12 Luther ’ s Early Approach to Justification ◈

Our understanding of Luther’ s theological development has changed dramatically since the 1890s as a result of the rediscovery of some of his early writings. In 1897, the German scholar Johannes Ficker had noticed how some of Melanchthon ’ s works made reference to works of Luther which were unknown to Luther scholarship at that time. Ficker rose to this challenge, and tracked them down. Most significantly, his researches led to the recovery in 1905 of the text of Luther’ s Romans lectures of 1515‒ 16, which are now regarded as being of central importance to any understanding of Luther’ s early theological development. 3 Karl Holl ’ s famous seminars on this text, conducted in 1908‒ 9, led to its importance being more widely appreciated. 4

During the period 1508– 14 the young Luther appears to have adopted an understanding of the ‘ righteousness of God’ essentially identical to that of the via moderna . The continuities between the young Luther and late medieval theology over the period 1509– 14 include several matters of significance to his understanding of justification – such as a critical attitude towards recognising a role for supernatural habits of grace in justification, following both the via moderna and the schola Augustiniana moderna in doing so. During this period, Luther developed an understanding of human involvement in justification which is clearly based upon the pactum theology of the via moderna and upon the interpretation of the axiom facienti quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam that is characteristic of this school of thought. 5 Over the period 1514– 19, however, Luther’ s understanding of justification underwent significant alteration. The nature, date and implications of this alteration have remained a matter of controversy within contemporary Luther scholarship, justifying an extended discussion of the question in the present chapter.

One of the most important sources for our understanding of this radical alteration in Luther’ s doctrine of justification is the 1545 autobiographical fragment in which Luther records the intense personal difficulties he experienced at an early stage in his career over the concept of the ‘ righteousness of God’ . 6

It is quite clear that Luther intended to make no global reference to the western tradition of interpretation of Romans 1:16– 17, but was referring specifically to the doctors who taught him – an unequivocal reference to the moderni at Erfurt, under whom he received his initial theological education. Luther here refers to the specific concept of iustitia Dei associated with the via moderna : God is righteous in the sense that God rewards the person who does quod in se est with grace, and punishes the person who does not. In view of Gabriel Biel ’ s unambiguous assertion that individuals cannot know for certain whether they have, in fact, done quod in se est , 8 there is clearly every reason to state that Luther’ s early concept of iustitia Dei was that of the righteousness of an utterly scrupulous and impartial judge, who rewarded or punished humans on the basis of an ultimately unknown quality.

The autobiographical fragment clearly indicates that Luther’ s difficulties over the concept of the ‘ righteousness of God’ were resolved by (although not necessarily in ) the year 1519. An analysis of Luther’ s lectures on the Psalter (1513– 15), on Romans (1515– 16) and on Galatians (1516– 17) indicates that Luther’ s understanding of ‘ the righteousness of God’ in particular, and his theology of justification in general, appear to have undergone a significant alteration over the period 1514– 15, with the crucial step apparently dating from 1515. 9

Luther’ s early understanding of justification (1513– 14) may be summarised as follows: humans must recognise their spiritual weakness and inadequacy, and turn in humility from their attempts at self-justification to ask God for his grace. God treats this humility of faith (humilitas fidei ) as the precondition necessary for justification under the terms of the pactum (that is, as the quod in se est demanded of humans), and then fulfils God’ s obligations under the pactum by bestowing grace upon them. 10 It is clear that Luther understands humans to be capable of making a response towards God without the assistance of special grace, and that this response of iustitia fidei is the necessary precondition (quod in se est ) for the bestowal of justifying grace. 11

Although some Luther scholars have argued that Luther’ s understanding of the term iustitia Dei appears to have undergone a significant alteration during the course of his exposition of Psalms 70 and 71, it is more likely that Luther has merely clarified the terminology within his existing theological framework, so that the precise relationship of the various iustitiae : specifically, the iustitia which humans must possess if they are to be justified (that is, iustitia fidei ) and the iustitia by which God is obliged to reward this righteousness with grace (that is, iustitia Dei ) ‒ implicated in the process of justification is clarified. Luther still expounds (with, it may be added, some brilliance) the pactum theology of the via moderna .

