16 Protestant Orthodoxy

The primary source for Christian theological speculation is Holy Scripture; indeed, Christian theology may be regarded as an extended commentary upon the biblical material. 3 Christian theology thus references and engages a number of important concepts originating from a Hebraic context; the transference of these concepts from their original Semitic context to that of western Europe may be expected to result in shifts of meaning with potentially significant theological consequences. The equation of Hebraic and western concepts of ‘ righteousness’ – or substitution of Aristotelian or Ciceronian notions of justice for the Old Testament notions of righteousness – is sometimes implicit in theological works, so that western concepts of justice come to be employed in the articulation of the Christian doctrine of justification without attention being paid to the original Semitic context of such discourse. 4 As this study will make clear, the interpretation of the ‘ righteousness of God’ within the western theological tradition has been accompanied by some intractable exegetical problems, many relating to the difficulties of rendering the meaning of Hebrew theological terms in a Latin-speaking Roman cultural context.

Central to the Christian understanding of the economy of salvation is the conviction that God is righteous, and acts in accordance with that righteousness in the salvation of humanity. It is clear, however, that this conviction raises certain fundamental questions, not least that of which concept of ‘ righteousness’ can be considered appropriate to a discussion of the divine dispensation towards humankind. A Christian understanding of the relationship between God and humanity may be set out as three propositions:

A study of the classic western understandings of justice suggests that these are essentially secular and practical , 7 and therefore potentially quite unsuited to a discussion of the ‘ righteousness of God’ . This section, dealing with the Hebrew, Greek and Latin understandings of ‘ righteousness’ , is therefore intended as a prolegomenon to the study of the doctrine of justification. Although not strictly a part of the history of the doctrine itself, the problem of misunderstandings in cultural transfer exercised such an influence over the subsequent discussion of justification that its omission at this stage is impossible.

Recent theories of the historical background of the Hebrew language have tended to divide the Afro-Asiatic (or Hamito-Semitic) languages into two groups: the archaic southern Cushitic and Chadic languages, and the more progressive northern group of languages, including the Semitic languages, the Berber languages of North Africa, and ancient Egyptian and Coptic. The triliteral or triconsonantal root is a conspicuous feature common to all the languages of the northern group; no other Afro-Asiatic subfamily has enforced triliteralism as determinedly. 10 It is possible to argue that at every level – whether semantic, grammatical or phonological – features of these languages are theoretically derivable from a common source. When the etymology of the grapheme sdq is examined, using other ancient Near Eastern languages as models, a spectrum of possible meanings emerges, of which the most fundamental appears to be that of conformity to a norm . 11

Yet while comparative philology and etymology can help us understand the historical development of the meaning of the grapheme sdq , what is ultimately determinative in discerning its semantic significance is its context of use . This makes it clear that the dominant sense of the terms sedeq and sedaqa is that of ‘ right behaviour’ or ‘ right disposition’ . 12 The close semantic association between the ideas of ‘ righteousness’ and ‘ truth’ in the Aryan rtá and Iranian ӑsa is also of relevance here. 13 The world is understood to be ordered in a certain way as a result of its divine creation; to act ‘ rightly’ is thus to act in accordance with this patterning of structures and events arising through the divine act of creation, which involves the imposition of order upon chaos, or the defeat of personified forces of chaos. 14 Similar understandings of ‘ righteousness’ were common elsewhere in the ancient world. For example, contemporary Assyrian documents suggest that the king was to be seen as the guardian of the world order, who ensured the regular functioning of the world through his cultic actions. 15

The oldest meaning of sedaqa , as judged by its use in the Song of Deborah (Judges 5:1– 31), appears to be ‘ victory’ . 16 This meaning is thought to be retained in some later texts, such as 1 Samuel 12:7 and Micah 6:5, although it is clear that the nuances of the term have shifted. In this early passage, which contains many unusual grammatical forms and rare words, God is understood to have acted in ‘ righteousness’ by defending Israel when its existence was threatened by an outside agency. 17 This use of the term allows us to appreciate that the term ‘ righteousness’ can possess both retributive and salvific aspects, without being reduced to, or exclusively identified with, either concept. God’ s act of judgement may be retributive with regard to Israel’ s enemies, but it is salvific with regard to God’ s covenant people. The theological notion of a covenant between God and Israel thus establishes a framework for ‘ right’ or ‘ righteous’ action and behaviour on both sides. When God and Israel mutually fulfil their covenant obligations to each other, a state of righteousness can be said to exist – that is, things are saddiq , ‘ as they should be’ . 18 Much Old Testament thinking about righteousness is linked with the notion of a covenant between God and Israel, demanding fidelity on the part of both parties if a state of ‘ righteousness’ is to pertain. The close connection between the themes of creation and covenant in the Old Testament points to a linking of the moral and salvific orders. It also helps us understand the manner in which such a covenantal notion of ‘ righteousness’ could serve as a communal identity-marker. 19

