24 The Tridentine Debates on Justification ◈

The initial doctrinal debates concerned the relation of Scripture and tradition, and original sin. 2 It was, however, recognised that the doctrine of justification was of peculiar importance. It was agreed that a number of aspects of Catholic teaching required clarification in the light of the Protestant challenge. 3 On 22 June 1546, a commission of theologians laid down the following questions for discussion: 4

In the six meetings of the Council (technically known as ‘ congregations’ ) held in the period 22– 28 June 1546, some thirty-four theologians addressed themselves to the questions set for discussion. It is clear from those addresses that most were of the view that the question of the nature of justification was of particular significance. Most of the speakers addressed themselves to this point offering a number of understandings of justification for further consideration. 5 Despite this remarkable variety of definitions, it is clear that there existed a consensus concerning the essentially factitive and transformational character of justification. 6

There was, however, some variation on this matter. Two interventions are of particular interest: those of the Dominican Marcus Laureus and the Franciscan Observant Andrés de Vega . On 23 June 1546 Laureus defined justification as remissio peccatorum per gratiam , significantly omitting any reference to the concomitant spiritual regeneration or moral transformation of the believer. 7 A superficial reading of this intervention might suggest that Laureus approached the Protestant position at this point. In fact, as we noted in our discussion of medieval accounts of the processus iustificationis , Thomas Aquinas had demonstrated, on Aristotelian grounds, that a process could be defined in terms of its final goal, so that the processus iustificationis could be defined simply as remissio peccatorum , the final element in this process. It is highly likely that Laureus was restating Aquinas’ s position on this question – a point confirmed by his later intervention in the debate. 8

Andrés de Vega defined justification in a noticeably extrinsicist manner, identifying three core elements of the process: absolution from sin, possession of divine grace and acceptance to eternal life. 9 Vega’ s conception of justification clearly parallels that of Duns Scotus and the later Franciscan school, and is reflected in the statements of other Franciscan theologians in these congregations. 10 The weakening of the ontological link between remissio peccatorum and infusio gratiae , characteristic of both this school and the via moderna , places them closest to the extrinsic approaches to justification associated with Melanchthon during the 1530s and beyond. Nevertheless, it is important to note the theological diversity of the Franciscan contingent at Trent at this point; other Franciscans defined justification in strongly factitive and transformational terms, such as internal renewal, 11 or some kind of spiritual change within sinners effected by habitual grace, 12 echoing the approaches associated with Bonaventure and the earlier Franciscan school. The evidence of these debates suggests that there was some theological tension present within the Order of Friars Minor between the followers of Bonaventure and later writers such as Duns Scotus.

Despite differences of emphasis, it was clear that there was general agreement over the nature of justification, summarised as follows by Marcus Laureus : 13

This approach to the presentation of the Catholic doctrine of justification is reflected in the first draft of the decree on justification, dating from 24 July 1546, once believed to be the work of Andrés de Vega , 16 as well as the final Decree on justification itself. The first draft consists of a brief introduction, three chapters, and a series of eighteen canons. 17 No formal definition of justification is given, although it is possible to deduce such a definition from the material appended to the first two canons. The first three canons make clear the lines of distinction between the Catholic and Protestant understanding of the nature of justification. Most importantly, it was argued that it is not acceptable to suggest that a sinner may be justified solely as a matter of reputation or imputation, while remaining a sinner in fact. 18 ‘ Therefore, if anyone says that a sinner (impium ) who is justified by God through Jesus Christ, is or remains unrighteous, but is somehow reputed to be righteous, rather than becoming righteous, so that this justification is only the imputation of righteousness , let him be condemned.’ Justification is thus defined in terms of a person becoming, and not merely being reputed as, righteous (sic vere non modo reputatur, sed efficitur iustus ). Although this clearly excludes the concept of a ‘ legal fiction’ in justification, it is somewhat unclear whether it represents an effective criticism of Lutheran teaching on the question at that time. Participants at Trent tended to offer unhelpful generalisations about views of justification apud hereticos , failing to appreciate the diversity within Protestantism around this time, or offer detailed documentary evidence of how certain critical terms are used or understood by their Protestant opponents. For Melanchthon , the notional separation of justification and sanctification did not entail their division, as if one could be justified without subsequently being sanctified. It is, however, evident that there was a consensus throughout the Tridentine debates that the Protestants did, in fact, restrict the meaning of the term iustificatio to iustum reputatio . This is particularly apparent from the comments of the Spanish Jesuit Alfonso Salmeron, who clearly failed to understand the significance of Melanchthon’ s distinction between iustificatio and regeneratio . 19 The fact that Melanchthon understood by ‘ justification’ and ‘ regeneration’ what Catholics understood by ‘ justification’ alone does not appear to have been appreciated. As the Catholics understood iustificatio to refer to Christian existence in its totality, the Protestant exclusion of regeneratio from iustificatio appeared to amount to the exclusion of any transformational dimension from Christian existence altogether.

