Continuities of Conflict: Ecumenism and Justification

Three main levels of discussion will be noted in this chapter. The first three sections deal with the perceived relevance and interpretation of the doctrine of justification. The chapter opens by considering the movement now generally known as ‘ Dialectical Theology’ – though the phrase ‘ Theology of Crisis’ is still encountered in the literature. This movement, dominated by Karl Barth , can be seen as the quest for a viable theology following the end of the First World War. So what role did the doctrine of justification play in the initial phases of this movement, and in its later more constructive phases? The second section explores the subjective aspects of the doctrine of justification, given particular emphasis in the years immediately following the First World War by Karl Holl , and subsequently developed in quite distinct ways by Rudolf Bultmann , Emil Brunner and Paul Tillich . The third surveys a range of recent explorations of the theological role of justification, set against the backdrop of an often expressed concern that the doctrine of justification was a relic from an earlier period of theological history that had ceased to possess relevance for today. This judgement, it has to be said, appears to have been somewhat premature.

As has been emphasised throughout this work, the doctrine of justification can serve as a window into the complex relationship between the disciplines of systematic or constructive theology and biblical interpretation. In terms of both its conceptual specificity and theological substance, the history of Christian reflection on justification has involved interaction with the Bible, especially the Pauline letters. So what of today? How has – or how might ‒ contemporary Pauline interpretation impact on theological reflection? To encourage reflection on this topic, three significant lines of Pauline interpretation in the last thirty years are considered, with some brief reflections on their significance. Interestingly, all these approaches to the New Testament are shaped to some extent by their historico-theological judgements about precipitating causes and the nature of Luther’ s views on justification and biblical interpretation, which may not be quite as secure as their exponents believe.

Finally, the work turns to consider the question of whether the doctrine of justification can serve as the ground of ecumenical reconciliation, or whether it remains a legitimate source of division between historic Christian communities. This raises difficult questions about how Christian denominations frame their identities, particularly in terms of the language and concepts they prefer to use to describe God’ s saving action in the world, and the means and manner in which this is appropriated by human beings.

Such radical developments in the world of religious ideas could not fail to have an impact upon the doctrine of justification. Cultural anxieties about human frailty, fallibility and irrationality were highlighted by the destructiveness of the First World War, creating a degree of receptivity to the notion that humanity was flawed and in need of redemption. 4

Following the deep and unsettling questions raised about the legacy of German Protestant theology as a result of the Great War (1914‒ 18), a new interest emerged in returning to the fons et origo of Protestant theology in the writings of Luther and other reformers. The Swiss Reformed pastors Karl Barth and Eduard Thurneysen both considered that the catastrophe of the First World War represented a moment of crisis – a judgement on a complacent collusion between Christian theology and secular culture, and a challenge to rediscover the core themes of the Christian faith. 5 Thurneysen and Barth had studied theology together at the University of Marburg in 1909, and were convinced that the war had exposed fundamental, if not fatal, flaws in prevailing understandings of the grounds and tasks of Christian theology. Their friendship was consolidated when they served as Reformed pastors in the neighbouring villages of Safenwil and Leutwil in the Aargau region of Switzerland in the late 1910s and early 1920s. Both Barth and Thurneysen saw a historical precedent for their emerging programme of critical and radical theological restructuring as lying in the Reformation of the sixteenth century, spearheaded by Martin Luther .

The movement loosely known as ‘ Dialectical Theology’ is an important witness to attempts at theological reconstruction in the post-war period through a critical reappropriation of the past, by-passing what was seen as the false turns taken by ‘ Culture Protestantism’ . During the 1920s, the group consisted of Barth, Thurneysen, Emil Brunner , and the German Lutheran theologian Friedrich Gogarten , although Rudolf Bultmann was involved to some extent with the movement at points. We shall begin our reflections on the doctrine of justification in recent theological reflection by considering both the significance of this doctrine in shaping Barth’ s theological programme and his own formulation of this theological theme, before considering other members of this movement.

A good starting point for considering Karl Barth’ s approach to justification is his lecture of 16 January 1916 in the Aarau Stadtkirche on the theme of ‘ the righteousness of God’ . Even today, the rhetorical power of this lecture may still be felt, and the passage of time has done nothing to diminish the force of Barth’ s sustained critique of humanity’ s self-assertion in the face of God, which he links with the question of the true meaning of the ‘ righteousness of God’ . For Barth, the ‘ deepest, inmost and most certain fact of life, is that “ God is righteous”’ . 6 This fact is brought home to humans by their consciences, which affirm the existence of a righteous God in the midst of human unrighteousness, to be seen in the forces of capitalism as much as in the war which was raging over the face of Europe at that moment. Deep within the inmost being of humans lies the desire for the righteousness of God – and yet paradoxically, just when this divine righteousness appears to be on the verge of altering their nature and conduct, humans assert their own self-righteousness. They are unable to contemplate the concept of a ‘ righteousness’ that lies beyond their own control. Humans welcome the intervention of divine righteousness if it puts an end to wars or general strikes – but feel threatened by it when they realise that behind the results of human unrighteousness lies the uncomfortable reality of human righteousness itself. Unable to accept this, people deform the ‘ righteousness of God’ into various forms of human righteousness.

For Barth, the First World War both questions and demonstrates the righteousness of God. It questions that righteousness, in that people are unable to understand how a ‘ righteous’ God could permit such an outrage; it demonstrates that same righteousness, in that it shows up human caricatures of divine righteousness for what they really are. Humans have made their own concepts of righteousness into a God, so that God is simply the ‘ great personal or impersonal, mystical, philosophical or naive Profundity and patron saint of our human righteousness, morality, state, civilisation, or religion’ . 7 For Barth, the war has destroyed this image of God for ever, exposing it as an idol. By asserting its own concept of righteousness in the face of God, humanity constructed a ‘ righteous’ God who was the first and least mourned casualty of the war. 8 The ‘ death’ of this God has forced people to recognise that the ‘ righteousness of God’ is qualitatively different from, and stands over and against, human conceptions of righteousness.

This lecture is of considerable significance in a number of respects, particularly on account of the dialectic that Barth constructs between human and divine righteousness, which marks a break with the prevailing liberal Protestant understanding of the generally continuous nature of history, progress and civilisation. 9 ‘ God’ s will is not a superior projection of our own will: it stands in opposition to our will as one that is totally distinct (als ein gänzlich anderer ).’ 10 It is this infinite qualitative distinction between human and divine righteousness which forms the basis of Barth’ s repeated assertion that God is, and must be recognised as, God.

