Retrieving the Objective Aspects of Justification: Albrecht Ritschl
28
The Long Nineteenth Century
◈
Retrieval and Reconfiguration
The term ‘
Long Nineteenth Century’
is widely used to refer to the period between the French Revolution of 1789 and the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, framing a significant –
and, to some extent, self-contained –
period in intellectual and cultural history. Although this period was until recently regarded as period of progressive secularisation, there is increasing evidence that the period is better seen as one of significant and sustained intellectual engagement with the Christian tradition, even if this is often articulated in ways which diverge from what had generally been accepted as orthodox up to that point.
1
In the case of the doctrine of justification, this sustained engagement between an intellectual culture concerned with ‘
reasonableness’
and Christian theology was largely confined to Protestantism. The phenomenon of ‘
Catholic Modernism’
may have emerged in the late nineteenth century; it is arguable that it had limited impact within Catholic theological circles until after the First World War.
2
The theological concerns of Protestantism during the ‘
Long Nineteenth Century’
were as extensive as they were significant, ranging from growing realisation of the dogmatic significance of biblical criticism to an increasing awareness of the theological issues raised by Charles Darwin’
s theory of natural selection. These theological preoccupations do not in themselves, however, account for the growing disengagement with the concept of justification within Protestantism throughout this period, perhaps reflecting a sense that the most important issues confronting
Christian theology during this period lay elsewhere. It is easy, of course, to offer a counter-narrative to this position, pointing out that many individual theologians of this period do engage this topic; the point being made, however, is comparative
–
the extent of engagement is clearly significantly lower than that observed, for example, on the eve of the Enlightenment
.
3
A good example of a theologian who engages this topic in some detail in this period is John Henry Newman
, to be considered later in this chapter. Yet Newman’
s concern in his Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification
(1837) was not to respond to rationalist criticisms of this doctrine or its intellectual substructure, but to construct a defensible Anglican via media
between what he then considered to be the deficiencies of Catholicism and Protestantism. Towards the end of the period under consideration, Martin Kähler
advocated the centrality of the doctrine of justification by faith, declaring that it was the fundamental article of the Christian faith, a focal point on which all lines of theological reflection could converge.
4
In this chapter, we shall consider three representative engagements with the doctrine of justification from this period, and note some of the trends that they represent.
A Turn to the Subjective: F. D. E. Schleiermache
r
The late eighteenth century witnessed a reaction against some aspects of the rationalism of the Enlightenment, most notably its suppression of the human imagination, and its perceived inattentiveness towards human feelings and emotions.
5
The rise of Romanticism is generally considered to reflect a number of concerns, including the rise of the Industrial Revolution, the ‘
disenchantment’
of nature through the rationalisation of scientific investigation, and a perception that reason offered only limited access to the complexities of the world and human existence.
6
However, the breadth and diversity of the movement makes it difficult to generalise about its origins or distinctive features. The movement secured a presence in Berlin, particularly through the Schlegel brothers. Although Schleiermacher is not best regarded as a Romantic, it is clear that the new significance which the movement attached to human ‘
feeling’
(das Gefühl
) allowed him to develop an account of Christian faith which moved beyond portraying it purely as offering a rational account of the world, or a moral framework within which to live. For Schleiermacher, the fundamental basis (Grundtatsache
) of Christian theology is the existence of the individual’
s faith or ‘
piety’
(Frömmigkeit
). It is the task of theology to give an account of the content of this piety, rather than to establish it in the first place.
7
This emphasis on ‘
piety’
allows us to understand why Schleiermacher designated himself as a ‘
Pietist of a higher order.’
The essence of ‘
piety’
, which Schleiermacher holds to be the irreducible element in every religion, is not some rational or moral principle, but the immediate self-consciousness. Christian doctrines are to be seen as formal accounts or representations of Christian religious feelings.
8
Schleiermacher constructs his dogmatic system upon the fact of redemption in Christ, and particularly the ‘
feeling of absolute dependence’
. Schleiermacher argues that the origins of this piety are to be accounted for soteriologically, in terms of the impact of Christ upon the collective consciousness of the Christian community.
9
Even from this brief account of Schleiermacher’
s approach, it will be clear that he diverges significantly from the reason-based approach of the Enlightenment
, offering instead a religious account of Christianity. Schleiermacher attributes to Christ an ‘
absolutely powerful God-consciousness’
(schlechthin kräftiges Gottesbewußtsein
), charged with such assimilative power that it is able to effect the redemption of humankind.
10
The essence of redemption is that the God-consciousness already present in human nature, although feeble and repressed, becomes stimulated and elevated through the ‘
entrance of the living influence of Christ’
.
11
As the redeemer (Erlöser
), Christ is distinguished from all other humans both in degree and in kind by the uninterrupted power of his God-consciousness. The redemptive activity of Christ consists in his
assuming individuals into the power of his God-consciousness. On this basis, Schleiermacher criticises the soteriologies of both the Aufklärung
and Protestant orthodoxy.
For Schleiermacher, the Aufklärer
treated Christ solely as a prophet, regarding him primarily as the teacher of an idea
of God, or the exemplar of a religious or moral principle. This view –
which Schleiermacher designates an ‘
empirical’
understanding of the work of Christ –
‘
attributes a redemptive activity on the part of Christ, but one which is held to consist only in bringing about an increasing perfection in us, and which cannot take place other than by teaching and example’
.
12
If this account of the significance of Christ is correct, Schleiermacher argues that redemption in the proper sense of the term becomes an impossibility. The orthodox understanding of the work of Christ –
which Schleiermacher designates as ‘
magical’
–
attributes to Christ a purely objective transaction which is ‘
not mediated by anything natural’
.
13
For Schleiermacher, divine causality operates through natural means, so that the assimilative power of Christ’
s dominant God-consciousness is mediated to humanity through natural channels.
