Immanuel Kant: Radical Evil and Justification

This judgement is now recognised to be deeply flawed. D’ Alembert’ s judgement about the clergy of Geneva is clearly not supported by the evidence, 3 which suggests a strong degree of intellectual continuity within the Genevan pastorate, with a willingness to engage the new philosophical questions without capitulating to them. Since 2000, there has been a growing realisation that one can speak more widely of a ‘ religious enlightenment’ . 4 In this chapter, we shall consider the impact of the Enlightenment upon the development of the doctrine of justification. We begin by identifying the trends in late seventeenth-century England which appear to lie behind the changes to be documented.

Anti-trinitarianism called into question the politically demarcated boundaries of faith, in order to relocate the source of belief from public authority to the epistemological criteria of individual reason and conscience. 8 These debates over the Trinity can be interpreted as representing a secularising influence; yet they can also be seen as an attempt to accommodate rational concerns within a Christian worldview. 9

A similar relocation of sources and boundaries can be seen taking place in the English discussion of justification over the period 1660– 1730. Earlier, we considered the shifts in thinking on justification which took place in England during the reigns of Charles I and Charles II which could be seen as framing the doctrine of justification in terms of moralism 10 – or as emphasising traditional aspects of that doctrine (such as the inseparable link between the gracious justification of the sinner and the process of renewal and regeneration which led to moral virtue) which were particularly important during an unstable period in English history. Yet the process of dialogue about the formulation and interpretation of the doctrine of justification became entangled with many of the issues linked to the doctrine of the Trinity. Calvin ’ s Trinitarian account of justification 11 indicates how misgivings about the theological framework within which the doctrine of justification is embedded can give rise to reduced accounts of justification – for example, those which reframe justification in terms of the elicitation of a human desire to imitate Christ.

While the main English Deist writers – such as John Toland and Matthew Tindal – had relatively little to say about the doctrine of justification itself, their critiques of traditional Christian ideas were of major significance for the context within which the theological discussion of the justification of humanity was located. The two following points are of particular importance.

While Locke clearly believed that it is possible to create a link between a publicly credible morality and the figure of Jesus Christ, 22 later Deist writers tended to see Christ as someone who endorsed a rational morality which could be established equally well on the basis of unaided reason. Chubb argues that Christianity is essentially the republication of a natural ethic. The essential moral simplicity of Christianity has been compromised by certain unjustifiable theological beliefs – such as the doctrine of imputed righteousness , and the vicarious significance of the death of Christ. 23 The only manner in which Christ could effect the salvation of humans was by summoning them to repentance and conversion. 24 Thus Paul’ s statement that the ‘ blood of Christ takes away sin’ is to be understood in the sense that the moral example of the death of Christ moves sinners to repentance, and hence entails their forgiveness on this account. 25 Christ saves humans ‘ by his working a personal change in them’ , in that this alteration leads to their being accepted by God – not by merit, but by grace.

So how does Chubb understand the notion of ‘ justification’ ? Although critical of traditional Protestant views concerning the framework within which justification is set – such as the ideas of original sin or the imputation of righteousness – Chubb retains the notion of justification as acquittal. ‘ Justification is an Acquitting of the Person under Trial, so that Acquitment is either an Act of Debt or of Grace.’ 26 In the case of a Christian, Chubb argues that justification is clearly an act of divine grace: 27 ‘ The Christian hath no right founded in Innocency to claim an Acquitment, because he is a Transgressor of God’ s Law; and therefore his Acquitment is founded in the merciful Goodness of God, the Lawgiver.’ The Christian’ s realisation of moral guilt evokes a sense of sorrow and remorse, which leads to a desire to forsake sin, and start over again. 28

These views, though originating in England, had a significant impact in the American colonies, as well as in other European contexts, particularly France and Germany. 29 Jonathan Edwards ’ s statements on justification – such as the 1734 sermon ‘ Justification by Faith Alone’ – are probably best understood as critiques of positions which emerged in England during the late seventeenth century. 30 But what of the reception of such ideas in Germany? How did English Deism shape the intellectual, and particularly the theological, contours of the Aufklärung ?

Töllner rejects the first condition as unprovable, and thus denies that Christ’ s active obedience could be of benefit to others. On the basis of this conclusion, Töllner argues that the concept of vicarious satisfaction for sin may be rejected. 37 It is the renewal (Heiligung ) of the individual which leads to pardon or reprieve (Begnadigung ), rather than the satisfaction of Christ. The obedience of Christ is an essentially moral quality, which inspires a corresponding moral quality within humans – upon the basis of which they are forgiven and justified. Those who are justified are morally regenerate individuals, whose justification depends not upon the allegedly ‘ objective’ value of the death of Christ, but upon the subjective moral influence which it exerts upon them.

