The Canons: Rejected Opinions

The Tridentine decree on justification devoted sixteen initial chapters to a point-by-point exposition of the Catholic teaching before proceeding to condemn thirty-three specific opinions deemed to be unacceptable to the Catholic church. As will become clear from the following chapter , there was considerable disagreement in the immediate post-Tridentine period concerning the precise interpretation of the decree. In the present chapter, we shall explore the broad range of opinions on justification which the Council of Trent recognised as authentically Catholic. In establishing these, the following principles have been employed.

First, in that the council was primarily concerned with distinguishing Catholic teaching from that of the Reformers, and not to settle disputed matters within the Catholic schools of theology, it is assumed that the previously professed theological positions of these schools may continue to be held, unless these are explicitly excluded by the statements of the Council itself.

Second, it is assumed that the final decree on justification is to be interpreted in the light of the debates which led to its formulation, in order to establish what the Tridentine delegates intended particular terms and phrases to mean. Although the attempt to interpret any historical document is notoriously difficult, in this case we possess sufficient documentary evidence to clarify the intended meaning of most of the Council’ s statements.

With these two points in mind, we may turn to the analysis of the decree and its canons.

The final arrangement of the decree reflects the three ‘ stages of justification (statūs iustificiationis )’ , a modification of the medieval processus iustificationis which emerged during the earlier debates. The first nine chapters discuss the ‘ first justification’ , in which humanity’ s initial transition from a state of sin to righteousness is described. This is followed by four chapters dealing with the ‘ second justification’ – how humans, once justified, increase in righteousness. The final three chapters deal with the status tertius , indicating how someone might forfeit justification and subsequently regain it through penance, and clarifying the manner in which this differs from the first stage of justification.

The decree opens with an analysis of the fallen condition of humanity. Although the subject of original sin had been dealt with in some detail in the Council’ s fifth session de peccato originali , the Council’ s concern to ensure it provides a coherent account of the entire process of justification entailed inclusion of a brief account of the nature and significance of this topic. On account of original sin, a condition affecting the entire human race, humans are incapable of redeeming themselves. Gentiles were unable to redeem themselves through their natural powers, or Jews to redeem themselves through the Law of Moses. All required grace as a precondition for their justification. 3

Free will (liberum arbitium ) is not destroyed on account of original sin; it is, however, weakened and debilitated by the Fall. 4 The council thus reaffirmed the position of Augustine and the Second Council of Orange on this crucial point, and implicitly rejected Luther’ s statement that ‘ free will after sin exists in name only’ . The particularism implicit in Luther’ s teaching on election is excluded by the unequivocal assertion that Christ died for all people, granting grace through the merits of his passion in order that humans might be born again, and hence justified. Yet while Christ indeed died for all people, salvation is contingent upon the communication of the merits of Christ to individuals. 5 Unless people are born again in Christ, they can never be justified, in that the new birth bestows upon them the grace by which they are made just.

In the fourth chapter, justification is defined in transformational terms, including reference to necessary alterations in human status and nature: 6

The definition of justification in the fourth chapter is followed in the fifth and sixth chapters with a discussion of the necessity of preparation towards justification and the form which this takes. People are called through prevenient grace, without reference to their merits, to dispose themselves towards justification. As a consequence of their assenting to and co-operating with this call, God touches their hearts through the illumination of the Holy Spirit. 7 The traditional medieval terminology usually employed in the discussion of the necessity for a disposition towards justification is studiously avoided, exemplifying Trent’ s general tendency to avoid scholastic language wherever possible, while nevertheless affirming the basic theological consensus of that age. Indeed, the decree on justification is notable for its marked preference to appeal directly to Scripture, passing over the vocabulary of the medieval period altogether.

‘ The beginning of justification must proceed from the predisposing grace of God through Jesus Christ.’ The preparation for justification is defined in terms of people believing the truth of divine revelation and the divine promises (particularly the promise that God will justify the ungodly through his grace), and as a result being moved to abhor their sins and repent of them. This culminates in the sacrament of baptism, in which individuals declare their intention to lead a new life and observe the divine commandments. 8 The ‘ first justification’ is thus firmly connected with the sacramental economy of the church through baptism.

The seventh chapter presents a careful analysis of the nature and causes of justification. 9 In line with its affirmation of the strongly transformational character of justification set out in its fourth chapter, the Decree affirmed that justification is not merely the remission of sins, but consists of the sanctification and internal renewal of human nature (non est sola peccatorum remissio, sed et sanctificatio et renovatio interioris hominis ). In what some might see as a lapse into scholastic concerns and forms of presentation, the Decree then identifies five causes of justification as shown in Table 25.1 .

