The Role of Supernatural Habits of Grace in Justification

The eleventh- and twelfth-century discussions of this question made it clear that a careful and systematic distinction between naturalia and gratuita was required if confusion was to be avoided. The distinction which required elucidation was between datum (i.e., that which is already given in nature) and donum (i.e., the subsequent and additional gift of grace). As we have noted, confusion over precisely this point prevailed during the Pelagian controversy , even if this may have been overstated at points for polemical reasons.

The first instance of a systematic distinction between the datum (i.e., nature) and donum (i.e., grace) may be found in the ninth century. In drawing this distinction, Scotus Erigena drew a line between what he termed the natural and supernatural orders. 3 Of particular importance in this respect is Erigena’ s explicit reference to gratia supernaturalis in this context. 4 Phrases indicating that the realm of grace was increasingly conceived in supernatural terms – e.g., supra naturam or ultra naturam – are encountered with increasing frequency in the following centuries. 5 The first major step towards the definition of the concept of the supernatural may be regarded as having been taken by Simon of Tournai , who argued that the datum is the purely natural, while the donum is the purely spiritual. 6

This attempt to define the nature of grace in terms of the dialectic between the natural and the spiritual did not, however, really meet the problem. Neither did Peter of Poitiers ’ s attempt to define the distinction between naturalia and gratuita in terms of their respectively human and divine origins. 7 While it is probably impossible to point to any single theologian who may be credited with making the crucial distinction between nature and supernature in defining the essence of grace, it would seem that Praepositinus of Cremona has better claim than anyone else for this innovation.

Standing at the dawn of the thirteenth century, Praepositinus argued that there must be a higher order than nature itself, and deduced its existence from considerations such as the following. Reason is the highest thing in nature, yet faith must be considered to transcend reason. Therefore faith must be regarded as transcending the natural, being itself something which is beyond nature (supranaturam ). 8 This distinction can also be applied to the virtues. For example, in his polemic against the teaching of Hugh of St Victor , William of Auxerre distinguished a purely natural amor amicitiae erga Deum from a meritorious love for God. 9 On the basis of such considerations, William argued for two distinct orders of being. Even though there is a tendency here to define grace purely in terms of the meritorious, it is clear that significant progress towards the classic definition of supernature has been made. The turning point in achieving this definition appears to have been due to Philip the Chancellor, who distinguished the natural order from the ‘ more noble’ supernatural order: to the former belong reason and natural love, to the latter faith and charity. 10 This important distinction allowed justification to be resolved into a twofold operation: the natural , in which grace operates on the will, effecting its moral goodness; and the supernatural , in which grace affects the meritorious character of human acts, raising them from the purely natural plane to that of the supernatural.

In one sense, it could be argued that this is not a new development at all, for these effects of justification had been generally accepted since the time of Augustine. Philip’ s achievement, however, is to distinguish the two aspects of justification in terms of two levels of being, thereby removing much of the confusion surrounding the matter. While the theologians of the earlier twelfth century tended to define grace in terms of merit, the theologians of the closing years of the century generally regarded merit as the consequence of the transference of an act from the natural (i.e., morally good) to the supernatural (i.e., meritorious) plane, in a transition effected by grace. This distinction, once made, became generally accepted; thus Thomas Aquinas stated that ‘ when someone is said to have the grace of God, what is meant is something supernatural (quiddam supernaturale ) in humans which originates from God’ . 11

For example, Albertus Magnus distinguishes eight senses of the term: 14 rational nature and its powers; natural moral goodness; Adam’ s supernatural gifts prior to the Fall; imperfect movements towards salvation; inspiration, thaumaturgy and similar gifts; the assistance of the angels; the indelible character received in the sacraments of baptism and confirmation; and the divine concursus.

