22 An Attempt at Rapprochement ◈

Some believed that these approaches could be seen as essentially different formulations of essentially the same fundamental ideas. After all, Luther and Melanchthon had developed distinct ways of speaking about justification, while believing that they shared a common theological foundation. 2 Might not there be some way of framing Protestant views on justification in such a way that they might align with their Catholic counterparts? Or at least of initiating conversations to explore such questions? 3 The publication of Erasmus’ s treatise on restoring the unity of the church (1533) prompted some to try to get such conversations under way. 4

The influence, whether direct or indirect, of Erasmus over such reflections was considerable, not least in terms of his recognition of the role that language played in shaping human relationships. 5 Erasmus urged the principled accommodation of discourse, recognising the ease with which individuals and communities could become unnecessarily entrenched in positions which were determined by the terminology which they favoured, rather than the concepts which lay behind it. Erasmus at times seemed a lonely voice in a rapidly polarising world; yet his fundamental belief that language, when rightly used, could reduce polarisation was grasped by some early modern eirenicists, such as Martin Bucer in Strasbourg. 6 Erasmus’ s emphasis on the importance of language kindled interest in the question of whether certain forms of words might be devised that respected the positions and concerns of each side of the debate, while at the same time aiming to identify common ground and to frame such positions as distinctive but not necessarily divisive for that reason. Luther tended to see such approaches as compromises or as disingenuous evasions, in effect amounting to an arbitrary ‘ gluing together (zusammenleimen )’ of contradictory opinions; 7 Bucer, however, saw them as having the potential to reduce tensions and foster understanding.

The opportunities and limits of such an approach can be seen from the Leipzig debate of 1539 between Bucer and Georg Witzel , which resulted in fifteen articles of agreement. 8 A similar debate was held between Melanchthon and Eck in Worms in November 1540, leading to a broad agreement on the issue of original sin. 9 Yet although both these discussions touched on (and achieved some significant agreement over) some important themes, those issues did not lie at the heart of the emerging debates between Protestants and Catholics, which were increasingly focussing on the questions of the nature of justification and of justifying righteousness. These issues were finally and fully addressed at the Regensburg Colloquy in April and May 1541. 10 This Colloquy took place during the Regensburg Imperial Diet (Latin: Dieta Imperii ; German Reichstag ), attended by Charles V and other senior figures.

The Colloquy brought together a group of theologians from both sides of the debate, of which six were formally requested by Charles V to act as Disputantes – that is, to make formal presentations which would be the subject of discussion: Martin Bucer, Philipp Melanchthon and Johann Pistorius on the Protestant side; and Johann Gropper , Johann Eck and Julius Pflug on the Catholic side. Gasparo Contarini was present as Papal Legate, representing the Pope. John Calvin was present on the Protestant side, although he was not invited to be a ‘ Disputant’ . 11

Contarini, though not formally involved in the disputation, was clear about how some degree of resolution could be achieved. In a letter focussing on the question written from Regensburg on 25 May 1541 to Cardinal Ercole Gonzaga, Contarini argued that justification could be considered as both becoming righteous (iustum fieri ) and being counted as righteous (iustum haberi ). It was possible to hold these two notions together using the colligatory concept of a ‘ double righteousness (duplex iustitia )’ . 12

The position of Johann Gropper is particularly significant, in the light of later discussions at the Council of Trent . In his Enchiridion (1538), Gropper defines justification in terms of two components: the remission of sin and the internal renewal of the mind. 16 Gropper criticises Melanchthon ’ s concept of forensic justification, which uses the analogy of the people of Rome declaring Scipio to be free as an analogy for an essentially declaratory understanding of justification. 17 For Gropper, justification is a process of transformation that is inextricably linked with the internal renewal of the individual: ‘ nobody is justified, unless through the renewal of the will’ . Yet Gropper diverges from many of his Catholic colleagues at this point, being willing to implicate the concept of imputed righteousness in the process of justification. Gropper seems to understand this concept as divine acceptation, which is predicated on the renewal of believers through remissio peccatorum et mentis renovatio . 18 While Gropper does not use the formula duplex iustitia , he clearly distinguishes, without separating, the ‘ righteousness that God, when we are justified through the Holy Spirit, effects within us both the remission of sins and the renewal of the mind’ . 19 While some have argued that Gropper proposed a novel doctrine of ‘ double justification’ , the evidence suggests that Gropper merely restates the traditional medieval idea that justification includes , but does not take place on account of , the interior renewal of the believer. There are obvious parallels, for example, with Thomas Aquinas ’ s distinction between iustitia infusa (a God-given cause of justification) and iustitia acquisita , arising from human actions, which is inadequate as a basis for justification. 20 It is quite clear that Enchiridion does not affirm a ‘ double righteousness’ , but rather affirms a double aspect or outcome of the single process of justification which makes or renders us righteous in multiple senses. 21