This theme of the reassertion of the otherness of God becomes a dominant theme in the second edition of his Romans commentary; it is not, however, linked with writers such as Luther, or framed in terms of the doctrine of justification by faith. Indeed, in his 1922 lectures on Calvin , Barth makes it clear that the key theme of the Reformation is the reaffirmation of God’ s deity. 11

Barth’ s work attracted the attention of the German Lutheran theologian Friedrich Gogarten, who admired its negative and iconoclastic approach to culture. For both Barth and Gogarten, God’ s revelation negated the significance of human culture, experience and history. Where many others – such as Emil Brunner – found Barth’ s iconoclasm problematic, Gogarten found it compelling. 12 Gogarten mounted a full-frontal assault on any theologies which seemed to him to be dependent on, or controlled by, cultural assumptions or values. These, he argued, were locked into the ideas and values of a passing age. God was totally removed from the ideas and values of this world, and was revealed in the negation of human ideas, values and history. Anything that human beings produce has both an origin, and an ending. It is not of permanent significance, but must be recognised as transient and contingent.

Gogarten saw Luther as embodying this radical and iconoclastic attitude, and developed his own distinct interpretation of Luther as a prophetic voice in this period of chaos and uncertainty. 13 Yet Gogarten’ s reading of Luther is idiosyncratic, and seems to be driven by the need to find a plausible figurehead for his own theological and cultural agenda. Luther’ s emphasis on the ‘ article of justification’ plays no significant role in Gogarten’ s theological vision. 14

Barth’ s early emphasis on the outcomes of allowing God to be God focusses on the theme of revelation, rather than justification. It is the task of any authentic and responsible Christian theology to attempt to unfold the nature and identity of the God who had spoken to sinners in the human-ward movement envisaged in the Deus dixit . Yet as Barth’ s theology moved into a more constructive phase in the Church Dogmatics , an understanding of justification emerges which shows his grounding in the Reformation heritage. His discussion of the relation of justification and sanctification echoes common themes within the Reformed tradition: these are to be seen as two different aspects, or two genuinely different moments, of the one event of salvation. 15 There is, Barth insists, an indestructible connection between justification and sanctification. Yet this must be seen as a connection , not misunderstood as an identity .

It is clear that Barth found much to value in the writings of Luther, 16 evident in the fact that no theologian is referenced as often in the Church Dogmatics as Luther. Barth clearly regarded Luther as a theologian whose appeal and significance extended beyond the bounds of confessional Lutheranism. There are a number of themes in Barth’ s mature theology that clearly reflect Luther’ s influence, including the following. 17

Barth could hardly overlook this assessment of Luther’ s views on justification, 20 given Wolf’ s status as a theologian at Göttingen, and as a fellow member of the Confessing Church. In his important discussion of the historically situated significance of the articulus iustificationis , Barth acknowledged the peculiar importance which Luther and his age attached to the doctrine, and further concedes that Luther did not regard the articulus iustificationis as the primus et principalis articulus merely in his polemic against Rome, but also against all forms of sectarianism. However, he noted that no evangelical theologian – with the possible exception of Martin Kähler – ever dared to construct a dogmatics with the doctrine of justification at its centre. Conceding that the articulus iustificationis has been regarded as being the Word of the gospel on several occasions in the history of the church, he points out that these occasions represented instances where the gospel, understood as the free grace of God, was under threat – such as in the Pelagian controversy . Barth then argues that it is necessary to free the theological enterprise from the contingencies of such controversies. 21 The articulus iustificationis is not, and need not be, fundamental or central for the Christian proclamation. ‘ In the church of Jesus Christ, this doctrine has not always been the word of the gospel, and it would be an altogether restrictive and improperly exclusive act to treat it as such.’

While Barth is prepared to retain the traditional designation of the articulus iustificationis as the articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae , it is only on account of the community of faith’ s need to know the objective basis of its existence: ‘ without the truth of the doctrine of justification, there was and is no true Christian church’ . 22 Nevertheless, so long as the essential truth of this article is not denied, Barth argues that it may withdraw into the background: 23

It is interesting to compare Barth with another member of the ‘ Dialectical Theology’ group on this point – Rudolf Bultmann . A good case can be made for suggesting that Luther’ s doctrine of justification by faith is the defining theological framework around which Bultmann’ s notions of the kerygma and demythologisation are developed. 26 Bultmann himself emphasised the parallels between his notion of demythologisation and Luther’ s doctrine of justification. The significance of Jesus Christ for humanity does not lie in some neutral and objective assessment of his historical identity, but in a fiduciary embrace of his existential significance. 27

Bultmann, as a confessional Lutheran, had little difficulty in reading the New Testament in the light of the law-gospel dialectic, and seeing the doctrine of justification as a core theme of the Pauline corpus. While Bultmann here develops an essentially Lutheran reading of Paul, the distinctiveness of his proposal lies largely with his correlation of Paul with the existential analysis of the human situation developed by his Marburg colleague, Martin Heidegger , which we shall consider later in this chapter. For Bultmann, as for Luther, theology must give an account of the full significance of Jesus Christ pro nobis . Any substantive Christology must focus on the impact of the proclaimed Christ upon the believer, rather than the ‘ historical Jesus’ , so that faith is fundamentally a cognitive and existential trust in the Christ of the New Testament kerygma . 28 Like Luther, Bultmann considered it essential to break free from historical details, and discover the theological treasure which they enfolded – which the doctrine of justification affirmed and expressed. 29

During the 1920s, the Swiss dialectical theologian Emil Brunner reached beyond his natural Reformed theological constituency to engage a broader vision of Protestantism, including the appropriation of some core themes of the theology of Martin Luther , particularly his dialectic between law and gospel and his notion of the ‘ orders of creation’ . 30 Yet Brunner did not see the doctrine of justification as standing at the heart of either the Christian faith, or his own personal vision of theology. In his 1925 inaugural lecture at the University of Zurich, Brunner set out his emerging understanding of the nature of revelation, the central place of Jesus Christ within the Christian faith and theology, the limits of philosophy, and the tasks of theology. 31 Brunner’ s affirmation of theology as an academically rigorous yet pastorally engaged discipline is linked with an insistence upon the priority of revelation as the ‘ ground and object of theology’ , and does not privilege – or, indeed, engage significantly with – the notion of justification.

Brunner saw the particular importance of Luther’ s doctrine of justification to post-war theological reconstruction as lying in its anthropology. One particularly important point at which Brunner appropriates and develops Luther’ s thinking concerns the articulation of a genuinely theological anthropology. Barth was opposed to any engagement with anthropology, believing that it would ultimately compromise the integrity of theology. Brunner, however, believed that the Christian faith provided an intellectual framework which offered a rigorously theological account of human nature. In doing so, he picked up on some themes developed by Luther in framing his doctrine of justification, especially his totus homo anthropology, which refused to treat sin and righteousness as different aspects or components of human nature. 32 For Luther, sin is not merely something within human nature that is corrupt; rather, it is the corruption of human nature in its totality.