The Protestant concept of justification per solam fidem presented a similar difficulty for the Tridentine theologians, who generally seem to have understood it to exclude works from Christian existence (whereas the Protestants, operating with a quite distinct concept of justification, understood it merely to refer to the exclusion of works from the causation or initiation of the Christian life). This is evident in the rejection of the notion of justification by faith alone : 20 ‘ If anyone says that faith alone, without works, justifies the ungodly – that is, brings about their justification – in the sense in which the heretics of this age profess, as if nothing is required on the part of humanity except that they should believe, let him be condemned.’ The full significance of the new understanding of the nature of justification associated with Melanchthon was not wholly grasped by his Catholic opponents, with important consequences for the interpretation of the relevance of the Tridentine pronouncements for Protestant theologies of justification. Throughout the Tridentine debates on justification, there was a general consensus that Protestants employed the terms fides and credere in a highly unorthodox sense. Alfonso Salmeron critiqued Melanchthon’ s interpretation of the term fides as fiducia divinae misericordiae , thus excluding the Catholic notion of fides quae per dilectionem operatur . 21

The clear absence of a full understanding of what Melanchthon and other leading Lutheran writers meant by such key notions as ‘ justification by faith alone’ highlights the importance of the dialogical approach adopted at Regensburg, considered in the previous chapter . Whatever differences Melanchthon and Bucer might have had with Eck and Gropper, the quality of their discussions suggest that they understood what each other believed, and why they did so. In marked contrast, the Tridentine discussions of justification lacked any first-hand understanding of the dynamics of the emerging Protestant understandings of justification. Concern that Trent failed to grasp the core concerns of Protestant writers or to interpret their approaches to justification correctly has inevitably led to recent suggestions that these matters ought to be reconsidered – for example, through ecumenical dialogue. 22

Although the July debate on this draft document proved inconclusive, 23 progress was made during the discussion of 17 August, which took into account a document presented to the legates by Giralmo Seripando, theological advisor to the Papal legate Marcello Cervini degli Spannochi, on 11 August 1546. 24 This important document remedied what was now realised to be a major deficiency of the first draft – its omission of a formal definition of the term iustificatio hominis . Justification was now defined unequivocally in transformative terms: 25

The significance of the document, however, lies not only in its new form, but also in its views on the formal cause of justification . Seripando himself had sympathies with recognising at least the theological intent, if not the precise verbal formulation, of the notion of iustitia imputata . As noted earlier, any recognition of a ‘ double righteousness (duplex iustitia )’ in justification was rendered problematic on account of the multiple manners in which this formula was interpreted. Seripando, aware of the importance of language and terminology at this critical point, urged the Council to avoid falling into the trap of arguing that the Protestant use of certain theological terminologies somehow tainted earlier Catholic use of those same terms. 27 Seripando is sometimes asserted to have attempted to steer the Council towards a doctrine of double justification, in the sense of recognising two formal causes of justification; a more natural interpretation of the textual evidence suggests that his concern was to avoid a narrowing of both the vocabulary and concepts developed within the Catholic tradition on account of a perceived similarity with those of Protestantism. 28