This helps us understand why Israel’ s early triumphant victories over its enemies were seen as proof of the sidqot ‘adonay (Judges 5:11) – the iustitiae Dei of the Vulgate . At this stage in the history of Israel, the ‘ righteousness’ of the covenant does not appear to have been considered to face a threat from within Israel itself, but primarily from external agencies. Even where the specific term ‘ righteousness’ is not found, it seems that a clear connection is understood to exist between God’ s activity as a judge and Israel’ s victory over its neighbours (as at Judges 11:27, and possibly also 2 Samuel 18:31). 20 However, with the establishment of Israel as a settled nation, attention came to focus on the threat posed to the covenant relationship from within Israel itself. It is significant in this context that the figures of ‘ Judges’ are presented as national saviours, rather than impartial administrators of justice who are called to deliver Israel from both external threats and an internal ‘ downward spiral’ . The eighth-century prophets Amos and Hosea stressed the importance of righteousness on Israel’ s part if it were to remain in a covenant relationship with its righteous God. This insight was expressed by the prophets in terms of the conditional election of Israel as the people of God, For the prophets, sedaqa was effectively that condition or state required of Israel if its relationship with its God was to continue.

Hermann Cremer (1834– 1903) argued that the only plausible way of making sense of the Old Testament usage of sedaqa was to assume that, in its basic sense, the term refers to an actual relationship between two persons, and implies behaviour which corresponds to, or is consistent with, whatever claims may arise from or concerning either party to the relationship. The relationship in question is that presupposed by the covenant between God and Israel, which must be considered as the ultimate norm to which sedaqa must be referred. The Hebrew concept of sedaqa thus stands in a conceptual class of its own – a class which Cremer characterised as iustitia salutifera . 21 Yet there are some clear weaknesses with Cremer’ s approach, not least that God’ s righteousness is often seen as expressed in acts of both deliverance and judgement. 22 Cremer’ s point nevertheless remains significant: sedaqa and classic western notions of justice may overlap at points; they nevertheless diverge significantly at others.

The strongly soteriological overtones of the term sedaqa are evident from passages in which ‘ righteousness’ and ‘ salvation’ are practically equated, particularly at many points within Deutero-Isaiah: 23 ‘ I will bring my sedaqa near, it is not far away, / And my salvation will not be delayed’ (Isaiah 46:13). A similar theme recurs throughout many Psalms, which stress and proclaim ‘ the reliable, foundational event of the covenant and the continuous salvific faithfulness of Yahweh in history and worship’ . 24 This is not, it must be emphasised, to say that ‘ righteousness’ and ‘ salvation’ are treated as being synonymous; rather, they are regarded as being inextricably linked at a theological level on account of the covenant relationship between God and Israel. Semantic and theological considerations combine to give the Old Testament concept of the ‘ righteousness of God’ strongly soteriological overtones which the western concept of iustitia distributiva cannot convey.

Although there are many instances where sedaqa can be regarded as corresponding to the concept of iustitia distributiva , which has come to dominate western thinking on the nature of justice (despite the rival claims of iustitia commutativa ), there remains a significant number which cannot. A particularly significant illustration of this may be found in the Old Testament attitude to the poor, needy and destitute. As we have noted, sedaqa refers to the ‘ right order of affairs’ which is violated, at least in part, by the very existence of such deprived or marginalised social groups. God’ s sedaqa is such that God must deliver them from their plight – and it is this aspect of the Hebrew concept of sedaqa which has proved so intractable to those who attempted to interpret it solely as iustitia distributiva . It is clear that this aspect of the Hebraic understanding of ‘ righteousness’ cannot adequately be understood in terms of an impartial judge who administers justice according to whichever party has broken a universally accepted law.

The later meaning of sedaqa in post-biblical Hebrew (‘ almsgiving’ ) can thus be seen as the development of a trend already evident in passages such as Psalm 112:9: the ‘ right (or intended) order of affairs’ is violated by the existence of the poor and needy; it is therefore a requirement of sedaqa that this be remedied by the appropriate means. 25 Thus the sense which sedaqa assumes in the Targums and Talmud (‘ benevolence’ in general, or ‘ almsgiving’ in particular) can be seen to represent a natural development of the soteriological nuances which had been associated with the term from the earliest of times, rather than the final rupture of the semantic connection between a word and its root. 26 The etymology of the term on its own is inadequate to explain this development; the theological context within which it is deployed, especially when linked with the motif of the covenant between God and Israel, enables this extended meaning to be understood without difficulty.

