Justification as Ontological and Relational Transformation
4
The Nature of Justification
◈
As sustained theological reflection got under way once more after the restoration of political and economic stability in many parts of western Europe during the late eleventh century, the western church found its thinking on the redemption of humanity focussing on issues linked with Paul’
s discussion of justification by faith. Not only did Paul’
s approach to justification enable medieval theology to deal with questions of salvation history –
such as the status of the Old Testament patriarchs and the role of the Mosaic covenant in the Christian life; it also enabled theology to align itself with the growing interest in law, which increasingly became seen as integral to the maintenance of a civilised society.
1
Anselm of
Canterbury’
s defence of the rationality of the Christian faith –
especially its doctrine of incarnation –
thus entailed the correlation of intellectual, legal and moral rationality.
2
God’
s redemption of humanity was not to be seen as a wilful display of divine power
, but as a principled outworking of divine righteousness
, which in turn led to human beings becoming righteous in the eyes of God. Other soteriological metaphors –
such as regeneration, sanctification and divinisation –
might all touch upon aspects of this overall grand scheme; the concept of justification managed to hold them together in a coherent theological framework. Although this theme recurs at multiple points in medieval expositions of theology, it is most evident at two points: discussion of the nature of justification on the one hand, and the righteousness of God on the other. We shall consider these two major themes in the opening sections of this chapter, before going on to explore other aspects of the medieval accounts of justification.
Justification: Some Preliminary Reflections
What is signified by the word ‘
justification’
? As noted previously, the Latin term iustificatio
is post-classical, and almost entirely restricted to works of Christian theology, especially those which offer translations of the Greek term diakaiosis
–
such as Pauline commentaries
. (The plural iustificationes
is occasionally encountered, when the term iustificatio
is used to translate diakaiomata
.) Augustine’
s interpretation of iustificare
as iustum facere
, based on the assumption that -ficare
was the unstressed form of facere
, was universally accepted during the medieval period, reflecting the considerable esteem in which he was held. Although iustificare
is occasionally interpreted as iustum habere
(‘
to be held as righteous’
),
3
it is clear that this is intended to refer to a human estimation of a person’
s status (iustificatio coram hominibus
) rather than status in the sight of God (coram Deo
).
4
The characteristic medieval understanding of the nature of justification is that the term iustificatio
refers not merely to the beginning of the Christian life, but also to its continuation and ultimate perfection, in which Christians are made righteous in the sight of God and of humanity through a fundamental change in their nature, and not merely in their status. There is no hint of the later distinction between justification (understood as an external pronouncement of God) and sanctification (understood as the subsequent process of inner renewal), characteristic of leading writers of the Protestant Reformation, in the medieval discussions of the meaning of iustificatio
. This fundamental difference concerning the nature
of justification remains one of the best criteria of distinction between the doctrines of justification associated with the medieval and the Reformation periods.
The medieval discussion of the notion of ‘
adoption as sons of God’
–
found especially in Paul’
s reflections on Christian identity, as set out in Romans 8 –
is of interest. Adoption is an essentially legal metaphor, in which individuals are granted a legal status which they did not possess as a consequence of their birth.
5
This might suggest that justification could be seen in similar terms, as a change in the believer’
s legal standing. Medieval theologians, however, did not draw this conclusion. While emphasising that adoptive filiation was the result of divine grace, they
pointed out that it also rested on the regenerative work of the Holy Spirit.
6
Peter Abelard
is representative of the tradition as a whole, pointing out that this altered legal status is the result of the transformed nature of the believer, arising from the work of the Holy Spirit.
7
It is because we have received a ‘
Spirit of Adoption’
that we can be considered to be sons of God.
There are, however, some points at which medieval theologians speak of justification in reputational terms –
in other words, in terms of the esteem in which someone is held in the sight of another. Although Thomas Aquinas adopts a strongly factitive approach to justification,
8
there are points in his biblical commentaries in which he notes that the term iustificari
can bear a declarative sense. In his Romans lectures, Aquinas distinguishes several ways in which the Bible uses the verb iustificari
.