In his first draft, Seripando explicitly rejected the Lutheran doctrine that the only basis upon which justification may take place is imputatio iustitiae Christi . 29 This was slightly altered in his draft of 11 August, in that it clarifies the basis of this rejection. The second draft thus censured the opinion that we are justified ‘ only by the imputation of the righteousness of Christ to the exclusion of the righteousness diffused in our hearts’ . 30 Although the obvious interpretation of this statement is that humanity is justified on the basis of an infused or intrinsic righteousness, a more natural reading of this statement suggests that Seripando intended it merely as the rejection of the opinion that humanity is justified solely on the basis of the imputation of the righteousness of Christ. 31

The September draft of the decree omitted any explicit reference to the potentially ambiguous concept of duplex iustitia , and reworked the teaching of Canon 3 of the July draft in such a manner as to exclude the opinion that the Christian possesses one iustitia deriving from God and another deriving from Christ. 32 Nevertheless, Canon 7 of the September draft still follows the wording of Seripando’ s original version closely, and condemns only the opinion that the imputed righteousness of Christ alone is the basis of the justification of humanity, if this is understood to exclude an inherent righteousness through the action of the Holy Spirit. 33 The draft of 23 September set out the following position: 34 ‘ So there are not two righteousnesses which are given to us, that of God and that of Christ, but one righteousness of God through Jesus Christ (this is charity itself or grace), by which we are not merely reputed, but truly are named and are righteous.’ The opinion that humans are justified on the basis of duplex iustitia – that is, iustitia imputata and iustitia inhaerens – is thus not explicitly condemned, and might even be considered to be condoned. The opinion that humans are justified on the basis of duplex iustitia – that is, iustitia imputata and iustitia inhaerens – is thus not explicitly condemned, even if it is not formally commended.

The ambiguity of the phrase duplex iustitia and the entangled question of the relation of iustitia imputata and iustitia inhaerens clearly caused concern to the participants. The records of the proceedings for the period 27 September– 8 October 1546 clearly show that many of the delegates found themselves unable to make sense of the phrasing of the seventh chapter. 35 There were growing calls for clarification of the ambiguities of the September draft, and the elimination of the confusion that they were creating. 36 The case for replacing – rather than merely supplementing – the ambiguous non sunt duae iustitiae with the more explicit una est iustitia was pressed with some force, forcing Seripando and his supporters – including the Augustinians Aurelius of Rocca Contrata, Marianus Feltrinus and Stephen of Sestino , the Servite Lorenzo Mazocchi, and the Spanish secular priest Antonio Solis – to make their views on the matter explicit, and to defend their provenance. The preponderance of opinion, however, was quite clear: the concept of iustitia imputata was a theological novelty, unknown to Catholic theology up to this point. 37 Not merely was this notion an innovation; it was also conceptually redundant, on account of the transformation of the believer in the processus iustificationis . 38

The outcome was inevitable. On 31 October 1546, the September draft of the decree was rewritten in response to this widespread criticism of the concept of duplex iustitia (or duae iustitiae ). 39

Yet the question of the formal cause of justification was one of a number of highly contentious issues in this area to be debated at Trent; another was the assurance of salvation, a highly significant issue for the Reformers, and particularly for Luther. The medieval consensus on this matter was that such assurance was both spiritually arrogant and an epistemic impossibility, thus apparently placing clear blue theological water between Trent and Protestantism. This manifest difference of opinion, along with its polemical potential, made it impossible for the theologians assembled at Trent to ignore the matter, despite its absence from the initial agenda for their discussions. 42

Initially, there appears to have been little interest in the question of assurance during the discussions of justification. The records of the congregations of 22– 28 June 1546 show that only two speakers deemed the matter worthy of consideration. The very different approaches adopted by Andrés de Vega 43 and Antonius Frexius 44 were indicative of the divisions which would subsequently be exposed on this question, and it is significant that these contributions were not included in the summary of the discussion presented by Marcus Laureus . 45 Although the Lutheran doctrine of assurance is included among the list of proscribed errors concerning the second status iustificationis tabled for discussion on 30 June 1546, little attention was paid to it. 46