The problems attending the translation of the Old Testament into any second language, whether modern English or Hellenistic Greek, are well illustrated by the application of semantic field theory. The semantic field of a word includes not merely its synonyms, but also its antonyms, homonyms and homophones. As such, it is much broader than the lexical field , which may be defined very precisely in terms of words which are closely associated with one another. 27 The translation of a word into a different language inevitably involves a distortion of its original semantic field, so that certain nuances and associations present in the original cannot be conveyed properly in a translation, while new nuances and associations not already present make their appearance. The word chosen to translate the original will itself have a well-established semantic field, so that an alien set of associations will become associated with this word as a result of the translation process itself.

This difficulty is well illustrated in the two non-contiguous semantic transitions of importance to our study. In each case, a Hebrew word is replaced by a Latin equivalent in the Vulgate translation of the Old Testament. In his Hebraicum , Jerome himself provided a direct translation from the Hebrew scriptures into Latin, offering extended reasons for doing so, including asserting the greater reliability of Hebraica veritas (‘ Hebrew truth’ ). 28 The state of biblical scholarship during the Middle Ages was such that it was the Vulgate, rather than the Hebrew original, which became normative for medieval theology. Most theologians of the period were unaware of the semantic issues involved, not having access to the Hebrew original (and probably, in any case, being unable to understand the older language). 29 In each case, the transition from Hebrew to Latin involves an intermediate Greek term in the Septuagint (LXX) translation of the Hebrew text, which itself introduces new issues. Two semantic transitions were particularly problematic:

While the translators of the Septuagint generally appear to have attempted consistency in their translation of Hebrew terms, 33 they were unable to accommodate the meaning of sedaqa by the simple substitution of dikaiosyne in every case. Of particular interest is the translation of sdq in the construct form (e.g., at Leviticus 19:36, Deuteronomy 25:15 and Ezekiel 45:10). Here, the Hebrew clearly has the sense of ‘ accurate’ – that is, in the case of Leviticus 19:36, the weights are ‘ as they are intended to be’ – namely, accurate. The Septuagint, however, translates this phrase as the ‘ weights of righteousness’ . This phrase could easily be misunderstood as possessing developed cultic or religious overtones, when it clearly denotes nothing more than accurate weights. Similarly, the Septuagint’ s ‘ sacrifices of righteousness’ (Deuteronomy 33:19; Psalms 4:6; 51.21) are essentially ‘ correct sacrifices’ – that is, those which are ‘ in order’ under the cultic prescriptions of the covenant, rather than sacrifices which are to be thought of as ethically ‘ righteous’ in themselves.

The basic meaning of the sdq group as ‘ conformity to a requirement’ , illustrated by the use of sdq in the construct form, caused some difficulty for the Septuagint’ s translators, in that there was no satisfactory Greek equivalent for this grammatical form. While the dik- lexical group appears to have been considered capable of translating the sdq group in the majority of cases, the soteriological connotations of sedaqa were occasionally so strong that it could not be translated by dikaiosyne , the translators being instead forced to use eleemosyne – in other words, ‘ mercy’ . This would be expected to have at least one very significant consequence for Greek readers of the Old Testament unfamiliar with its Hebrew original; here they might encounter a reference to God’ s dikaiosyne , there to God’ s eleemosyne – without knowing that the same Hebrew word, sedaqa , lies behind both. A reader who was unaware that the same Hebrew word was being ‘ translated’ in each case might thus conceivably set God’ s ‘ righteousness’ and ‘ mercy’ in opposition, where no such tension is warranted on the basis of the text itself. If anything, righteousness and mercy are to be seen as theologically interconnected.