Having considered how the individual believer enters into fellowship with Christ, Schleiermacher moves on to consider how this expresses itself in the life of the believer. Although Schleiermacher tends to use the term ‘
redemption (Erlösung
)’
in his discussion of the transformation of humanity, he uses the term ‘
justification’
to refer to a specific aspect of this transition, which is predicated on ‘
the assumption of a turning point, at which the continuity of the old has ceased and the continuity of the new has begun the process of becoming (zu werden begann
)’
which leads to the believer being assumed into a communion of life with Christ.
14
This process has two aspects. First, considered in terms of the change it brings about in the relationship of the believer to God, it is the ‘
justification (Rechtfertigung
)’
of the believer; considered in terms of the changed form of life (veränderte Lebensform
) it brings about, it is the ‘
conversion (Bekehrung
)’
of the believer.
15
At this point, a significant theological continuity can be seen between Schleiermacher and Pietism, in that both hold that justification is contingent upon a real change in believers.
16
Justification presupposes something in respect of which a person is justified; and since no error is possible for the Supreme Being, it must be assumed that something has happened to an individual between the former and present state, by which the divine displeasure has been removed and without which the individual could not have become the object of divine favour.
This clearly raises a question similar to that posed by Calvin
concerning the relation of justification and sanctification. Are these different aspects of the same process, as with Calvin, or different processes? Schleiermacher
insists that his own understanding of ‘
justification’
is substantially the same as that which is found in the foundational confessional documents of Protestantism. In what many will consider to be a misreading of Catholicism, Schleiermacher asserts that it has a quite distinct approach, in effect making justification dependent upon sanctification.
17
Like leading Enlightenment
theologians such as Töllner and Steinbart on the one hand, and Pietist writers on the other, Schleiermacher insists that justification is contingent upon a prior alteration within humans. The point at which Schleiermacher diverges from the Enlightenment is his understanding of the nature of this change. For the Enlightenment, this was to be conceived morally (Besserung
, rather than Heiligung
). For Schleiermacher, the critical alteration on which divine acceptance was dependent was to be conceived religiously
as ‘
laying hold of Christ in a believing manner’
(Christum gläubig ergreifen
).
18
Schleiermacher clearly saw himself as reframing the traditional Protestant understanding of justification in a way that preserved its theological integrity, while connecting with the changed cultural situation of his age. Others, however, saw things rather differently. Karl Barth
, for example, levelled three charges against Schleiermacher’
s doctrine of justification in his 1923–
4 lectures on Schleiermacher’
s theology: first that justification is not a free act of God grounded in the divine will; second, that justification is conceived as a process which takes place according to the ‘
law of nature’
, in which God and the human being alike actively participate; and third, that justification takes the form of an infusion of righteousness.
19
Although each of these charges can be parried, if not entirely refuted, Barth’
s comments highlight the importance of retaining active continuity with the Protestant tradition in the process of theologising.
Despite Barth’
s concerns, it is clear that Schleiermacher’
s approach to justification is firmly rooted in the sixteenth century on the one hand yet accommodated to the methodological concerns and cultural outlook of the early nineteenth century on the other. We now turn to consider an English discussion of justification which is chronologically located in the early nineteenth century, but theologically represents a reversion to the agenda of the seventeenth century in order to engage a nineteenth-century ecclesiological question –
namely, to defend his view of ‘
what has often been considered to be the characteristic position of the Anglican church, as lying in a supposed Via Media
, admitting much and excluding much both of Roman and of Protestant teaching’
.
20
Justification and Ecclesiology: John Henry Newma
n
Justification was not a matter of great controversy in England during the early nineteenth century –
not because the issues separating High Churchmen and Evangelicals within the Church of England had been resolved, but mainly because the issues separating the diverging schools of thought were well understood, so that a sense of theological laissez-faire
had descended on the Church of England at this point. Indeed, both parties to the debate emphasised the need for personal holiness as a result of justification, showing a remarkable convergence in their respective teachings on piety.
This relative calm came to an end with the publication (1834–
7) of the Remains
of the lay theologian Alexander Knox
, which included his 1810 essay ‘
On Justification’
,
21
arguing that the Church of England, far from teaching a doctrine of forensic
justification in its Homilies and Articles, was actually committed to a doctrine of moral
justification. ‘
In the judgement of the Church of England justification by faith contains in it the vitalisation which vera et viva fides
(true and lively faith) produces in the subject; as well as the reputation of righteousness, which follows coram Deo
(before God).’
22
Noting Cranmer’
s frequent references to patristic writers in the Homily of Salvation
, and the failure of the church historian Joseph Milner to demonstrate that such writers taught a forensic doctrine of justification
, Knox suggested that the patristic consensus favoured a doctrine of moral justification, and urged that justification
should not be accepted as a purely forensic without any moral implications.
In 1837, John Henry Newman delivered a series of lectures in the Adam de Brome chapel of the University Church of St Mary the Virgin, Oxford, on the theme of justification.
23
The lectures are of significance in a number of respects. In them, Newman defined what he took to be a via media
understanding of justification, which allowed an authentically Anglican
concept of justification to be defended in the face of the distortions of both Protestantism and Roman Catholicism. Newman thus declared his intention to ‘
build up a system of theology out of the Anglican divines’
and indicated that the lectures were a ‘
tentative inquiry’
towards that end.
These lectures belong to a cluster of writings, including The Arians of the Fourth Century
(1833) and Lectures on the Prophetical Office of the Church
(1837), in which Newman develops a historical analysis of the history of doctrine as a means of clarifying and defending the distinctive position of the Church of England. Newman’
s concern is ultimately ecclesiological, even if his tool of inquiry is historico-critical. Newman generally proceeds by identifying theological voices of the past whom he considers to be objectionable –
such as Arius and Luther –
and mapping these onto contemporary Anglican currents of thought in a way which modern scholarship has criticised as a mixture of ‘
complacent bigotry and historical fantasy’
, an ‘
eccentric, superficial and prejudiced’
approach which has little value in serious historical reflection.