9
In those Pauline passages which speak of the impossibility of justification through works of the law, being ‘
justified’
designates a transformational process arising from receiving a new righteousness (iustitiam de novo accipit
). Yet in other contexts, such as references to those who faithfully observe divine commandments (e.g., Romans 2:13), references to such individuals being ‘
justified’
mean the esteem or reputation in which they are held by God, by other people –
or both. At other points, iustificari
can bear the sense of ‘
carrying out works of righteousness’
, as in the case of the publican who returned home justified because he had –
rightly and righteously –
confessed his sin (Luke 18:14). Yet such variations must be set alongside the consensus of the western church: to be justified is to be made righteous. As Aquinas put it, justification is about a transition to righteousness. Iustificatio de sui ratione importat motum ad iustitiam.
10
This understanding of the nature of justification is not limited to texts written in Latin. An examination of Gothic and early English vernacular works appears to confirm this conclusion concerning the ubiquity of the Augustinian interpretation of the significance of ‘
justification’
. The Gothic version of the New Testament, generally accepted as having been translated directly from the Byzantine Greek text by the Arian bishop
Ulphilas
(d. 383),
11
shows clear evidence of a factitive understanding of dikaioun
in its translation of the Pauline epistles. Thus dikaioun
, as it occurs in Galatians 2:16, is translated as raihts wairthan
, which clearly bears the sense of ‘
becoming righteous’
. It may be noted, however, that dikaioun
is not translated regularly as raihts wairthan
in the Gothic version of the gospels –
for example, dedikaiōmenos
is translated as garaithoza
at Luke 18:14.
The early English church was generally able to express Christian ideas by giving new meanings to existing words in the vernacular, or by forming new compounds of words already in use. Anglo-Saxon works generally translate the noun ‘
justification’
as gerihtwisung
and the verb ‘
justify’
as gerihtwisian
. An Anglo-Saxon version of the Old Latin Psalter thus translates the words ‘
iustificata sunt’
in Psalm 18:8 as ‘
Hi synt gerihtwisode’
.
12
Both these Old English terms should probably be seen as an interpretation, rather than a mere translation, of the original Latin term.
13
Ælfric uses the phrase rihtwise getealde mid Gode
to mean ‘
accounted righteous with God’
,
14
so that the most appropriate contemporary translation of gerihtwisung
would appear to be ‘
putting right’
, or ‘
rightwising’
. A number of works of English-language biblical scholarship have suggested that the notion of justification as ‘
rightwising’
might profitably be retrieved.
15
However, this Old English way of rendering justification seems to have fallen out of use as a result of the Norman Conquest of 1066, which saw some older theological terms remain in circulation (such as God
, heofon
and hel
), while others –
such as hœl
(salvation) and œrist
(resurrection) –
fell out of use, to be replaced by terms derived from French or Latin.
16
The Old English terms for ‘
justification’
and its cognates appear to have suffered the latter fate, gerihtwısung
being replaced with the Middle English iustification
, and gerihtwisian
with iustifien
, both presumably derived from the Old French justification
and justifier.
This disappearance may be illustrated from the translation of Psalm 143:2 from a fourteenth-century vernacular source, where the Romance theological term seems out of place among its Middle English neighbours:
17
‘
Lorde, they seruaunt dragh neuer to dome, / For non lyuyande to the is justyfyet.’
Processus Iustificationis: The Inner Dynamics of Justification
During the Middle Ages, the most important systematic development of the concept of justification lay in the formulation of the processus iustificationis
–
the systematic discussion of the inner structure of justification which began during the opening decades of the twelfth century.
18
This discussion marks an important development in the history of the doctrine of justification, which facilitated the correlation of the process of justification with the emerging sacramental system of the church, particularly the formal requirements of sacerdotal confession which were set out by Gregory VII between 1078 and 1080.
Its beginnings may, however, be discerned at a much earlier period in the history of doctrine. Augustine distinguished three aspects of the justification of the ungodly:
19
‘
In this life, justification confers these three things upon us: first, the washing of regeneration, by which our sins are forgiven; then confession of our sins, the guilt of which has been remitted; thirdly, through our prayers, in which we say “
Forgive us our sins”
.’
Bruno the Carthusian
similarly distinguished three aspects of the process of justification in the late eleventh century.
