Continuities between Late Medieval Theology and the Reformation

The medieval discussion of merit may be regarded as based upon Augustine’ s celebrated maxim si ergo Dei dona sunt bona merita tua non Deus coronat merita tua tanquam merita tua, sed tanquam dona sua. 4 When God crowns the merits of humanity, he merely crowns his own gifts to humans, rather than some attribute of humanity which God is legally obliged to acknowledge, respect and reward. 5 Human acceptation by God is an outcome of God’ s promises, not human achievement, so that the ultimate ground of ‘ merit’ is God’ s graciousness, not human self-righteousness. Augustine’ s references to the divine chirographum as the basis of merit 6 hints at a personal handwritten attestation of a binding promise on God’ s part – here understood by Augustine to refer to the Bible. Despite the semantic associations of the Latin term meritum , the early use of the term appears to have been quite innocent of the overtones of ‘ works-righteousness’ which would later be associated with it within Pelagian circles.

The Augustinian interpretation of merit as gratis pro gratia can be illustrated from many works of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, 9 but is particularly associated with Gilbert de la Porrée ( sometimes referred to as ‘ Gilbert of Poitiers’ ) and his school, 10 among whom we may number Cardinal Laborans, Odo of Ourscamp , Alan of Lille and Radulphus Ardens. The axiom Christus solus meruit is of particular importance in this connection, as it summarises the opinion, characteristic of the Porretani , that only Christ may be said to merit anything in the strict and proper sense of the term. Once more, the context of the discussion needs to be noted: what Christ may be said to ‘ merit’ for us is not the first grace of justification, but eternal life. ‘ Only Christ can properly merit eternal life for us.’ 11

This concept of merit appears to have found its most important application in connection with the question of whether, and in what sense, Mary can be said to have merited the honour of bearing the saviour of the world. 14 The most widely accepted answer was that Mary could not be thought of as having merited this distinction in the strict sense of the term, although it was appropriate or ‘ congruous’ that she should have been favoured in this manner. The concept of meritum congruitas or meritum interpretativum thus passed into general circulation, being understood as a form of merit, but only in the weakest sense of the term.

This distinction between merit in the strict sense of the term and in its weaker sense of ‘ propriety’ passed into the theological vocabulary of the thirteenth century as the concepts of meritum de condigno and meritum de congruo . Although these precise terms can be shown to have been used occasionally in the late twelfth century, 15 they do not always bear precisely the same meaning as they would in later periods. Furthermore, the concept of congruous merit, which was initially used chiefly in connection with the question of the propriety of Mary’ s bearing the saviour of the world, came to be used increasingly in a quite distinct context – that of the meritorious character of the human disposition towards justification. Thus whenever a theologian of the twelfth century concedes merit prior to justification, the ‘ merit’ in question is not to be understood as merit in the strict sense of the term, but rather as meritum de congruo . 16

Three points may be noted about the concept of ‘ congruous merit’ . First, the pastoral intention of the concept cannot be overlooked. 17 Although humanity has no claim to justification on the basis of divine justice, humans may look towards the divine generosity and kindness for some recognition of their attempts to amend their lives in accordance with the demands of the gospel. It may be pointed out that the concept of a disposition towards justification which is meritorious de congruo is particularly associated with the Franciscan order and the school of theology which came to be connected with it. The pastoral emphasis upon God’ s kindness towards sinful humanity finds its appropriate expression in the concept of congruous merit.

Secondly, human activity, which counts as the disposition towards justification, must be regarded as being already set within the context of grace. 18 Even in the later via moderna , the axiom facienti quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam is always understood as an expression and a consequence of divine grace. Those theologians who taught that humans could prepare themselves for justification in a manner which was meritorious de congruo invariably insisted that this be understood as a consequence of divine grace. Human justification must be seen as a divine gift , rather than as a divine reward.

In the third place, most theologians of the period explicitly taught that humans require the assistance of actual grace before they are capable of disposing themselves proximately towards justification, although they might concede that humans are capable of disposing themselves remotely towards justification through the proper exercise of their unaided natural faculties. Those theologians who held that a proximate disposition towards justification was meritorious de congruo thus presupposed that gratia gratis data (and not merely the concursus generalis ) was an integral element in effecting this necessary disposition.