The individualism that was so characteristic of late eighteenth-century German Enlightenment theology inevitably led to Christianity being seen as a privatised religion, 38 with justification focussing entirely on an individual’ s personal status in the sight of God. Johann Salomo Semler’ s notion of a ‘ private religion’ or a ‘ private faith’ captured something of the spirit of this age, reflecting the conviction that believers had independent access to the basic truths of Christianity, and were not dependent upon the ecclesial mediation of core evangelical themes. Individual Christians thus did not need to see themselves as bound to the doctrinal tradition of the churches, or to necessarily be part of a wider community of belief as a consequence of their ‘ private faith’ .

Many of the representatives of the German Enlightenment had Pietist roots, and appear to have been familiar with the standard Pietist critique of the ‘ als-ob ’ theologies of justification of Protestant (especially Lutheran) orthodoxy – namely, that Orthodoxy articulated a doctrine of justification that was fictitious rather than actual, in that it treated sinners ‘ as if’ they were righteous, and did little to encourage their moral regeneration. For the Pietist, the object of justification was potentially or actually morally regenerate individuals, whose moral regeneration both caused and demonstrated their justification. This emphasis upon the moral dimension of justification, and the rejection of the view that justification entailed a synthetic, rather than an analytic, judgement, was also characteristic of the early Aufklärung . 39 Thus Johann Franz Buddeus makes no reference to the concept of iustificatio impii , and instead insists that it is the regenerate alone who may be justified: ‘ it is certain that there is some change in the person who is justified’ . 40 Buddeus argues that the person who is justified must already possess an inherent quality, or undergo a transformation (mutatio ) that brings about such a quality, which legitimates the divine pronouncement of acceptance: ‘ this change, which occurs through regeneration, is presupposed in justification, so that no one is justified without being renewed’ . 41

These insights were developed further by Gotthilf Samuel Steinbart in his influential System der reinen Philosophie (‘ System of Pure Philosophy’ , 1778). For Steinbart, the divine dispensation towards humanity was totally focussed upon the promotion of ‘ a supremely excellent and complete morality’ , 42 which is personified in Jesus Christ. God demands nothing of humans that is not directly and totally beneficial to them. Steinbart thus insists that God asks nothing of his children other than that which leads immediately to their increased happiness and perfection. 43 Steinbart’ s tendency to employ the term Besserung where Heiligung had traditionally been used serves to emphasise the moral cast of his theology. The essential simplicity of this moral gospel has, however, become obscured, according to Steinbart, partly by cultic and cultural accommodations evident within the biblical text itself, 44 but mainly by the intrusion of ‘ arbitrary hypotheses’ , of which the four most significant are the following: 45

On the basis of his historical research, Steinbart concludes that the origins of these concepts are such as to call their continued use into question. 49 Thus Augustine’ s doctrines of original sin and predestination represent vestiges of his Manichaeism, which should be abandoned in order that the teaching of the Greek fathers and Pelagius might be recognised as representing older and more authentic Christian teaching on the matter. Similarly, Anselm’ s concept of vicarious satisfaction represents a further distortion, based upon Augustinian presuppositions, of the original moral interpretation of Christ’ s death. The concept arises through the union of the Manichaean good and evil principles in one God, so that they constitute a permanent and internally irreconcilable tension which must be resolved from outside the Godhead. No such tension may be found in the teaching of Jesus. 50

What, then, does Steinbart understand to be the objective grounds of justification? Steinbart dismisses questions such as the necessity and significance of Christ’ s passion and death as beyond meaningful discussion, 51 and irrelevant to human happiness and moral perfection. The concept of vicarious satisfaction is both impossible theologically and unnecessary practically. According to Steinbart, Christ redeemed humanity from false understandings of God – such as the idea of God as wrathful, as a tyrant, or as one who imposed arbitrary penalties or conditions upon his creation. 52

This important conclusion finds its expression in the ‘ moral’ or ‘ exemplarist’ interpretation of the death of Christ, characteristic of the theologians of the later Enlightenment . Christ’ s death is here understood as a supreme example or inspiration to humans, motivating and encouraging them to emulate the outstanding moral character of Christ. 53 If Christ may be said to redeem humanity, it is in the restricted sense of ‘ redeeming humankind from false concepts of God’ . Thus Steinbart declares that Christ has redeemed people from the idea of God as a tyrant, and from the idea of Satan, illustrating with some clarity the notion of ‘ redemption’ as ‘ intellectual liberation’ so characteristic of the rationalism of the movement.