Brunner echoes these themes. In the third volume of his Dogmatics , Brunner asserts the importance of the Pauline doctrine of justification as the ‘ true centre and climax of the Christian proclamation’ and criticises – without naming Barth – those who argue that its importance is subject to the contingencies of history (zeitgeschichtlich bedingte Zufälligkeiten ). 33 For Brunner, the negative aspect of justification is a ‘ radical understanding of our sinfulness’ 34 – in other words, a Christian anthropology which denies the possibility of human self-justification, and thus sets the scene for the coming of redemption, while also disclosing the dark truths about human nature that western culture is reluctant to confront.

Sin affects the whole of human existence, and cannot be isolated in some hermetically sealed compartment. It is not one part of human nature which is sinful, and requires redemption. Humanity, as a totality, is sinful, and stands in need of radical transformation through Christ. Brunner perhaps articulates this point most clearly in his Robertson Lectures at the University of Glasgow: ‘ It is not a part of a human being which is guilty of sin but the whole human being … We could express it like this: we not only commit sins, but we are sinners.’ 35 Brunner’ s commitment to developing a theologically informed and grounded anthropology (which incorporated some key themes from Luther’ s approach) dates from the late 1920s. Although Gogarten had also stressed the importance of constructing such an anthropology, 36 this was decidedly a minority opinion within dialectical theology at this time. Gogarten’ s strategic move is known to have irritated Barth.

Brunner locates the positive aspects of justification in God declaring the sinner to be righteous, explicitly acknowledging the forensic dimensions of justification. 37 Yet his exposition is framed primarily in terms of an ‘ I‒ Thou’ relationship, 38 which allowed Brunner to discuss justification in terms of a transforming encounter with God, picking up themes he developed in his earlier work Truth as Encounter . 39

Although Thurneysen was actively involved in the Dialectical Theology movement, particularly in its earlier stages, his theological focus increasingly shifted to the interface of theology and pastoral ministry, perhaps best seen in his 1948 work on pastoral theology. 40 Yet Thurneysen arguably produced one of the most significant accounts of the significance of the Reformation doctrine of justification in relation to pastoral care. His 1928 article ‘ Justification and Pastoral Care’ highlighted the role of the doctrine in dealing with the spiritual anxieties – what Luther might call Anfechtungen – of Christian believers, offering consolation in times of despair. 41 Although this article attracted little attention at the time, it can be seen as prophetic in highlighting the affective aspects of the doctrine of justification in an age which seemed preoccupied with its more cognitive formulations.

The importance of this theme for Lutheran pastoral theology is brought out clearly in some documents prepared in 1983 to facilitate and resource ecumenical dialogue between Lutherans and Catholics. The Lutheran representatives were concerned to explain why Luther’ s emphasis upon faith rather than grace was of such pastoral importance. 42

Yet other approaches began to gain traction during this post-war period, and would continue to flourish thereafter. We now consider the turn – or, better, re turn – to the subjective, which opened up fresh ways of exploring the doctrine of justification.

Earlier, we noted how Schleiermacher had developed a partial extension of the Pietist emphasis upon religious experience which allowed the doctrine of justification to be presented in a manner that avoided the excessive objectivity of Lutheran Orthodoxy, while maintaining the essentially religious character of Christianity. Although the Danish existentialist writer Søren Kierkegaard initially encountered Schleiermacher’ s ideas indirectly, he became more fully familiar with his approach during the period 1839‒ 46. 44 Kierkegaard’ s existentialist reworking of Schleiermacher’ s ideas was not translated into German until the 1920s. Once they were available, many German-speaking theologians began to appreciate their importance for the new theological tasks of the post-war era. 45 Two particularly important works influenced by Kierkegaard may be noted: Ferdinand Ebner ’ s Das Wort und die geistigen Realitäten (‘ The Word and Spiritual Realities’ , 1921), and Martin Buber ’ s Ich und Du (‘ I and You’ , 1922). Both of these works were critical of the depersonalising trends that emerged in the aftermath of the Great War, and argued for the need to preserve human individuality in the face of such collectivising or depersonalising pressures. In both cases, this safeguarding of human identity was located subjectively, particularly through a recognition of the importance of relationships. 46

These ideas were developed further by Martin Heidegger in his Sein und Zeit (‘ Being and Time’ , 1927). 47 Arguing that the basic meaning of the word ‘ existence’ derives from the Latin root ex-sistere , ‘ to stand outside’ , Heidegger characterised the existence of humans in terms of their ability to stand outside the world of things. What is it that distinguishes the existence of people from that of inanimate objects? Heidegger’ s answer to this complex question involves a distinction between two different modes of being: authentic (eigentlich ) and inauthentic (ineigentlich ) existence. 48 Humans exist in the world, and are bound up with its existence, even though they are quite distinct from its way of being. The possibility that we will be overwhelmed by the way of being which the world represents, and thus ‘ fall’ from an authentic to an inauthentic mode of existence, is an essential element of Heidegger’ s analysis of existence. There is a possibility that we may fall away (abfallen ) from ourselves, obliterating our awareness of our essential distinction from the world by becoming absorbed in it, and thus becoming ‘ uprooted’ (entwurzelt ) from our proper way of being. Although it is tempting to equate Heidegger’ s concept of Verfallenheit directly with the theological concept of original sin, it is clear that Heidegger maintains that fallenness and alienation are merely existential possibilities open to humanity , rather than a normative definition of human existence. 49 Heidegger’ s analysis of the structures of human existence allows him to propose that authentic and inauthentic modes of being can arise; but not to provide normative accounts of authenticity or inauthenticity.

The relevance of this existential analysis of human existence to the Christian theology of justification was indicated by Heidegger himself, who pointed out that Luther’ s doctrine of justification, especially when considered in relation to the question of the assurance of salvation, could be interpreted in existentialist categories. 50 Although Luther is primarily concerned with the justification of humans’ coram Deo , rather than with their self-justification in their particular existential situation, there is no doubt that Luther was alert to the existential dimensions of justification.