This notion of being placed under obligation (de indebito debitum facere ) was taken up by theologians of the early thirteenth century, such as Stephen Langton 22 and Godfrey of Poitiers , 23 and is stated with particular clarity by William of Auvergne. 24 Merit is now defined as an act performed by humans that places God under an obligation to them. It must be pointed out, however, that this obligation on the part of God is usually understood to arise as a consequence of the gracious decision by which God chooses to be placed under an obligation to humans in this manner. 25 A similar definition of merit may be shown to be characteristic of the writers of the early Franciscan school, such as Odo Rigaldi 26 and Bonaventure , 27 as well as the first Summist, William of Auxerre . 28

The introduction of Aristotelian physics had a pronounced and profound effect upon the early Dominican school. We have already noted the considerable influence of Aristotelian physics upon Thomas Aquinas ’ s teaching on both the nature of justification and the necessity of a disposition for justification. Aristotelian influences are also evident in the early Dominican school’ s teaching on merit. Roland of Cremona ’ s definition of merit locates its essence in its being a motus connecting humanity’ s initial state and the final state of eternal life. 29 In this, we can see the beginnings of the tendency, which would become particularly clear in the writings of Thomas Aquinas, to conceive merit ontologically , rather than in terms of a personal obligation of God to the individual Christian. Whereas the earlier medieval theologians had understood merit to refer essentially to the obligation of God towards humanity, the theologians of the early Dominican school tended to understand merit in terms of ontological participation in the divine nature itself. This may be contrasted with the teaching of the early Franciscan school, which retained the older more relational understanding of merit. 30

A significant feature of the medieval understanding of condign merit is that merit and its reward are understood to be proportionally related. Thus Roland of Cremona states that merit de condigno is not called merit de digno precisely because the initial cum indicates the association between the merit and its reward. 31 This idea is picked up by others around this time, and inevitably leads to the notion, first clearly encountered in the writings of William of Auxerre , that the relation between merit and reward can be established as a matter of justice . 32 This idea is developed by Thomas Aquinas, who stresses that the divine reward of human merit is to be regarded as an ‘ act of justice’ on God’ s part. Aquinas, however, emphasises that the term ‘ justice’ is used in this context in a sense that diverges significantly from its normal use. 33

Although merit de condigno is often referred to as ‘ true’ merit, to distinguish it from merit de congruo , Aquinas understands neither type of merit to represent a just claim on the part of humans before God. Justice, in the strict sense of the term, can exist only among equals. Just as Aristotle excluded animals and gods from his concept of justice on the grounds that there existed too great a dissimilarity between them and humans to allow their inclusion in the contracting political community, so Aquinas argues that there is too great a dissimilarity between humans and God to allow anyone to speak of humanity having a ‘ just’ claim before God. ‘ It is obvious that there is the greatest inequality between God and humans, for they are infinitely different, and all of humanity’ s good comes from God.’ 34 Thus one cannot speak of iustitia secundum absolutam aequalitatem in this context, but only of iustitia secundum proportionem quandam. Although one can speak of justice and merit in terms of the relationship between God and humanity, it must be appreciated that merit in this context must be understood as merit on the basis of iustitia secundum praesuppositionem divinae ordinationis , rather than on the basis of iustitia secundum absolutam aequalitatem.

The merit in question is thus merit secundum quid – a merit before God which, though in some sense analogous to human merit, nevertheless diverges sharply from it. Merit before God is based upon a divine ordination according to which God will reward a particular work with a specified reward. God cannot be thought of as being in debt to humanity, in any sense of the notion; God’ s faithfulness, understood as self-obligation rather than obligation to humanity, is reflected in the divine ordination that God will reward such acts in this manner. 35 Merit arises from grace, in that God can be said to bestow quality upon his creatures in an act of grace. Merit is therefore not based upon strict justice, but upon iustitia secundum quid , ‘ a sort of justice’ , which is founded upon God’ s decision to reward creatures. In effect, Thomas develops Augustine’ s principle, that merit is based upon the divine promise, to the effect that all merit before God is ‘ improper’ merit, in the sense that it is not based upon strict justice between equals.

