The Analogy between Divine and Human Justice

In both cases, the ‘ righteousness of God’ is taken to refer to a gracious act of justification, rather than to an abstract divine property which stands over and against humanity. In the case of the subjective interpretation of the construction, iustitia Dei is understood to refer to the general framework within which the justification of humanity takes place (i.e., the promises of God set out in the Old Testament), whereas the objective interpretation of the construction refers to the immediate means by which that justification takes place (i.e., the ‘ righteousness’ which God bestows upon sinners, in order that they may be ‘ made just’ ). It will be clear that these two interpretations of the construction iustitia Dei are complementary rather than mutually exclusive, and it is not uncommon to find both interpretations affirmed within the same work. Iustitia Dei is thus understood to be set in a soteriological context, referring to the salvation of humankind, whether as a consequence of God’ s faithfulness to the divine promises of mercy or of the bestowal of divine righteousness upon the sinner.

Other ways of understanding the concept can also be found in the literature of the earlier medieval period, some reflecting a popular religious outlook which linked God’ s favour with human achievement. Iustitia Dei is here taken to refer to the divine attribute by which God rewards humans according to their just deserts. God, acting in accordance with this conception of righteousness, will reward those who act justly and punish those who act unjustly – thereby justifying the godly, and punishing the ungodly. 4 This corresponds to what might be called a ‘ popular catholic’ understanding of justification, according to which justification is understood to be dependent upon human efforts to emulate the example which is set them in Christ.

While the early exponents of this theology of justification insisted that humans cannot justify themselves, 5 the orthodoxy of this position is more verbal than substantial. As justification is defined as the divine judgement that humankind is righteous, it follows as a matter of course that humans are not competent to pronounce this judgement themselves, in that they would thereby usurp the place of God. Justification is God’ s judgement upon humanity, made upon the basis of whether each has emulated the iustitia Dei revealed to humankind in Christ – that is, the divine standard of righteousness, which humans must imitate. It may be God’ s judgement – but the basis of that judgement is human achievement or status.

Pelagius’ s interpretation of the concept of the ‘ righteousness of God’ is of particular interest in this respect. For Pelagius, iustitia Dei refers to the righteousness which God gives to humans in Christ as their example , so that their justification may be attributed to their own moral efforts to imitate iustitia Dei , per exemplum Christi , through the free and autonomous exercise of liberum arbitrium . A similar, although more developed, understanding of iustitia Dei can be found in the writings of Julian of Eclanum . 6 God deals with humanity in equity, totally impartially, considering only the merits and demerits of each in justification, ‘ giving each what is due to them, without deceit or favour – that is, without respect of persons’ (reddentem sua unicuique sine fraude sine gratia, id est sine personarum acceptione ). 7 In effect, Julian applies a quid pro quo understanding of justice to the divine dealings with humans – an understanding of iustitia which found its classic expression in the Ciceronian definition of the term. For Julian, God rewards humans according to their merits – otherwise, God is made guilty of a gross injustice.

Julian singles out several aspects of Augustine’ s theology of grace for particular criticism on the basis of this understanding of iustitia Dei – for example, his understanding of the nature of original sin, and the doctrine of the justification of the ungodly. If God is to reward human beings sine personarum acceptione , this must take place on the basis of what they have done , rather than on the basis of who they are – that is, they must be rewarded on the basis of merit. This Ciceronian understanding of iustitia Dei had earlier been criticised by Augustine, who pointed out that the parable of the Labourers in the Vineyard (Matthew 20:1– 10) gave a more reliable insight into the divine justice than Julian’ s Ciceronian analogy. Every man was rewarded with his denarius, irrespective of the period he actually spent working; although the workers had no claim to the denarius in terms of the work they had performed, they did have a claim on account of the promise made to them by the owner of the vineyard. By analogy, humanity has no claim to grace on the basis of their works (i.e., on a quid pro quo basis), but does have such a claim on the basis of the obligation of God to fulfil his promise. 8