These insights were developed by Rudolf Bultmann , who argued that the New Testament was ultimately concerned with the fundamental question of the nature of human existence. 51 Paul understands justification, according to Bultmann, as an eschatological and kerygmatic event that liberates us from our sinful past and opens us toward a future of new possibilities. The Christian kerygma represents a divine word addressed directly to humans, revealing that their present state of existence is inauthentic, and making known the possibility of authentic existence through the Christ-event, upon condition of the decision (Entscheidung ) of faith – an issue which Bultmann holds to be directly addressed in Paul’ s doctrine of justification by faith. 52 Humanity is a ‘ potentiality to be’ whose innate potentiality for authentic existence is disclosed and actualised by the kerygma. In coming to their decision of faith, in response to the kerygma, individuals attain their authentic self (sein eigentliches Sein ). 53 Yet Bultmann does not propose a generalised philosophy of existence; he rather thinks in terms of a transformative existential encounter which is mediated through the proclamation of Christ, in which the kerygma transmits the significance of Christ to its hearers through the church. 54 ‘ The Christ of the kerygma has, as it were, displaced the historical Jesus and authoritatively addresses the hearer – every hearer.’ 55

A similar existential interpretation of the doctrine of justification is associated with Paul Tillich , although with some important divergences, most notably relating to their differing understandings of the historical specificity of Christ in relation to the believer’ s existential transformation. 56 In an important essay of 1924, Tillich noted that the doctrine of justification applied not merely to the religious aspects of moral life, but also to the intellectual life of religion, in that it is not merely the sinner , but also the doubter , who is justified by faith. 57 Tillich thus extends the scope of the doctrine to the universal human situation of despair and doubt concerning the meaning of existence. Consequently, he argues that the doctrine of justification, when rightly understood, lies at the heart of the Christian faith. 58 While, in the nineteenth century, humans were characterised by their idealism, their twentieth-century counterparts are characterised by existential despair and anxiety – and it is to this latter humanity that the Christian message must be made relevant. Tillich undertakes this task by the ‘ method of correlation’ , by which the Christian proclamation is ‘ correlated’ with the existential questions arising from human existence. For Tillich, the doctrine of justification addresses a genuine human need; humans must learn to accept that they are accepted, despite being unacceptable. 59

Although Tillich repeatedly stated that he stood within a Reformational tradition on the question of justification, it is clear that his approach represents a significant transposition of Luther’ s doctrine of justification. 60 Luther emphasised the specificity of justification, anchoring the possibility of existential transformation in the particular event of the life, death and resurrection of Christ; Tillich offers what is best seen as a generalised universal existential principle, which has a limited connection to the historical specificity of Christ – a universal philosophy of religion, rather than a theology rooted in history and transmitted by historically embedded traditions.

It is instructive to compare Tillich’ s position with that of the Lutheran Zurich theologian Gerhard Ebeling . Like Tillich, Ebeling recognises the cultural strangeness of traditional language of justification, which is as unfamiliar to modern humanity ‘ as an Egyptian sphinx’ . The concept must be demythologised and interpreted in order that it may be shown to have an essential connection with contemporary human existence and its problems. 61 For Ebeling, in the event of justification, a fundamental change in the situation of humans takes place, by which they are transferred from the state of non-existence (Nichtsein ) to that of authentic existence (Sein ). 62

Although Ebeling’ s approach to the doctrine may appear to parallel that of Bultmann or Tillich, Ebeling has in fact drawn out the existential hermeneutical insights which lay at the basis of Luther’ s doctrine of justification sola fide , thus clarifying the nature of the doctrine as a critical principle in judging thought and practice. According to Ebeling, the central point of the Christian faith is that the proclamation of the grace of God in word and sacrament is itself the saving event, in that it proclaims the death and resurrection of Christ, and thence effects what it proclaims. Ebeling’ s personal respect for Luther, evident throughout his career and demonstrated through his substantial body of research on Luther’ s theology, roots Ebeling deeply within the conceptualities of the Protestant tradition on the one hand, and the specificity of the Christian approach to acceptance coram Deo through the death of Christ on the other. 63 Existential correlation is thus achieved without transposing Christian theology into a generalised philosophy of human existence, or losing a foundational conceptual link with the narrative of Jesus Christ.

In the twenty-first century, there has been increased recognition of the pastoral importance of the doctrine of justification. These approaches can be tracked back to Thurneysen’ s 1928 article on justification and pastoral care, 64 which foregrounded the relationship between Luther’ s theology of justification and the spiritual needs of individual believers. This theme was important in early Lutheranism, and was often explicitly referenced in Lutheran confessional material, such as Melanchthon ’ s Apology for the Augsburg Confession , which emphasised how the doctrine was able to console and uplift those who were in despair. 65 These statements about the capacity of the doctrine of justification to console those who are terrified, or who sense the need for peace with God, are not to be seen as subordinate aspects of an essentially cognitive affirmation; they are integral aspects of a doctrine which has both cognitive and affective dimensions . The essentially forensic imagery of the imputation of Christ’ s righteousness to sinners through faith is thus channelled pastorally through its affective and psychological effects, in an explicit and plausible synthesis. 66

Whereas theologians of the pre-modern period were primarily concerned with the exposition and analysis of the church’ s proclamation of the divine justification of sinful humans, western theologians now find themselves increasingly obliged to defend its relevance and legitimacy in the face of fundamental challenges to both. It is no longer humanity that needs to be justified in the face of God, but God who needs to be justified in the face of an increasingly sceptical humanity, 70 troubled as it is by the violence and suffering of the world and the manifest failings of institutional religion. As we noted earlier, this has led to an increased emphasis on bringing out the existential aspects of the doctrine of justification. It must be emphasised that this is not about imposing alien categories on the doctrine; it is clear that Luther’ s early theology of justification, particularly in relation to the notion of Anfechtung , is strongly affective and existential in its orientation, 71 apparently reflecting comparable trends in late medieval Augustinian spirituality. 72

So what of justification as an explicitly theological category? Has the passing of time led to its theological marginalisation, as some suggested? While there remain questions about Luther’ s assertion of its privileged status, 73 predictions of its demise as a meaningful theological category have not been fulfilled. Contemporary Lutheran theology has tended to see the doctrine of justification by faith as essential to its identity, while remaining open to debates about how it is best to be framed. 74 Recent Lutheran works of theology – such as those of Robert Jenson and Robert Kolb – have provided non-defensive articulations of the doctrine of justification, seeing this, and its associated vocabulary, as a proper interpretation of the New Testament which is theologically appropriate and productive. 75

Recent reformed theology has made extensive use of the doctrine of justification, emphasising its continuity with the Reformed tradition of the sixteenth century. The Scottish reformed theologian T. F. Torrance has been particularly significant in this respect. Following his own early recognition of the importance of this doctrine for the Reformed tradition, 76 Torrance made it a central theme of his theological enterprise, often using the Reformed concept of ‘ union with Christ’ as a means of establishing a secure link between justification and sanctification. 77 Torrance nuances the traditional Reformed understanding of justification at points – for example, in his insistence that the work of Christ must not be commodified, or detached from the person of Christ. 78 ‘ Jesus Christ does not mediate a reconciliation (any more than a revelation) other than what he is in himself, as though he were merely the intermediary or instrument of divine reconciliation. He embodies in himself what he mediates, for what he mediates and what he is are one and the same.’ Torrance also, as noted earlier, rejects the traditional Reformed federal theology, within which the doctrine of justification was located, arguing that such a theology reduced justification to a contractual, conditional, and individualistic transaction.