24
Unfortunately, this also proves to be the case with Newman’
s reflections on the doctrine of justification in relation to Anglican identity.
Newman’
s lectures had a clear polemic agenda, which inevitably took priority over its more constructive proposal to determine the theological possibilities of a via media
.
25
For Newman, the essential preliminary step to this constructive task was the neutralisation of Evangelicalism’
s core doctrine –
namely, the doctrine of justification by faith –
which was to be traced back to Martin Luther
.
26
Newman’
s lectures set out to demonstrate the inadequacy of Luther’
s doctrine, seeing this as an indirect but effective way of challenging contemporary evangelicalism within the Church of England. Newman’
s theology of justification rests primarily
upon a historical analysis of the doctrines of justification associated with Luther (and to a much lesser extent, with Melanchthon
), with Roman Catholic theologians such as Bellarmine and Vásquez, and with the Caroline Divines
. As with his earlier account of Arius, Newman’
s historico-theological analysis of episodes in the history of the doctrine of justification is eccentric and prejudiced, incapable of serving any serious ecclesiological function.
27
Newman’
s positive formulation of the doctrine of justification focusses upon the real presence of the Trinity within the soul of the justified believer, conceived in broadly realist terms which undoubtedly reflect his interest in and positive evaluation of Greek patristic writers, such as Athanasius.
28
‘
This
is to be justified, to receive the Divine Presence within us, and be made a Temple of the Holy Ghost.’
29
Justification thus refers to a present reality, the ‘
indwelling in us of God the Father and the Word Incarnate through the Holy Ghost’
.
30
Although this divine presence is to be understood in Trinitarian terms, Newman makes it clear that it is most appropriately conceived as the presence of Christ himself. ‘
If to justify be to impart a certain inward token of our personal redemption, and if the presence of God within us is such a token, our justification must consist in God’
s coming to us and dwelling in us.’
31
This real presence of the Trinity within the soul of the believer has certain consequences, which Newman identifies as being counted righteous
and being made righteous
. Both justification and sanctification are bestowed simultaneously with the gift of the divine presence within the souls of the justified. In other words, Newman understands the primary and fundamental sense of the term ‘
justification’
to be the indwelling of the Trinity within the soul of believers, which has as its necessary consequence those aspects of their conversion which are traditionally (although Newman feels inappropriately
) termed ‘
justification’
(that is, being counted as righteous) and ‘
sanctification’
(that is, being made
righteous).
32
This is made clear in what is probably the most important passage in the Lectures
:
33
We now may see what the connection really is between justification and renewal. They are both included in that one great gift of God, the indwelling of Christ in the Christian soul. That dwelling is ipso facto
our sanctification and justification, as its necessary results. It is the divine presence which justifies us, not faith, as say the Protestant schools, not renewal, as say the Roman. The word of justification is the substantive and living Word of God, entering the soul, illuminating and cleansing it, as fire brightens and purifies material substances. He who justifies also sanctifies, because it is He. The first blessing runs into the second as its necessary limit; and the second being rejected, carries away with it the first. And the one cannot be separated from the other except in idea, unless the sun’
s rays can be separated from the sun, or the power of purifying from fire or water.
Justification is therefore notionally distinct
from sanctification, although inseparable from it, in that they are both aspects of one and the same thing –
the indwelling of the Holy Trinity within the soul of the believer. This distinction between justification and renewal allows Newman to maintain a proleptic relation between them: ‘
Justification is at first what renewal could but be at last; and therefore is by no means a mere result or consequence of renewal, but a real, though not a separate act of God’
s mercy.’
34
The distinction between justification and sanctification is thus ‘
purely mental’
,
35
relating to the single act of divine mercy, and does not necessitate the division of that act itself.
Although Newman seems unaware of this, his analysis here parallels that of John Calvin
. Both affirm the need to distinguish, but not separate, justification and sanctification. In place of Calvin’
s Christological emphasis on the union of Christ with the believer and its twofold outcome, set within a Trinitarian context,
36
Newman works within an explicitly Trinitarian framework. As recent studies have shown, Calvin was not read extensively by English evangelicals around this time,
37
partly for political reasons, and Newman’
s failure to include reference to Calvin
in his lectures probably reflects this lack of interest.
In his tenth lecture, Newman turns his attention to the vexed question of the precise role of faith in justification. Newman rejects a purely fiduciary interpretation of faith as excluding other Christian virtues, such as love or obedience. While Newman would not go so far as to state ‘
that there is no such thing as a trusting in Christ’
s mercy for salvation, and a comfort resulting from it’
,
38
he insists that this is inadequate to characterise true Christian faith. The evil and good alike can trust in God’
s mercy, whereas the good and the evil are distinguished on account of the former’
s charity, love and obedience. The Protestant understanding of faith, as Newman perceives it, is thus not so much wrong, as incomplete.
39
Following some later Caroline divines such as Jeremy Taylor
, Newman argues that faith and works must both be said to justify, although in different manners.
40
Thus the fact that all acknowledge that it is Christ who justifies does not prevent the simultaneous assertion that faith justifies, nor does the fact that faith justifies exclude works from justifying:
41
It seems then, that whereas faith on our part fitly corresponds, or is the correlative, as it is called, to grace on God’
s part, sacraments are but the manifestation of grace, and good works are but the manifestation of faith; so that, whether we say we are justified by faith, or by works or by sacraments, all these but mean this one doctrine, that we are justified by grace, which is given through sacraments, impetrated by faith, manifested in works.
In his Lectures on Justification
, Newman develops his own position in debate with the Caroline Divines
, Catholicism and Luther. Newman’
s historical analysis of the doctrine of justification leads him to the conclusion that Anglicanism represents an ecclesiological via media
between the Protestant notion of justification by imputed righteousness
, and the Catholic notion of justification by imparted righteousness. By holding that justification involves both imputed and imparted righteousness, Newman appears to believe he has resolved a theological conundrum by retrieving a position adopted by leading Anglican divines of the seventeenth century.
