The Via Moderna on God’s Absolute Power

The problem identified above is recognised by Augustine, who set out the outlines of a solution which would be taken up and developed by the theologians of the medieval period, particularly by those of the via moderna . For Augustine, the divine obligation to humanity arises purely from the divine promises made to humans: ‘ non debendo enim, sed promittendo debitorem se deus fecit, id est non mutuo accipiendo ’ . 3 If God is under any obligation to humans, it is as a consequence of God’ s own free, non-coerced decision to enter into such an obligation by means of the promises made to humanity. We have already noted the significance of the divine promises to humanity in relation to Augustine’ s understanding of iustitia Dei .

The thirteenth century saw the rise of Averroist determinism at Paris, posing a serious threat to the concept of the divine freedom. Among the propositions which were condemned at the University of Paris in 1277 were several which denied or seriously questioned the omnipotence and freedom of God. 5 According to Siger of Brabant, God necessarily produces everything which God creates. The essential problem which these opinions raise may be stated in terms of the problematic relationship between two propositions:

Thomas Aquinas points out that, while God is omnipotent, there are many things which God could do but nevertheless wills not to do. From an initial set of possibilities, limited only by the condition that the outcome must not involve contradiction, God willed to actualise only a specific subset. In that God could have willed a different subset of possibilities, and was not coerced in this selection, the subset selected for actualisation cannot be regarded as resulting from absolute necessity. They are contingencies – but contingencies that are nevertheless grounded in the will of God. 7

The distinction between God’ s ordained and absolute power allows Aquinas to affirm the radical contingency of everything that is not God and insist that the form of the world as we know it is not necessary; other worlds were possible, and things do not exist of necessity. 8 There is no necessity for God to create anything at all; indeed, the divine goodness is so perfect in itself that, even if no creature whatsoever existed, God’ s goodness would still be completely perfect in itself. 9

The distinction between God’ s absolute and ordained powers (potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata ) allowed theologians to avoid the Averroist dilemma by insisting upon a voluntary decision of self-limitation on the part of an omnipotent God and hence upon the non-necessary and contingent nature of the established orders of creation and redemption. There is no contradiction in declaring that an omnipotent God chooses to act in certain ways and not others – and having made that decision, stands by and works within the ensuing orders of nature and salvation. God’ s potentia absoluta frames an entire world of possibilities open to God, limited solely by the requirement that they should not be inconsistent with one another. God’ s potentia ordinata frames a more limited world – the actual orders of creation and redemption freely and reliably established by God, within which human beings find themselves positioned.

The ‘ dialectic between the two powers of God’ was thus a theological tool designed to demonstrate the radical contingency of the established orders of nature and redemption, thus affirming that neither the origins nor the specific characteristics of these orders were imposed upon God by external constraints. Yet these contingent orders were completely reliable. In choosing to create and respect these orders, God entered into a covenant of self-limitation, choosing neither to implement alternative realities nor to overrule or deny what had been established through creation and revelation. This insight was important for the development of the natural sciences, in that it allowed science to explore these natural contingencies, which could not be established in advance by a priori philosophical speculation. 10

For Scotus, 12 God’ s decision concerning which world would be created was non-coerced, in that God was free from external constraints (save that contradiction must not result) in any decisions concerning the nature of the present established order. Scotus is thus able to reject the idea that God acts of absolute necessity. Once having determined the nature and character of the established orders of creation and salvation, however, God is under a contingent, conditional and self-imposed obligation to respect the order thus established – which may therefore be regarded as totally reliable. The distinction between the ‘ two powers of God’ thus reflected a fundamental perception that ‘ what God created or established did not exhaust divine capacity or the potentialities open to God’ . 13

Like Scotus, William of Ockham uses the tension between what is de facto and what might have been de possibili to safeguard the divine freedom in the face of Greco-Arabian determinism. 14 Although Ockham frequently refers to the first article of the Creed, ‘ Credo in deum patrem omnipotentem ’ , it is clear that he understands this omnipotence to have been qualified and circumscribed by the uncoerced divine decision to create. 15 Ockham does not teach that God is currently able to act in multiple manners, doing one thing de potentia absoluta , and something quite different – perhaps its inverse – de potentia ordinate . As he frequently emphasises, there exists only one power in God at present, and that is the ordained power, which itself is an expression of the contingent and uncoerced divine decision to create the established order. 16

Where Ockham appears to go further than Scotus is in the use he makes of the dialectic between the powers of God. For Ockham, the dialectic between the powers of God was a critical tool for theological analysis; we shall illustrate this point later in this chapter by exploring his critique of the necessity of created habits in justification. Thus while Peter Aureole insisted upon the absolute necessity of a created habit in justification, on the basis of the natural order of creation, Ockham pointed out that God was free to choose an alternative mode of justification. Without rejecting their de facto implication in justification, Ockham demonstrated that created habits were not involved as a matter of absolute necessity.