By the year 1780, the foundations of the Christian doctrine of justification had been subjected to a penetrating moral and historical criticism by the Enlightenment, leading to reformulations of the concept that were more in line with the bourgeois cultural consensus of this age. Yet the Enlightenment was a complex movement, and it was clear that there was conceptual room for the reconsideration of the doctrine within its ample bounds. We now turn to consider the distinctive contributions of the philosopher Immanuel Kant to the re-establishment of the doctrine of justification.

In his essay of 1793, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone , Kant argues that human morality is dependent upon our ability to transform our underlying attitude or disposition (Gesinnung ) from evil to God. 58 Kant uses a range of terms with a demonstrably theological provenance to refer to this transition from evil to good, most of which can be understood as reframings of the fundamental concept of metanoia . Having defined a ‘ good disposition’ as the intention to work towards the Urbild of moral perfection, Kant argues that God treats those who possess an intention to work towards moral perfection as if they were already in full possession of that perfection . Although he concedes that humans have no right to expect God to treat them in this remarkable manner, he insists that God gratuitously (aus Gnaden ) reckons the Gesinnung as the Urbild . 59 This striking reappearance of an als-ob-Theologie , or ‘ legal fiction’ , so vigorously rejected by Pietism and theologians sympathetic to the Aufklärung , is of considerable interest. As noted earlier, the later Enlightenment had stressed that the bestowal of grace or divine acceptation was contingent upon moral improvement; for Kant, however, grace seems to be implicated at the earliest phase of justification.

The ‘ person who is pleasing to God’ (der wohlgefällige Mensch ) is ‘ pleasing’ only on the basis of a gratuitous act by which God overlooks their deficiencies. As Kant puts this elsewhere, individuals who attempt to be pleasing to God ‘ in so far as it lies within their ability’ (so viel in seinem Vermögen ist ) may rely upon God to ‘ supplement’ (ergänzen ) their deficiencies. 60 The parallels between Kant and the via moderna at this point will be evident, particularly in their shared presupposition that those who do their best (quod in se est – so viel in seinem Vermögen ist ) will become pleasing to, or accepted by, God as an act of grace, rather than of strict justice . While some might be concerned about a possible Pelagianism lying beneath Kant’ s ethical reflections, it is quite possible to argue that he adopts a thoroughly orthodox position. 61

Kant’ s appeal to divine grace at this point clearly sets him apart from Enlightenment Deism , which tended to focus on a purely human volition, even if many allowed that this was informed and perhaps stimulated by the moral example of Christ. Yet perhaps the most significant divergence between Kant and Deism is brought out in his discussion of how God may justify an individual who leads an immoral life but subsequently decides to repent. Kant insists that this is a real possibility – as, indeed, it must be, if the practical possibility of the unconditioned component of the highest good is to be maintained, even in the weakest of senses. However, Kant notes a difficulty raised by this possibility: individuals who alter their evil disposition to the good are nevertheless the same individuals who formerly committed evil acts, and as a result are burdened with the guilt associated with that evil. How can God justify such individuals? 62

Although Kant elsewhere rejects the notion of vicarious satisfaction (stellvertretende Genugthuung ), holding that guilt, like merit, is strictly non-transferable, he appears to invoke precisely such a notion as a solution to this difficulty. 63 The individual who turns away from their evil disposition to embrace a good disposition may be regarded as having become a morally different person. The discontinuity between the old and the new disposition is such that Kant denies that they may be predicated on the same moral individual. This conclusion appears to rest upon the assumption that the disposition itself is the only acceptable basis of establishing the identity of the moral agent. This new disposition ‘ takes the place’ (vertritt ) of the old in respect of the guilt which is rightly attached to the latter disposition. It is on account of the new disposition that the former guilt of humans is cancelled, and that they are justified before God.

Kant thus distinguishes between a process of moral transformation and the event of justification, understood as the imputing to us of a goodness as if we were already in full possession of it. 64 On the basis of these assumptions, Kant asserts that those who attempt to be pleasing to God may rest assured of the truth expressed by the doctrine of reconciliation, which represents their former sins as abolished (abgetan ). 65 Kant thus interprets the doctrine of reconciliation to mean that individuals who determine to keep the moral law, whatever their previous history may have been, have the right to hope that their moral past may be abolished, and present moral deficiencies supplemented, through divine grace. This does not, Kant argues, lead to moral laxity or presumption 66 – using, it may be added, arguments that bear a striking resemblance to those used by Protestant theologians to reject the idea that gratuitous justification absolves believers from any obligation to grow in holiness.