Yet Newman’
s use of the later Caroline divines to determine what constitutes an authentically Anglican doctrine of justification is deeply problematic, and seems to rest more on Newman’
s personal intuitions
and predilections rather than rigorous historical analysis. The theology of justification of the post-Restoration divines, such as George Bull
and Jeremy Taylor
, by no means represents a unanimous or even the majority
opinion within contemporary Anglicanism. Yet Newman appears to suggest that this theology of justification is characteristic of Anglicanism, and may be taken to define the via media
between Protestant and Roman Catholic. Although he uses several formulations of the issue, Newman holds that Protestants taught that humanity was justified on account of faith, where Roman Catholics taught that humans were justified on account of their renewal –
and therefore that the via media
consisted in the affirmation that humans are justified on account of both faith and renewal. This view broadly corresponds with that of the ‘
holy living’
school within later Caroline divinity,
42
which Newman appears to believe establishes the distinctively ‘
Anglican’
character of this mediating doctrine. However, the discontinuity within Anglicanism over the period 1550–
1700 on precisely this point is sufficient to negate any attempt to characterise such a position as ‘
Anglican’
.
Newman’
s superficial engagement with Roman Catholic theologies of justification cannot be allowed to pass without comment. Newman nowhere attempts a detailed analysis of the teaching of Bellarmine and Vásquez, forcing us to base our tentative conclusions upon the few passing statements made in the Lectures
concerning Roman Catholicism in general. As noted above, Newman clearly believes the Roman Catholic teaching to be that humans are justified on account of their renewal. Like many contemporary Evangelicals, Newman appears to have assumed that the notion of factitive justification implies that the analytic divine verdict of justification is based upon the inherent righteousness of the individual, achieved through moral renewal –
whereas the reference is, of course, to the impartation of divine
righteousness which is the cause
of subsequent moral renewal, and is not identical with that renewal itself. The evidence contained within the body of the Lectures
suggests (though it is not conclusive) that Newman did not entirely understand the Tridentine doctrine of justification
.
So what of Newman’
s critique of Luther?
43
It is clear Newman has a very limited understanding of Luther, offering some criticisms of Luther that are impossible to sustain, save by special pleading.
44
[Luther] found Christians in bondage to their works and observances; he released them by his doctrine of faith; and he left them in bondage to their feelings. He weaned them from seeking assurance of salvation in standing ordinances, at the cost of teaching them that a personal consciousness of it was promised to every one who believed. For outward signs he substituted inward; for reverence towards the church contemplation of self.
None of these criticisms stand up to scholarly examination.
45
As contemporary English critics of Newman pointed out, this distorted view of Luther was ultimately an extrapolation of the ideas of an English ‘
Evangelical School’
of thought onto this theological icon.
46
Newman must, however, be set within his historical context. The full scholarly edition of Luther’
s works was begun in 1883, in celebration of the 400th anniversary of Luther’
s birth. Neither Newman nor his contemporaries could have hoped to have access to the full range of Luther’
s writings in their original language. In one sense, the modern study of Luther dates from after the First World War, when it became possible to engage with the primary sources in a level of detail which had hitherto been impossible. Furthermore, a number of the English translations of Luther which would have been familiar to Newman were inaccurate and unreliable.
It is clear that Newman is viewing Luther through the lens of the evangelicalism that he knew within the Church of England during the 1830s, and thus generally offers an indirect critique of the prevailing Evangelical image of Luther, rather than a direct critique of the views of Luther himself. Recent scholarship has highlighted the highly polemical way in which Luther and other Reformational writers were read in the Victorian age, which fuelled misreadings and misrepresentations of these writers.
47
Nevertheless, Newman explicitly identifies Luther himself, rather than an evangelical portrayal of Luther, as the object of his criticisms.
Newman argues that Luther’
s fundamental belief is that the righteousness of Christ is imputed to believers through faith. This would suggest that Luther sees justification in abstract terms, expressed as the imputation of impersonal qualities or benefits of Christ to the believer rather than personal transformation through the indwelling of Christ. While it is entirely proper to suggest that some such criticism may be directed against some of Luther’
s later followers, such as Philip Melanchthon
,
Luther himself cannot fairly be critiqued at this juncture. In setting out this criticism, Newman draws heavily (yet somewhat selectively) upon the 1535 Galatians commentary. Yet that same commentary contains substantial sections dealing with the manner in which faith achieves a personal and living relationship between the believer and Christ. ‘
The Christ who is grasped by faith and lives in the heart is the true Christian righteousness, on account of which God counts us righteous, and grants us eternal life.’
48
It is quite clear that Luther understands faith, here and elsewhere, not purely as ‘
fiduciary assent’
or ‘
trust’
,
49
but as the means by which a real, personal and living relationship is established between Christ and the believer. Luther’
s strongly personalist understanding of the relation of Christ and the believer is particularly clearly set out in the 1520 work The Freedom of a Christian
,
50
which clearly asserts that faith is more than cognitive assent or trust: ‘
Faith does not merely mean that the soul realizes that the divine word is full of all grace, free and holy; it also unites the soul with Christ, as a bride is united with her bridegroom.’
Newman’
s presentation of Luther is also puzzling for another reason –
namely, the extent to which Newman cites doctored passages from Luther omitting sections that significantly qualify Newman’
s interpretations of the passages in question.
51
The most serious case of such misrepresentation demands particular attention. As noted earlier, Newman’
s view on justification is that faith and works both justify, although in different manners.
52
It seems, then, that whereas faith on our part fitly corresponds, or is the correlative, as it is called, to grace on God’
s part, sacraments are but the manifestation of grace, and good works are but the manifestation of faith; so that, whether we say we are justified by faith, or by works or sacraments, all these but mean this one doctrine, that we are justified by grace, which is given through sacraments, impetrated by faith, manifested in works.
This view is to be contrasted with what Newman understands to be Luther’
s view, which is that faith (understood as trust) alone justifies.