The voluntarist position is particularly associated with the later Franciscan school and the via moderna . Its fundamental and characteristic feature is the recognition of a discontinuity between the moral and the meritorious realms, the latter being understood to rest entirely upon the divine will itself. For Scotus, every created offering is worth exactly what God accepts it for, and nothing more. 37 The meritorious value of an act need therefore have no relation to its moral value, as it rests upon God’ s estimation alone. This position is developed with particular clarity in the works of William of Ockham , and we shall illustrate it with reference to these.

For Ockham, the decision as to what may be deemed to be meritorious or de-meritorious lies entirely within the scope of the divine will, and no reference whatsoever need be made to the moral act in question. There is a fundamental discontinuity between the moral value of an act (i.e., the act, considered in itself) and the meritorious value of the act (i.e., the value which God chooses to place upon the act). Moral virtue imposes no obligation upon God, and where such obligation may be conceded, it exists as the purely contingent outcome of a prior uncoerced divine decision. This aspect of Ockham’ s teaching has been the subject of considerable criticism, as it appears to suggest that the relation between the moral and the meritorious domains is purely arbitrary. 38 Although Ockham insists that an act can be meritorious only if it is performed in a state of grace, it appears that he regards this as merely a conditio sine qua non for merit, secondary in importance to the divine acceptation. 39 For Ockham, an act can be meritorious de potentia ordinata only if it is performed in a state of grace – but the meritorious value of that act is determined solely through the divine will.

For Ockham, God is not bound by the moral value of an act, but is free to impose upon that act whatever meritorious value he may deem appropriate. The relationship between the moral and meritorious values of an act is thus to be regarded as purely contingent, a consequence of the divine will, and not merely a necessary consequence of the nature of the act itself which God is obliged to respect. Ockham’ s concept of covenantal causality necessitates his rejection of an ex natura rei causal relationship between the moral and meritorious realms. Ockham uses the dialectic between the two powers of God to demonstrate that de potentia absoluta an act which is now deemed meritorious might have been de-meritorious, even though precisely the same act is involved in each case. 40

Ockham’ s discussion of the nature of congruous merit appears to underlie the criticisms of Thomas Bradwardine and Gregory of Rimini directed against the ‘ modern Pelagians’ . According to Ockham, God rewards virtuous acts performed outside a state of grace with congruous merit. 41 However, Ockham insists that this ‘ merit’ carries with it no claim to eternal life; such a claim can be held to arise only on account of merit de condigno . 42 All that Ockham intends to convey by the notion of congruous merit is that humans are capable of acting in such a way that God may bestow upon humanity a habit of grace – which, as we noted earlier, is the general understanding of the concept at the time. The function of the concept within the context of Ockham’ s soteriology is that it forms the necessary (understood as necessitas consequentiae , rather than necessitas consequentis ) bridge between the state of nature and of grace, and between the moral and theological virtues.

Older studies of the doctrines of grace and justification asserted that Ockham’ s optimism concerning human abilities leads him into Pelagianism or ‘ semi-Pelagianism’ . These judgements, however, are not merely somewhat anachronistic; they fail to recognise that Ockham’ s optimism concerning humanity relates solely to its moral capacities, and that the radical discontinuity which Ockham sees between the moral and meritorious values of an act means that the ultimate grounds of merit lie outside of humanity, in the extrinsic denomination of the divine acceptation. As we have pointed out, the meritorious value of an act lies in the divine estimation of that act rather than in its inherent moral value. Ockham’ s theology of merit allows him to take a favourable view of human moral capacities, while at the same time totally subverting the theological foundation upon which human acts might be considered capable of meriting grace or eternal life.