This view has been challenged at two levels, in that it fails to recognise the continuity between Calvin and the later Reformed tradition, and that it misrepresents the character of the covenantal theology of justification that emerges from this tradition. 79 Michael Horton, perhaps the most significant recent defender of such a federal Reformed theology of justification, offers a critique of Torrance’ s position, while at the same time reaffirming the theological integrity and pastoral utility of such a covenantal theology of justification. 80

Others, however, have reappropriated classic themes of the Reformation era without reference to such a covenantal framework. Kathryn Tanner is a good example of a theologian who picks up on some key themes in the writings of both Luther and Calvin in forging her own approach to justification. In her Warfield Lectures given at Princeton Theological Seminary in 2007, she developed the idea that Christ is the ‘ key’ to what God is doing – including justification. ‘ God wants to give us the fullness of God’ s own life through the closest possible relationship with us that comes to completion in Christ.’ 81

Tanner develops the traditional Protestant distinction between justification and sanctification without problematising either notion, seeing them as offering appropriate conceptual frameworks for developing a Christ-focussed theology of human transformation. ‘ We are justified through our attachment to Christ, who is righteous as we are not.’ This new relationship with Christ undergirds the change in our situation which we call ‘ justification’ : 82

It is not difficult to provide recent examples of the affirmation of core themes of the Council of Trent’ s theology of justification, without using its specific terminology. A good example lies in the Catholic-Lutheran ‘ Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification’ (1999), whose signature affirmation avoids the terms, while affirming the conceptualities, of justification by faith. 84 ‘ Together we confess: By grace alone, in faith in Christ’ s saving work and not because of any merit on our part, we are accepted by God and receive the Holy Spirit, who renews our hearts while equipping and calling us to good works.’ The continuing vitality and significance of the fundamental themes of the doctrine of justification – though not necessarily its specific vocabulary – within contemporary Catholicism is evident from the apostolic Evangelii Gaudium (‘ The Joy of the Gospel’ , 2013), particularly its affirmation of the sheer graciousness of God’ s work of salvation. ‘ The salvation which God offers us is the work of his mercy. No human efforts, however good they may be, can enable us to merit so great a gift. God, by his sheer grace, draws us to himself and makes us one with him.’ 85 The concept of justification continues, of course, to find use in Catholic theological discourse outside ecumenical contexts – for example, in Hans Urs von Balthasar’ s discussion of the redemptive transformation of the human situation. 86

Ritschl’ s point must be taken with the greatest seriousness. It is important to recall that writers such as Augustine, Aquinas, Luther and Calvin wrote biblical commentaries, as well as more explicitly theological works, often – as in the case of Luther – developing their theologies in direct interaction with the biblical text. In the case of Luther, his closeness to the biblical text has led some scholars to suggest that his theological breakthrough essentially arose through the discovery of a new hermeneutic, so that he read the same texts in a new manner. 89

The importance of this link between theology and the Bible became particularly clear in the early sixteenth century, as the original Greek text of the New Testament became increasingly available to theologians, who found that their theological interpretations of certain texts had been compromised through the inadequate and inaccurate Latin translation of the Vulgate . Yet New Testament scholarship is a moving field, where it is sometimes difficult to speak of a stable consensus. Interpretations of the doctrine of justification are linked with wider discussions about the nature of Paul’ s understanding of the gospel, and particularly the relationship between Christianity and Judaism. 90

The history of Pauline interpretation since about 1800 can be seen as a series of entanglements with interpretatively predisposing presuppositions – such as F. C. Baur ’ s view, set out in Paulus, der Apostel Jesu Christi (‘ Paul, the Apostle of Jesus Christ’ , 1845) of a dialectic in early Christianity between Paul and Gentile Christianity on the one hand, and forms of Jewish Christianity associated with Peter, James, and the rest of the Jerusalem apostles on the other. 91 The close link between Scripture and systematic theology within Protestantism ensured that exegetical outcomes shaped by controlling presuppositions would duly find their way into theological interpretation. 92 These assumptions, however, are often matters of historical contingency, linked with cultural moods and regnant cultural narratives.

Yet Baur’ s discussion of Paul opened up three questions, which remain helpful in reflecting on the manner in which Pauline scholarship shapes discussion of justification, particularly within Protestant circles: the identity and perspectives of Paul’ s opponents as a key to his own life and thought; Paul’ s view of the law and its relationship to his own understanding of the gospel; and the search for the generating centre of Paul’ s theology. 93 Rival answers to these questions were forthcoming – such as J. B. Lightfoot ’ s argument that Paul’ s opponents were not Judaisers, but members of a ‘ Christian Essene’ movement. 94 None of these interpretations, or their later successors – such as those arguing that Paul is best seen against a Hellenistic gnostic background – can be said to command universal assent. 95

The question of the precise role of the concept of justification to Paul’ s understanding of the gospel remains intensely controversial within modern Pauline scholarship. Martin Luther regarded it as central, not simply to the apostle’ s theology, but to the proclamation of the Christian gospel as a whole, a judgement which some leading Protestant theologians maintain to this day. Others, however, have been somewhat more critical of this traditional Lutheran stance, seeing the centre of gravity of Paul’ s thought as lying elsewhere. 96 Indeed, there is disagreement among scholars as to what the idea of such a ‘ centre’ actually means. 97 A principle of coherence? A summarising principle? A criterion of theological authenticity? These difficulties stand in the path of any attempt to reach agreement on the importance of justification to Paul’ s thought. We may briefly note two broad positions within recent scholarship on this question, along with some representative examples of scholars taking such a position.

A concern for historical accuracy is, of course, to be welcomed; historical objectivity is, however, something rather different, and rather more difficult to achieve, not least because the Enlightenment ’ s quest for a disinterested approach to knowledge too easily led to the scholar being seen as detached from the questions under consideration and from any cultural embeddedness which might influence how a text is read or evidence assessed. 105 Such concepts as ‘ objectivity’ and ‘ impartiality’ attained the status of epistemological virtues in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, largely because they bolstered the plausibility of a ‘ view from nowhere’ , untainted by partisan concerns or cultural pre-commitments. 106 Luther certainly reads Paul in the light of his own context; yet his critics sometimes seem to fail to acknowledge the extent to which their own vision is shaped by their somewhat different contexts, or how a more informed reading of the Reformational heritage might illuminate the contemporary interpretation of Paul. 107

In the last fifty years, however, scholars have become increasingly alert to the possibility and dangers of the over-interpretation of Paul. James Dunn is among the more perceptive commentators to urge caution in speaking of a ‘ Pauline theology’ . How can we speak of the theology of Paul rather than merely the theology of his individual letters ? As Dunn points out, ‘ a theology of Paul cannot be more than the sum of the theology of each of the individual letters, and yet it has to be more than simply the sum of the letters’ theologies’ . 108 Dunn’ s point is that although a ‘ Pauline theology’ can be loosely considered to be the greater vision of reality that emerges from the Pauline letters, the decision about how to arrange and correlate its individual components will depend at least in part on the implicit theology of the interpreter. Such an approach to Pauline theology often follows the approach of Philip Melanchthon , 109 and takes the (supposed) argumentative construction of Romans as a framework within which the remainder of the epistolary data can be coordinated and rendered coherent as a doctrinae christianae compendium (‘ compendium of Christian doctrine’ ). 110 The pathway from the Pauline letters to a Christian systematic theology is not straightforward, involving contested hermeneutical and theological presuppositions which require identification and justification.

