The Axiom
7
The Human Appropriation of Justification
◈
The medieval theological tradition followed Augustine of Hippo
in insisting that, despite being fallen and frail, humans have a positive role to play in their own justification. Augustine’
s celebrated dictum ‘
The one who made you without you will not justify you without you’
(qui fecit te sine te, non te iustificat sine te
)
1
virtually achieved the status of a theological axiom in the medieval discussion of justification. Attempts to clarify the precise nature of this human role in justification, however, became the subject of considerable disagreement within the medieval theological schools.
It is important to note that the medieval discussion of the appropriation of justification is not framed in terms of the concept of justification by faith.
Justifying faith is universally understood to be a gift of God that is bestowed upon sinful human beings as a result of their disposition towards justification, rather than as a cause of their justification. Any notion of justifying faith being a human work or achievement is excluded from the outset. The medieval discussion of the appropriation of justification is primarily concerned with establishing the conditions upon which justifying grace and faith are bestowed upon the individual by God. There was also widespread recognition that it was not possible to offer a full discussion of the subjective appropriation of justification without reference to the role of the sacraments in justification, to which we shall return in Chapter 10
.
The development of the various traditional positions on the question, which forms the subject of this chapter, will be discussed under four broad headings:
1
The nature of human free will.
2
The understanding of the human capacity for transformation, usually framed in terms of iustitia originalis
(‘
original righteousness’
) and peccatum orignalis
(‘
original sin’
).
3
The necessity and nature of the proper disposition for justification.
4
The origin, interpretation and application of the axiom ‘
God will not deny grace to those who do their best (facienti quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam
)’
.
The Nature of Human Free Will
The influence of Augustine upon the medieval discussion of justification is probably at its greatest in connection with the relation between grace and free will. Although the term liberum arbitrium
is pre-Augustinian and unbiblical, Augustine succeeded in imposing an interpretation upon the term which allowed a profoundly biblical understanding of the human bondage to sin and the need for grace to be maintained, while simultaneously upholding the reality of human free will. This understanding of the nature of human free will would be discussed, and to some extent clarified, in the course of a series of debates immediately succeeding Augustine’
s death, in addition to two during his lifetime –
the Pelagian and Massilian controversies.
In essence, Pelagianism
must be seen as a reforming movement in the increasingly corrupt world of the later Roman empire, especially critical of the growing tendency to see in Christianity an almost magical way of obtaining salvation in the next world without undue inconvenience in the present. It was primarily against this moral laxity that Pelagius
and his supporters protested,
2
apparently unaware that their chief theological opponent shared precisely the same concern. Indeed, many scholars would now suggest that its emphasis on ascetic discipline is one of the least
original aspects of Pelagianism, reflecting a wider western reception of oriental monastic traditions through the translations of Rufinus in the late fourth century. The acquisition of a reliable historical and theological account of Pelagianism remains a work in progress, hindered by polemical framings of the positions of both Pelagius and Augustine, and a lack of detailed documentation concerning the Roman context within which Pelagius and his associates gained spiritual traction.
3
Augustine and Pelagius agree that humanity stands in need of grace, although Pelagius tends to understand this as a general grace
, given in the
endowment of nature (i.e., a ‘
given (datum
)’
rather than in Augustine’
s terms as a specific ‘
gift’
(donum
), enabling humans to perform God’
s will with their natural faculties. It is, however, clear that Pelagius considered that the human moral responsibility which lay at the heart of the quest for a proper morality and spirituality presupposed the freedom of the human will. In creating humans, God gave them the unique privilege of being able to accomplish the divine will by their own choice, setting before them life and death, and bidding them choose the former –
but permitting the final decision to rest with the individuals themselves. Pelagius was resistant to any suggestion that the human liberum arbitrium
was diseased or compromised, leading to an inherent bias towards evildoing. This is brought out clearly in Pelagius’
s letter to Demetrias, a 14-year-old girl who in 412 vowed to live a life of celibacy, which remains one of the most important sources relating to the Pelagian controversy
:
4
‘
No one knows the extent of our strength better than the God who gave us that strength …
God has not willed to command anything impossible, for God is righteous, and will not condemn anyone for what they could not help, for God is holy.’
The Massilian controversy appears to have arisen over Augustine’
s doctrine of predestination. Although this was referred to as the ‘
semi-Pelagian’
controversy in older literature, this designation was a potentially misleading anachronism which has no continuing place in the scholarly discussion. The term ‘
Massilian’
is used by Augustine himself, and eliminates the unjustified comparison with Pelagianism implicit in the term ‘
semi-Pelagianism’
. Augustine described the chief error of the Massilians as lying in their teaching on predestination.
5
Yet at other points, their doctrinal commitments ‘
clearly distinguished them from the Pelagians’
, which contrasts sharply with Prosper of Aquitaine
’
s description of them as the ‘
remnants of the Pelagians (reliquiae Pelagianorum
)’
.
6
Augustine’
s teaching on predestination met with considerable hostility in the southern regions of Gaul. Indeed, Vincent of Lérins appears to have formulated his famous ‘
canon’
with Augustine’
s predestinarianism in mind. The defining characteristic of catholic doctrine is that ‘
it is believed everywhere, always, by everyone’
.
7
As Augustine’
s doctrine of predestination failed to conform to this triple test of ecumenicity,
antiquity and consent, it could not be regarded as catholic. Like Vincent, John Cassian rejected the Pelagian doctrine of the free will, apparently accepting Augustine’
s theology of grace with the specific exception of his doctrines of predestination and irresistible grace.
8
In particular, it may be noted that he appears to have grasped and upheld the Augustinian concept of the dialectic between the liberum arbitrium captivatum
and liberum arbitrium liberatum
: ‘
A person is truly free only who has begun to be your prisoner, O Lord.’
9
Cassian’
s emphasis upon the reality of the human free will has its context in monastic asceticism, with its characteristic stress upon the need for discipline in the spiritual life. Cassian wrote primarily for monks, who may be regarded as having been initiated into the Christian life. It may therefore be assumed that when Cassian speaks of grace, he intends co-operative
rather than operative
grace to be understood (to use Augustine’
s terms). If Cassian appears to be a ‘
synergist’
, it is because, like Augustine, he asserts the synergy of grace and free will after
justification. Furthermore, it may be pointed out that Cassian’
s emphasis upon prayer
as a means for improving the spiritual condition is a sign of the importance
he attaches to grace, rather than of his rejection
of its necessity, as some have supposed. Perhaps the real difficulty is that these debates tended to be framed in a binary manner: either liberum arbitrium
or gratia
–
but not both.
10
The Synod of Jerusalem (July 415) and the Synod of Diospolis (December 415) led to mild censure of Pelagianism
, with the influence of Augustine much in evidence. Neither of these synods can be considered to be significant in comparison with the Council of Carthage (418), whose canons would receive wide acceptance in the Catholic church, and feature prominently in medieval discussions of the nature of the Pelagian error.
11
Of these canons, the most important is the fifth, which teaches the impotence of human free will unless aided by grace, and the further necessity of grace to enable humans to fulfil the commandments of the law. The Council of Ephesus (431) condemned both Nestorianism and Pelagianism (the latter in the form associated with Caelestius
), although the council does not appear to have recognised the potential theological connection between the two heresies so ably summarised in the famous dictum ‘
The Nestorian Christ is the fitting saviour of the Pelagian man’
.
The most specific attack upon Pelagianism to be
found in a fifth-century authoritative source is that of the Indiculus de gratia Dei
(431),
usually regarded as the work of Prosper of Aquitaine. Its chapters explicitly reject the Pelagian understandings of the nature of grace and the capabilities of human free will. Individuals cannot rise from the depths of Adam’
s sin unless the grace of God should lift them up. Even after justification, humans require God’
s grace if they are to persevere. The most important statement of the document relates to the effects of grace upon free will; the Indiculus
makes it clear that grace liberates
rather than abolishes
the human liberum arbitrium
.