20
A more detailed discussion of the inner structure of justification may be found in Hervaeus of Bourg-Dieu
’
s comments on Romans 3:20: the recognition of sin is followed by the operation of healing grace, which leads to a love for righteousness:
21
For through the law comes the knowledge of sin (cognitio peccati
); by faith comes the infusion of grace against sin; by grace comes the cleansing of the soul from the guilt of sin; through the cleansing of the soul comes freedom of the will; through the freedom of the will comes the love of righteousness; and through the love of righteousness comes the operation of the law.
The sequential ordering of the process of justification, so clearly set out in this extract, allows the inner dynamic of the process to be visualised as a cascade of developments, with each element leading to another in a causal sequence.
Initially, as noted above, the theologians of the twelfth century envisaged the processus iustificationis
as consisting of three elements. As a study
of twelfth-century works indicates, the terminology of the processus iustificationis
was still fluid at this stage, and although the threefold structure appeared relatively fixed, its elements were still not clearly defined. Peter Manducator
defined the threefold sequence as follows: ‘
justification consists of three things, namely, the infusion of the first grace, the contrition
of the heart, and the remission of sin’
.
22
The processus
is elsewhere defined as consisting of the infusion of grace, the co-operation of the free will and its consummation.
23
Occasionally, a threefold scheme is encountered which omits any reference to the infusion of grace, such as the disavowal of sin, the intention not to sin further and remorse for past sins.
24
Nevertheless, it is clear that a threefold process, which is initiated through the infusion of grace and terminates in the remission of sin, was widely accepted as normative. Although all three elements involved had long been recognised as being closely interrelated, the increasing tendency to link the three elements together as the ‘
process of justification’
represented an important landmark in the systematic articulation of the doctrine.
Although the threefold scheme appears to have gained considerable acceptance in the twelfth century, it was a fourfold account of the inner structure of justification which would finally become accepted as normative within western theology. The threefold processus
recognised a single motion of the liberum arbitrium
; this subsequently came to be divided into two components: a movement of the free will towards God
and away from sin
. As stated by Peter of Poitiers
in 1179, the scheme now took the following form:
25
Four things take place in the justification of the ungodly: the infusion of grace, a movement arising from grace and the free will, contrition, and the remission of sin. None of these is to be regarded as taking precedence in time, although by nature the infusion of grace precedes the other three. This, however, is by nature, not in time. While any of these could be described as ‘
justification’
, none of them can be present without the other three.
The infusion of grace thus initiates a causal chain of events which eventually leads to justification; if any of these events may be shown to have taken place, the remaining three may also be concluded to have
taken place. The fourfold processus iustificationis
differs from the threefold scheme in including a dual, rather than a single, motion of the human free will, while otherwise retaining the same overall structure. It was taken up by the first Summist, William of Auxerre
, in the form infusio gratiae
, motus liberi arbitrii
, contritio
, peccatorum remissio
.
26
William’
s major work, the Summa Aurea
, is now regarded as an influential precursor of the monumental systematic theological treatises that followed half a century later, and helped gain wide acceptance of this formulation of the processus iustificationis
by the doctors of the early Dominican and Franciscan schools. The inclusion of contritio
in the processus
is of no small significance, as it greatly assisted the correlation of the processus
with the sacrament of penance in the thirteenth century.
27
The justification of the fourfold processus iustificationis
within the early Dominican school highlights the considerable influence of Aristotelian physics upon theological speculation within that school.
28
Albertus Magnus
defined justification as a motus
from sin to grace and rectitude.
29
Having already applied the Aristotelian theory of motion, as stated in the celebrated maxim of Aristotelian physics, omne quod movetur ab alio movetur
, to a physical motus
such as free fall, or to a theological problem of motus
such as the existence of God, he now applied the same principle to the analysis of the inner structure of the motus
of justification. The explicit application of the Aristotelian theory of generation to the transition from nature to grace leads to a fourfold processus iustificationis
, with a dual motion of the free will. This application of Aristotelian physics to the motus
of justification is particularly associated with Thomas Aquinas.
Thomas Aquinas on the
Processus Iustificationis
For Aquinas, the processus iustificationis
is a motus
consisting of the infusion of grace; the movement of the free will directed towards God
through faith; the movement of the free will directed against sin; and the remission of sin.