The emergence of the question of assurance as a serious issue demanding further attention dates from the July 1546 draft of the decree, which included as its fifteenth canon an explicit condemnation of the Lutheran doctrine of assurance as an assertion contrary to proper Christian humility. 47 It became clear, however, that this canon provoked considerable disquiet. There was obviously serious disagreement on the matter among the theologians, as well as a general desire to discuss the matter further. 48 As a result, the Conventual Antonio Delfini was invited to prepare an expert opinion on the question if Christians might have certainty over whether they were in a state of grace, and to clarify the position of Duns Scotus on this contentious matter. 49 In his document, however, Delfini interpreted Scotus from the not entirely appropriate perspective of Gabriel Biel , 50 leading him to the conclusion that Scotus could not be regarded as holding any such doctrine of assurance. Others disagreed, pointing out that that Scotus upheld the possibility of the certitude of grace on account of the ex opere operato character of the sacrament of penance. 51

By 17 August 1546, it was apparent that there was a significant division of opinion on the matter, with the Dominicans opposed to any suggestion that certitudo gratiae was possible, and others affirming precisely such a possibility, with due divergence over the degree of certainty that might be attainable. 52 In view of this difficulty, a general congregation of 28 August 1546 took the decision to condemn the Protestant position without offering a statement concerning the Catholic position on the matter. 53 This same principle was followed in drawing up the September draft of the decree. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that this required further discussion, and that an informed account of – for example – the distinct approaches of Luther and Aquinas to the issue of certainty would have led to a more informed and helpful outcome. 54

This September draft refers to the question of the certitude of grace at two points. The seventh chapter rejects the opinion, which it attributes to ‘ heretics and schismatics’ , that it is possible to know with confidence and certainty that one’ s sins have been forgiven. 55 While rejecting the Lutheran position, no clarification on the Catholic teaching is provided. Canon 8 explicitly rejects any suggestion that believers may know with certainty that they are among the predestined, or that they will persevere to the end, apart from special divine revelation. 56 Once more, it proved easier to reject Protestant views than to provide an authoritative statement of the Catholic alternative, because of the diversity of views represented at Trent on the question.

The compromise of 28 August was finally recognised as being unsatisfactory, and debate on the question of certitude resumed on 12 October 1546. 57 Discussion of this matter over the period 15– 26 October highlighted divisions within the council at this point; of the thirty-seven theologians who expressed their opinions, twenty were in favour of the possibility of certitude of grace, fifteen against and two undecided. 58

The third draft of the decree was submitted for consideration on 5 November 1546, with a revised statement on the question incorporated into the decree in the form of its ninth chapter, with a revised opening statement. 59 ‘ September draft: not all have such confidence and certainty / November draft: no-one has such confidence and certainty.’ Although this went some way towards meeting the demands of some delegates that the condemnation of certitudo fidei, se esse in gratia should be strengthened and made more explicit, this new chapter still failed to win general approval. By 17 December, the issue, although forcefully contested on both sides, was still unresolved. In view of the serious delays this difficulty was occasioning, it was proposed that the council should merely condemn the Protestant position and leave further discussion of the Catholic position until a future date. 60 Despite opposition from some who did not wish to see the results of months of discussion come to nothing, the procedure was approved.

It was not a good decision, and pressure grew to reconsider it. On 9 January 1547, four days before the final decree was due to be published, a small group of senior officials met to attempt to establish a last-minute consensus on the ninth chapter on the certainty of grace. 61 After three hours’ debate, a compromise formula was finally agreed: ‘ no one can know with a certainty of faith, which cannot be subject to error, that he has obtained the grace of God’ (nemo possit esse certus certitudine fidei, cui non potest subesse falsum, se esse in gratia Dei ). 62 The formula was immediately incorporated into the fifth draft of the decree, submitted for consideration on the same day, 63 and finally approved.