12
The definitive pronouncement of the early western church on the Pelagian and Massilian controversies may be found in the Second Council of Orange (529). This local council, which appears to have been respected only in the locality of southern Gaul, declared that to teach that the ‘
freedom of the soul’
remained unaffected by the Fall was Pelagian.
13
Canon 1. If anyone denies that it is the whole human being –
that is, both body and soul –
that was changed for the worse through the guilt of Adam’
s sin, but believes that the freedom of the soul remains unaffected and that only the body is subject to corruption, he is deceived by the error of Pelagius
.
Faustus of Riez’
s doctrine of the initium fidei
–
that is, that humans can take the initiative in their own salvation –
was explicitly rejected; not only the beginning
, but also the increase
of faith, are alike gifts of grace. While the council declared that the human liberum arbitrium
is injured, weakened and diminished, its existence was not questioned.
14
The impact of this Council on the medieval discussion of justification was very limited, perhaps because it was a local council, attended only by a dozen bishops. For whatever reason, the Council’
s decisions do not appear to have been discussed or incorporated into reflection on the doctrine of justification from the tenth century to the middle of the sixteenth.
15
The twelfth century witnessed the emergence of a broad consensus on the issues of grace and free will. Pope Leo IX’
s ‘
Confession of Faith’
(1053) set out the relationship between the two as follows: grace precedes and follows humans, yet in such a manner that it does not compromise their free will.
16
Anselm of Canterbury
defined free will as the power
(potestas
) of preserving the rectitudo voluntatis
: humanity, though fallen, still possesses this potestas
, and can therefore be said to possess libertas arbitrii.
However, no power is capable of actualising its potential unaided,
17
and if the potestas
of the human free will is to be realised it must be actualised by God’
s general or special concursus.
In effect, Anselm’
s definition of free will is such that a positive answer to the question of whether humans can justify themselves is excluded from the outset; as only God can convert potestas
to actus
, so only God can justify.
Anselm’
s definition of free will was seen as deficient by some of his successors, such as Philip the Chancellor.
18
It was all very well to define it as ‘
the ability to preserve rectitude of will for the sake of rectitude itself (potestas conservandi rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem
). But while Anselm identifies the final cause of free will, he did not explain what we are free from, or what we are free to do. Philip located his understanding of freedom in a capacity to do good, and to avoid evil.
19
Albert the Great noted ways in which Anselm’
s definition might be expanded.
20
Free will can be defined in many ways. For if it is defined with regard to its outworking, in those things it is able to do from its own nature as such, then it is an ability to incline to opposite outcomes. If, however, it is defined according to the term ‘
freedom’
, then it is a power of doing what it wishes. …
If it is defined in relation to the end to which it habitually inclines, then free judgment is, as Anselm says, the power of preserving rectitude of will for its own sake.
This concept of the divine actualisation of potestas
found its expression in the thirteenth-century doctrine of the concursus simultaneus.
There was, however, considerable confusion concerning exactly how potency was reduced to act; according to some, the agent involved was the Holy Spirit, while others considered it to be actual or habitual grace.
21
Underlying these discussions was the basic conviction, expressed by Peter Lombard
in his Sentences
, that the human liberum arbitrium
cannot do good unless it is first liberated (liberatum
) and subsequently assisted by grace.
22
‘
Free will (liberum arbitrium
) is a faculty of reason and will,
which chooses the good when grace assists it, or the bad when grace is lacking.’
23
The subsequent lack of clarity concerning the precise nature of the concursus
probably reflects a corresponding imprecision concerning the nature of grace itself, so characteristic a feature of early scholasticism.
The apparent medieval ignorance of the canons of Orange II is of particular importance in relation to the evaluation of the ‘
Pelagianism
’
of the teaching on human liberum arbitrium
associated with the via moderna
.
We shall illustrate this with reference to Gabriel Biel
. The relevance of Gabriel Biel’
s doctrine of liberum arbitrium
to the development of Luther’
s doctrine of servum arbitrium
has been emphasised by many scholars,
24
as it is now generally accepted that Luther’
s Disputatio contra scholasticam theologiam
(1517) is specifically directed against Biel, rather than against ‘
scholastic theology’
in general. Following the common teaching of the via moderna
, Biel declines to distinguish human intellect and will, so that liberum arbitrium
, libertas
and voluntas
are regarded as being essentially identical. This approach to the question leads to a strong assertion of the freedom of the will, as libertas
is regarded as a corollary of rationality. That the will is free is evident from experience, and requires no further demonstration. For Biel, free will is the power of the soul which allows the viator
to distinguish and choose between good and evil, by which he is distinguished from other animals.
25
The theological consequences of Biel’
s doctrine of liberum arbitrium
may be stated as follows:
26
1
The human free will may choose a morally good act by purely natural means (ex puris naturalibus
), without the need for grace.
2
Humans are able, by the use of their free will and other natural faculties, to implement the law by their own power, but are unable to fulfil the law in the precise manner which God intended (that is, quoad substantiam actus
, but not quoad intentionem praecipientis
).
3
Ex puris naturalibus
the free will is able to avoid mortal sin, to love God above everything else, and to dispose itself towards the reception of the gift of grace.
Some scholars have interpreted Biel as teaching a form of Pelagianism in these matters. However, this is open to challenge. As Biel himself makes clear, his discussion of the role of individuals in their own justification must be set within the context of the divine pactum
. The requirement of a
minimum response on the part of humans of the divine offer of grace is totally in keeping with the earlier Franciscan school’
s teaching, such as that of Alexander of Hales or Bonaventure
. Biel has simply placed his theology of a minimum human response to the divine initiative in justification on a firmer foundation in the theology of the pactum
, thereby safeguarding God from the charge of capriciousness.
Biel’
s modern critics’
surprise at the absence of contemporary criticism of his teaching as Pelagian simply reflects the fact that, by the standards of the time, Biel’
s doctrine of justification would not have been considered Pelagian.
27
There is a serious risk of anachronism in applying one era’
s understanding of ‘
Pelagianism’
to another, which based its judgements on different criteria. The sole legitimate criteria by which the ‘
Pelagianism’
of Biel’
s doctrine of justification may be judged are the canons of the Council of Carthage –
the only criteria which medieval doctors then possessed, for reasons we have already noted. Biel’
s high regard for the tradition of the church is such that he accepts whatever the church defined as being de fide.
Biel’
s attitude to tradition is such that, had he known of the decrees of Orange II, he would have incorporated their substance into his doctrine of justification as binding determinationes ecclesiae
.
28
In general, although the assertion that humanity possesses the freedom to respond to the divine initiative in justification is characteristic of the medieval period, this consensus was accompanied by widespread disagreement as to the precise nature of the freedom in question, and whether it could be regarded as given in nature or acquired through grace. This point becomes particularly clear in the medieval discussion of the axiom facienti quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam
, to which we shall return later.
Predispositions for Justification: Original Righteousness and Original Sin
In an earlier section, we noted the importance of grace in relation to the justification of humanity. For Augustine and his followers, human nature was wounded or damaged by sin, and hence requires assistance if it is to be healed and renewed. For Augustine, the human situation had to be framed in terms of ‘
original sin’
–
a condition or predisposition which
was inherited, not acquired, and which affected the human capacity to desire and attain a state of ‘
righteousness’
or ‘
rightness’
with God. It is therefore appropriate to consider how medieval theologians developed their thinking on human predispositions towards justification, which were traditionally set out in terms of original righteousness (iustitia originalis
) and original sin (peccatum originalis
).
One of the most important aspects of the early Dominican school’
s teaching on justification relates to the question of ‘
original justice’
, iustitia originalis.
The thirteenth century witnessed considerable discussion of the question of whether the first human was created in a state of grace or a purely natural state. The general consensus in the earlier part of the period was that Adam was created in the integrity of nature, but not in a state of grace. If Adam received the gift of sanctifying grace, he did so voluntarily.
29
In his earlier works, Thomas Aquinas
appears to register a hesitant disagreement with the opinion of Albertus Magnus
on this question. It seems clear that Thomas favoured the opinion that Adam received grace at the instant of his creation, as judged from his discussion of the matter in the Commentary on the Sentences
.