However, in his Antidigmata (1544), Gropper moves unequivocally towards what most scholars would see as a proper formulation of ‘ double justification’ – the idea that there are two causes of justification. In the Enchiridion , Gropper had stated that ‘ iustificatio duo proprie complectitur’ 22 – but at this stage, he did not understand this to entail two formal causes of justification. For reasons that remain unclear, Gropper’ s 1544 discussion of justification makes explicit a doctrine of double justification – that is to say, that the justification of humanity has two formal causes. ‘ We are justified by God through a double righteousness (duplex iustitia ), as formal and essential causes.’ 23 Gropper identifies these explicitly as iustitia imputata and iustitia inhaerens . Yet subsequently, Gropper seems to have moved away from this position, downplaying – and at times even seeming to ignore – the role of iustitia imputata in justification. 24

The Regensburg Colloquy navigated its way to what it regarded as a viable resolution of the debates of the age over the question of justification. It soon became clear, however, that other theological disputes – such as those concerning the sacraments – could not be resolved. 25 Luther’ s reformation may have been precipitated in the 1510s by his concerns about justification; yet by the end of the 1530s, the reforming movement had developed a wider and more complex agenda. The possibility of meaningful dialogue was complexified further by the Lutheran accentuation of soteriology, seeing this as taking priority over ecclesiology; whereas Catholics tended to see ecclesiology as primary.

In Article 5, the Colloquy acknowledged the complexity of the vocabulary and conceptualities that had come to be associated with justification, and attempted to weave a coherent theological framework that incorporated multiple perspectives into a coherent account of the justification of the sinner. The unusually extensive documentary evidence available for this Colloquy indicates that the participants did not regard the outcome of their deliberations as a political compromise, but as a credible and generous account of the dynamics of human redemption.

After setting out the consequences of sin, the human need for redemption, and the essential role of the Holy Spirit in the transformation of the human situation, the Colloquy affirmed the theological richness of the justification of humanity. Through faith, the believer ‘ accepts the Holy Spirit, the remission of sins, the imputation of righteousness , and innumerable other gifts’ . Wishing to avoid any purely notional sense of faith, the Colloquy emphasised the transformative character of a true faith: 26

So what of the notion of ‘ double justification’ , which featured in the Tridentine discussions of justification? Did Regensburg affirm that there were two fundamental causes of justification – an imputed and an imparted righteousness? The evidence suggests not. There is no doubt that the Colloquy gave careful consideration to the role and mutual relationship of iustitia imputata and iustitia inhaerens – this latter term, incidentally, being an apparent innovation. 29 Yet the six Regensburg Disputants did not understand these to be two distinct causes of justification; rather, they saw them as establishing a principled correlation of the foundations and outcomes of justification. 30

The difficulty, of course, was that this agreement was the outcome of an extended process of negotiation between a small group of individuals, whose claims to be representative of their constituencies ultimately rested on the process of imperial selection. Others who remained outside this process were more critical – as may be seen, for example, in the hostile reaction of the Faculty of Theology at Louvain, particularly to the contribution of Gropper. 32 What can be seen as a careful exploration of the issues to allow a genuine terminological convergence could easily be represented as a purely verbal agreement, pasting together statements originating within quite different visions of theology without resolving the divergences between these systems – a tactic that appears to lie behind Bellarmine’ s later polemical attempt to discredit those present at Regensburg for political reasons. 33

As tensions between Protestants and Catholics in Germany increased during the early 1540s, many senior Catholics began to feel that the moment for dialogue had passed; the best strategy for the future lay in defensive consolidation – in other words, in the convening of a Council that would affirm Catholic teachings and censure those who opposed or diverged from them. The Tridentine debates on justification, to which we shall presently turn, can be seen as arising from the growing perception within Catholicism that Regensburg had offered an unworkable solution to the rise of the Reformation. Other options now needed to be considered.