In a remarkable section, Newman then asserts that Luther is obliged to confirm Newman’
s view, ‘
not willingly …
but in consequence of the stress of texts urged against him’
. This frankly rather patronising
statement is followed by a citation from Luther’
s 1535 Galatians commentary, as follows:
53
‘
It is usual with us’
, he says, ‘
to view faith, sometimes apart from its work, sometimes with it. For as an artist speaks variously of his materials, and a gardener of a tree, as in bearing or not, so also the Holy Ghost speaks variously in Scripture concerning faith; at one time of what may be called abstract faith, faith as such: at another of concrete faith, faith in composition, or embodied. Faith, as such, or abstract, is meant, when Scripture speaks of justification, as such, or of the justified. (Vid. Rom. and Gal.). But when it speaks of rewards and works, then it speaks of faith in composition, concrete or embodied. For instance: “
Faith which worketh by love”
; “
This do, and thou shalt live”
; “
If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments”
; “
Whoso doeth these things, shall live in them”
; “
Cease to do evil, learn to do well”
. In these and similar texts, which occur without number, in which mention is made of doing, believing doings are always meant; as, when it says, “
This do, and thou shalt live”
, it means, “
First see that thou art believing, that thy reason is right and thy will good, that thou hast faith in Christ; that being secured, work”
.’
Then he proceeds: –
‘
How is it wonderful, that to that embodied faith, that is, faith working as was Abel’
s, in other words to believing works, are annexed merits and rewards? Why should not Scripture speak thus variously of faith, considering it so speaks even of Christ, God and man; sometimes of his entire person, sometimes of one or other of his two natures, the divine or human? When it speaks of one or other of these, it speaks of Christ in the abstract; when of the divine made one with the human in one person, of Christ as if in composition and incarnate. There is a well-known rule in the Schools concerning the “
communicatio idiomatum”
, when the attributes of his divinity are ascribed to his humanity, as is frequent in Scripture; for instance, in Luke ii the angel calls the infant born of the Virgin Mary “
the Saviour”
of men, and “
the Lord”
both of angels and men, and in the preceding chapter
, “
the Son of God”
. Hence I may say with literal truth, That infant who is lying in a manger and in the Virgin’
s bosom, created heaven and earth, and is the Lord of angels …
As it is truly said, Jesus the Son of Mary created all things, so is justification ascribed to faith incarnate or to believing deeds.’
This passage, as cited, clearly indicates that Luther concedes, on the basis of biblical texts, that justification is to be ascribed to ‘
believing deeds’
–
an excellent summary of Newman’
s own position, as well as that of certain earlier Anglican divines, including George Bull
. Luther’
s doctrine of justification by faith alone
is thus to be set aside as irreconcilable with Scripture on the one hand, and with Luther’
s own words on the other. Yet although Newman cites Luther extensively without any omissions, he suddenly introduces an ellipsis, just before the end, in the form of three periods (…
). Most scholars use this device, generally to save weary readers from having to wrestle with textual material which is not
totally germane to the issue under discussion. Yet it is unclear why verbal economy is required at this point, given the extensive nature of the citation up to this point.
To anyone familiar with Luther, however, this line of argumentation is suspicious, being quite out of line with what Luther consistently maintains throughout his extensive body of writings. I must therefore point out that the omitted portion is not a sentence or two, but a block of material
which qualifies the meaning of Luther’
s final sentence in such a way as to exclude Newman’
s interpretation of it. In what follows, we shall pick up Newman’
s citation at the penultimate sentence, and insert the omitted material, before proceeding to the final sentence. For the sake of clarity, the material which Newman did include has been printed in italics:
Hence I may say with literal truth, That infant who is lying in a manger and in the Virgin’s bosom, created heaven and earth, and is the Lord of angels
. I am indeed speaking about a man here. But ‘
man’
in this proposition is obviously a new term, and, as the sophists say, stands for the divinity; that is, this God who became man created all things. Here creation is attributed to the divinity alone, since the humanity does not create. Nevertheless, it is correct to say that ‘
the man created’
, because the divinity, which alone creates, is incarnate with the humanity, and therefore the humanity participates in the attributes of both predicates. [A list of biblical passages relating to this point follows.] Therefore the meaning of the passage ‘
do this and you will live’
is ‘
you will live on account of this faithful doing; this doing will give you life solely on account of faith. Thus justification belongs to faith alone, just as creation belongs to the divinity. As it is truly said, Jesus the Son of Mary created all things, so is justification ascribed to faith incarnate or to believing deeds
’
.
Throughout this analysis, we find Luther insisting that ‘
faith alone justifies and does everything’
; works are implicated only in a derivative manner. The significant omitted section unequivocally qualifies the final quoted sentence so that its only meaning can be that ‘
faith alone justifies’
.
So did Newman himself deliberately and knowingly omit this critical section of the passage, or did he encounter the passage in this mutilated form, unaware of the significance of the excision? Given Newman’
s context, the latter option is much more probable. Newman may simply have copied the passage in this distorted version from another source.
54
Evidence supportive of this suggestion can be found in the generally inaccurate citations which he provides from Luther, which suggest
borrowing from secondary sources rather than an engagement with the original.
Newman is an interesting and important witness to the iconic position of Luther and the totemic role played by the doctrine of justification by faith alone
within evangelical circles in the Church of England at this time. However, his assessment of Luther’
s doctrine of justification is of historical interest only, in that it casts light on how Luther was then viewed within certain circles in England. Newman’
s positive exposition of his doctrine of justification remains of interest, not least on account of its obvious –
though partial –
affinities with Reformed understandings of the correlation of justification and sanctification through the believer’
s union with Christ.
Now that the polemical theological polarisation of the early Victorian age is behind us, it is possible to retrieve what is good and useful in Newman’
s theology of justification, and even to appreciate its important resonances with the approach of Calvin
and the Reformed tradition.