Although Bonaventure concludes that the divine concursus should be excluded from this list, 15 his concept of gratia gratis data is still conceived in the broadest of terms, embracing virtually any means by which God interacts with humanity. It would seem that the general concept which underlies Bonaventure’ s catalogue of instances of gratis gratis data is anything which prepares or disposes humanity towards the gift of gratia gratum faciens. A similar degree of ambiguity is evident from the earlier writings of Thomas Aquinas . Thus Thomas uses the term gratia gratis data in a flexible manner, apparently regarding the concept as being beyond meaningful definition. 16 In contrast, the concept of gratia gratum faciens appears to have been relatively well characterised by this point. 17 Further confusion, however, existed concerning the distinction between operative and co-operative grace, an important feature of Augustine’ s theology of justification. We shall illustrate this point with reference to the developing insights of Thomas Aquinas on this matter.

It is important to appreciate that Aquinas’ s understanding of both the nature and the operation of grace underwent considerable development during his lifetime. The nature of these changes and their underlying motivation are not always clear. In his early discussion of grace in the Commentary on the Sentences , Aquinas poses the following question, to answer it in the negative: whether grace is a multiple entity within the soul (utrum gratia sit multiplex in anima ). 18 The reply given to this question illustrates his early confusion concerning the concept of actual grace. A distinction may be made between grace and the virtues: if grace is to be identified with these, it must follow that there are many graces, which is impossible. Although it might appear that the distinctions between prevenient and subsequent, operative and co-operative grace point to the multiplicity of grace, these distinctions in fact merely reflect the various effects of the one grace.

In other words, the distinction between ‘ prevenient grace’ (gratia praeveniens ) and other forms of grace – such as subsequens , operans and cooperans – are purely notional and not real. Grace produces in us a number of effects, and the multiplicity of the effects of grace does not necessitate the deduction of a multiplicity of graces. The effect of operative grace is to produce a good will within humans, and that of co-operative grace to actualise this good will in a good performance – which amounts to an exact restatement of the teaching of Augustine on this matter. Internal gracious acts are thus to be attributed to operative grace, and external acts to co-operative grace. This understanding of grace is based simply upon the distinction between the formal and effective aspects of operative and co-operative grace, is of particular significance in that the entire analysis of the nature of grace can, at least in principle, proceed without reference to gratia gratis data .

In his discussion of the matter in the later De veritate , a slightly different question is posed: whether in one person there is one such gratia gratum faciens . 19 In his answer to this question, Aquinas makes an important and explicit distinction between gratia gratis data and gratia gratum faciens , the former being more a loose catalogue of various possibilities rather than a precise catalogue, and hence evidently multiple.

Gratia gratum faciens , however, is something quite different. If this type of grace is understood as referring to every aspect of the divine will, such as good thoughts or holy desires, it is clearly multiple. This simple admission of the multiplicity of gratia gratum faciens represents a clear and significant development in Aquinas’ s theology of grace. In his earlier Commentary on the Sentences , Aquinas had insisted upon the simplicity of gratia gratum faciens , while conceding the multiplicity of its effects. The multiplicity of the division of graces is purely notional, reflecting the effects of the one gratia gratum faciens .

One of the most important theological moves that Aquinas makes is to introduce a distinction between the habitual gifts of grace and grace understood as the effects of the gratuitous will of God. Here the distinction between formal and efficient causality is retained, but is transferred from the distinction between the external and internal operation of grace (discussed above) to the distinction between operation and co-operation .

This has the important consequence of excluding the possibility of operative grace acting efficiently , which Aquinas had upheld in the Commentary on the Sentences. It is clear, however, that the distinction between the formal and efficient causality of habitual grace leads to consequences which are merely distinct at the notional level, while the distinction between formal and efficient causality in the case of grace, understood as an effect of the divine will, leads to consequences which are distinct in fact. This clearly marks a significant departure from the Augustinian understanding of the distinction between operative and co-operative grace – indeed, it seems that Aquinas is so dissatisfied with Augustine’ s understanding of the concepts that he practically abandons them. Whereas Augustine taught that operative grace excites the will to desire good, and that co-operative grace subsequently actualises this good will in good deeds, Aquinas now explicitly teaches that co-operative grace both excites the will to good desires and also externalises this in external action. This opinion, however, would soon be abandoned.

Aquinas’ s mature discussion of the nature and divisions of grace, as presented in the Summa Theologiae , is of particular interest. Aquinas’ s attempt to correlate Augustine’ s teaching on the relation between good will and good performance, which first appeared in the Commentary on the Sentences , only to be rejected in De veritate , makes its reappearance in the Summa Theologiae , although in a significantly modified form.

