9Gregory IX, DecretalsV, title 19, c. 5.
10ST II–II, Q. 78, A. 1.
11See n. 3, supra.
12ST II–II, Q. 43, A. 2.
13Ethics V, 11 (1138a34—b1).
14Ibid., 5 (1133b32–1134a1).
15Enchiridion 11 (PL 40:236).
16Letter 47, to Publicola, n. 2 (PL 33:184).