30
This opinion is unequivocally stated in the later disputed questions De malo
, which affirms that iustitia originalis
, which Adam received at the moment of his creation, included sanctifying grace (gratia gratum faciens
).
31
Much the same view is advocated in the Summa Theologiae
, in an important discussion of the Old Testament locus which usually constituted the point of departure for speculation on this matter: Deus fecit hominem rectum
(Ecclesiastes 7:30). What can this mean except that God created humanity, and then bestowed original justice upon it? The basis of this original justice must be considered to be the supernatural submission of the will to God, which can be effected only through sanctifying grace.
32
This original justice pertains to the essence of the soul, and is inherent within humans. Thomas is careful to point out that this does not amount to an equation of nature and grace. For Thomas, the status naturae integrae
is merely an abstraction; not even Adam could ever be said to have existed in this state, for at the instant of his creation he was
endowed with the donum supernaturale
of gratia gratum faciens
. Although nature must be regarded as being good, it is nevertheless incomplete, and requires ordering towards its principal good (i.e., the enjoyment of God) through the aid of supernatural grace. It therefore follows that original sin may be formally defined as the privation of original righteousness.
A somewhat different approach was characteristic of the early Franciscan school, which is generally agreed to take its theological inspiration from its first great Parisian master, Alexander of Hales, who caused a scandal at Paris by ceasing to be a secular priest, and joining the Friars Minor. The work generally known as the Summa Fratris Alexandri
,
long thought to be an authentic work of Alexander’
s, is now recognised as being composite.
33
Alexander’
s authentic lectures on the Sentences
, generally considered to date from the period 1222–
9, were discovered in the form of students’
notes in 1946.
34
On the basis of these, and a series of disputed questions which antedate his joining the Franciscan order, it is possible to argue that the main features of the early Franciscan school’
s teaching on justification are essentially identical with the early teaching of Alexander of Hales. In other words, Alexander does not appear to have modified his theology significantly upon joining the Friars Minor, and subsequent Franciscan masters reproduced his teachings as the authentic teaching of their order. This is particularly the case in his teaching on original justice.
Alexander notes that there are two opinions concerning Adam’
s pristine state: the first is that he was created in a purely natural state; the second that he was created in a state of gratia gratum faciens
.
35
Again appealing to Ecclesiastes 7:30, Deus fecit hominem rectum
, Alexander draws a distinction between natural and gratuitous justice, and argues that the verse in question clearly refers to a state of natural justice.
36
In this, he was followed by Odo Rigaldi
, who taught that Adam was created in a state of purely natural justice and innocence, relying upon actual grace (gratia gratis data
) rather than gratia gratum faciens
.
37
Bonaventure
similarly states that humans were endowed with gratia gratis data
but not gratia gratum faciens
at their creation.
38
For many theologians of the medieval period, original sin is essentially a loss of original righteousness, while the process of justification brings about its partial restoration. The prime effect of the first sin, according to Thomas, is thus the instantaneous fall of Adam from the supernatural
plane to which he had been elevated at the moment of his creation through gratia gratum faciens
to the purely natural
plane. The human nature which is transmitted to us from Adam is thus a nature which is deprived of the supernatural gifts once bestowed upon Adam, but capable of receiving such gifts subsequently –
a principle expressed succinctly in the theological maxim anima naturaliter capax gratiae
.
39
However, original sin was recognised to be inadequately described purely in terms of an absence of original righteousness.
40
While it was possible to suggest, following Anselm of Canterbury
, that original sin was essentially a privation of original righteousness (privatio iustitiae originalis
), many insisted that original sin had to be seen as an inclination away from God, carrying with it associations of guilt, fallenness and disruption.
41
These themes, it may be noted, are found in many popular religious writings of the Middle Ages, such as Langland’
s Piers Plowman
.
42
Although many have argued that the fourteenth-century theologian Thomas Bradwardine
sets out a radically Augustinian theology, rejecting the thesis that anything in humanity is the cause of its justification, the grounds of Bradwardine’
s views at this point are metaphysical. Bradwardine’
s rejection of any ratio iustificationis ex parte creaturae
are Aristotelian in nature, rather than Augustinian, in that he holds that God is the efficient, formal and final cause of everything which occurs concerning his creatures, so that the creature has no role to play in the causal sequence whatsoever.
43
The human need for grace in justification is a consequence of their creatureliness
, rather than of their sinfulness as a result of the Fall. Bradwardine’
s view of causality appears to make God the author of human evil; more significantly, it makes it deeply problematic to think of Bradwardine as Augustinian in any meaningful sense of the term.
This point was made by many Augustinian writers in the decades following the appearance of De causa Dei
. Johannes Klenkok and Hugolino of Orvieto
both regarded Bradwardine as asserting a metaphysical
determinism which owed nothing to Augustine.
44
Similar criticisms were made by the later Augustinians Johannes Hiltalingen of Basel and Angelus Dobelinus, the first professor of theology at the university of Erfurt.
45
It is also possible that Bradwardine is the ‘
modern doctor’
who is the target of Gregory of Rimini
’
s criticisms of the intrusion of metaphysical determinism into theology.
46
Yet for our purposes, perhaps the most important consequence of original sin is the recognition of the need for some kind of ‘
disposition’
for justification, to which we now turn.
The Necessity and Nature of the Proper Disposition for Justification
What happens before the sinner is justified? Is justification preceded by a preparation on the part of sinners to receive the gift that God subsequently gives to them? And if this is the case, is God obliged to bestow the gift in question upon such sinners on account of their having prepared themselves to receive it? The twelfth century saw a growing conviction that some form of preparation was required of humans in advance of their justification. Peter of Poitiers
used a domestic analogy to illustrate the role of such a preparation for justification. A person may clean out their house and decorate it in order to receive an important guest, so that all will be ready when the guest arrives. This preparation, however, does not necessitate the arrival of the guest, which depends only upon the guest’
s love for the host.
47
The necessity of a preparation or disposition for justification was insisted upon by both the early Franciscan and the Dominican schools, although, as we shall demonstrate, for very different reasons. The pre-Bonaventuran Franciscan school demonstrates a degree of uncertainty on the question, partly due to a related lack of clarity concerning the concept of created grace. Alexander of Hales may have seemed to limit the human role in justification to not resisting grace,
48
but his teaching
was developed by John of La Rochelle
in a significant direction. John insists upon the need for a disposition for justification in people, in that the recipients of uncreated grace –
that is, of the Holy Spirit –
are unable to receive it unless their souls have first been prepared for it. The need for such a disposition does not result from any deficiency on the part of God. John draws a distinction between sufficiency on the part of the agent (i.e., God) and that on the part of the recipient in justification. God is all-sufficient in justification, but the recipient of uncreated grace must first be disposed for its reception by created grace.
49
Odo Rigaldi
likewise distinguished between the gift of the uncreated grace of the Holy Spirit and the disposition of the human soul towards the reception of this gift by created grace.
50
(It may be noted that Odo appears unclear as to the nature of created grace, tending to regard it as a hybrid species.)
51
This unclarity was resolved by the Summa Fratris Alexandri
in what appears to have been the first systematic discussion of the nature of created grace.
52
Gratia ponit aliquid in anima
; grace places something in the soul. But what? The Summa
begins by considering the concept of uncreated grace, which transforms the human soul in justification.
53
If uncreated grace did not alter the soul in justification, there would be no difference between the justified and the unjustified sinner. Uncreated grace may therefore be considered as the forma transformans
and created grace as the forma transformata.
54
This important interpretation of the nature of created grace points to its being a quality of the soul –
that is, a disposition
, rather than a substance.
The Holy Spirit can be said to dwell in the souls of the justified as in a temple; this is impossible unless there is something within the soul which, although not itself the temple, is able
to transform the soul into such a temple capable of receiving the Holy Spirit.