One of the most brilliant and original aspects of Ockham ’ s theology of merit is that he permits the moral acts of humans to have a considerable inherent moral value, while simultaneously establishing that the moral value of an act is irrelevant in determining its meritorious value, by locating the ratio meriti in the extrinsic denomination of the acceptatio divina . Ockham’ s teaching on this matter has been subject to a considerable degree of misrepresentation and misunderstanding by both contemporary and modern critics. 43 Of Ockham’ s contemporary critics, his fellow Englishman Thomas Bradwardine may be singled out for particular comment. Bradwardine totally rejected the concept of congruous merit prior to grace, insisting that merit was the consequence of grace; unless the tree is itself good, it cannot bear good fruit. 44 A similar position is associated with Gregory of Rimini . 45 In response to the opinion which was more associated with Ockham’ s followers than with Ockham himself, that humans can merit justification de congruo by an act of contrition , 46 Gregory denies that contrition is a possibility apart from grace.

A rather different, and somewhat startling, approach to the question is associated with John Wycliffe , the later English follower of Bradwardine. Wycliffe totally rejected the concept of condign merit, even after the bestowal of grace, holding that the concept implied that God rewarded human acts de pura iustitia , as if they were entirely performed by the humans themselves without the assistance of divine grace. 47 Wycliffe defines congruous merit as merit which arises through God’ s rewarding those human acts which result from the influence of divine grace – and hence altogether excludes the concept of condign merit from consideration. 48 Unlike Bradwardine, who conceded both congruous and condign merit after justification, Wycliffe conceded only congruous merit, and that only after justification. A similar position is associated with Huss, who pointed out that pura iustitia implied an equality between God and humanity which simply did not exist, except in the form of equalitas proportionis . 49 It is therefore impossible for humans to merit eternal life de condigno , even when in a state of grace. 50

The later via moderna continued the teaching of Ockham on the nature of merit. Gabriel Biel emphasised that the concept of congruous merit is based upon divine liberality rather than on divine justice. The disposition of humanity towards justification is regarded as meritorious non ex debito iusticie sed ex sola acceptantis liberalitate . 51 As we have already noted, the teaching of the via moderna concerning congruous merit was criticised for its implicit Pelagian tendencies. It is therefore of particular interest to note the defence of the doctrine provided by the distinguished early sixteenth-century Tübingen exegete Wendelin Steinbach. Steinbach points out that the early church was confused concerning the concept of merit, but that the concept was now sufficiently well understood to avoid a Pelagian misunderstanding of the concept of congruous merit. 52

This intellectual continuity is particularly clear in the case of John Calvin ’ s views concerning the merits of Christ. The later Franciscan school, the via moderna and the schola Augustiniana moderna regarded the ratio meriti as lying in the divine good pleasure; nothing was meritorious unless God chose to accept it as such. This teaching was extended to include the work of Christ; the merita Christi were regarded as being grounded in the acceptatio divina . There are excellent reasons for suggesting that Calvin himself encountered such teaching during his formative Paris years. 55 It is therefore of some considerable interest that Calvin reproduces the essential features of this late medieval understanding of the ratio meriti Christi in the Institutio of 1559 (xi.xvii.1– 5), a section which is based upon an exchange of letters between Calvin and Laelius Socinus . In 1555, Calvin responded to questions raised by Socinus concerning the merit of Christ and the assurance of faith, 56 and appears to have incorporated these replies into the 1559 Institutio without significant modification. In the course of this correspondence, Calvin’ s strongly voluntarist understanding of the ratio meriti Christi becomes apparent. Although the evident similarity between Calvin and Scotus on this question has been noted in the past, there has been a tendency in the past to assume that this similarity between Scotus and Calvin reflects the specific influence of Scotus upon Calvin, whereas it actually reflects a much more general influence of currents of thought prevalent within later medieval theology. 57

Calvin insists that ‘ apart from God’ s good pleasure, Christ could not have merited anything’ . For Calvin, Christ’ s work is meritorious pro nobis because God has ordained that it will be so, and accepted it as such. The fact that Calvin’ s discussion of the ratio meriti Christi is so clearly continuous with that of the via moderna suggests that Calvin encountered such ideas at Paris, perhaps through the influence of the Scottish master John Mair. 58