55
Newman’
s criticism of Luther is best seen as a witness to popular (mis)understandings of Luther rather than a serious attempt to understand and assess his ideas. Yet Newman’
s theology of justification itself remains interesting and generative, not least on account of the explicit link Newman proposes between justification and incarnation as part of the overall trajectory of the enactment of divine grace. Perhaps its most succinct statement is not to be found in his lectures on justification, but in a stanza of his most famous hymn, written some three decades later:
56
And that a higher gift than grace,
Should flesh and blood refine;
God
’
s presence and his very self,
And essence all-divine.
Retrieving the Objective Aspects of Justification: Albrecht Ritsch
l
Although Schleiermacher
’
s soteriology was subjected to considerable criticism from both more radical and conservative theological traditions during the period 1820–
70, his approach gained support from many in Berlin who were drawn by its connections with both the subjectivities of
human experience and the values of the Enlightenment
.
57
Yet although Schleiermacher achieved some success in demonstrating that a purely rationalist or moralist account of the justification of humanity before God was religiously deficient, he made little attempt to defend, still less reintroduce, the notion of an objective dimension to the doctrine of justification. Justification was still seen essentially in terms of human transformation –
an approach that resonated with both Pietism and certain streams of the Enlightenment.
In part, this may reflect the growing sense that these aspects of justification had been irretrievably displaced through historical and cultural progress. We have already noted how the German Enlightenment turned to history in order to close down certain traditional theological approaches, and open up new ones. Yet a deeper ‘
turn to history’
can be discerned within German theology around this time, which has no direct parallel in the English-speaking world. In his influential study of the development of the doctrine of reconciliation, published in 1838, Ferdinand Christian Baur
asserted, on the basis of a Hegelian understanding of the nature of historical development,
58
that an element of this doctrine, once eliminated, could no longer be restored. Baur’
s Hegelian view of history led him to suggest that objective soteriological concepts had now been permanently eliminated from the doctrine of reconciliation. As most of Baur’
s contemporaries were sympathetic to his Hegelian presuppositions, and thus to his views on the implications of the historical development of the doctrine of reconciliation, it seemed that the objective elements of the doctrine rejected by the Aufklärung
were to be regarded as irretrievably lost.
The use of Hegelian speculative categories was widespread within theological circles, and is particularly evident in the first work of one of Baur’
s most promising pupils: Albrecht Ritschl
’
s Die Entstehung des altkatholischen Kirche
(1850). Yet a growing scepticism about Hegelianism, which became particularly marked in the fifth decade of the nineteenth century, led to a weakened commitment to a Hegelian understanding of the nature of historical development. The consequences of this can be seen from the second edition of Ritschl’
s Entstehung
(1857), in which a break with both Baur and Hegelianism is
evident.
59
More significant, from the standpoint of the present study, was Ritschl’
s decision to reinvestigate the development of the Christian doctrine of justification without the restrictions of the Hegelian interpretative framework imposed upon it by Baur.
60
As a confessional Lutheran, Ritschl clearly considered it important to explore this landmark doctrine, and consider how it might be reaffirmed.
61
Ritschl’
s interpretation of Luther is important in its own right. Although Ritschl rightly discerned the central role of the doctrine of justification in Luther’
s thought, and sought to restore this emphasis in his own theological presentation, his interpretation of Luther is significantly skewed by his theological and cultural precommitments. Ritschl uses Luther selectively and creatively, offering a ‘
modernised’
account of Luther which is more concerned with using Luther as a corrective to recent Protestant distortions of his ideas –
as seen, for example, in Lutheran Orthodoxy or Pietism –
than in a careful historical examination of his writings.
62
After a series of preparatory articles in Jahrbuch für deutsche Theologie
, the first volume of Ritschl’
s Christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung
(‘
Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation’
) was published in 1870.
63
The three volumes dealt with the historical development of the doctrine, the biblical foundations of the doctrine, and the positive statement of the doctrine. The full importance of this historical analysis in consolidating the doctrine of justification has not been fully appreciated. In this work, Ritschl was able to demonstrate that, contrary to Baur
’
s axiom, elements eliminated from the doctrine of reconciliation by one generation had subsequently been reappropriated by another. Having shown that Baur’
s a priori imposition of the speculative and unempirical categories of Hegel’
s philosophy of history was incapable of accounting for the objectively given historical data pertaining to the progression of the doctrine of reconciliation, Ritschl was able to move towards the positive restatement of the doctrine through the reappropriation of objective
soteriological concepts (such as sin) without being impeded by the constraints imposed upon such a restatement by Baur’
s understanding of the nature of historical development. It is this positive
restatement, amounting to a critical retrieval of the doctrine,
64
which forms the subject of the third volume of his Christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung
.
Ritschl’
s definition of justification is of significance, in that it represents the reintroduction of objective concepts into the systematic discussion of the doctrine. ‘
Justification, or the forgiveness of sins (as the religious operation of God upon people, fundamental within Christianity), is the acceptance of sinners into that fellowship with God within which their salvation will be effected and developed into eternal life.’
65
Ritschl’
s explicit identification of justification and the remission of sins indicates his concern to retain an objective dimension to justification, and represents a critical reappropriation of certain aspects of the concept associated with the Reformation in general, and Luther in particular.
66
For Ritschl, sin separates humans from God, effecting the withdrawal of God’
s presence from the sinner; justification is the divine operation through which the sinner is restored to fellowship with God. The objective dimension of justification is therefore prior to, although inseparable from, the subjective consciousness of divine forgiveness.
67
Ritschl thus criticises an earlier generation of Lutheran theologians for their excessive objectivism, which led to justification becoming divorced from personal experience and practice.
68
Yet Ritschl also criticises the view associated with theologians sympathetic to the Enlightenment
–
that moral regeneration is a condition for entering into a real relationship with God. For Ritschl, this amounts to the subversion of the central and fundamental presupposition of Christianity –
namely, that God justifies sinners
. Ritschl stresses that justification (Rechtfertigung
), which is concerned with the restoration of humanity’
s fellowship with God, necessarily finds its concrete expression in reconciliation (Versöhnung
), the lifestyle of the reconciled community. It could be argued that Ritschl has significantly reinterpreted the core concept of ‘
reconciliation’
(Versöhnung
) at this point, leading to a fracture of his relationship with historic Protestantism.