55
This interpretation of the nature and function of created grace is closely linked with the anthropology of the early Franciscan school, according to which the human soul is not naturally capable of receiving grace. In order for the human soul to receive grace, it must first be disposed to receive it. By contrast, the early Dominican school maintained that the human soul is naturally capable of receiving grace (anima naturaliter est gratiae capax
), reflecting a quite different understanding of humanity’
s pristine state. The disposition of the human soul for the reception of uncreated grace is understood by the Summa
to be a quality of the soul brought about by the action of grace, and which may be termed created grace.
It will, however, be clear that there was still uncertainty as to whether gratia creata
was to be considered as the disposition towards the reception of uncreated grace
or the result of the reception of uncreated grace.
This basic teaching of the early Franciscan school was developed along more psychological lines by Bonaventure
. Human nature is sufficiently frail that it is simply incapable of receiving the gift of sanctifying grace unless it is prepared beforehand.
56
This disposition towards justification is effected with the assistance of prevenient grace, gratia gratis data
, and cannot be brought about by the unaided free will.
57
The transition from nature to grace is achieved by prevenient grace disposing the human soul to receive the supernatural gift of habitual grace. Matthew of Aquasparta
reports the opinion that a preparation for justification is useless and unnecessary, since grace is given to humans according to their natural aptitudes and capacities.
58
This opinion is to be rejected, he argues, as being improbable and contrary to experience; humans cannot prepare themselves for justification without gratia gratis data
, which moves and excites the will to detest sin and desire justification. Following Bonaventure, Matthew emphasises the frailty of human nature; just as humans cannot look at the sun until they have become accustomed to its brilliance
by appropriate preparation, so free will cannot prepare itself for the light of grace unless itself moved by grace.
59
In effect, actual grace is conceived as a medium between the states of nature and supernature; it is impossible to proceed directly from one to the other, and gratia gratis data
provides the intermediate position by which the transition may be concluded.
60
Richard of Middleton distinguished between a proximate
and a remote
disposition towards justification.
61
Humans may dispose themselves towards their own justification by virtue of their own powers; this disposition, however, is remote, and not an immediate disposition towards justification, which may be effected only through actual grace exciting and illuminating the human mind.
62
It is clear that Richard understands actual grace to refer primarily to a special supernatural motion directly attributable to the Holy Spirit.
63
Unlike habitual grace, no disposition is required for actual grace. Thus Roger of Marston emphasised that the gift of actual grace is the first gift by which God prepares the human will for grace, and does not itself require any preparation for justification.
64
In general, the strongly Augustinian illuminationism of the early Franciscan school led to a theology of justification in which the necessity of a disposition or preparation towards justification was maintained on the grounds of the frailty of the unaided human intellect.
65
Just as the human intellect was incapable of attaining and comprehending divine truth unless illuminated directly by God,
66
so the human will was incapable of desiring or attaining justification unless similarly illuminated.
The early Dominican school also taught the need for a disposition for justification, but for quite different reasons. The axiom naturaliter est anima gratiae capax
is particularly associated with the early Dominican school, and on the basis of this anthropology there would appear to be no prima facie case for the necessity of a disposition towards the reception of grace. If the human soul is naturally capable of receiving grace, there would seem to be no compelling reason to posit such a necessity. The early Franciscan school had proposed the necessity of such a disposition on the grounds that a transformation of the natural state of the human soul was required in order for it to be capax gratiae.
It is therefore
important to observe that the theologians of the early Dominican school, particularly Thomas Aquinas
, deduced the necessity of such a disposition on the basis of the Aristotelian analysis of motion
.
67
Grace, being a form, exists as a disposition in the subject who receives it. Application of the Aristotelian theory of generation to this results in the deduction of a stage of preparation. Albertus Magnus
did not develop this question at any length,
68
and it is with Thomas Aquinas that its full statement may be found.
In his Commentary on the Sentences
(1254–
7), Aquinas considers the question of whether someone can prepare for grace without the assistance of grace (utrum homo possit se praeparare ad gratiam sine aliqua gratia
.)
69
His answer involves distinguishing two understandings of grace, either as the arousal of the human will through divine providence, or as a habitual gift in the soul. In both cases, a preparation for grace is necessary, in that justification, being a motus
, requires premotion on the basis of the Aristotelian theory of generation. ‘
Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur
.’
Grace, being a form, exists as a disposition in the subject who receives it. So how can the human free will be prepared to receive the gift of habitual grace? Thomas points out that the preparation cannot take the form of a second habitual gift, as this would merely result in an infinite regression of habitual gifts; some gratuitous gift of God is required, moving the soul from within. While humans are converted to their ultimate end by the prime mover (God), they are converted to their proximate end (i.e., the state of justification itself) by the motion of some inferior mover.
70
In the Commentary on the Sentences
, Aquinas had treated the premotion required for justification as being external and natural –
the examples which he provides of such premotions include admonition by another person, or a physical illness. In the later Quaestiones disputatae de veritate
(1256–
9), however, Aquinas acknowledges an internal means of premotion, divinus instinctus secundum quod Deus in mentibus hominum operatur
,
71
although it appears that his most characteristic position remains that humans can naturally dispose themselves towards the reception of grace.
The Summa contra Gentiles
(1258–
64) is generally regarded as marking a turning point in Aquinas’
s teaching on the nature of the preparation for justification. It appears that the pseudo-Aristotelian Liber de bona fortuna
first came to Thomas’
s attention during this period.
72
In this work, Aquinas described the ‘
errors of the Pelagians’
as lying in the assertion that the beginning of human justification is a human achievement, while its consummation is the work of God.
73
The crucial statement which marks Aquinas’
s changed views on the question is the following: ‘
Matter does not move itself to its own perfection; therefore it must be moved by something else.’
Therefore, humans cannot move themselves to receive grace, but are rather moved by God to receive it.
74
The Quodlibetum primum
, dating from Aquinas’
s second Paris period, attributes the beginnings of human justification to an internal operation of God, by which God acts on the will internally to cause it to do good.
75
The essential difference between Aquinas’
s early and mature opinions on the question, as determined from the Commentary on the Sentences
and the Summa Theologiae
respectively, is that while in both cases he asserted the need for premotion for the motus mentis
of justification, the early opinion that the ‘
inferior mover’
causing that premotion was a human agency was rejected in favour of the later opinion that the ‘
inferior mover’
was God. Human preparation for justification is thus understood to be a divine work, so that no preparation is required for the justification of humans which God does not provide.
76
The preparation for grace in humans is the work of God as the prime mover and of the free will as the passive entity which is itself moved.
77
Aquinas’
s discussion of the justification of humanity therefore proceeds along thoroughly Aristotelian lines, presupposing that there are two unequal stages in the process: the praemotio
(i.e., the preparation for justification as the proximate end), and the motus
itself (i.e., the movement from the natural to the supernatural plane, with the infusion of supernatural justice). Aquinas understands the priority of the premotion over the motion to be by nature
and not in time
; the two may coincide temporally, as in the case of the conversion of Paul.
78
The later medieval period saw the need for a human disposition towards justification accepted as axiomatic. The disputed aspects of the matter related primarily to the question of whether this disposition was itself a work of grace, or a purely human act performed without the aid of grace. Thus Luther’
s mentor Johannes von Staupitz affirmed the necessity of a proper disposition for justification, even though he stressed the moral impotence of fallen humans and taught gratuitous election ante praevisa menta.
79
This brings us to the question of the nature
of the disposition towards justification, which was practically invariably discussed in terms of the axiom facienti quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam
(‘
God does not deny grace to someone who does their best’
) It is to this axiom that we now turn.
The theologians of the early medieval period worked within a broad consensus that humanity and God have their respective roles to play in justification; when humans have fulfilled their obligations through penitence, God will subsequently bestow grace upon the penitent. The theological principle underlying the axiom may be shown to have achieved acceptance in the early patristic period. Irenaeus
of Lyons, for example, writing in the second century, remarked that ‘
if you offer to [God] what is yours, that is faith in God and subjection, you shall receive grace, and become a perfect work of God’
.