The most significant of these statements concerns the formal cause of justification . It is asserted that the single formal cause of justification (unica formalis causa ) is ‘ the righteousness of God, not by which he himself is righteous, but by which he makes us righteous (iustitia Dei , non qua ipse iustus est, sed qua nos iustos facit )’ . 10 This formalises the earlier discussion within the Council about the need to avoid ambiguity through hinting at a possible concession of two formal causes of justification. The statement excludes the possibility that iustitia imputata is a contributing cause to human justification through its insistence that this iustitia Dei leads to the renewal of the Spirit of our minds, so that ‘ we are not merely reputed, but are truly called, and are righteous, receiving righteousness within us’ .

Perhaps more significantly, the entire medieval debate over whether the formal cause of justification was an intrinsic created habit of grace or the extrinsic denomination of the divine acceptation was circumvented by a reversion to the traditional Augustinian concept of iustitia Dei . This does not resolve the medieval debate on this matter one way or the other, and represents an attempt to establish the common basis of both medieval understandings of the matter without using the terminology of the period. The linking of the ‘ first justification’ with the sacrament of baptism continues the common medieval tradition of excluding the possibility of extrasacramental justification, and parallels the subsequent linking of the recovery of justification with the sacrament of penance, thus integrating justification within the symbolic framework and ecclesial practice of the two sacramenta mortuorum .

The eighth chapter deals with the related concepts of ‘ being justified by faith’ (iustificari per fidem ) and ‘ being justified freely’ (gratis iustificari ). 11 Both these terms are to be understood in that sense in which the ‘ uninterrupted unanimity of the Catholic Church’ has held and expressed them. Faith is to be seen as the ‘ beginning of human salvation, the foundation and root of all justification, without which it is impossible to please God’ . This gift is given freely (gratis ) in the sense that none of the things which precede justification (including faith, as well as works) can be said to merit justification:

There is, however, one point that needs further consideration. The eighth chapter of the Tridentine decree on justification makes the following statement: 12 ‘ We are therefore said to be justified freely , because none of those things which precede justification – whether faith or works – themselves merit the grace of justification (nihil eorum, quae iustificationem praecedunt, sive fides, sive opera, ipsam iustificationis gratiam promeretur ).’ As noted earlier, there was a substantial body of opinion within the Franciscan order which held that humanity could merit justification de congruo . Is this opinion excluded by this statement?

Heiko A. Oberman, in answering this question in the negative, drew attention to the somewhat unusual use of the verb promereri in the place of the more usual mereri in the above statement. 13 Oberman suggests that a contrast between mereri and promereri had become well established within Catholicism by the time of the Council of Trent , the latter meaning ‘ merit in the full sense of the term’ . He argued that during the Tridentine proceedings on justification the verb mereri was associated with meritum de congruo , and promereri with the weaker sense of merit associated with the concept of meritum de condigno . The statement cited above should therefore be interpreted as meaning that none of the acts which precede justification, whether faith or works, merit the grace of justification de condigno . On this reading of the text, the possibility of a disposition towards justification which is meritorious de congruo is thus not excluded by the decree.

This highly problematic distinction between promereri and mereri is generally considered to represent an over-interpretation. The Council of Trent was anxious to break away from the vocabulary of medieval theology, including such terms as meritum de congruo and meritum de condigno . 14 For this reasons, phrases such as mereri ex debitum or proprie et vere mereri were used extensively in lieu of mereri de condigno . 15 Oberman suggests that promereri was understood by Tridentine participants to mean proprie et vere mereri , and that the use of this term in place of the more usual mereri was intended to emphasise this point. This suggestion is problematic, not least because there are no grounds for believing that such a distinction was current in the later medieval period. For example, Robert Holcot uses the term promereri simply to designate ‘ merit’ – both congruous and condign. 16 Furthermore, the supplementation of promereri with vere at points during the Tridentine proceedings suggests that the verbs mereri and promereri were regarded as synonymous. 17 Elsewhere, ample evidence is to be had that the terms were not distinguished in the manner Oberman suggests. Oberman himself concedes the critically important point that Domingo de Soto does not distinguish the two terms. 18 Furthermore, his suggestion that this distinction was made by Andrés de Vega has now been shown to be untenable. 19 Yet although Oberman’ s suggestion that Trent explicitly endorsed the Franciscan approach cannot be sustained, there is no doubt of Trent’ s intention that the traditional Franciscan teaching should continue to be regarded as falling within the scope of Catholic orthodoxy.