69
For Orthodoxy, ‘
reconciliation’
referred to the
objective basis of justification, especially the historical work of Christ. Ritschl inverted the traditional frame of reference, so that God is now understood as the subject
, rather than the object
, of reconciliation.
Ritschl appears to regard the terms Rechtfertigung
and Versöhnung
as being essentially synonymous, their difference lying in the aspects of the God–
human relationship to which they refer. Rechtfertigung
refers to the divine judgement, understood as an unconditional act of will, independent of whether an individual or a community appropriates it. Versöhnung
also refers to the same divine judgement as it is appropriated by an individual or community.
In other words, Versöhnung
expresses as an actual result the effect which is intended in Rechtfertigung
–
that the individual or community who is justified actually enters into the intended relationship. For Ritschl, God’
s gracious gift of justification is inextricably and irrevocably linked with the ethical consequences of this divine act: ‘
Christianity, so to speak, resembles not a circle described from a single centre, but an ellipse which is determined by two foci
.’
70
The first focus
is ‘
redemption through Christ’
, and the second ‘
the ethical interpretation of Christianity through the idea of the kingdom of God’
. His conviction that Lutheran orthodoxy had tended to concentrate upon redemption without correlating it with Christian existence led to his insistence upon the necessity of correlating the divine and human elements in justification and reconciliation.
Ritschl’
s was therefore only a partial retrieval of the historic objective aspects of justification, classically formulated in terms of the atoning death of Christ. The theological lineage of Ritschl’
s approach was questioned by writers such as Martin Kähler
, who argued that there was an essential continuity between Ritschl and the Aufklärung
in relation to the meaning of the death of Christ. Christ tends to be reduced to a mere symbol of the grace of God, without having any essential connection with that grace. For Kähler, Versöhnung
corresponds to the objectively altered situation between God and humanity, arising through the historic work of Christ, while Rechtfertigung
refers to one specific aspect of this situation –
the individual’
s appropriation of this reconciliation through faith.
71
The objective reality of reconciliation is necessarily prior to the subjective consciousness of this reconciliation.
72
For Kähler, a theology of the work of Christ could be classified under one of two types: the first, which corresponds to that of the Aufklärung
, understands Christ to have disclosed certain significant insights concerning an essentially unchanged human situation; the second, which corresponds to his own view, understands Christ to have brought about a change in the human situation. This distinction allows two quite different approaches to the death of Christ to be identified.
1.
Those which regard humanity’
s predicament as being ignorance of the true situation
. Humans are
saved, but do not realise it; upon being informed of the true situation, they are enabled to act upon the basis of this knowledge, and to adjust and reorientate their existence to what they now realise to be the true state of affairs. In so far as any alteration takes place in the situation, it is in the subjective awareness of humans of their situation. Kähler considered Ritschl to belong to this first category of theologies.
2.
Those which regard the predicament of humanity as being bondage to sin or evil
. Humans are enslaved, and may not realise it; upon being informed of the true situation, they still require liberation. The knowledge of their bondage may well lead to a recognition of the possibility of liberation, and hence to the search for the means of that liberation –
but such liberation is not identical with, or given simultaneously with, or even a necessary consequence of, the knowledge of humanity’
s true situation. A victory of good over evil, of grace over sin, is required, which humans may appropriate and make their own, if they are to break free from the hegemony of sin –
and precisely such a victory is to be had in the death of Christ upon the cross. Kähler positioned himself within this second category of approaches.
Ritschl’
s imperfect retrieval of the doctrine of justification may, however, be seen as having stimulated a more informed attempt to restore the doctrine in the work of Karl Holl
. Holl’
s retrieval of the doctrine of justification was closely linked with his personal interest in the religious outlook of Luther, and the role that the doctrine of justification played in its development.
73
The outbreak of the First World War in August 1914 brought such scholarly endeavours and theological reflections to an abrupt halt; after peace was restored in November 1918, however, the scene was set for a renewal of interest in Luther and his doctrine of justification.
1
For the distinctive features and themes of this period, see the introductory comments in Rasmussen, Wolfe and Zachhuber, The Oxford Handbook of Nineteenth-Century Christian Thought
, 1‒
8.
2
For an analysis, see Chappel, Catholic Modern
, 1‒
20. Both the traditional narrative of Catholic modernism and Chappel’
s revised narrative date the impact of modernism to the period after the First World War, while offering different accounts of its causes and outcomes. Modernism’
s chief concerns did not relate to the doctrine of justification, but to a cluster of questions relating to revelation, dogma, and the authority of the church: see, for example, Meszaros, ‘
Revelation in George Tyrrell, Neo-Scholasticism, and Dei Verbum
’
.
3
For some representative protests against this trend, see Schiffmann, Die evangelische Lehre von der Rechtfertigung durch den Glauben
; Böhl, Von der Rechtfertigung durch den Glauben
. For a good assessment of Eduard Böhl’
s attempt to retrieve this doctrine, in terms of both its Reformational substance and its emphasis, see Forster, Eduard Böhl’s (1836‒1903) Concept for a Re-emergence of Reformation Thought
, 132–
81.
4
Kähler, Die Wissenschaft der christlichen Lehre
, 67. Cf. Schäfer, ‘
Die Rechtfertigungslehre bei Ritschl und Kähler’
. For Kähler, the doctrine of justification is to be seen as ‘
ein Ausgangspunkt’
or ‘
ein beherrschenden Mittelpunkt’
for the theological enterprise. Cf. Jüngel, Das Evangelium von der Rechtfertigung des Gottlosen als Zentrum des christlichen Glaubens
, 21–
3.