30
Thomas now justifies this inner dynamic on the basis of Aristotelian physics. By nature, the movement of the mover must come first, followed by the disposition of the matter, or the movement of that which is to be moved, followed by the final termination of the motion when the objective of the movement has been achieved. Thus the infusion of grace must precede the remission of sin, as the infusion of grace is the efficient cause of that remission. The motus
which is justification thus ends in the remission of sin, which may be considered as the terminus
of the infusion of grace.
31
As every movement may be said to be defined by its terminus
, justification may thus be said to consist of the remission of sin.
32
That final statement needs further discussion. Some commentators, perhaps unaware of Aquinas’
s understanding of the relation of motus
and terminus
, have misunderstood his occasional definition of justification solely in terms of the remission of sin, representing him as approaching a forensic concept of justification. It will be clear that this is not correct. When Aquinas defines justification as remissio peccatorum
, he does not exclude other elements –
such as the infusion of grace –
from his definition, for the following reasons. First, justification cannot be defined without reference to its content, solely in terms of its terminus.
Such a definition is adequate, but not exhaustive, and should not be treated as if it were. Second, Aquinas’
s understanding of the processus iustificationis
means that the occurrence of any one of the four elements necessarily entails the occurrence of the remaining three. The definition of iustificatio
as remissio peccatorum
once more expressly includes
the remaining three elements. ‘
In the justification of souls, two things occur together, namely, the remission of guilt and the newness of life through grace.’
33
Having established that the remission of sin is the final element in the processus iustificationis
, Aquinas argues that the element intervening between the initial element (i.e., infusio gratiae
) and the final one (i.e., remissio peccatorum
) must be the disposition of the object of justification –
that is, the motus mobilis
, the movement of that which is to be moved. As justification is motus mentis
, this disposition must refer to the human free will, which precedes justification itself by nature.
34
This consideration leads to a definition of justification as ‘
a movement by which the human mind is moved by God from the state of sin to a state of righteousness (quidam motus quo humana mens movetur a Deo a statu peccati in statum
iustitiae
).
35
This allows a threefold processus iustificationis
to be established: infusio gratiae
, motus liberi arbitrii
, remissio peccatorum
. Tradition had by now, however, established a dual
motion of the free will in justification: faith (directed towards God) and contrition
(directed away from sin). Aquinas accommodates this by applying a further axiom of Aristotelian physics –
that ‘
in movements of the soul, the movement to the principle of understanding or to the end of the action comes first’
36
–
to the motus
of justification. Thus a movement of the liberum arbitrium
towards God must precede its motion against sin, as the former is the cause of the latter.
37
This teaching, found in the Summa Theologiae
, is of particular interest, as it represents an abandonment of his earlier teaching that there should be no intermediates between the influence of grace and the remission of sin.
38
In justification, according to Aquinas, humanity is translated from a state of corrupt nature to one of habitual grace; from a state of sin to a state of justice, with the remission of sin.
39
But how is this state of justice to be conceived? As noted earlier, Augustine’
s understanding of iustitia
embraces practically the entire ordering of the universe, so that justification can be understood as the restoration of humans to their correct place in the hierarchy of being, including the establishment of the correct relationship between the various existential strata within humanity, on the basis of the Neoplatonist anthropological model favoured by Augustine. Aquinas’
s discussion of the question involves a crucial distinction between the virtue
of justice, and the supernatural habit
of justice, infused by God. Iustitia acquisita
, the virtue of acquired justice,
40
may be considered either as particular justice, which orders individuals’
actions relating to their fellows, or as legal justice as defined by Aristotle
.
41
Iustitia infusa
, however, on the basis of which humanity is justified, comes from God himself, through grace. Justification is concerned with ‘
justice in the sight of God’
(iustitia quae est apud Deum
).
42
Failure to appreciate this distinction will lead to the quite untenable conclusion that Aquinas teaches justification purely through self-endeavour or moral attainment.
Iustitia infusa
is that justice which is infused into humans by God, by which their higher faculties are submitted to God. In essence, it may be noted that Aquinas’
s concept of infused justice is very similar to Aristotle’
s notion of metaphorical justice, which refers primarily to a
rectitude of order within the interior disposition of humans. It is this infused justice, and this justice alone, which is the basis of the justification of humanity.