Yet despite these concerns, it is obvious that Christian theology considers an engagement with Paul’ s letters to be integral to its tasks. The difficulty concerns knowing how what may turn out to be transient episodes in the history of Pauline interpretation can shape theological reflection and articulation. To illustrate this point, we shall briefly note three recent manners of reading Paul, not to determine which of them is right, but to ask what may be learned from their divergence. We shall consider the ‘ New Perspective on Paul’ , represented by James D. G. Dunn and N. T. Wright , and two ‘ Post-New Perspective’ approaches offered by Douglas Campbell and John Barclay .

The ‘ New Perspective’ has its origins in E. P. Sanders ’ s critique of what he saw as a Christian caricature of Judaism as a religion of legalistic works-righteousness perpetuated by the ‘ Lutheran’ interpretation of Paul. This concern fits into a wider framework of debate – such as Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza’ s exaggerated portrayal of an essentially misogynistic Judaism, which contrasts with egalitarian reconstructions of Christian origins, particularly in the circle around Jesus of Nazareth. 111 Schüssler Fiorenza’ s critics can point to the gender-egalitarian impulses in Second Temple Judaism that arguably nurtured Jesus and the early church. 112 In relation to both grace and gender equality, a good case can be made for a re-reading of Palestinian Judaism in relation to early Christianity.

According to Sanders, Palestinian Judaism at the time of Paul could be characterised as a form of ‘ covenantal nomism ’ . The law is here regarded as an expression of the covenant between God and Israel, and is intended to spell out as clearly and precisely as possible what forms of human conduct are appropriate within the context of this covenant. Righteousness is thus defined as behaviour or attitudes which are consistent with being the historical covenant people of God. ‘ Works of the law’ are thus not understood (as Luther suggested) as the means by which Jews believed they could gain access to the covenant, in that they already stood within it. Rather, these works are an expression of the fact that the Jews belonged to the covenant people of God, and were living out their obligations to that covenant. Sanders thus rejects the opinion that ‘ the righteousness which comes from the law’ is ‘ a meritorious achievement which allows one to demand reward from God and is thus a denial of grace’ . ‘ Works of the law’ were understood as the basis not of entry to the covenant, but of maintaining that covenant. As Sanders puts it, ‘ works are the condition of remaining “ in” , but they do not earn salvation’ .

There is perhaps a risk of caricaturing ‘ Lutheran’ readings of the Bible here; however, Sanders’ s point is primarily that Paul was inappropriately read through the spectacles of a later age or a different ideology. 113 Sanders declares that Judaism ‘ kept grace and works in the right perspective’ 114 – a puzzling phrase, it must be said, which appears to suggest that there is some self-evidently ‘ correct’ way of framing the relation of grace and works. For Sanders’ s critics, this appears to indicate that what might be termed a ‘ certain covert Protestantism’ is implicitly presupposed by his analysis. 115

James D. G. Dunn followed through on Sanders’ s challenge to reconsider the interpretation of Paul, through shifting ‘ our perspective back from the sixteenth century to the first century’ , and thus rediscovering Paul as he actually was, rather than being locked into a sixteenth century way of reading Paul. 116 It is an attractive invitation, which immediately invites comparison with Renaissance humanism’ s programmatic attempt to return ad fontes – reading the New Testament without the interpretative filters and presuppositions of later periods, above all those of the Middle Ages.

Dunn argued that Paul’ s concern over the ‘ works of the law’ did not represent a concern about generic attempts to earn salvation through achievement. When Paul used the phrase ‘ the works of the law’ , he was not referring to ‘ good works’ which sought to earn God’ s favour, but to ‘ Jewish works’ (such as circumcision, the Sabbath and the food laws) which marked out Israel as distinct from the Gentiles and thereby became ‘ badges’ of covenant membership. 117 Paul resisted attempts on the part of some Jewish believers to impose such distinguishing ‘ works’ on Gentile Christians because it amounted to an inappropriate ethnocentricity that was inconsistent with his ‘ New Creation’ vision of the unifying of all peoples. As we have seen in this volume, this interpretation of Paul is often encountered in the pre-Augustinian Christian tradition of interpretation of Paul.

The New Perspective thus moves the focus of Paul’ s theology away from a dialectic between grace and legalism (or, to put it another way, between divine initiative and human self-sufficiency) to a dialectic between universalism and ethnic exclusiveness (inclusiveness versus particularism). It is what Paul came to believe about Christ that determines his attitude towards Judaism, not dissatisfaction with Judaism that led him to Christ in the first place. 118 The concept of the ‘ righteousness’ of Christian believers should thus be framed in ways that take full account of its covenantal context. 119 Yet Dunn leaves us with the impression that the ‘ New Perspective ’ , like the ‘ Old Perspective’ , is critical of Judaism; the locus of criticism has simply shifted from its views on ‘ works righteousness’ to its problematic ‘ ethnocentrism’ .

A second scholar who has developed the ‘ New Perspective on Paul’ is the British New Testament scholar N. T. Wright . 120 There is obvious continuity between Wright and Dunn, most notably their shared belief that Pauline ‘ works of the law’ are not to be understood as moral achievements through which one gains merit but the works through which a Jew is defined against Gentiles. Rightly pointing out that this is an important insight, Wright equally correctly points out that this does not settle a wide range of questions which still confront the interpreter of Paul. He here echoes James Dunn ’ s judgement that ‘ the proper reading of Paul from the new perspective of first-century Palestinian Judaism opened up so helpfully by Sanders himself’ has thus far eluded the grasp of scholarship. 121

Wright’ s own approach is intellectually ambitious and engaging, dealing with the larger narratives within which Paul’ s views on justification are located, 122 and considering its implications for Christians living under the Roman imperium . His view on justification could be summarised thus: Justification is the declaration of God, the just judge, that someone has had their sins forgiven and that they are a member of the covenant family, the family of Abraham. 123 Justification thus does not deal with the question of how people get into God’ s forgiven family; it rather declares that they are within the covenant. This fits in well with Wright’ s argument that the ‘ righteousness of God’ in Paul should be understood as ‘ the covenant faithfulness of God’ – a theme that is found in many patristic writers, and which echoes some of the semantic points we considered in the opening chapter of this volume. Wright puts these points succinctly as follows: 124

There is much more that could be said about Dunn and Wright. Both have explored the limitations of an ‘ old perspective’ (although questions need to be asked about the validity and general theological utility of this notion) and proposed re-readings of Paul in its place. Both are equally clear that the ‘ new perspective’ should not be defined or regarded as an alternative to the ‘ old perspective’ . 127 Yet it is quite clear that such ‘ new perspectives’ have only gained partial support, and that others originating from beyond this specific perspective are now competing for attention. We shall consider two such ‘ fresh perspectives’ – again, briefly. Our concern here is to highlight the diversity of such approaches, and consider how this diversity of interpretations feeds into the domain of historical and systematic theology.