This chapter has considered the evolution of the Tridentine decree on justification to clarify the process by which the Protestant challenge was assessed; the manner in which Catholic responses might be framed in order to deal with this external threat but also to respect its own various schools of thought; a growing realisation that the western patristic tradition was more supportive of Catholicism than Protestantism; and the perceptions of how potential dogmatic formulations might be received by Catholicism at large. All four points merit brief comment.

First, Protestantism tended to be constructed primarily through polemical accounts of the views of Luther and Melanchthon – but not those of Bucer or Calvin . 64 It may, of course, be pointed out that the Council of Trent was conceived as a rebuttal of Protestantism, not as initiating a dialogue, and that the social dynamics of the Council were such that neutralisation of a poorly understood – but unquestionably real – threat took precedence over the more empathetic style of engagement demanded by a dialogue, such as that which took place earlier at Regensburg. However, there are points at which critics might suggest that Trent has constructed its own form of Protestantism for polemical purposes, in effect consolidating the view that Protestantism was a coordinated and coherent ecclesial and theological entity, without an appreciation of either its diversity or its evolving trajectory. The ‘ heretics and schismastics’ are often portrayed as a uniform ‘ other’ . There is a serious risk here of the mere perpetuation of ultimately unhelpful and misleading ‘ binary oppositions and abstracting dichotomies’ . 65

Second, it is clear that Trent was obliged to respond to an external threat without exacerbating or fostering its own internal tensions over theological issues, some of which were exposed through the process of negotiating an agreed response to Protestantism. The Tridentine debate over Duns Scotus ’ s position on the certitude of grace is an excellent example of a general issue: how could Trent create a coherent response to ‘ heretics and schismatics’ , without unintentionally closing down traditional lines of reflection within its own ranks, or prescribing long-standing Catholic approaches whose orthodoxy had never been in question in the past? Catholicism had come to tolerate a generously wide range of views within its ranks on a variety of questions, such as whether justification could be said to be ‘ merited’ . For example, consider these two condemnations of propositions relating to merit, formulated early in the discussion process: 66

Third, although the Tridentine discussions of justification often involved detailed discussion of scholastic theologians – Duns Scotus being an obvious example – this frequently reflected a concern to safeguard the distinctive beliefs or approaches characteristic of the medieval schools of theology that were represented at Trent rather than a belief that such theologians might themselves resource a response to the Reformation. During the entire period of the Council of Trent , a growing confidence can be seen emerging that there was a broad correspondence between contemporary Catholic thought and that of Augustine and other patristic writers. 68 The Reformation’ s correspondence with the thought of Augustine related primarily to his doctrine of grace; in other respects, there were clear points of divergence. This may help us understand why the final decree tends to cite mainly from the Bible and patristic writers in its support.

Fourth, Trent had to consider its potential audience – in other words, to give thought to how its text would be received by Catholics. The cultural context illuminates matters here: Many Catholic bishops – especially those from Italy – were sympathetic to aspects of the Renaissance, and were aware of spiritual and religious movements within Italy which emphasised the importance of internal spirituality, regarded the New Testament and particularly the Pauline letters as important spiritual and theological resources, and had little interest in scholasticism. 69 This may help us understand why the Tridentine decree on justification avoids the use of scholastic jargon, and is rich in biblical allusions. For example, in relation to the question of merit noted above, the Council completely avoided the scholastic terms of ‘ condign’ or ‘ congruous merit’ , instead preferring terms such as ‘ proper’ or ‘ true’ merit to convey what was essentially the same teaching. In addition to presenting itself as the authentic interpreter of the New Testament against Protestant innovations or misreadings, Trent wished to reassure those who took the New Testament seriously that they did not need to look beyond the Catholic church to satisfy those concerns.

We now turn to consider the final Tridentine decree on justification in detail. It remains a landmark in the history of the doctrine of justification and deserves careful analysis, particularly in the light of its central role in the ecumenical discussions of the late twentieth century.