The ninth chapter deals with the question of the certitude of faith. 20 This question having been the subject of intense debate at Trent, the chapter is worded with some care. Fiducia on the part of the believer concerning the mercy of God, the merit of Christ and the efficacy of the sacraments is certainly appropriate; what is inappropriate is the ‘ mad confidence (fiducia ) of the heretics’ concerning the individual’ s justification. 21

It is thus both possible and necessary to keep the law of God: ‘ God does not command things that are impossible, but by commanding commands you to do what you can and to pray for what you cannot, and helps you so that you may be able.’ 24 The opinion that such good works as are involved in this second justification are sinful is rejected. The Augustinian doctrine of final perseverance is reaffirmed: in this mortal life, no one may know whether he is among the number of the predestined, except through special revelation. 25

Although the sacrament of baptism is linked with the first justification, and that of penance with the restoration of justification in the ‘ third justification’ , it is significant that there is no specific mention of any of the five remaining sacraments – the sacramenta vivorum – in connection with the second justification. This reflects the fact that the role of the sacraments in the Christian life was tabled for discussion at a later stage in the Tridentine proceedings, and was not seen as requiring to be clarified at this stage in proceedings.

Although the grace of Christ precedes and accompanies human efforts, those efforts are nevertheless to be recognised as genuine. Believers, by their co-operation with grace, are enabled to receive merit and to increase in justification. The individual who perseveres until the end may be said to receive eternal life as a reward, the crowning gift promised by God to those who persevere. The question of the ultimate foundation of merit (ratio meriti ), a subject of some controversy in the medieval schools, is answered in non-scholastic terms (such as the union of the believer with Christ) that permit the traditional views to be retained.

Having dealt with a classical heresy, the Council now turned to the more demanding task of engaging Protestant ideas. However, it appears that it is certain caricatures of Protestantism which are actually condemned, rather than Protestantism itself. 27 Thus the Catholic scholar Otto Hermann Pesch identifies areas of misunderstanding in nearly every significant disagreement between the Council and Luther, as expressed in these canons. For example, the Council appears to have thought that Luther excluded any necessity of good works, when he actually regarded these as an evidence of grace, rather than a means of grace. Many of these condemnations seem to reflect the considerable confusion accompanying the different understandings of the nature of justification which was by then associated with Protestants and Catholics. Canon 11 may be singled out as being of particular importance in this respect: 28

The degree of latitude of interpretation incorporated into the Tridentine decree on justification at points of importance makes it problematic to speak of ‘ the Tridentine doctrine of justification ’ , as if there were one such doctrine . In fact, Trent may be regarded as endorsing a range of theologies as Catholic, and any one of them may reasonably lay claim to be a ‘ Tridentine doctrine of justification’ . Trent may be regarded as endorsing the medieval catholic heritage on justification, while eliminating much of its technical vocabulary, substituting biblical or Augustinian phrases in its place.

Trent thus marks a point of transition in our study, in that it denotes the deliberate and systematic rejection of much of the terminology of the medieval schools, while nevertheless retaining the theology which it expressed. It is possible to argue that Trent indicates the end of the medieval discussion of justification, in the sense that it established a new framework within which subsequent discussion of the matter was increasingly obliged to proceed. Yet the extent of the apparent degree of theological latitude of interpretation implicitly endorsed by Trent remained untested. What were the limits of Tridentine orthodoxy? As we shall see, the post-Tridentine period led to controversy over certain aspects of the Council’ s teaching, which we shall consider in the following chapter .

In closing this analysis of the Tridentine decree on justification, it is important to appreciate its impact on the changing vocabulary of the Christian tradition. During the Middle Ages, western Christianity used a wide variety of soteriological metaphors in both the popular communication and the theological articulation of the significance of the death and resurrection of Christ for humanity. 29 The concept of justification offered a helpful framework for exploring a range of issues relating to the continuity of Christianity and Judaism, which remained significant in part of western Europe around this time. Yet justification was not treated as a privileged soteriological metaphor. While medieval Pauline commentaries on Romans and Galatians engaged the question of justification by faith, dogmatic treatises tended to speak more in terms of salvation through grace, drawing on Ephesians 2:8: ‘ by grace you have been saved through faith’ . This terminological landscape was altered significantly by the rise of evangelical groups in the early sixteenth century, which privileged the soteriological maxim of ‘ justification by faith’ . The reasons for this remain unclear, although Luther’ s personal history of existential and exegetical engagement with the notion of iustitia Dei is unquestionably an important element of any persuasive answer.

The Council of Trent ’ s decree on justification consolidated this terminological shift, by enfolding the entire discussion of the acceptance of humanity by God and its growth (and recovery) in grace under the category of ‘ justification’ . Whatever the divergences between Trent and Protestantism might have been, the decision to retain the evangelicals’ focus on justification as a privileged soteriological metaphor in effect ensured its terminological dominance for at least two generations subsequently. It was not until the end of the seventeenth century that Catholicism found its way back to its traditional diversity of images of salvation – a matter to which we shall return in the following chapter .