This criticism of the predication of the Ciceronian concept of iustitia to God would be continued by the theologians of the early medieval period. Thus the Carolingian theologian Remigius of Auxerre pointed out that human concepts of justice involved the rendering of good for good, and evil for evil; God, in marked contrast, rendered good for evil in justifying sinful humanity. 9 If God’ s dealings with humans are to be rationalised on the basis of justice, human ideas of justice must give way to those of God. A somewhat different approach to the question may be found in Atto of Vercelli’ s gloss on Romans 1:17. Here the legal category of justice is retained, along with a Ciceronian interpretation of iustitia – but it is interpreted in terms of Christ’ s obedience to the law. 10

This marks a development of Ambrosiaster ’ s approach to iustitia Dei , in that God’ s faithfulness to his promise of mercy is now expressed in legal terms – that is, ‘ faithfulness’ is interpreted in terms of ‘ keeping the law’ . It may, however, be emphasised that while the earlier medieval period is characterised by its conviction that God’ s righteousness is somehow grounded in his promise of mercy, there is no real attempt to establish the precise relationship between iustitia Dei and misericordia Dei : most theologians were content merely to affirm that God, being righteous, was faithful to what God promised. 11

The importance of this issue is easily appreciated by looking at vernacular English poems of the early Middle Ages, where the question of how God’ s righteousness is correlated with ordinary or common-sense notions emerges as significant. William Langland’ s Piers Plowman addresses such issues at multiple points, 13 as does the poem ‘ The Pearl’ , which raises the question of how a girl who died young can have a right to enter paradise. 14

God is wholly and supremely righteous. So how then can God give eternal life to people who deserve eternal death? How can God justify sinners? This is the central question with which Anselm is concerned in Cur Deus homo (1098). 15 Earlier, Anselm had wrestled with substantially the same problem in the Proslogion (1079). Initially, Anselm locates the source of God’ s mercy in the divine goodness (bonitas ), which may be contrasted with God’ s justice (iustitia ). He then proceeds to argue, however, that despite the apparent contradiction, God’ s mercy (misericordia ) must somehow be grounded in God’ s justice. 16

Anselm resolves this dilemma by arguing that God is righteous, not because God rewards humans according to their merit, but because God does what is appropriate to God, considered as the highest good (summum bonum ). 17 Although Anselm does not specifically reference Cicero at this point, there is no doubt that he is mounting an explicit criticism of the Ciceronian definition of iustitia as reddens unicuique quod suum est at this point. Far from endorsing prevailing secular accounts of justice, as some less perceptive critics have suggested, Anselm aims to uncouple the theological discussion of redemption from preconceived human paradigms of distributive or retributive justice.

A similar pattern of engagement and criticism with secular concepts of justice may be seen in Cur Deus homo , where Anselm notes various interpretations of the concept of iustitia , before selecting that which is most appropriate for his purposes. These concepts include iustitia hominis , which pertains under law; iustitia districta , beyond which ‘ nothing more strict can be imagined’ ; and supreme justice, summa iustitia . 18 The concept of justice which Anselm selects as most appropriate to characterise God’ s dealings with humankind is, as in the Proslogion , justice understood as action directed towards the highest good. As that highest good includes the redemption of fallen humanity, the incarnation may be regarded as an act of divine justice. In the course of the discussion, however, it becomes clear that Anselm understands the concept of rectitudo to underlie that of iustitia , and to determine its basic meaning.