80
The medieval period saw this axiom become a dogma, part of the received western tradition concerning justification. The final verbal form of the axiom can be shown to have been fixed in the twelfth century, although it was widely used in slightly different forms, adapted to various contexts.
81
For example, Stephen Langton
, an important member of the circle of theologians who gathered around Peter the Chanter,
82
informed his audience that they ought to do what was required of them, because God could be relied upon to do what was required of him.
83
An excellent example of a pastoral application of the axiom is found in the Homilies
of Radulphus
Ardens:
84
‘
It is as if the Lord had said: “
Do what is appropriate for you, and I will do what is appropriate for me. I will make you my friend, and act for you; you, as my friends, will love me and keep my commandments.”’
Yet does a person’
s action place God under an obligation
to act in this way? Does someone doing quod in se est
mean that God is now coerced to bestow grace upon them? If so, this action could be deemed to be meritorious, at least in some sense of the term. The idea that humans could, by doing ‘
what lies within them’
(quod in se est
) place God under an obligation to reward them with grace is particularly well illustrated from the works of Stephen Langton
and others influenced by him in the twelfth century.
85
The use of debere
by an anonymous twelfth-century writer in this connection is of significance, as it specifically and explicitly uses the language of obligation
in relation to God: if someone does what they are required to do, God must respond accordingly. Si homo facit, quod suum est, Deus debet facere, quod suum est
.
86
This view is echoed by some other twelfth-century theologians, such as Robert Pullen. Drawing on the imagery of James 4:8 (‘
Draw near to God, and he will draw near to you’
), Pullen argued that humans, by drawing near to God, placed God under an obligation to draw near to them.
87
The relationship between the human penitential preparation for justification and the divine justification of humanity which followed it was the subject of considerable discussion among twelfth-century theologians, especially in exploring the correlation between the human attitude of penitence and the penitential structures and ministries of the church. This potential correlation of theology and ecclesial ministry was envisaged by the ninth-century writer Rabanus Maurus
, who argued for a link between justification and sacerdotal confession in particular, rather than a personal act of contrition
or repentance.
In general, the possibility of a penitential preparation for grace being an efficient
cause of justification was rejected; most theologians appear to have adopted a solution similar to that of Alan of Lille
. According to Alan, the preparation of humanity for justification could be likened to opening a shutter to let sunlight into a room. The act of penitence was
the causa sine qua non
and the occasio
, but not the causa efficiens
, of justification:
88
Penitence is indeed a necessary cause [of grace], in that unless someone is penitent, God will not forgive that person’
s sins. It is like the sun, which illuminates a house when a shutter (fenestra
) is opened. The opening of that shutter is not the efficient cause of that illumination, in that the sun itself is the efficient cause of that illumination. However, [the opening of that shutter] is nevertheless its occasion.
In effect, the preparation of humanity for justification may be regarded as the removal of an obstacle to grace (removens prohibens
). This analysis was placed upon a firmer basis by Hugh of St Cher
, who distinguished three aspects of the remission of sin: abandoning acts of sin, removing sin’
s stain or guilt, and resolving its debt (actus peccandi desertio
, maculae sive culpae deletio
, reatus solutio
). The act of sinning is an obstacle to grace, and humans, by ceasing to perform acts of sin, remove this obstacle and thus prepare the way for grace to be infused into their souls.
89
Although only God is able to forgive sin, humans are able to set in motion a series of events that culminate in forgiveness of sins by the act of ceasing to perform acts of sin, which lies within their own powers. Humans do what is asked of them, and God subsequently does the rest.
The origins of the interpretation of the axiom characteristic of the early Franciscan school are thought to lie with John of La Rochelle
, who argues that since humans cannot dispose themselves adequately for grace, so the required disposition must be effected by God. God effects this disposition conditionally, if humans do quod in se est.
John uses Alan of Lille
’
s analogy of the opening of a shutter to illustrate this point: the opening of the shutter permits the light of the sun to dispel darkness, just as the act of doing quod in se est
permits the grace of God to dispel sin. Although humans do not have the power to dispel darkness, they do have the power to initiate a course of action which has this effect, by opening a shutter and thus removing the obstacle to the sun’
s rays; similarly, although humans do not have the ability to destroy sin, they can remove the obstacles to divine grace, which then effects the required destruction of sin.
90
God continually and generously bestows
grace, and by doing quod in se est
, humans remove any obstacles in the path of that grace.
91
Odo Rigaldi
similarly teaches that grace is given to those who dispose themselves to receive it by doing quod in se est
–
for example, by attrition. The subsequent gift of grace transforms this to contrition
, which in turn leads to the remission of sins.
92
To anticipate a distinction we shall consider later in this chapter, while this disposition towards grace cannot be considered to be meritorious in the strict sense of the term (i.e., de condigno
), it can be considered meritorious de congruo
.
93
The Summa Fratris Alexandri
considers the case of good pagans, who are ignorant of the Christian faith, and argues that if they do quod in se est
–
which is clearly understood as a purely natural act –
God will somehow enlighten them, in order that they may be justified.
94
Humans prepare themselves for justification by receiving the dignitas congruitatis
which arises from the proper use of their natural faculties of reason or free will.
95
Similarly, Bonaventure
argues that, although gratia gratis data
stirs the will, it remains within the power of the human free will to respond to or reject this excitation. Bonaventure frequently stresses that God does not justify humans without their consent, giving grace in such a way that the free will is not coerced into accepting it.
96
The interpretation of the axiom within the early Dominican school was initially somewhat confused, as Thomas Aquinas
presents radically different interpretations of the axiom in his Commentary on the Sentences
and the later Summa Theologiae.
In the Commentary
, Aquinas concludes his discussion of the human preparation for grace with what seems to be a Pelagian interpretation of the axiom: humans can prepare themselves for justification by virtue of their own natural abilities, unaided by grace.
97
This disposition, Aquinas adds, is meritorious de congruo
.
98
God continuously offers grace to humans, and anyone who does quod in se est
necessarily receives it.
99
This can be seen as representing a further
development of Alan of Lille
’
s analogy of the opening of a shutter. Philip the Chancellor had earlier applied the Aristotelian categories of material and formal causality to the sun and the opening of the shutter respectively, so that the formal (i.e., the immediate) cause of justification is the human preparation for justification, understood as the removal of obstacles to grace. Aquinas was thus able to formalise his causal scheme in Aristotelian terms, further enhancing the Aristotelian cast of his discussion of the doctrine of justification.
Critics of Aquinas’
s early teaching on justification, particularly within the early Franciscan school, pointed out that he allowed a purely natural disposition towards justification, which was clearly contrary to the teaching of Augustine.
100
It is therefore important to appreciate that his mature teaching, as expressed in the Summa Theologiae
(1266–
73), is significantly different. Later commentators frequently highlighted these differences; for example, several fifteenth-century manuscripts refer to ‘
conclusions in which St Thomas seems to contradict himself’
, or ‘
articles in which Thomas says one thing in the Summa
, and something different in his writings on the Sentences
’
, or –
more diplomatically! –
‘
articles in which Thomas expresses himself better in the Summa
than in his writings on the Sentences
’
.
101
While Aquinas continued to insist upon the necessity of a preparation for justification, and frames this in terms of people doing quod in se est
, he now considers that this preparation for grace must be considered to lie beyond purely natural human powers. Humans are not even capable of their full natural
good, let alone the supernatural
good required of them for justification. The preparation for justification is therefore itself to be seen as a work of grace,
102
in which God is active and humans are passive. For Aquinas, the axiom facienti quod in se est
now come to mean that God will not deny grace to those who do their best, in so far as they are moved by God to do this.
103
It is highly significant that Aquinas does not follow the early Franciscan school in applying the axiom to the good pagan in the Summa
, even where it would be expected at IIa–
IIae q. 10
a. 1.
104
Aquinas now understands quod in se est
to mean ‘
doing what one is able to do when aroused and moved by grace’
, thus marking a significant departure from his earlier interpretation of the concept. A similar interpretation of quod in se est
is encountered in the writings of Peter of Tarantaise.