The characteristically Augustinian understanding of justification as the restoration of humanity to its proper place in the created hierarchy of being is reflected in Aquinas’
s discussion of why justification is properly named after justice, rather than after faith or love. Although both faith and love are involved in justification, and although their supernatural habits are infused in its course, Aquinas insists that the transformation which is called ‘
justification’
is properly named after justice alone on account of the all-embracing character of the latter, which refers to the entire rectitude of order of the human soul, with all its faculties. Faith and love refer only to specific aspects of this order, whereas justice embraces the higher nature of humans in its totality.
It may be noted at this point that Aquinas’
s understanding of justification as a motus mentis
reflects his intellectualist understanding of human nature; if the higher nature is subordinate to God, it will be enabled to restrain the lower nature. The human intellect is restored through justifying faith, so that individuals are able to avoid mortal
sin; although the higher nature subsequently restrains the lower, it is unable to overcome it entirely, so that they are still unable to avoid venial
sin after justification.
43
Thus even the individual who is in a state of grace cannot be said to be free from sin. Aquinas’
s exposition of Romans 7 is of particular interest in this respect, as he clearly understands the chapter to refer to the Christian constituted in grace. Justification is about ‘
being made just’
: the precise nature of this ‘
making just’
is, however, carefully defined in terms of the rectitude of the human mind so that it, acting as a secondary cause, may bring all that is subordinate to it into conformity with the exemplar established for it by God. The event
of the infusion of the habit of justice must therefore be followed by the process
of the submission of the lower to the higher nature; in this understanding of the dual nature of justification, Thomas remains faithful to the teaching of Augustine.
Franciscan Approaches to the
Processus Iustificationis
Aquinas’
s understanding of justification as a motus mentis
allows him to apply the Aristotelian theory of motion to its presuppositions, as well as its interior structure, and is of particular interest in relation to his
discussion of the need for a disposition towards justification on the part of the sinner. The early Franciscan school, however, developed a more psychological approach to justification, reflecting an Augustinian illuminationist epistemology which was not characteristic of the Dominican school.
The general features of the early Franciscan teaching on the nature of justification may be found in Bonaventure
’
s Itinerarium mentis in Deum
, which develops a hierarchical concept of justification that clearly reflects the influence of Dionysius. The three fundamental operations of grace in justification are the purification
, illumination
and perfection
of the soul.
44
Christ performed three acts which re-established and reordered humanity’
s supernatural life towards God: he purged our guilt, enlightened us by his example and perfected us by enabling us to follow in his footsteps. Christians are required to respond to these in three hierarchical acts by which they can appropriate the associated benefits.
These three aspects of the justification of the sinner correspond to the ‘
Three Ways’
which are so characteristic of Bonaventure’
s spirituality, distinguished by their goals rather than by their relation in time. The stimulus conscientiae
motivates the way of purification, the radius intelligentiae
the way of illumination and the igniculus sapientiae
the way of unity with God. From the moment of its first infusion, sanctifying grace takes over the substance and faculties of the soul, setting each in its respective place and ordering the soul that it may be conformed to God.
45
The process of justification involves the destruction of the passions which threaten the development of the new life of humanity, so that humans can rediscover the image of God within themselves. Thus the soul, reconstituted by grace, can begin its ascent towards the goal of supernatural perfection. It will be clear that Bonaventure’
s understanding of the nature of justification differs from that of Thomas only in emphasis: both understand justification as the establishment of rectitude within the higher nature of humans, whether this be considered as mens
or as anima.
Bonaventure’
s teaching was developed further by his Italian disciple Matthew of Aquasparta
,
46
who discussed justification in terms of six stages: the hatred of sin and the love of good; regeneration; the reforming and reordering of the human nature; the generation of virtues; conversion to, and union with, God; and remission of sin.
47
His emphasis upon
the regeneration of the sinner and their ultimate union with God points to a psychological approach to justification more characteristic of Bonaventure than Thomas.