9
Der christliche Glaube
, §4, 4, 1.20–
2. Cf. Beisser, Schleiermachers Lehre von Gott
, 57–
68; Offermann, Schleiermachers Einleitung
, 47–
65.
11
Der christliche Glaube
, §106, 1, 2.162.
12
Der christliche Glaube
, §100, 3, 2.101.
13
For Schleiermacher’
s complex position on natural causality, see Dole, Schleiermacher on Religion and the Natural Order
, 31‒
9.
14
Der christliche Glaube
, §107.1, 2.168.
17
Der christliche Glaube
, §109, 1, 2.193.
18
Der christliche Glaube
, §109, 4, 2.201. But note his emphatic rejection of any suggestion that faith is the instrumental cause of justification: §109, 4, 2.202.
20
Newman, Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification
, ix. These comments were added to the third edition of this work.
21
Originally a letter to D. Parker, dated 16 April 1810, entitled ‘
On Justification’
: Remains
, 1.281–
317.
22
Remains
, 1.308.
25
On this notion and its importance for Newman, see Holtzen, ‘
Newman’
s “
Via Media”
Theology of Justification’
.
26
Newman’
s hostility towards the influence of evangelicalism within the Church of England can be seen as a significant driving force behind his theological agendas: see Turner, John Henry Newman
.
27
Bellarmine and Vásquez are mentioned, but not engaged. Newman appears to believe that they taught that believers are justified on account of their renewal. For concerns about Newman’
s idiosyncratic appeal to the Caroline Divines, see Parker, ‘
Newman’
s Individualistic Use of the Caroline Divines in the Via Media
’
.
28
Dessain, ‘
Cardinal Newman and the Eastern Tradition’
; King, Newman and the Alexandrian Fathers
. The best account of Newman’
s doctrine of justification is Möllenbeck, Gerechtfertigt durch Erfahrung?
, 404‒
543. For further accounts of Newman’
s conception of justification, see Sheridan, Newman on Justification
; Morales, ‘
Newman and the Problem of Justification’
.
30
Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification
, 144.
31
Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification
, 149.
32
Newman here distances himself from Knox, who suggested that justification concerned being made righteous
, and sanctification concerned being made holy
: Knox, Remains
, 1.307–
9.
33
Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification
, 154.
34
Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification
, 74. This also permits the earlier statement (63) to be understood correctly: ‘
justification and sanctification [are] in fact substantially one and the same thing; …
in order of ideas, viewed relatively to each other, justification followed upon sanctification’
.
35
Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification
, 112.
36
See the earlier discussion in this volume, as well as Billings, Calvin, Participation, and the Gift
; Garcia, Life in Christ
.
37
Bebbington, ‘
Calvin and British Evangelicalism’
, 282–
6. English hostility towards the French Revolution caused suspicion of Calvin’
s political republicanism during the first decades of the nineteenth century.
38
Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification
, 263.
39
Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification
, 262.
41
Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification
, 303.
43
For some divergent analyses of this question, see O’
Leary, ‘
Impeded Witness’
; Perry, ‘
Newman’
s Treatment of Luther in the Lectures on Justification’
; Sheridan, ‘
Newman and Luther on Justification’
.
45
Newman’
s anxieties about ‘
feelings’
surfaces elsewhere in his writings, and is often correlated with his criticisms of evangelical accounts of justification and conversion: see especially Möllenbeck, Gerechtfertigt durch Erfahrung?
, 13–
20, 182–
202.
46
Hare, Vindication of Luther against His Recent English Assailants
, 96.
47
See the excellent study of Burstein, Victorian Reformations
.
49
Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification
, 256.
50
WA
7.25.26–
26.9. For an English translation of the full passage, see the earlier discussion in this work. Cf. Sibylle, Zum Herzen sprechen
.
51
For example, see Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification
, 331–
3. Compare this with the full text: WA
40/I.282.
52
Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification
, 303.
54
Despite careful searching, I have not yet been able to trace this source in the Oxford libraries to which Newman might have had access at this time.
55
Newman does not engage Calvin in his Lectures on Justification
. His discussion of Calvin elsewhere in his writings is generally unsatisfactory, demonstrating a lack of first-hand knowledge of Calvin’
s main works.
56
‘
Praise to the Holiest in the height’
; this hymn first appeared in 1865, as part of the poem The Dream of Gerontius
.
58
Baur, Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung
, 748. Baur appears to have minimised the distinction between the soteriologies of the Aufklärung
and both Kant and Schleiermacher
, presumably to achieve consistency with his Hegelian theory of historical development. For a good assessment of Baur’
s approach, see Zachhuber, Theology as Science in Nineteenth-Century Germany
, 25–
50.
59
Zachhuber, ‘
Albrecht Ritschl and the Tübingen School’
, 64–
7. For the view that Ritschl retained Hegelian metaphysical tendencies even after his break with Baur, see von Scheliha, Der Glaube an die göttliche Vorsehung
, 236–
43.
60
For the theological significance of Ritschl’
s historical research, see Ohst, ‘
Ritschl als Dogmenhistoriker’
.
63
Note that the German term Versöhnung
can be translated as both ‘
reconciliation’
and ‘
atonement’
.
64
For the issues associated with a critical retrieval of the past, see Buschart and Eilers, Theology as Retrieval
; Allen and Swain, Reformed Catholicity
.
65
Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung
, §16, 83. The other two definitions of justification offered by Ritschl represent an extension of this basic definition.
68
Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung
, §15, 72.
69
Cf. Widman, ‘
Albrecht Ritschls Rückgriff auf die Reformation’
; Barth, ‘
Das gebrochene Verhältnis zur Reformation’
; Schäfer, ‘
Rechtfertigungslehre bei Ritschl und Kahler’
, 73–
4.
70
Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung
, §1, 11.
72
Note the critical question posed by Kähler, Zur Lehre von der Versöhnung
, 337: ‘
Hat Christus bloß irrige Ansichten über eine unwandelbare Sachlage berichtigt, oder ist er der Begründer einer veränderten Sachlage?’