A decisive break with this theology of justification is evident in the Romans lectures of 1515– 16. Three major alterations may be noted, leading to this break. First, Luther insists that humans are passive in their own justification. 12 Although not denying that humans have any role in their justification, Luther clearly states that they are not capable of initiating, or collaborating with, the process leading to justification. Whereas, in the Dictata super Psalterium , humans were understood to be active in the process of their justification (in that they were able to turn to God in humility and faith, and cry out for grace), Luther now unequivocally states that it is God who converts humans.

Second, Luther now insists that human will is held captive by grace, and is incapable of attaining righteousness unaided by divine grace. 13 It was better to speak of servum potius quam liberum arbitrium , as Augustine reminded Julian of Eclanum . Third, and perhaps most significant of all, Luther states that the idea that humans can do quod in se est is nothing more and nothing less than Pelagian, even though he once held this position himself. 14 Despite the fact that his theology of justification up to this point was based upon the explicitly stated presupposition that humans were capable of doing quod in se est , he now concedes the Pelagianism of the opinion that salvation is dependent upon a free decision of the human will. 15 Even though he will continue to identify fides and humilitas for some time to come, it is clear that a genuine and radical alteration in his theology of justification has taken place. Although he may not have arrived at any dramatically new understanding of the nature of faith, he has certainly arrived at a radically new understanding of how faith comes about in the first place .

The recognition that God bestows the precondition of justification upon humanity inevitably involves the abandonment of the soteriological framework underlying the pactum theology of the via moderna . Luther’ s early interpretation of iustitia Dei was based upon the presupposition that God, who acts according to equity (equitas ) rewarded the person who had done quod in se est with justifying grace, sine acceptione personarum . The divine judgement is based solely upon the divine recognition of an individual’ s possessing or achieving a quality that God is under an obligation to reward.

Yet if it is God who bestows this quality upon humanity – rather than humanity that achieves or acquires it – then the framework of equitas and iustitia essential to the pactum theology of the via moderna and the young Luther can no longer be sustained, in that God suddenly becomes open to the charge of inequitas , iniustitia and acceptio personarum . The essential feature of Luther’ s theological breakthrough is thus the destruction of the framework upon which his early soteriology was based, and thence the necessity of reinterpretation of the concept of iustitia Dei . It is therefore clear that an important change in Luther’ s understanding of justification took place at some time in the year 1515.

How, then, does this relate to the experience described in the autobiographical fragment of 1545? The first point to note is that the fragment does not state that Luther’ s discovery took place in 1519, or that it essentially consisted of the recognition that iustitia Dei was none other than iustitia qua nos Deus induit, dum nos iustificat , as some more superficial discussions appear to suggest; if this were the case, we should be forced to conclude that Luther merely came to a conclusion identical to that already reached by Karlstadt in 1517, in a work known to have been read by Luther. Rather, the fragment states that his theological insights were complete by 1519, and also that these insights involved the rethinking of the specific concepts, not merely of iustitia Dei , but also of sapientia Dei , fortitudo Dei and gloria Dei . Second, the understanding of iustitia Dei as iustitia activa which Luther describes in the fragment is clearly that associated with the soteriology of the via moderna . 16 Luther argues that iustitia Dei is not to be understood as the righteousness by which God is himself just, but the righteousness by which he justifies the ungodly, while noting that this ‘ righteousness of God’ is revealed in the cross, contradicting human preconceptions and expectations of the form that it should take. Luther’ s discovery of what he earlier described as a ‘ wonderful new definition of righteousness’ is essentially programmatic, and capable of being applied to other divine attributes, such as those referred to in the autobiographical fragment, leading ultimately to Luther’ s distinctive theologia crucis , the ‘ theology of the cross’ .