Justification as Ontological and Relational Transformation
The medieval statements concerning the nature of justification demonstrate that justification is universally understood to involve a real change in its object, so that regeneration is subsumed under justification. As John of La Rochelle
pointed out, unless justification did produce a real change in humans, it would appear to serve no useful purpose:
48
‘
Persons are justified. If this places nothing within them, there has been no change on their part, nor are they any closer to their eternal good than before. If something is placed within them, I say that this is grace.’
This statement is of particular interest, as it involves the appeal to the reality of a change in humans arising through their justification to refute the earlier opinion, widespread in the eleventh century, that grace did not make any change to the human soul (gratia ponit nihil in anima
).
49
While justification was universally understood to involve the regeneration of humanity, the opinion that an ontological
change is thereby effected within humans is particularly associated with the period of High Scholasticism and the development of the concept of created grace. The earlier medieval theologians expressed the change effected in justification in terms of a particular presence of God in his creature, which did not necessarily effect an ontological change. Thus the Summa Fratris Alexandri
,
written after 1240, developed the Augustinian concept of the indwelling of God in creatures by declaring that while God is present in all creatures, only some (i.e., those who are justified) may be said to possess God.
50
The Summa
thus conceives a special presence of God in the justified, such that an ontological change occurs in the soul. The presence of God in the justified sinner necessarily results in created
grace –
a created grace which can be conceived as a conformity of the soul to God. This special presence of God in the souls of the justified must be distinguished from
the general presence of God in the world, and from the unique union between God and humanity achieved in the hypostatic union. In this, the Summa
makes an important advance on Peter Lombard
’
s discussion of the divine presence in all creatures; in angels and the souls of the justified through indwelling grace, and in Christ.
51
The later medieval period saw the rise of the opinion, particularly associated with the via moderna
, according to which the relationship between God and humans was to be understood covenantally
rather than ontologically
.
52
Although this opinion involves the linking of justification with the extrinsic denomination of the divine acceptation, the de facto
necessity of a habit of grace
in justification continued to be maintained. Although the ultimate reason for humanity’
s acceptation lies in the divine decision to accept, the fact remains that, in terms of the ordained divine manner of operation (i.e., de
potentia Dei ordinata
), the infusion of grace, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit and the divine acceptation coincide. It is thus essential to distinguish the rejection of the metaphysical necessity of such a habit of grace from the assertion of its de facto
necessity within the context of the covenant that governs the divine dispensation towards humankind.
The necessity of a habit of created grace in justification is thus to be considered to be radically contingent, a necessitas consequentiae
rather than a necessitas consequentis
; however, as theology is concerned with the articulation of the divine dispensation towards humankind as it now pertains, the justification of humans before God must be considered to involve an ontological change within them. De
potentia Dei ordinata
the habit of created grace is the middle term between sinful humans and their acceptation by God in justification; it need not have been so, but the fact remains that it is so. The essential contribution of the via moderna
to the medieval understanding of the nature of justification is its emphasis upon the contingent
nature of the ontological change which occurs within humans in justification.
53
It is only by confusing the actual divine dispensation de potentia ordinata
with a hypothetical dispensation de potentia absoluta
that any continuity with the Reformation understandings of the nature of justification may be maintained.
Associated with the via moderna
in particular is the weakening of the link between the elements of the traditional processus iustificationis
.
As
noted above, the four elements of the process were regarded as essentially aspects of one and the same transformation, causally linked by their intrinsic natures (ex natura rei
). From the time of Duns Scotus
onwards, this view was subjected to increasing criticism. The infusion of grace and the remission of sin came increasingly to be seen as fundamentally distinct, coexisting and causally related only through the divine ordination (ex pacto divino
). One may take place without the other. Scotus states four reasons why the remission of sin and the infusion of grace cannot be regarded as aspects of one and the same change (i.e., justification):
54
1
The remission of sin is multiple, as God forgives each committed sin individually, while the infusion of grace is single.
2
Infusion of grace can occur without remission of sin, and vice versa. Thus God infused grace into Adam in his state of innocence without remitting his sin, as he did also with the good angels.
3
There is no necessary correlation between sin and grace as opposites.
4
Sin cannot be regarded simply as the privation of grace, which would be necessary if justification were regarded as the transition from a privation to its corresponding quality.