One such fresh perspective is due to Douglas Campbell (Duke University), who launched a concentrated attack on the traditional reading of Paul which focussed on ‘ justification by faith’ , arguing that this tradition was compromised by its inappropriately contractual reading of the process of human salvation. 128 Campbell holds that a ‘ successful and constructive theological explanation of Paul’ is not possible on the basis of a focus on his concern with justification, and in its place proposes what he terms a ‘ pneumatologically participatory martyrological eschatology’ as the best way of framing the central concerns of Paul’ s theology. 129 Campbell regards the traditional model of interpreting Paul in terms of justification by faith as rooted in Romans 1– 4; his own model as rooted in Romans 5– 8; and the ‘ salvation-historical’ approach as grounded in Romans 9– 11. These three models are ‘ not really ultimately compatible in rational terms as soteriologies’ in that they make ‘ fundamentally different assumptions about reality, about salvation, and about its appropriation’ . 130

Campbell offers an important methodological criticism of what he considers to be the traditional ‘ Justification Theory’ which Campbell argues that it offers a ‘ plight to solution’ model which begins by defining the human soteriological problem before offering a solution in justification. Campbell argues that the ‘ prospective orientation’ of this ‘ Justification Theory’ is a problem in that it moves from ‘ a particular understanding of the problem to its Christian solution,’ and hence, precisely because it works forward , ‘ its “ Christian” solution is dictated before it arrives by assumptions derived within the problematic pre-Christian state’ . 131 Yet as we have seen, this is not in fact the trajectory of exploration that has been deployed by many Christian theologians and interpreters of Paul (such as Ritschl and Brunner), who begin from the actuality of justification and then move to consider what ‘ plight’ it presupposes.

A second recent alternative to the ‘ New Perspective ’ has been set out by John Barclay (University of Durham), who argues for a reconsideration of what Paul means by grace, and the role it plays in his theology. Barclay’ s theological approach can be described as apocalyptic, in that he regards the Christ-event not as the culmination of a progressive historical narrative, but rather as ‘ a moment that gives meaning to the whole’ . 132 Barclay’ s distinctive contribution to a discussion of Paul’ s theology of grace is his insistence that we need to understand ancient notions of gift if we are to grasp Paul’ s relationship to Judaism, his theology of the Christ-event and his ethic of reciprocal generosity. Barclay thus approaches Paul’ s theology of grace through the lens of the cultural anthropology of ‘ gift’ . This innovative approach marks out his work, and opens up new ways of thinking about grace and justification.

Barclay identifies six ways in which a gift can be ‘ perfected’ , and uses this multi-layered framework to reflect on the nature of God as giver, and the impact of the gift upon those who receive it: 133 (1) superabundance (the generosity and scale of the gift); (2) singularity (the giver is consistently and only benevolent ‒ there is no punishment for evil); (3) priority (the gift is given before there is any initiative on the part of the recipient); (4) incongruity (the gift is given regardless of the worth of the recipient); (5) efficacy (the gift empowers the one to whom it is given); and (6) non-circularity (there is no expected return for the gift). Barclay highlights how modern western understandings of a gift diverge from those of the ancient Greco-Roman world. In that context, gifts and reciprocity were not seen as antithetical but complementary, in that someone was obligated to respond appropriately to a gift. As a result, social bonds were strengthened and formed through both the gift and the response to the gift. 134

For Barclay, Paul’ s theology of grace ‘ perfects the incongruity of the Christ-gift, given without regard to worth’ . Yet this emphasis is not always found in his interpreters. Augustine, for example, develops an understanding of grace that is both incongruous in that it is given to sinners before they were worthy, yet is also congruous since the grace given to the ungodly transforms them in justification. Luther, however, while emphasising the superabundance of grace and its priority, is characterised by his recognition of the incongruity of grace. Barclay thus offers an analytical tool by means of which the reliability of an interpretation of Paul’ s theology of grace can be assessed. While Barclay’ s reading of Luther may need some nuancing, and while he himself fails to apply his approach to patristic and medieval commentators on Paul, other than Augustine, he nevertheless creates a framework of interpretations that others can use for this purpose.

Barclay also demonstrates how this framework helps expose the deficiencies of Sanders’ s ‘ New Perspective’ on Paul. Sanders understands the priority of grace as if it were functionally equivalent to the incongruity of grace. Yet Barclay argues that Judaism, in line with the view of a gift widely held in antiquity, held that grace was given to those who were worthy. Sanders, he suggests, appears to think that Judaism followed an Augustinian view of grace in this respect. Priority and incongruity are not the same. Both Paul and Second Temple Judaism affirmed God’ s grace; Barclay’ s analysis helps us understand that they understood this grace in rather different ways. Barclay’ s approach can be seen as either as ‘ a re-contextualization of the Augustinian-Lutheran tradition’ or as a reconfiguration of the new perspective. 135 Barclay thus allows us to read Paul as criticising all socially constructed value systems. The good news of God’ s grace in Christ, he affirms, ‘ brings into question every pre-existent classification of worth’ . 136 This allows a direct correlation with early patristic exegesis of Paul, where a strict exegetical concern to interpret ‘ works of the law’ linked it directly with the Mosaic law and cult, whereas a recognition that the gospel transcended ethnic boundaries suggested that the term ‘ works of the law’ had cultural equivalents outside Judaism which amounted to socially constructed value systems – and hence could lead to a doctrine of justification by observation of cultural norms.

Catholic biblical scholarship has, on the whole, seen these debates as a characteristically Protestant matter, and does not regard itself as being affected significantly by them. After all, despite reservations that might be expressed about the term, the ‘ old perspective’ was essentially a Lutheran perspective. The renewal of Catholic New Testament studies following the Second Vatican Council can be seen as reflecting the ideas in the constitution Dei verbum , which set out an account of revelation as a multifaceted reality, and outlined an approach to biblical interpretation that endorsed some styles of modern historical critical analysis while insisting that Scripture should be interpreted in the light of a knowledge of what God intended to convey through it. 137 Yet although Catholic biblical scholars have devoted much attention to the relation of Christianity and Judaism, this has tended to focus on issues of exegesis, rather than Paul’ s theology of justification. 138

Yet while such approaches to Paul often fail to achieve a long-term consensus, they nevertheless generate research programmes for historical theology focussing on the questions that they raise – such as whether Christian theologians misunderstood Paul’ s language about ‘ works of the law’ . 139 It remains important that both historical and systematic theology remain in dialogue with New Testament scholarship and – perhaps even more importantly – the biblical text itself.