Initially, Luther could not understand how the concept of a ‘ righteous God’ was gospel, in that it appeared to offer nothing other than condemnation for sinful humanity. The Ciceronian concept of iustitia as reddens unicuique quod suum est (‘ giving someone their due’ ) informs the concept of iustitia Dei associated with the via moderna . For Luther, this can only mean that the individual who failed to do quod in se est was condemned. The fundamental presupposition at the heart of this soteriology is that humans are indeed capable of quod in se est – in other words, that humans are capable of meeting the fundamental precondition of justification through their own unaided faculties. The essential insight encapsulated in Luther’ s breakthrough of 1515 is that God meets a precondition which humans cannot fulfil – in other words, that God bestows upon humankind the gift of fides Christi . It is this insight which underlies Luther’ s remarks of 1517, paralleling the statements of the 1545 fragment: 17 ‘ A wonderful, new definition of righteousness! This is usually described thus: “ righteousness is a virtue which renders to each their due (virtus reddens unicuique, quod suum est )” . This truly says: “ Righteousness is faith in Jesus Christ” .’ Luther was concerned that the essentially theological notion of opera legis was in danger of being transposed into a philosophical or ethical outlook, particularly that associated with Aristotle , 18 or the popular ‘ works-righteousness’ of many sections of late medieval popular religious culture. 19 Aristotle held that ‘ we become righteous by performing righteous actions’ ; 20 for the younger Luther, it is by becoming righteous in God’ s sight (iustus coram Deo ) that we are able to perform righteous actions. 21 Luther’ s concern here was that an Aristotelian concept of iustitia had found its way into the soteriology of the via moderna , shaping its conception of what it meant to speak of a ‘ righteous God’ . As a result, an essentially secular, common-sense understanding of justice in terms of a quid pro quo morality, whose validity was immediately apparent to reason, had become culturally entangled with the Pauline notion of opera legis , obscuring the proper theological sense of this theological term. The Aristotelian concept of iustitia , if applied analogically to God, led to an understanding of God’ s righteousness which was the ‘ worst enemy of grace’ , 22 in effect making justification conditional on the implementation of the ‘ works of the law’ . Luther’ s joy at his discovery of a ‘ wonderful new definition’ of iustitia reflects his realisation that God loves and forgives sinners, and that the iustitia of iustitia Dei is not to be understood qua philosophi et iuriste accipiunt , but qua in scriptura accipitur .

Perhaps the most distinctive feature of Luther’ s mature doctrine of justification is the emphasis he places on its theological centrality. 23 It was Luther above all who saw the articulus iustificationis as the word of the gospel, to which all else was subordinate. The doctrine of justification which he propounded was to cause him to reject the papacy and the church of his day, not on the basis of any direct ecclesiological argument, but upon the basis of his conviction that the church of his day had compromised its identity by allowing itself to be shaped by doctrines of justification which were essentially Pelagian. 24 The priority of his soteriology over his ecclesiology is particularly evident in his remarkable statement of 1535, to the effect that he will concede the Pope his authority if the latter concedes the free justification of sinners in Christ. 25

The cornerstone of both Luther’ s theological breakthrough and his subsequent controversy with the church of his day lie primarily (though not exclusively) in his insight that humans cannot initiate the process of their own justification. Luther held that the church of his day had fallen into some form of Pelagianism . This is a questionable judgement, perhaps reflecting Luther’ s familiarity with the academic theology of the via moderna , rather than that of the schola Augustiniana moderna (despite his being a member of the Augustinian order). In view of the fact that the soteriology of certain Reformed theologians (such as Peter Martyr Vermigli and John Calvin ) may reflect precisely this soteriology, it is necessary to treat Luther’ s generalisations concerning the theology (especially the pastoral theology) of the late medieval church with a degree of caution.

Following his decisive break with the soteriology of the via moderna in 1515, the general lines of the development of Luther’ s theology are clear. The important concept of iustitia Christi aliena , the ‘ commerce of exchange’ between Christ and the sinner, and the totus homo theology all make their appearance in the Romans lectures of 1515– 16; the theologia crucis emerges over the period 1516– 19; the place of good works in justification is clarified in the 1520 Sermo von den guten Werken ; and the crucial distinction between forgiving grace and the gift of the Holy Spirit is made clear in what is perhaps the most impressive of Luther’ s early works, Rationis Latomianae confutatio (1521). We shall consider these points individually.