Aquinas introduces the distinction between actus interior voluntatis and actus exterior voluntatis to express the substance of Augustine’ s earlier distinction. 20 Grace is now understood either as a habit or as a motion, both of which may be either operative or co-operative. Such is the frailty of humans that, once in a state of habitual grace, they require a continual and unfailing supply of actual graces (note the deliberate use of the plural) if they are to grow in faith and charity. Habitual grace is thus operative , in so far as it heals the wounded nature of humans and justifies them, rendering them acceptable to God; and co-operative , in so far as it is the basis of meritorious human action. Grace, understood as motus , operates on the human will in order that it may will good. In this matter, God is active and the free will passive. Grace, understood as motus , then co-operates with the will to achieve the good act itself. In this matter, the will is active, and may be said to co-operate with grace. This new interpretation of the nature and divisions of grace assigns actual grace a definite role in human justification.

Aquinas’ s changing views on the nature and divisions of grace are complex and difficult to follow. At points, his intellectual motivation for his changing views have to be inferred, in that they are not always clearly indicated. It is therefore important to identify any underlying factors which may explain the leading features of these changes. The decisive alteration which seems to underlie Aquinas’ s changing views on the nature and divisions of grace appears to be his growing pessimism concerning humanity’ s natural faculties, which we noted earlier in relation to Aquinas’ s teaching on the nature and necessity of human preparation for justification. In his early period, Thomas regarded a preparation for justification as necessary, yet possible without the assistance of grace. As such, the concept of gratia gratis data had no significant role to play in the justification of humans. In his later period, Aquinas taught that the beginning of an individual’ s conversion must be seen as an internal operation of grace, 21 thus necessitating the implication of gratia gratis data prior to justification.

Further, in his early period, Aquinas seems to have regarded humanity’ s natural capacities to be such that, once justified, no further assistance in the form of grace was required: gratia gratum faciens alone is treated as being gratia operans et cooperans . 22 Thomas cited with approval Averroes’ s statement to the effect that the possession of a habit allows the will to be transformed to action spontaneously. 23 While conceding that humans are far from perfect, Aquinas appears to have considered this deficiency to be remedied by the possession of habitual grace.

This conclusion is confirmed by two additional considerations. First, the further interference of God in human life is to be rejected as amounting to a violation of human dignity. Second, the mere external action of God would not bring about any permanent change in humans. Divine action may make a particular action good, but it fails to achieve any fundamental alteration within the individuals themselves. Humans would remain as deficient after this external intervention as they were before it, and so a means of grace is to be rejected in favour of an internal change within humans, which is articulated in terms of the habitual gift of gratia gratum faciens .

Aquinas’ s discussion of the same point in De veritate suggests that he is no longer content with this understanding of the nature of habitual grace. No matter how perfect the habit may be, humans are frail enough to need the continual assistance of further divine graces functioning as gratia cooperans – that is, acting on humans who are already in a state of habitual grace. No habit or set of habits is sufficiently efficacious to make human operations truly good, 24 not because of any failing on the part of divine grace, but because of the flawed and fallen capacities of human nature. God alone is capable of perfect action. Aquinas makes it clear that he now regards humans as needing actual grace both before and after their conversion; the internal change wrought within them by the habit of created grace requires further supplementation by external graces. Perhaps Aquinas’ s developing understanding of the divisions of grace reflects his growing awareness of human limitations, which we noted earlier in relation to the human disposition for justification.

The development of the concepts of gratia gratis data and gratia gratum faciens in the later medieval period still remains to be clarified at present, as it is not clear how the precise relationship between the habit of created grace and the extrinsic denomination of the divine acceptation was understood in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. 25 We shall return to this question in connection with the related topic of the formal principle of justification.