105
A further development may be noted in relation to Aquinas’
s teaching on the meritorious character of the disposition towards justification. In the Commentary on the Sentences
, Aquinas allows that such a disposition is meritorious de congruo
.
106
In the later De veritate
, however, we find an unequivocal assertion that there are no merits save de
merits prior to justification,
107
a view which finds fuller expression in the Summa Theologiae.
Although Aquinas is prepared to allow that a justified sinner can merit de congruo
the first grace for another person,
108
he is not prepared to allow the individual’
s preparation for their own justification to be deemed meritorious, even in this weak sense of the term.
109
Significantly, Peter of Tarantaise –
who reproduces Aquinas’
s interpretation of quod in se est
–
declines to follow him in this matter, teaching that the preparation for justification is meritorious de congruo
.
110
It is thus clear that there was some divergence within the early Dominican school upon this matter.
An examination of the writings of later medieval theologians of the Augustinian order also reveals a significant lack of agreement concerning the interpretation of the axiom. Thomas of Strasbourg states that those who do quod in se est
cannot be regarded as preparing themselves for justification; the role of individuals in their own justification lies in their consenting to the divine action which is taking place within them.
111
In this he is followed, as in so many other matters, by Johannes von Retz.
112
Thomas is, however, prepared to allow that this disposition towards justification is meritorious de congruo
.
113
Retz’
s rejection of the possibility
of a purely natural
disposition for grace is of interest, as it proceeds upon Aristotelian presuppositions. Justification involves a transition from form to matter. Just as a natural form is converted to natural matter by a natural agent, so the conversion of a supernatural form to supernatural matter requires the action of a supernatural agent moving the soul –
namely, divine grace.
114
While the theologians of the Augustinian order continued the common teaching of the necessity of a disposition towards justification, older Augustinian theologians were prepared to allow that this disposition was meritorious de congruo
, whereas theologians of the schola Augustiniana moderna
tended to exclude this possibility. Thus Thomas Bradwardine
, Gregory of Rimini
, Johannes Klenkok, Angelus Dobelin, Hugolino of Orvieto
and Johannes Hiltalingen of Basel rejected the opinion that the disposition for justification was meritorious de congruo
.
115
A similar position is associated with Luther’
s mentor at Wittenberg, Johannes von Staupitz,
116
although his regent of studies at Erfurt, Johannes de Paltz, allowed that such a disposition was meritorious de congruo
.
117
The theologians of the via moderna
adopted a much more positive attitude to the axiom facienti quod in se est.
Underlying this attitude is the theology of the pactum
, by which a distinction is to be made between the inherent value of a moral act and its ascribed value under the terms of the covenant between God and humanity. Just as, in today’
s economic system, the ascribed value of paper money has a value much greater than its inherent value on account of the covenant on the part of the issuing agency or bank to pay the bearer the equivalent sum in gold upon request, so in the Middle Ages the king appears to have been regarded as entitled to issue ‘
token’
coinage, often made of lead, which had a negligible inherent value, but which would be redeemed at its full ascribed value at a later date.
118
In the meantime, the ascribed value of
the coins was vastly greater than their inherent value, on account of the promise of the king expressed in the covenant regulating the relationship between the valor impositus
and valor intrinsecus
.
119
Such analogies from the economic system of the period lent themselves particularly well to illustrate the important distinction, characteristic of the via moderna
, between the moral and the meritorious value of an act. Just as a major discrepancy could arise within an economic system between bonitas intrinseca
and valor impositus
, given a firm and binding contract on the part of the king, so a similar discrepancy could arise between the moral value of an act (i.e., its bonitas intrinseca
) and its meritorious value (i.e., valor impositus
), given a comparable covenant on the part of God. Although human acts have negligible inherent value in themselves by God’
s absolute standards, God has nevertheless entered into a pactum
with humanity, by virtue of which such human acts have a much greater contracted value –
sufficient to merit the first grace de congruo.
Just as a king might issue a small leaden coin with negligible inherent value and a considerably greater ascribed value which permitted it to purchase goods, so human moral acts, although in themselves incapable of meriting grace, have a much greater contracted value adequate for this purpose.
The essential point emerging from this analysis of the context in which the characteristic interpretation of the axiom facienti quod in se est
associated with the via moderna
is set is that the disposition of individuals cannot be said to cause their justification on account of its own nature (ex natura rei
), but only on account of the contracted value ascribed to it by God (ex pacta divino
). This point is made by Ockham
, again using the illustration of the king and the small lead coin.
120
A similar analogy is employed by Robert Holcot, who pointed out that a small copper coin may buy a loaf of bread, despite the much greater inherent value of the latter.
121
Failure on the part of God to honour this contractual obligation by rewarding the person who did quod in se est
with grace would amount to a contradiction of the divine nature. While God is not bound by absolute necessity (i.e., necessitas consequentis
) to act in this way, God has set up a situation by which there exists a conditional necessity (i.e., necessitas consequentiae
) which God is bound to respect.
Gabriel Biel
interprets the axiom facienti quod in se est
to mean that God is under obligation to give the first grace to the person who desists from sin. However, this does not mean that humans are capable of remitting their own sin. As Biel emphasises, the link between doing quod in se est
and the remission of sin is provided by the covenant, rather than by the nature of the entities in themselves.
122
As noted earlier, Alan of Lille
and the early Franciscan school illustrated the axiom with reference to a shutter and the rays of the sun; implicit in this analogy is an ontological
concept of causality. The nature of the entities (i.e., the shutter and the sun’
s rays) is such that the removal of the obstacle permits the sunlight to enter the room. Biel and the via moderna
operated with a concept of covenantal
causality
, by which the relationship between human action and the divine response is a consequence of the divine ordination, rather than of the nature of the entities in themselves. By the pactum
, God has graciously ordained that such an act may be accepted as worthy of grace.
123
Biel reproduces the earlier Franciscan teaching, by which the human disposition towards justification may be regarded as removing an obstacle in the path of divine grace:
124
The soul, by removing an obstacle towards a good movement to God through the free will, is able to merit the first grace de congruo
. This may be proved as follows: because God accepts the act of doing ‘
what lies within its powers’
(actum facientis quod in se est
) as leading to the first grace, not on account of any debt of justice, but on account of God’
s generosity. The soul, by removing this obstacle, ceases from acts of sin and consent to sin, and thus elicits a good movement towards God as its principle and end; and does ‘
what lies within its powers’
(quod in se est
). Therefore God accepts, out of his generosity (ex sua liberalitate
), this act of removing an obstacle and a good movement towards God as the basis of the infusion of grace.
Following the general teaching of the Franciscan schools, Biel holds this disposition towards justification as meritorious de congruo.
Although humans are able to remove an obstacle to grace, Biel insists that it is God, and God alone, who remits sin –
but by virtue of the pactum
, humans are able to act in such a manner as to oblige God to respond in this way.
125
The pastoral significance of the axiom may be illustrated with reference to the sermons of Johannes Geiler of Keisersberg, cathedral preacher at Strasbourg from 1478 to 1510. In his exposition of the Lord’
s
Prayer, Geiler stresses that if people’
s prayers are to be heard, they must do quod in se est.
Each of the seven petitions of the Lord’
s Prayer presupposes that humans are already doing what lies within their powers. Thus people pray to God that they might be given their daily bread, but this presupposes that they do quod in se est
by cultivating the fields.
126
The same principle is elaborated with reference to Matthew 6:26, which refers to the birds of the air being fed by their heavenly Father. Geiler observes that this does not mean that the birds sit on their branches all day, doing nothing; they too must do quod in se est
, going out early in the morning looking for food.
127
It is therefore only to be expected that Geiler should apply the same principle to human justification, for which he considers preparation to be essential: ‘
Fools expect to have this gold without paying for it –
that is, without a disposition for grace.’
128
Just as the wind does not enter into a sail until the sailsman first turns the sail directly into the wind, so the wind of the Holy Spirit enters only that soul which has been prepared to receive it. Humans must therefore dispose themselves towards the reception of grace by doing quod in se est
.