It is, however, important to distinguish between the cognitive content of a doctrinal statement and its social function – this latter being a historically and culturally contingent phenomenon. One of the sociological functions of doctrinal statements is to distinguish and to divide – whether to distinguish the church from the world, or one Christian group from another. 142 Certain doctrinal statements become identity-giving, not necessarily because they constitute the centre of an ecclesial theological system, but because they serve to guard its peripheries, in effect establishing and policing the often porous boundaries between ecclesial traditions. As noted earlier, the rise of Confessionalism in Germany in the 1560s led to certain Lutheran and Reformed beliefs becoming identity markers, precisely because they enabled insiders and outsiders to distinguish between two otherwise theologically similar ecclesial groupings.

In this section, we shall consider three quite distinct approaches to dealing with the ecumenical aspects of justification. We begin by considering an influential individual exploration of the themes: Hans Küng ’ s 1957 study Rechtfertigung (‘ Justification’ ) in which he argued that there was a basic convergence between the position of Karl Barth on justification and that of the Roman Catholic church, seen in its totality. 143 Küng’ s approach is entirely plausible, given the latitude of interpretation that is possible within the framework of the Tridentine Decree on Justification. A lack of familiarity with both the Decree itself and the debates which led to its formulation may have contributed to a lack of appreciation of the possibilities for dialogue on the part of Protestant theologians.

Küng’ s work is, of course, open to criticism on a number of points. 144 For example, Küng is perhaps somewhat selective in those aspects of Barth’ s theology of justification which he chooses to expound. The obvious differences between Barth and Trent on the question of the freedom of the will and the nature of election are not considered. Furthermore, Küng does not interpret the Tridentine decree on justification in terms of its historical context, and thus presents one interpretation of Trent – as it happens, that approximating most closely to the views of Barth – as if it were the Tridentine doctrine of justification . This point is of particular importance in relation to Trent’ s teaching on merit, as we noted earlier. Küng represents Trent as teaching ‘ no merit whatsoever prior to justification’ – a statement which overlooks the hermeneutical question about what kind of merit is being excluded. With the benefit of hindsight, Küng’ s most significant achievement was to demonstrate the potential of such an ecumenical engagement, and encourage others to develop his approach further.

A quite different approach was developed in the 1994 document ‘ Evangelicals and Catholics Together’ , which mapped out how Catholics and evangelicals could collaborate on social and moral issues in the United States, agreeing to live with their divergences on core themes such as justification. 145 The document was issued in March 1994, and built on the work of Charles Colson and Richard John Neuhaus, who had over time created a network of individual evangelicals and Catholics who were sympathetic to the idea of collaborative witness in the public arena. The group was never intended to represent denominations or denominational concerns, but was envisaged as a working group exploring the ways in which individual Christians might work together in the face of what appeared to be an increasingly hostile public arena. Neither the original document nor subsequent developments of its themes aimed to reconcile Catholicism and evangelicalism on the doctrine of justification; the intention was to allow individual Christians to work together to whatever extent was possible on shared concerns, without resolving their core theological divergences.

It is widely agreed that the Catholic and Lutheran Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification (1999) is the most thorough and theologically significant exploration of the possibilities for convergence between two ecclesial bodies. 146 This document, signed at a ceremony in Augsburg over the weekend of 29‒ 31 October 1999, was widely and rightly seen as a landmark in ecumenical dialogue. It is clear that the participants in the dialogue were informed about and attentive to the historical complexities attending the doctrine of justification, not least the different emphases placed upon it, and the specific ways of conceptualising God’ s gracious reception and transformation of sinners associated with each tradition. As the discussions at Regensburg in 1541 made clear long ago, there were significant limits placed upon finding an agreed formulation on the question of justification. Nevertheless, the Joint Declaration found ways of expressing theological convictions that were central to both traditions. For example, consider the agreed statement on justification: 147 ‘ By grace alone, in faith in Christ’ s saving work and not because of any merit on our part, we are accepted by God and receive the Holy Spirit, who renews our hearts while equipping and calling us to good works.’ The terms ‘ justification’ and ‘ sanctification’ are not used; the fundamental ideas which they express for each tradition are, nevertheless, faithfully echoed within a theological framework that clearly affirms the priority of divine grace.

It is, of course, clear that the central term ‘ grace’ is open to several interpretations. As noted earlier in this work, the term can be used to designate God’ s undeserved favour and a divine power or presence within the human soul that enables us to love God and acts as the basis of transformation. Yet the decision was clearly taken to maximise consensus, without resolving all the issues arising from diverging theological terminologies. Possible misunderstandings of this affirmation about grace are carefully excluded. 148

So what is the overall significance of such ecumenical convergence on justification, however limited and questionable it may be? One answer might be given in dialogue with Alasdair MacIntyre , who points how communities embody ‘ continuities of conflict’ in which their experience of moral, spiritual and intellectual tensions constantly encourage – if not impel – them to find a fuller and more comprehensive statement of their commitments. Conflict, so to speak, is thus a catalyst for reflection and development. For MacIntyre, it is unrealistic to describe the positions of faith communities as ‘ finished systems’ , coherent systems within which questions have been definitively answered. 150 As the history of the development of the doctrine of justification set out in this volume has made clear, the church’ s reflections on justification are a work in progress, not a finished article. We may indeed achieve a necessary clarification of thought in response to a crisis (such as the epochal developments of the sixteenth century); yet this does not shut down the process of reflection and reconsideration within ecclesial communities about how best to express Paul’ s insights on justification, and correlate these with a wider framework of understanding.

A second answer might be framed in terms of exploring what the doctrine of justification by faith commits us to denying. The question here is not primarily what is affirmed, but what is excluded. 151 This approach moves us beyond the somewhat sterile and abstract task of identifying a common core of beliefs, in that it asks us instead to imagine the alternative worlds that are being rejected. A close reading of the Joint Declaration certainly points to some diplomatic ambiguity about what is to be affirmed; it is, however, quite clear what the Declaration is excluding. The Christian does not believe in – in fact, emphatically rejects – the idea of God who is indifferent to our suffering and anguish, and who demands that we achieve moral and spiritual excellence on our own as a precondition for loving and accepting us. The approach, which is easily extended, goes further than affirming what Christians have in common, despite divergences in emphasis and vocabulary; it enables them to understand what they stand against – and why. While there are significant differences between (and within) Christian denominations on how the doctrine of justification is to be interpreted, there remains a shared insight that it liberates us from bondage to false expectations of human agency and achievement.