We conclude the present section by summarising the classic Thomist understanding of the nature and divisions of grace, as stated in the Summa Theologiae . Grace may be defined according to whether it is actual or habitual , and according to whether it operates upon humans, or co-operates with them. Actual grace, gratia gratis data , may be conceived as a series of transient effluxes of divine power or influence, given over and above the realm of nature, which impinge upon human will in order to incline it or assist it to particular actions. The earlier distinction between prevenient and subsequent grace must therefore be understood to apply only to actual grace. Quite distinct from this is habitual or sanctifying grace, gratia gratum faciens , which takes the form of a permanent habit of the soul, infused into humans by God, and which may be considered to amount to a participation by humanity in the divine being. Although permanent in the individual who has been justified, the habit may be lost by mortal sin, and must be regained in penance. The combination of these categories leads to the formulation of four main categories of grace:

The general teaching of the early Dominican and Franciscan schools is that the immediate or formal cause of justification , and hence of divine acceptation, is the infused habit of grace. This opinion is also characteristic of the schola Aegidiana , the early school within the Augustinian order, as may be illustrated from the position of Thomas of Strasbourg on this matter: ‘ nobody can be formally pleasing to God unless informed by created grace from God’ . 29 The possibility of a purely extrinsic acceptation is rejected on the grounds that a real change must occur in humans if they are to be acceptable to God, and that such a change is effected solely by a created habit of grace. Grace is aliquid creatum in anima , which alone renders humans acceptable to God. The general consensus of the thirteenth century was thus that gratiae infusio was prior to acceptatio divino .

The fourteenth century saw this consensus shattered through the systematic application of the dialectic between the ‘ two powers of God’ and the concept of covenantal causality . We shall consider this theological tool in more detail in Chapter 8 , as it is of major importance in its own right, as well as allowing later medieval writers to argue for the contingency of traditional views on the grounds of justification and merit, while not calling into question their de facto necessity in the order of salvation.

The origins of this critique of the role of supernatural habits in justification is generally regarded as owing its origins to Duns Scotus . 30 The terms acceptatio or acceptio are used by Scotus primarily to refer to the divine acceptation which not merely wills a thing to be, but also accepts it according to the greater good. 31 Scotus argues the ratio iustificationis and ratio meriti are identical, in that they must both be located in the extrinsic denomination of the acceptatio divino. So why is there any necessary involvement of a created habit of grace or charity in either of these processes?

Scotus is quite clear that the established order of salvation requires such a created habit of charity, and sets out a series of arguments justifying this assertion. 32 God has ordained that such a habit of charity is necessary for acceptation and justification. But this necessity arises, not through the nature of divine acceptation itself (ex natura rei ), but merely on account of the laws which God has established through the divine ordained will (ex pacto divino ). By God’ s absolute power, a quite different set of laws might have existed in connection with divine acceptation. While the laws relating to divine acceptation through created habits may be considered to be utterly reliable, they must also be considered to be equally contingent.

Scotus’ s teaching on the secondary and derivative role of the created habit in justification was criticised by Peter Aureole, 33 who is generally regarded as being the most important theologian in the period between Scotus and Ockham . He appears to have been dissatisfied with the Aristotelianism of his period, in that both his psychology and his noetic are fundamentally Augustinian in character. In marked contrast to Scotus, Peter maintains that, for a soul to be accepta Deo , a habit of charity is necessary. In his rejection of Scotus’ s maxim nihil creatum formaliter est a Deo acceptandum , Peter argues that the necessity of the intrinsic denomination of the habit of charity for divine acceptation is itself the consequence of a primordial divine ordination. 34

The fundamental disagreement between Peter and Scotus relates to the question of the causality of the supernatural habit of charity. For Scotus, the causality of the habit in connection with divine acceptation is covenantal , reflecting the divine ordination that such a causality should exist. For Peter, the causality is ex natura rei , itself a consequence of the nature of the created habit of charity and the act of divine acceptation. The nature of the entities implicated in the act dictates that such a causal connection is necessary, independent of any divine ordination concerning it. Once the habit of charity has been infused into the soul of the viator , God is obliged, by the very nature of things, to accept that viator .