According to Anselm, justice is a ‘ rectitude of will served for its own sake’ (rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata ). 19 Similarly, truth must also be defined in terms of metaphysical rectitude. 20 It will thus be clear that the concept of rectitude possesses both metaphysical dimensions (truth – i.e., the conforming of the mind to what it ought to be) and moral dimensions (justice – i.e., the conforming of behaviour to what it ought to be). 21

Anselm clearly assumes that these three concepts of rectitude, truth and justice are closely linked, noting the intersection of their meanings. 22 Iustitia has as its fundamental sense the moral rectitude of the created order, established by God at creation, and in itself reflecting the divine will and nature. This moral ordering of the universe extends to the relationship between humans and God, and humans and their fellows. Anselm appears to use the term rectitudo to describe the basic God-given ordering of the universe, and employs the term iustitia in a number of derivative senses, each of which may be traced back to the fundamental concept of rectitude. God’ s moral governing of the universe clearly involves both the divine regulation of the affairs of humans, and also the self-imposed regulation of God’ s dealings with human dealings. For Anselm, it is not possible to argue that the laws governing each are the same. In its fundamental sense, iustitia merely refers to rectitude; it remains to be seen what form this ordering may take with respect to the various aspects of creation. Thus, the justice which regulates the affairs of humans (e.g., the Ciceronian and Justinian principle of reddens unicuique quod suum est ) cannot be considered to be identical with the justice which regulates God’ s dealings with humanity.

For Anselm, the basic requirement of iustitia is that rational creatures be subject to God, which is essentially a recognition and acceptance of the place of humanity in the hierarchical moral ordering of creation. 23 This moral ordering of creation, itself an expression of the divine will, allots a specific place to humans, with a concomitant obligation that they submit their rational nature to God. This moral ordering of the universe was violated by humans at the Fall, so that the present state of humanity is that of iniustitia , understood as the privation of iustitia rather than as a positive entity in itself. The essence of original sin is the inherited lack of moral rectitude in the will of fallen humankind. 24 The human violation of the moral order of creation means that they are no longer capable of submitting their rational nature to God – and therefore that they are incapable of redeeming themselves. If humanity is to be redeemed, a divine act of redemption is required which must itself be consonant with the established moral order of the universe. God, having created the moral order of the universe as an expression of his nature and will, is unable to violate it himself in the redemption of humankind.

This important point is made with particular clarity at that point in Cur Deus homo at which Anselm considers the question of why God cannot simply forgive sins as an act of mercy. 25 For Anselm, God’ s freedom in will and action is limited by God’ s own nature; any divine action that violates this nature necessarily involves contradiction. God’ s character as summa iustitia is expressed in the moral order of creation, and the free forgiveness of sins through mercy alone would violate this ordering. God’ s attributes are essential to his being, and not mere accidents which God may change at will. Anselm’ s fundamental theological insight is that the divine attributes must coexist within the limiting conditions which they impose upon each other. The rectitude of the established moral order thus requires that God redeem humankind in such a way that God’ s own nature as summa iustitia is not contradicted. 26

In a very brief, but highly significant, review of the accounts traditionally given of the redemption of humankind in Christ, Anselm makes it clear that he is not satisfied with their failure to explain why God chose to redeem humans – at best, they were merely descriptions of how God redeemed them, so offering no explanation of why God should choose to redeem humans in the first place, or of the particular manner in which redemption was achieved. Anselm therefore presents an account of the redemption of humankind, based on iustitia , which demonstrates:

If iustitia Dei is understood as a lex talionis , or in the Ciceronian sense of reddens unicuique quod suum est , it is clearly impossible, in Anselm’ s view, to consider God’ s redemption of humanity as an act of justice . It is for this reason that Anselm does not employ these two concepts of justice in his soteriology. For Anselm, the moral ordering of the universe was violated by the sin of humans, so that the present state of affairs is that of a privation of justice – that is, iniustitia. As whatever is unjust is a contradiction of the divine nature, it is therefore imperative that the moral rectitude of the created order be restored. God, as summa iustitia , is therefore obliged, by his very nature (since to permit a state of injustice to continue indefinitely is tantamount to a contradiction of his nature) to restore the rectitude of the created order by redeeming fallen humankind – as an act of justice , rather than an act of power. For Anselm, sin disfigures the integrity of the created world, so that divine intervention is required to repair its fractures and restore its glory.