129
The pastoral orientation of Geiler’
s sermons is evident from the fact that the axiom is usually expressed in the imperative form: fac quod in te est
!
The use of the axiom remained a commonplace in the early sixteenth century, and is encountered in the earlier writings of Martin Luther
.
130
Luther’
s continuity with the via moderna
is particularly evident in the Dictata super Psalterium
(1513–
15), and may be illustrated from his comments on Psalm 114:1 (Vulgate
, 113:1):
131
The doctors rightly say that, when people do their best, God infallibly gives them grace. This cannot be understood as meaning that this preparation for grace is [meritorious] de condigno
, as they are incomparable, but it can be regarded as de congruo
on account of this promise of God and the covenant (pactum
) of mercy.
In this, as in so many other respects, the young Luther demonstrated his close affinity with the theology of justification associated with the via moderna.
The discussion of the subjective appropriation of
justification presented in the above section may have conveyed the impression that the
theologians of the medieval period understood justification in purely individualist terms, teaching that justification is solely concerned with the individual viator
and their status coram Deo
. This is, in fact, not the case. The medieval discussion of justification proceeds upon the basis of certain explicit presuppositions concerning the community within which this justification takes place. Justification takes place within the sphere of the church, being particularly associated with the sacraments of baptism and penance, so that it is impossible to discuss the medieval understanding of the subjective appropriation of justification without reference to the relationship between justification and the sacraments. The present chapter, therefore, may be regarded as having dealt with the individualist aspects of the appropriation of justification; the tenth chapter, which considers the relation between justification and the sacraments, may be considered to deal with the communal aspects of the appropriation of justification.
3
Lössl, ‘
Augustine, “
Pelagianism”
, Julian of Aeclanum and Modern Scholarship’
; TeSelle, ‘
Rufinius the Syrian, Caelestius
, Pelagius’
; Lamberigts, ‘
Recent Research into Pelagianism’
.
4
Epistola ad Demetriadem
16, PL
33.1110a–
b. For the background, see McWilliam, ‘
Letters to Demetrias’
.
5
De praedestinatione sanctorum
i, 2.
7
Commonitorium
2, PL
50.640b: ‘
In ipsa item catholica ecclesia magnopere curandum est, ut id teneamus, quod ubique, quod semper, quod ad omnibus creditum est; hoc est etenim vere proprieque catholicum.’
9
De incarnatione
vii, i, 2.
11
D
227.
13
Cap. 1, D
371.
14
Significantly, the council declined to affirm Augustine’
s later views on the doctrines of double predestination and irresistible grace.
15
This lacuna
was first noticed by Bouillard, Conversion et grâce chez S. Thomas d’Aquin
, 98–
102, 114–
21. See also Seckler, Instinkt und Glaubenswille nach Thomas von Aquin
, 90–
133.
16
D
685: ‘
Gratiam Dei praevenire et subsequi hominem credo et profiteor, ita tamen, ut liberum arbitrium rationali creaturae non denegem.’
17
De libero arbitrio
3.
19
Summa de bono
q. 2; ed. Wicki, vol. 1, 174.
20
De homine
III.iv.1. See also In IV Sent.
II, dist. xxv, 3. See further Schönberger, ‘
Rationale Spontaneität’
.
21
See Mitzka, ‘
Die Anfänge der Konkurslehre’
. For this concept in the early Augustinian school, see Trape, Il concorso divino del pensiero di Egidio Romano
. On the development of the concept in High Scholasticism, see Auer, Die Entwicklung der Gnadenlehre
, vol. 2, 113–
45.
23
II Sent.
dist. xxiv, 3: ‘
Liberum vero arbitrium est facultas rationis et voluntatis, qua bonum eligitur gratia assistente, vel malum eadem desistente.’
24
E.g., Grane, Contra Gabrielem.
25
In II Sent.
dist. xxv q. unica a. 1 nota 1.
27
Biechler, ‘
Gabriel
Biel on “
liberum arbitrium
”’
; McGrath, ‘
The Anti-Pelagian Structure of “
Nominalist”
Doctrines of Justification’
.
28
For an excellent study of Biel’
s attitude to tradition, see Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology
, 365–
408.
29
The position of Peter Lombard
, Alexander of Hales, Albertus Magnus and Bonaventure; see Garrigou-Lagrange, La synthèse Thomiste
, 305–
11.
30
In II Sent.
dist. xx q. 1 a. 3 appears to avoid any firm statement on the matter. A more definite statement may be found later: In II Sent.
dist. xxix q. 1 a. 2. For an excellent discussion, see Roo, Grace and Original Justice according to St. Thomas.
31
De malo q. 4 a. 2 ad 17um. See also Summa Theologiae
Ia q. 95 a. l.
32
Summa Theologiae
Ia q. 100 a. 1 ad 2um.
34
Published as Glossa in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi.
For an excellent introduction, see Glossa
4, 18∗
–
44∗
. Alexander is of particular significance in that it was through him that Peter Lombard
’
s Sentences
was divided into its present divisions, and became the standard text in the schools; see Brady, ‘
The Distinctions of the Lombard’
s Book of Sentences and Alexander of Hales’
.
38
In II Sent.
dist. xxxiv pars 2 a. 3 q. 2 ad 3um. For a useful summary of the differences between Bonaventure and Thomas, see Bruch, ‘
Die Urgerechtigkeit als Rechtheit des Willens nach der Lehre des hl. Bonaventuras’
, especially 193–
4. See further Kaup, ‘
Zum Begriff der justitia originalis in der älteren Franziskanerschule’
.
42
Aers, Salvation and Sin.
43
Bradwardine, De causa Dei
, 174.
44
Zumkeller, ‘
Johannes Klenkok’
, 266–
90; Zumkeller, ‘
Hugolin von Orvieto über Urstand’
, 175–
82.
45
Zumkeller, ‘
Der Augustinertheologe Johannes Hiltalingen von Basel’
, 115–
18; Zumkeller, ‘
Der Augustiner Angelus Dobelinus’
, 97–
103.
46
Gregory refers critically to (an unnamed) unus modernus doctor
in this context: In II Sent.
dist. xxxix q. 1 a. l. The name ‘
Bradwardine’
is inserted by an unknown hand in the margins of two manuscripts (Paris Nat. lat. 15891 and Mazarin 914).
49
Quaestiones disputatae de gratia
q. 7, ed. Hödl, 64; cf. Tractatus de gratia
q. 2 membr. 1 a. 2, ed. Hödl, 72.
51
In II Sent.
dist. xxvi membr. 1 q. 1 ad 1um, ed. Bouvy, 308.95–
105. It may be noted at this point that Thomas Aquinas
does not seem to use the term gratia creata
at all, although he appears to demonstrate familiarity with the term at one point (In II Sent.
dist. xxvi q. 1 a. 1).
52
Philips, ‘
La théologie de la grâce dans la “
Summa Fratris Alexandri”’
, 100–
23. For the complex authorship of this work, see Weber, ‘
The Glossa in IV Libros Sententiarum by Alexander of Hales’
, 79–
83.
53
See Summa Fratris Alexandri
pars iii inq. 1 tract. 2 q. 1 cap. 1 and the following sections; Alexandri de Hales Summa theologica
iv, 1023–
60.
54
Summa Fratris Alexandri
pars iii inq. 1 tract. 1 q. 2 cap. 1 a. 2 sol., ed. Quaracchi, vol. 4, 959. On this whole question, see Dhont, Le problème de la préparation à la grâce.
55
Summa Fratris Alexandri
pars ii inq. 2 tract. 3 sect. 2 q. 2 tit. 3 cap. 4 a. 1 ad 3um; ed. Quaracchi, vol. 1, 729. For a more detailed study of this question, see Philips, L’union personnelle avec le Dieu vivant.
56
Breviloquium
v, ii, 2. Cf. Mitzka, ‘
Die Lehre des hl. Bonaventura von der Vorbereitung auf die heiligmachenden Gnade’
.