While Luther’ s theology of justification developed a strongly anti-Pelagian cast from 1515 onwards, this is only one of its aspects. It is widely agreed that one the most distinctive features of Luther’ s later theology of justification is his explicit criticism of Augustine, evident from the same period, which focusses on the concept of iustitia Christi aliena , which is perhaps the most characteristic feature of Luther’ s early understanding of justification. Karl Holl argued that the early Luther understood justification as a progressive reale Gerechtmachung . 26 For Holl, the solution to ‘ the riddle of Luther’ s doctrine of justification’ lay not in a doctrine of double justification, nor in a juxtaposition of Rechtfertigung and Gerechtmachung , but in a proleptic understanding of the basis of the analytic divine judgement implicit in the process of justification. Holl illustrated this concept with reference to the analogy of a sculptor whose vision of the final outcome motivates and guides him as he begins work on a block of crude marble; similarly, God’ s present justification of sinners is based upon his anticipation of their final sanctification, in that the present justification of humans takes place on the basis of their foreseen future righteousness.

Holl’ s exposition of the dialectic between the sinner’ s state in re and in spe maps reasonably well onto some aspects of the concept of justification that is frequently employed by Luther in the 1515– 16 Romans lectures. Luther here does not make the distinction between justification and sanctification associated with later Protestantism, but rather treats justification as a process of becoming: fieri est iustificatio . 27 Justification is thus a ‘ sort of beginning of God’ s creation’ , initium aliquod creaturae eius , by which Christians wait in hope for the consummation of their righteousness. Luther’ s soteriology at this point is participationist rather than purely juridical. Like Augustine before him, at this stage Luther tends to see justification as a healing process which permits God to overlook the remaining sin on account of its pending eradication. 28 This is especially clear from the famous analogy of the sick person under the care of a competent physician, used by both Luther and Augustine: like a sick person under the care of a doctor, who is ill in re yet healthy in spe , the Christian awaits in hope the final resolution of the dialectic between righteousness and sin. Justification for the young Luther is thus a healing process that permits God to overlook whatever sin remains in the believer because of God’ s proleptic or anticipatory knowledge of the final outcome of this process of ‘ becoming’ or ‘ healing’ . This entire passage merits citation: 29

Our reflections on Luther’ s emerging views on justification has focussed on his early period, before Luther was involved in the major controversies which led to the formation of the evangelical faction at Wittenberg, outside the mainstream of the Catholic church. As we have emphasised, Luther’ s views on certain aspects of the process of justification were not fixed at this stage. Luther had recognised the need to locate the justification of humanity within an anti-Pelagian context, safeguarding the grace of God in the face of threats from human aspirations to autonomy or self-righteousness. Yet justification is clearly seen at this stage as a process of ‘ becoming’ or transformation, comparable to the healing of someone who is ill.

Luther develops a theological framework which allows him to view the inner reality of a sinner using two major interpretive theological categorial frameworks: aegrotus – sanus (ill – healthy) and iustus – peccator (righteous – sinful), linked with two further frameworks of interpretation which specifically engage the process of transformation: the dialectic between in re and in spe (in reality and in hope), and between the divine and human estimation of the situation (using terms such as reputatio or imputio , or invoking an informing dialectic between iustitia coram Deo and iustitia apud hominem ). It is not difficult to see how these frameworks can be resolved and even integrated within that of humans being justified by laying hold of a righteousness which is not, and can never be, their own – the iustitia Christi aliena , which God mercifully ‘ reckons’ to humans. But Luther has not yet got to that point, even if its basic components are beginning to fall into place.

Luther’ s theological framework was like a seedbed within which more explicitly forensic approaches to justification – such as Melanchthon ’ s notion of justification as acceptilation – could take root and grow, without distorting or doing intellectual violence to Luther’ s original conception of justification. Hints of these kinds of developments can be seen in his later writings – such as the 1535 Galatians commentary, which develops the important distinction between an active and passive righteousness. 32 This heavenly or passive righteousness is not something that we can be said to possess, but which we receive through faith; 33 active righteousness proceeds from this, and is expressive but not constitutive of the believer’ s relationship with God. Luther does not invoke the motif of ‘ union with Christ’ at this point, but it nevertheless provides a framework within which such insights can be integrated. Luther and Melanchthon use different informing images and analogies in visualising justification; while this observation leads some to conclude that their ideas were different, others suggest that these were purely verbal differences. 34 My own view is that these represent different modes of portraying or imagining justification, capable of conveying the distinct emphases of each writer without entailing their opposition or contradiction.

In the next chapter we shall explore how Luther’ s ideas were further developed, and how the evangelical faction at Wittenberg coalesced around a distinctive approach to justification which would be adopted and echoed by similar groups, particularly in Zurich and Geneva.