Furthermore, Scotus points out that infusion of grace is a real
change in humans, while the remission of sin is a mutatio rationis
, an ideal change within the divine mind and not within individuals themselves. As the concepts of the infusion of grace and the remission of sin have totally different points of reference, they cannot be allowed to be causally related as in the traditional processus iustificationis.
Since their relationship does not derive from the nature of the elements themselves, it must derive from the divine will –
i.e., it is arbitrary. Without in any way challenging the de facto
relationship of the elements of the processus iustificationis
, Scotus demonstrated that this relationship was itself radically contingent, the consequence of divine ordination rather than of the nature of the entities themselves. This point, which relates to the nature of the causal processes involved in justification, will be developed further in a discussion of the role of supernatural habits in justification later in this work.
Yet while there was a growing recognition of the contingency of the relation of the various elements of the processus iustificationis
, this did not
lead to their separation, or to the emergence of purely declarative approaches to justification. Indeed, the modernus
Gabriel Biel
explicitly contrasts a forensic justification before a secular judge with justification as transformation in relation to God, the spiritual judge.
55
Justification might be framed within a covenantal framework, thus highlighting a relational transformation between God and the individual believer; this, however, was not seen as displacing ontological transformation through the indwelling of grace.
In the later medieval period, the de facto
necessity of a habit of created grace in justification is maintained, even by those theologians who otherwise stood closest to the Reformers. Even among those who use such hypothetical constructs as the ‘
absolute power of God’
to argue that justification need not have been linked to such a created habit of grace
, the consensus remained that, whatever hypothetical possibilities might be noted, the actual ordained order of salvation did indeed involve the transformation of humanity through grace. From its beginning to its end, the medieval period saw justification as involving a real change in the sinner –
an understanding which precludes any distinction between iustificatio
and regeneratio
. The processus iustificationis
includes regeneration or renewal as one of its integral elements, making any such distinction intensely problematic.
1
See, for example, Sturges, Law and Sovereignty in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance
; Shoemaker, ‘
Le Diable et le droit au Moyen Âge’
. For the language of justification during this period, see Froehlich, ‘
Justification Language in the Middle Ages’
.
3
For example, Atto of Vercelli, Expositio epistolarum Pauli
, PL
134.149c; Haimo of Auxerre
, Expositio in divi Pauli epistolas
, PL
119.381a. On Haimo’
s engagement with Paul, see especially Heil, ‘
Haimo’
s Commentary on Paul’
.
4
For example, Sedulius Scotus
, Collatio in omnes Pauli epistolas
, PL
103.41c: ‘
aliud est iustificari coram Deo, aliud coram hominibus’
.
7
Abelard, Expositio in epistolam ad Romanos
, PL
178.902a–
903b. For Thomas Aquinas’
s reflections on the role of Christ and the Holy Spirit in adoptive filiation, see Somme, Fils adoptifs de Dieu par Jesus Christ
, 24–
36.
9
Super Epistolam ad Romanos Lectura
, §212. For a good discussion, see Keating, ‘
Justification, Sanctification and Divinization in Thomas Aquinas’
.
10
Thomas Aquinas, In IV Sent
. dist. xvii q. 1 a. 1.
12
Libri Psalmorum versio antiqua Latina cum paraphrasi Anglo-Saxonica
, 41.
13
For Ælfric’
s translation practice, see Stanton, The Culture of Translation in Anglo-Saxon England
, 144–
70.
14
Ælfric of
Eynsham, Homilies
, vol. 2, 286.
15
E.g., Macchia, Justified in the Spirit
, 3.
16
For a discussion and review, see Esteban-Segura, ‘
Translating and Glossing Nouns in the Old English Gospels’
.
18
For an excellent discussion of the processus iustificationis
in the early medieval period, see Landgraf, Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik
, vol. 3, 287–
302.
20
Expositio in Psalmos
, PL
152.1087a: ‘
Notandum quod haec beneficia non narrat ordine; prius enim fuit a captivitate per fidem averti, postea vero peccata operiri, et sic post iniquitatem remitti; et ad ultimum in bonis operibus et virtutibus benedici’
.
23
Peter Comestor, Sermo
17, PL
198.1769b: ‘
Iustificatio etiam in tribus consistit, vel notatur; in gratia infusione, in liberi arbitrii cooperatione, tandem in consummatione; primum est incipientium, secundum proficientium, tertium pervenientium’
.