Peter’ s idea that a created form in the soul is by its very nature (ex natura rei ) pleasing to God, so that it results in divine acceptation and the bestowal of grace, was rejected by William of Ockham. De potentia absoluta , God may bypass created habits, preparing and accepting the soul to eternal life in the absence of any such habit. God’ s granting eternal life and the beatific vision to an individual is in no way a consequence of or dependent upon the possession of such a created habit. 35 . If a created habit is indeed implicated in divine acceptation, this arises purely ex pacto divino , not ex natura rei . 36 While not questioning the de facto necessity of such habits in justification, Ockham demonstrated their radical contingency, and thus undermined the conceptual foundations upon which the habitus theology had been established in the thirteenth century. Ockham’ s basic position was affirmed by Gabriel Biel , who maintained the de facto necessity of habits in justification, while rejecting their absolute necessity. 37 That habits are implicated in the divine acceptation is a matter of theological contingency, in that nothing that is created may be held to necessarily elicit a specific divine action. 38

The theologians of the schola Aegidiana (i.e., the early school of theology within the Augustinian order, based upon the teaching of Giles of Rome) taught that divine acceptation was contingent upon a created habit of grace (we noted this point earlier in relation to Thomas of Strasbourg. This teaching is maintained by several later theologians of the Augustinian order, such as Johannes von Retz. 39 The schola Augustiniana moderna , however, followed Scotus and the via moderna in teaching the priority of the act of divine acceptation over the possession of created habits. This development is particularly associated with the theologian usually regarded as having established the theological foundations of the schola Augustiniana moderna , Gregory of Rimini , who argued that God was at liberty to bypass intrinsic modes of acceptation altogether. Distinguishing between created and uncreated grace, Gregory argued that the uncreated gift itself (i.e., the Holy Spirit) is sufficient for acceptation without the necessity of any created form or habit. 40

This logico-critical approach to the role of created habits in justification was developed by Hugolino of Orvieto , who is distinguished in other respects as being one of the most conservative anti-Pelagian theologians of the Augustinian order. Like Gregory, Hugolino was concerned to preserve the divine freedom in the justification of humanity, particularly in relation to created habits. With Gregory, Hugolino regarded the formal cause of justification as being the extrinsic denomination of the divine acceptation. 41 If the possession of a habit of charity were the formal cause of justification, Hugolino argues, it would follow that a creature (i.e., the created habit of grace ) would effect what was appropriate to the uncreated grace of the Holy Spirit, which is unthinkable. Hugolino thus assigns a minimal role to created habits in justification, tending to see justification as a direct personal act of God.

Hugolino’ s teaching was developed by his junior in the order, Dionysius of Montina, who lectured on the Sentences at Paris during the academic year 1371– 2. 42 Johannes Klenkok insisted that God could undoubtedly remit sin without the necessity for any created qualities within the soul. 43 A similar conclusion is drawn by Johannes Hiltalingen of Basel, 44 while the position of Angelus Dobelinus is less certain, although he is clearly critical of any underlying rationale for the necessity of created habits in justification. Dobelinus himself clearly attached considerably greater importance to the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit than to created habits. 45 In this, he may be regarded as having been followed by Johannes von Staupitz, who emphasised the priority of gratia increata over gratia creata ; the movement of the soul towards God in justification is effected by none other than the Holy Spirit. Indeed, there are grounds for suspecting that Staupitz may have abandoned the concept of a created habit of grace altogether. 46

This late medieval critique of the role of created habits in justification, with an increased emphasis upon the role of uncreated grace in the person of the Holy Spirit, constitutes the background against which Luther’ s early critique of the role of habits in justification should be seen. 47 Luther argues that the habit required in justification is none other than the Holy Spirit: ‘ habitus adhuc est spiritus sanctus’ . 48 There is every reason to suppose that Luther’ s critique of the role of created habits in justification, and his emphasis upon justification as a personal encounter of the individual with God, reflect a general disquiet concerning the theological foundations of created grace, and a decisive shift away from created grace towards the uncreated grace of the Holy Spirit in the late medieval period.

The question of the nature of the formal, or immediate, cause of justification is of particular significance to the historian of medieval theology, in that it offers a means by which otherwise very similar theological schools of thought may be differentiated. Thus it allows the schola Aegidiana to be distinguished from the schola Augustiniana moderna , as well as from the early and later Franciscan schools. It emerged as an important issue in its own right at the Council of Trent, whose discussion of the question can be understood only in the light of these medieval debates.