Anselm prefaces his discussion of the method by which God redeemed humankind by considering the rival theory of the ius diaboli , the ‘ devil’ s rights’ . This theory may be illustrated from the influential tract De redemptione humana , attributed to Bede, 27 in which it is argued that, while the death of Christ is a free act of divine love, the choice of the means employed to effect the deliverance of humanity from the devil is necessarily dictated by the fact that the devil is justly entitled to punish sinners. The origins of this teaching may be traced back to Gregory the Great , who taught that the devil had acquired a legal right over sinners as a consequence of the Fall, but had no such right over anyone who was sinless. Christ therefore assumed the form of a man in order to deceive his opponent, who naturally assumed that he, like the rest of humanity, was a sinner. 28 As the devil thus brought about the crucifixion of the sinless Christ contrary to justice, his own legitimate power over sinners was justly abolished. 29 While this theory makes an appeal to justice, it is a concept of justice very different from that approved and employed by Anselm.

For Anselm, justice relates to the moral ordering of creation, to which the devil himself, as a rational creature, is subject. The devil clearly violated this order in his seduction of humanity, and thus cannot be regarded as having any just claim over humans. Himself a rational creature, the devil is obliged to submit his rational nature to God – only if he were not part of God’ s creation, and could therefore stand above its moral ordering, could the devil claim any ‘ right’ over humanity. By his own violation of iustitia , the devil had lost any claim to ius over humans. Anselm therefore dismisses the theory of the work of Christ which had been current for so long, and with it an unacceptable concept of iustitia Dei : ‘ I do not see what force it has (non video quam vim habeat ).’ 30

The central theological trajectory of Anselm’ s own theory may be stated as a series of propositions which disclose the centrality of the concept of iustitia to his argument:

Significant – but not decisive. The theory that the devil had rights over humanity, which God was obliged to respect in the process of salvation, continued to influence theologians for some time after Anselm’ s death. Thus the school of Laon, marked by its theological conservatism, taught that the devil had gained a lawful possession of humanity in that humanity had freely chosen to enslave itself to the devil as a consequence of its sin. God is therefore obliged to respect the ius diaboli . 32 The theological justification provided for the incarnation by the school of Laon is that it is only God who has the ability , and only humans who have the obligation , to overcome the devil; by logic similar to that employed by Anselm of Canterbury , the necessity of the incarnation is then deduced, focussing on the notion of the ‘ devil’ s rights’ rather than satisfaction . The devil has no ius over Christ as God incarnate, and by abusing his legitimate power the devil forfeits his claim to ius over humanity. 33

A similar position is adopted by Hugh of St Victor , who argues that although humankind is justly punished by the devil, his dominion over it is held unjustly. 35 The school of Abelard, as might be expected, upheld its master’ s teaching that the devil had potestas over humankind de facto but not de iure . 36 Bernard of Clairvaux , an opponent of Abelard on so many matters, concedes that the devil’ s power over humans may be said to be just in that it derives from God, but unjust in that it was usurped by the devil. The crystallising position characteristic of the later twelfth century is neatly summarised by Peter of Poitiers : the devil has no right to punish humans, but on account of their sin, humans deserve to be placed under his power. 37

The significance of this critique of the ius diaboli lies in the concept of iustitia employed to characterise God’ s dealings with the devil. 38 If iustitia is understood to entail the respect of established ius – that is, the situation as it exists de facto – then God is obliged to respect the dominion of the devil over humankind. If, however, iustitia is instead conceived primarily as conformity to the divine will, the devil has no de iure rights over humans, having abused the limited and conditional rights which some theologians were prepared to allow him in the context of the economy of salvation. The general rejection of any legitimate ius diaboli by the theologians of the twelfth century is therefore of considerable significance in the development of the notion of the ‘ righteousness of God’ .