26
Summa Aurea
lib. iii tr. ii q. 1; fol. 121v.
27
See, for example, Alexander of Hales, In IV Sent.
dist. xvii n. 7
; Albertus Magnus, In IV Sent.
dist. xviia a. 10; ed. Borgnet, 29.673: ‘
Dicitur ab omnibus, quod quattuor exiguntur ad iustificationem impii, scilicet infusio gratiae, motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum sive contritio, quod idem est, motus liberi arbitrii in Deum, et remissio peccati’
; Bonaventure
, In II Sent.
dist. xxvi a. 1 dub. 3; Thomas Aquinas
, In IV Sent.
dist. xvii q. 1 a. 4; ed. Mandonnet, 4.843; Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae
IaIIae q. 113 a. 6; Odo Rigaldi
, In II Sent.
dist. xxvi membr. i q. 2 a. 3 (ed. Bouvy, 331.48–
132.68). Matthew of Aquasparta
redefines the four elements as satisfactio
, conversio
, reformatio
, vivificatio
: In II Sent.
dist. xxviii a. 1 q. 1.
28
See McGrath, ‘
The Influence of Aristotelian Physics upon St. Thomas Aquinas’
Discussion of the “
Processus Iustificationis”’
. See also Flick, L’attimo della giustificazione
, 104–
54.
29
In IV Sent.
dist. xviia a. 15.
30
IaIIae q. 113 a. 8.
31
IaIIae q. 113 a. 6.
32
IaIIae q. 113 a. 6 ad 1um.
33
Summa theologiae
, IIIa q. 56 a. 2 ad 4um.
34
IaIIae q. 113 a. 8 ad 2um.
35
IaIIae q. 113 a. 5.
36
IaIIae q. 113 a. 8 ad 3um.
37
IaIIae q. 113 a. 8.
38
De veritate
q. 28 a. 8; ed. Spiazzi vol. 1, 549: ‘
et ideo inter gratiae infusionem et culpae remissionem nihil cadet medium’
. An identical opinion is encountered earlier: In IV Sent
. dist. xvii q. 1 a. 4; ed. Mandonnet, vol. 4, 847.
39
IaIIae q. 113 aa. 1, 2.
40
IaIIae q. 63 a. 4.
41
IaIIae q. 58 a. 5.
42
IaIIae q. 113 a. 1.
43
IaIIae q. 109 a. 8.
45
See Guardini, Systembildende Elemente in der Theologie Bonaventuras.
46
Hayes, The General Doctrine of Creation in the Thirteenth Century with Special Emphasis on Matthew of Aquasparta.
48
Quaestiones disputatae de gratia
q. 7, ed. Hödl, 63.
49
For example, Glossa in decretum gratianis
, Cod. Bamberg Can. 13, cited in Landgraf, Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik
, vol. 1/1, 210: ‘
Talis est gratia, quia nec virtus nec opus vel motus mentis. Et secundum hoc nichil ponit.’
See Alszeghy, Nova creatura
, for further references and discussion.
50
Alexandri de Hales Summa theologica
pars i inq. i tr. ii q. 3 tit. 3 membr. 2 cap. i. sol, ed. Quaracchi, vol. 2, 77: ‘
Dicendum quod “
Deus esse per gratiam”
ponit necessario gratiam creatam in creatura.’
51
For the Christological aspects of such ideas, see Cross, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation
.
52
See Oberman, ‘
Wir sind pettler’
; Courtenay, ‘
Covenant and Causality in Pierre d’
Ailly’
; Hamm, Promissio, pactum, ordinatio
; McGrath, ‘
The Anti-Pelagian Structure of “
Nominalist”
Doctrines of Justification’
.
53
For reflection on this, see Courtenay, ‘
The Dialectic of Divine Omnipotence in the Age of Chaucer’
.
54
Opus Oxoniense
iv dist. xvi q. 2. For important reflections on the relation between the concepts of divine acceptation associated with Scotus and the Reformation, see Pannenberg, ‘
Das Verhältnis zwischen der Akzeptationslehre des Duns Scotus und der reformatorischen Rechtfertigungslehre’
.