Yet early Christian theologians in the Greek-speaking world of the first four centuries read the Septuagint in a cultural context which introduced assumptions that had the potential to distance them still further from the thought-world of ancient Israel. The considerable influence of Hellenistic philosophy and culture upon Christian thought in its formative period has been well documented. 34 The term dikaiosyne had by then acquired a generally Aristotelian sense, so that by dikaiosyne we may understand something very similar to iustitia distributiva – the notion of ‘ giving persons their due’ . 35 Aristotle ’ s ethical thinking is to be set in the context of the political community, the polis , so that ‘ righteousness’ is defined teleologically, in terms of the well-being which it brings to the political community as a whole. 36 Lower beings, such as the animals, and higher beings, such as the gods, were excluded from Aristotle’ s discussion of dikaiosyne precisely because they were not members of the contracting political community. The sphere of dikaiosyne is defined as that of the polis , so that the concept of the ‘ righteousness of God’ has no immediate practical significance. The contrast with the Old Testament notion of Israel as a covenant community will be evident; both Aristotle and the Old Testament presuppose a covenant community as the basis for an understanding of ‘ righteousness’ ; the ‘ covenants’ in question are, however, quite distinct, not least in the manner in which they implicate – or fail to implicate – God in human affairs. 37 It is evident that Aristotle’ s understanding of ‘ righteousness’ is quite different from that signified by the Hebrew word sedaqa . In particular, dikaiosyne had become an essentially secular concept incapable of assuming the soteriological overtones associated with the Hebrew term.

This problem became even more significant as the result of the expansion of Christianity in Europe. The western church had no direct knowledge of Semitic culture and its theologians were generally dependent on textual mediation of the core ideas of the Old Testament through the medium of a language which had no historical connection with Israel – Latin. This problem was compounded by the Vulgate ’ s translational idiosyncrasies, which placed additional distance between these scholars and the original Hebrew texts. 38 There is evidence that western European Christian scholars throughout the theological Renaissance of the twelfth century had to call upon Jewish scholars or converts to help them with their study of the Hebrew Bible.

For the first fifteen hundred years of its existence, the western church’ s theologians thus depended mainly upon Latin translations of the Bible, chiefly the Vulgate, for their theological deliberations. 39 As most theologians of the period did not have access to the original Hebrew version of the Old Testament – if they knew any Hebrew in the first place – their interpretation of such Latin theological terms as iustitia Dei and iustificare would ultimately be based upon the Latin version of the Bible available to them. 40 It is therefore of importance to appreciate the particular difficulties attending the translation of essentially Hebraic concepts, such as ‘ justification’ , into a Latin linguistic and conceptual framework.

By the end of the second century, the Latin term iustitia had acquired well-established juristic connotations which were to exert considerable influence over future theological interpretation of such notions as iustitia Dei – the ‘ righteousness of God’ . The Ciceronian definition of iustitia as reddens unicuique quod suum est (‘ giving someone their due’ ) had become normative. 41 In effect, the Ciceronian definition encapsulates the western concept of iustitia distributiva , the ‘ due’ of each person being established through the iuris consensus , and thence embodied in ius . The tension between this concept of ‘ righteousness’ and that of the Old Testament will be evident. There is no fundamental appeal to a covenant between God and humanity as determinative of ethical or legal norms or conventions.

The most important book of the Old Testament for the development of the Christian doctrine of justification is the Psalter, the subject of major commentaries by Augustine, Peter Lombard and Luther, to name but three. 42 The Vulgate, as we know it, contains Jerome’ s translation of the Hebrew books of the Old Testament, with the exception of the Psalter. 43 The Psalter found in the Vulgate is the Psalterium Gallicum , Jerome’ s second revision of the Old Latin Psalter, itself based upon Origen ’ s recension of the Septuagint version. 44 His later Psalterium iuxta hebraicam veritatem never gained general acceptance. The difference between the two Psalters may be illustrated from their translations of Psalm 24:5 (Vulgate 23:5, emphasis added):

Although it is clear that considerable confusion could potentially have arisen through such translations, two important factors served to reduce this possibility. First, the Vulgate itself is not consistent in its translation of the Septuagint. Thus the Septuagintal eleemosyne , when used as a translation of sedaqa , is translated into Latin as iustitia at Psalm 35:24 and elsewhere. It is almost as if the translation of the Greek has been corrected in the light of the original Hebrew, even though there are no persuasive arguments for believing that any such comparison took place. The reasons for this inconsistency are not clear. Second, the two passages in the Psalter which appear to have exercised the greatest influence over western conceptions of iustitia Dei are Psalm 31:1 (Hebrew and Vulgate, 30:2) and 71:2 (Vulgate, 70:2). 46 In both these passages, the Psalmist appeals to God, acting according to righteousness, for deliverance: ‘ In you, O Lord, do I take refuge, / Let me never be put to shame. / In your righteousness deliver me and rescue me.’ In both cases, the Septuagint translated sedaqa as dikaiosyne , and the Vulgate thence as iustitia . The strongly soteriological sense of the Hebrew root lying behind the Latin term iustitia in this specific context could thus be appreciated, as is borne out by the study of the exegesis of such passages in the early medieval period. 47