57
In IV Sent.
dist. xvii pars i a. 2 q. 2 ad 1.2. 3um. On this specific point, see Mitzka, ‘
Die Lehre des hl. Bonaventura von der Vorbereitung auf die heiligmachenden Gnade’
, 64.
58
Quaestiones disputatae de gratia
q. 3, ed. Doucet, 69–
72. The argument is based on the maxim ‘
naturaliter est anima gratiae capax’
, which is characteristic of the early Dominican school.
60
Quaestiones disputatae de gratia
q. 4, ed. Douhet, 98–
9: ‘
Gratia enim gratis data quasi medium tenet inter naturam vel voluntatem et gratiam gratum facientem.’
61
In II Sent.
dist. xxix a. 1 q. 1. See further Heynck, ‘
Die aktuelle Gnade bei Richard von Mediavilla’
.
62
In II Sent.
dist. xxviii a. 1 q. 2.
63
Hocedez, Richard de Middleton
, 277.
64
Quaestiones disputatae de statu naturae lapsae
q. 2; ed. Quaracchi, 178.
70
In II Sent.
dist. xxviii q. 1 a. 4, ed. Mandonnet, vol. 2, 728. See further Stufler, ‘
Die entfernte Vorbereitung auf die Rechtfertigung nach dem hl. Thomas’
. Cf. Summa Theologiae
IaIIae q. 109 a. 6.
71
De veritate
q. 24 a. 15, ed. Spiazzi, vol. 1, 467.
72
This work is cited for the first time at III, 89, and frequently thereafter. For details of the provenance of this work, see Condonier and Steel, ‘
Guillaume de Moerbeke Traducteur du Liber de Bona Fortuna
’
.
74
Summa contra Gentiles
III, 149, 1.
75
Quodlibetum primum
q. 1 a. 7. A similar opinion may be found in the Romans Reportatio
cap. 10 lect. 3.
76
Summa Theologiae
IaIIae q. 112 a. 2 ad 3um: ‘
nulla praeparatio exigitur quam ipse [Deus] non faciat’
.
77
IaIIae q. 112 a. 3.
78
Iallae q. 112 a. 2 ad 2um.
80
Irenaeus, Adversus haereses
iv, xxxix, 2. Cf. Origen
, Contra Celsum
vii, 42. See Rivière, ‘
Quelques antécédents patristiques de la formule “
Facienti quod in se est”’
.
82
On which see Baldwin, Masters, Princes, and Merchants
.
83
Landgraf, Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik
, vol. 3, 251 n. 16: ‘
Facite, quod vestrum est, quia Deus faciet, quod suum est.’
85
For example, see his Romans commentary, cited in Landgraf, Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik
, vol. 3, 251 nn. 14, 15. On Langton’
s concept of merit, see Hamm, Promissio, pactum, ordinatio
, 109–
18.
86
Cod. Erlangen lat. 353 fol. 84; cited in Landgraf, Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik
, vol. 3, 252.
88
Contra Hereticos
1, 51; PL
210.356b. Cf. 356a: ‘
Nec poenitentia est causa efficiens remissionis peccati, sed tantum gratuita Dei voluntas.’
See also Theologicae regulae
87; PL
210.666a–
c.
89
Cod. Vat. lat. 1098 Col. 155v; cited in Landgraf, Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik
, vol. 3, 260.
90
Quaestiones de gratia
q. 6, ed. Hödl, 55–
6. See also Tractatus de gratia
q. 3 membr. 2 a. 2 sol., ed. Hödl, 61.
91
Tractatus de gratia
q. 3 membr. 2 a. 2 sol., ed. Hödl, 60: ‘
Concedo igitur quod si homo faciat quod in se est, Deus necessario, id est immutabiliter dat ei gratiam.’
95
Summa Halensis
inq. 4 tr. 3 q. 3 tit. 1, ed. Quaracchi, vol. 2, 731.
96
In IV Sent.
dist. xiv pars 1 a. 2 q. 2; dist. xvii pars 1 a. 1 q. 2. Cf. Breviloquium
v, iii, 4: ‘
Rursus, quoniam Deus sic reformat, quod leges naturae inditas non infirmat; ideo sic hanc gratiam tribuit libero arbitrio, ut tamen ipsum non cogar, sed eius consensus liber maneat.’
97
In II Sent.
dist. xxviii q. 1 a. 4.
98
In II Sent.
dist. xxviii q. 1 a. 4 ad 4um.
100
See, for example, Roger of Marston, Quaestiones disputatae de statu naturae lapsae
q. 1 ad 11um; ed. Quaracchi, 195.
101
Cod. Paris Nat. lat. 14551 fol. 103r; Cod. Paris Nat. lat. 15690 fol. 228v; Klosterneuburg Cod. 322; cited in Grabmann, Mittelalterliches Geistesleben
, vol. 2, 453–
5.
102
Summa Theologiae
IaIIae q. 112 a. 3: ‘
Praeparatio ad hominis gratiam est a Deo sicut a movente, a libero autem arbitrio sicut a moto.’
103
IaIIae q. 109 a. 6 ad 2um: ‘
Cum dicitur homo facere quod in se est, dicitur hoc esse in potestate hominis secundum quod est motus a Deo.’
104
As pointed out by Dhont, Le problème de la préparation à la grâce
, 267‒
8; Capéran, Le problème du salut des infidèles
, vol. 2, 49‒
57.
105
In II Sent.
dist. xxvii q. 2 a. 4 ad 3um. Peter allows that people may dispose themselves remotely, but not proximately, to justification through their unaided powers: In II
Sent. dist. xxviii q. 1 aa. 2, 3.
107
De veritate
q. 29 a. 6, ed. Spiazzi, vol. 1, 564.
108
Summa Theologiae
IaIIae q. 114 a. 6.
109
IaIIae q. 114 a. 5. Cf. IaIIae q. 112 aa. 2, 3; q. 114 aa. 3, 5.
110
In II Sent
. dist. xxvii q. 2 a. 2. The context indicates that ‘
meritum impetrativum’
is here to be regarded as synonymous with ‘
meritum de congruo
’
.
111
In II Sent.
dist. xxviii, xxix q. 1 a. 4.
113
In II Sent.
dist. xxvi, xxvii q. 1 a. 3, conc. 2.
114
Textbeilage
117. Here, as above, Retz is heavily dependent upon Thomas of Strasbourg –
compare this with Thomas’
s In II Sent.
dist. xxviii, xxix q. 1.
115
Oberman, Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine
, 155–
9; Gregory of Rimini, In II Sent.
dist. xxvi q. 1 aa. 1, 2; Zumkeller, ‘
Johannes Klenkok’
, 240–
52; Zumkeller, ‘
Die Lehre des Erfurter Augustinertheologen’
, 32–
6, 44–
8, 46–
8, 184–
6. On the role of the auxilium speciale Dei
in Gregory’
s theology of justification, see Burger, ‘
Das auxilium speciale Dei in der Gnadenlehre Gregors von Rimini’
.
118
On this, see Courtenay, ‘
Covenant and Causality in Pierre d’
Ailly’
; Courtenay, ‘
The King and the Leaden Coin’
; Oberman, Werden und Wertung der Reformation
, 161–
200. On token coins, see Courtenay, ‘
Token Coinage and the Administration of Poor Relief during the Late Middle Ages’
.
120
In IV Sent.
dist. xvii q. 1c ‘
Sicut si rex ordinaret quod quicumque acciperet denarium plumbeum haberet certum donum, et tunc denarius plumbeus esset causa sine qua non respectu illius doni.’
121
Super libros Sapientiae
iii, 35.
123
In II Sent.
dist. xxvii q. unica a. 3 dub. 4.
125
In II Sent.
dist. xxvii q. unica a. 3 dub. 4.
127
Navicula sive speculum fatuorum
22s; cited in Douglass, Justification in Late Medieval Preaching
, 145 n. 1.
131
WA
4.262.4–
7. Cf. WA
3.288.37–
289.4. See further Grane, Contra Gabrielem
, 296–
301; Schwarz, Vorgeschichte der reformatorischen Bußtheologie
, 249–
59.