However, Ockham’ s use of the dialectic between the two powers of God as a critical theological tool was misunderstood at an early stage. In 1326 a commission of six theologians censured fifty-one articles taken from Ockham’ s writings, including a number of relevance to the doctrine of justification. Some six centuries later, this report was rediscovered, 17 allowing us to establish the precise nature of the condemned propositions, as well as the reasons for their condemnation. The four propositions which concern us are the following:

That Ockham is not guilty of Pelagianism in these propositions may be confirmed by considering the position of Gregory of Rimini , one of the most ferociously anti-Pelagian theologians of the medieval period, on the same questions. Like Ockham, Gregory emphasises that, while God is not bound by any absolute necessity to accept individuals to eternal life if they possess a habit of charity, God has ordained that de potentia ordinata the possession of such a habit will result in the glorification of the viator . Gregory thus draws three conclusions: 24

The use of the dialectic between the two powers of God within the writings of the leading modernus Gabriel Biel has been seriously misunderstood in the past, and it is still necessary to challenge the serious and influential misrepresentation of Biel’ s teaching on the potentia Dei absoluta which was set out by Carl Feckes in 1925. According to Feckes, Biel used the absolute power of God as a convenient vehicle for conveying his own true theology, while retaining traditional teaching in connection with the ordained power of God. In other words, Biel states de potentia absoluta what he would have otherwise stated de potentia ordinata , were it not for fear of recrimination by the ecclesiastical authorities. 26 This criticism of Biel is impossible to sustain, particularly when it is appreciated that Biel uses the dialectic between the two powers of God as a means for not merely defending the established order of salvation against divine capriciousness, but also for providing a firm theological foundation (in the concept of the pactum ) upon which the established order of salvation may be more securely grounded.

This misrepresentation of Biel’ s thought has also had considerable influence in connection with the related question of the influence of later medieval theology upon the young Martin Luther : if what Biel really meant is to be determined from his statements concerning the absolute power of God, then Luther’ s early opinions should be compared with Biel’ s opinions de potentia Dei absoluta . This inevitably leads to the simplistic and quite unjustifiable conclusion that Luther merely states de potentia ordinata what Biel stated de potentia absoluta – which is as much a caricature of Luther’ s thought as it is of Biel’ s. 27

Feckes’ s interpretation of Biel appeared in 1925; the first significant criticism of his approach appeared in 1934, with the publication of Paul Vignaux’ s highly influential study on fourteenth-century theology, which included a careful study of Ockham ’ s ‘ voluntarism’ . 28 Vignaux was able to show that the established order of salvation was not seen as arbitrary but rational, and its rationality can be demonstrated on the basis of probable, though not necessary, arguments. According to Vignaux, the hypothetical order de potentia absoluta represents the order of divine logic, in that the possibilities open to divine actualisation are non-contradictory; the actual order de potentia ordinata is the order of divine mercy, in that God has voluntarily made himself a debtor to those who possess divine grace in order that they may be justified. Vignaux developed this point further in a highly acclaimed study of the young Luther, in which he emphasised that it was a serious misrepresentation of Biel’ s thought to argue that the absolute power pertained to the order of reason and law, while the ordained order pertained solely to the arbitrary de facto situation. 29 The established order, Vignaux stressed, demonstrates simultaneously the divine justice and the divine mercy.

Through reading Biel within this revised conceptual framework, subsequent studies have emphasised the innocence of Biel’ s use of the dialectic between the two powers of God, 30 although criticism has frequently been directed against the amount of theological energy devoted to hypothetical speculation de potentia Dei absoluta . 31 Similar criticism was directed against the device in the fifteenth century, as may be seen from Erasmus ’ s comments concerning the theological questions which were perplexing Parisian theologians in the final decade of the century – such as whether God could have become a beetle or a cucumber, instead of a human being. 32 In fact, such questions raised serious theological issues, similar to the question of the necessity of created habits in justification, which could not be resolved without an appeal to the dialectic of the two powers of God. 33

The understanding of divine self-limitation associated with the via moderna is particularly linked to a ‘ covenant’ (pactum ) between God and humanity. This pactum should not be confused with the early form of the social-contract theory which is so characteristic a feature of the political thought of Marsilius of Padua. This soteriological pactum is ordained and instituted unilaterally by God, as an act of kindness and generosity towards humanity. At the heart of this concept of the covenant lies a major break with the rationalistic limitations of the Aristotelian concept of God, and a return to a more biblical concept of God who, though omnipotent, chose to enter into a covenant with the descendants of Abraham. The existence of this covenant affirms God’ s commitment both to the salvation of humankind and to the means ordained towards this end, particularly the sacramental system of the church. It is this pactum which forms the fulcrum about which the doctrines of justification associated with the via moderna turn. 34

The sustained critique of the alleged ‘ necessity’ of a created infused habit of grace in justification uncovered its theological contingency. Many now came to regard the notion of a created habit of grace as a regrettable consequence of the intrusion of Aristotelian ideas within the sphere of the doctrine of justification, and the application of ‘ Ockham ’ s Razor’ – in this case, supported by a critique based upon the dialectic between the two powers of God – gradually led to a loss of confidence in the necessity – or even appropriateness – of such a habit. A more natural explanation seemed to lie in the work of the Holy Spirit within the believer. The fact that the Tridentine decree on justification declines to affirm the necessity of a created habit of grace or charity in justification may be regarded as demonstrating that the hypothetical critique of the concept had made its point well. We shall consider this point further in Chapter 25 .