First, in its classical usage, dikaioun with a personal object almost invariably seems to be applied to someone whose cause is unjust , and thus bears the meaning of ‘ to do justice to’ – that is, ‘ to punish’ . Although it is possible to adduce occasional classical references in which dikaioun may conceivably be interpreted as assuming a positive sense – that is, to ‘ right an injustice suffered’ – it must be emphasised that this is extremely rare. In general, the classical usage of dikaioun is such that it is highly unusual to find it applied, with a personal object, in the sense of ‘ to justify’ – and yet it is this positive sense which constitutes the norm for the Septuagintal use of the verb. Indeed, there are no known occurrences of dikaioun in a negative sense in any part of the Septuagint for which there exists a Hebrew original. 49 It is therefore clear that the Septuagintal usage of the term represents a significant shift away from the classical meaning of the term towards that of the corresponding Hebrew term – a shift which might prove stultifying to a Greek reader of the Old Testament not familiar with the Hebrew original. No example of the classical use of dikaioun can be found within the Septuagint, and the normal meaning it assumes in the Septuagint can be adduced only in a few isolated and controversial passages in classical Greek literature.

Second, in classical Greek, dikaioun with a personal object applied to a person whose cause is unjust invariably assumes the negative meaning ‘ to punish’ . The Septuagintal use of the verb in an identical context demands that it assume a positive meaning – that is, ‘ to justify’ , ‘ to declare to be in the right’ or ‘ to acquit’ . For example, Isaiah 5:22– 3 (LXX) follows the wording of the Hebrew Massoretic text very closely. The substance of the complaint is that certain people are, for the sake of financial considerations, ‘ justifying the wicked’ . This complaint does not make sense if the classical sense of dikaioun (e.g., as it is encountered at Sirach 42:2) is presumed to apply; if the unjust are punished – that is, have ‘ justice done to them’ – there can be no cause for complaint. 50 The complaint does, however, make sense if the term is presumed to have a Hebraic background, in that the substance of the complaint is then that certain people have been bribed to declare the guilty to be innocent. It is clear that the term dikaioun , although of classical Greek provenance, has assumed a Hebraic meaning as a consequence of its being used to translate the sdq words. A Greek-speaking reader of the Old Testament who was unfamiliar with the Hebraic background to such material would find passages such as the above highly perplexing.

The locus classicus for the secular Greek use of the verb is Book V of Aristotle ’ s Nicomachean Ethics . If the classical Aristotelian understanding of the concept is applied to the Septuagintal translation of Isaiah 43:26, an apparent absurdity results. Israel is there invited to confess its sins ‘ so that [it] may be justified’ . It is not clear why this should move Israel to confess its sins, since, in the classical sense of the verb, its punishment will follow as a matter of course. Of course, if it is assumed that the Greek verb dikaioun has here taken on the meaning of hasdiq , rather than conforming to secular Greek usage, the meaning becomes clear and comprehensible: Israel is invited to confess its sins, in order that it may be acquitted of them. 51

A difficulty of a quite different nature arose in the translation of terms such as hasdiq or dikaioun into Latin. The verb iustificare (‘ to justify’ ), employed for this purpose, was post-classical, and thus required interpretation. The general tendency among Latin-speaking theologians was to follow Augustine of Hippo in interpreting iustificare (‘ to justify’ ) as iustum facere (‘ to make righteous’ ). Augustine’ s etymological speculations are sometimes wide of the mark – for example, his impossible derivation of the name Mercurius from medius currens . His explanation of the origins of the term iustificare is, however, quite plausible, for it involves the entirely plausible assumption that the suffix -ficare is the unstressed form of facere . In interpreting iustificare in this manner, Augustine appears to be following the precedent set by earlier Greek Christian writers, who generally interpreted dikaioun in a factitive manner.

The initial transference of a Hebrew concept to a Greek, and subsequently to a Latin, context points to a fundamental alteration in the concepts of ‘ justification’ and ‘ righteousness’ as the gospel spread from its Palestinian source to the western world. 52 The most significant such development, as we shall see, was the widespread assumption that the all-important theological notion of the ‘ righteousness of God’ – which, for Paul, lay at the heart of the Christian gospel – was about God giving each person their due. And as Martin Luther would later point out, that meant condemning sinners such as him, and justifying those who were already righteous. In what way, he asked, was that good news? 53

We have only briefly touched on Paul’ s contribution to the development of the western doctrine of justification. We must now turn to consider the role of the Pauline epistles in much greater detail.