A further theological development of significance is associated with Peter Abelard . Throughout his writings, there is an analogical predication to God of the definition of iustitia taken directly from Cicero : ‘ a virtue, serving the good of the community, which rewards each according to their dignity’ . 39 In effect, it is this concept of iustitia which underlies Abelard’ s rejection of the ius diaboli : the devil, by insisting upon more than his due, stepped outside the boundaries of iustitia. Although Augustine had earlier subjected the theological application of the Ciceronian concept of iustitia to a penetrating critique, most theologians of the late twelfth century returned to the Ciceronian concept of iustitia to clarify the apparently related concept of iustitia Dei . The widespread use of the concept within the Abelardian school 40 points to the influence of Abelard himself in this development.

While Godfrey of Poitiers followed Stephen Langton in distinguishing three aspects of the term iustitia , he appears to have introduced a significant innovation – the opinion that iustitia reddit unicuique quod suum est is attributed to Augustine . 41 William of Auxerre , the first Summist, distinguished the specifically theological use of the term from its ordinary sense, 42 noting that justice and mercy were not opposed in the former case. Simon of Hinton also reproduces the Ciceronian definition, again attributing it to Augustine. 43 The application of this concept of iustitia to the specific matter of justification may be illustrated from the De virtutibus of John of La Rochelle : 44

A major point of transition can now be identified, arising from the introduction of the Aristotelian concept of justice to the theology of the western church in the middle of the thirteenth century. The great twelfth-century theological explorations of the theme of the ‘ righteousness of God’ had taken place without any such reference; from this point onwards, the influence of Aristotle ’ s Ethics becomes of growing and ultimately decisive importance. Thus Albertus Magnus ’ s commentary on Book III of the Sentences appears to demonstrate familiarity with Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics , while his commentary on Book IV (1249) makes explicit use of a translation of this work for the first time. While this introduction allowed a classification of the various senses which the term iustitia could bear, it does not appear to have had a significant effect around this time on the medieval discussion of the ‘ righteousness of God’ . The basic concepts employed remained much the same, despite differences in terminology. It is during the fifteenth century that some serious difficulties emerge, leading Luther to excoriate the use of Aristotelian ethics in theology on account of its implications for the doctrine of justification.

However, as God is the supreme and common good of the universe (supremum et commune bonum totius universae ), it follows that the culpa in question has not been committed against some authority higher than God, but against God himself. And just as it is perfectly acceptable for individuals to forgive an offence against themselves without satisfaction, so God may forgive the sinner without the necessity of satisfaction. An interpretation of iustitia Dei which insists upon the absolute necessity of satisfaction – and Thomas appears to have Anselm of Canterbury in mind – is to be rejected in favour of one by which satisfaction is recognised to be most appropriate (convenientius ) to right reason, and universally recognised as such by rational beings.

This point becomes clearer when voluntarist interpretations of iustitia Dei are considered. 51 For Duns Scotus , the divine will is the chief arbiter and principle of justice, establishing justice by its decisions, rather than acting on the basis of established justice. Morality and merit alike derive from the divine will, in that the goodness of an act must be defined not in terms of the act itself, but in terms of the divine estimation of that act. Scotus laid down the general voluntarist principle that every created offering to God is worth precisely whatever God chooses to accept it for. 52 The consequences of this principle for the doctrine of merit will be explored later. Applying this principle to the passion of Christ and the redemption of humankind, Scotus points out that a good angel could have made satisfaction in Christ’ s place, had God chosen to accept its offering as having sufficient value: the merit of Christ’ s passion thus lies solely in the acceptatio divina , not in any intrinsic value of Christ’ s person or work. 53

Although the origins of this approach are especially associated with Duns Scotus, it was more thoroughly developed in the soteriology of the via moderna . Gabriel Biel insists upon the priority of the divine will over any moral structures by declaring that God’ s will is essentially independent of what is right or wrong; if the divine will amounted to a mere endorsement of what is good or right, God’ s will would thereby be subject to created principles of morality. What is good, therefore, is good only if it is accepted as such by God. 54

The establishment of such a reliable moral framework within which justification takes place allows Biel to resolve a difficulty which had previously impeded theologians from applying the Ciceronian definition of iustitia directly to God. The Ciceronian, Justinian and Aristotelian concepts of iustitia are based upon the notion of a contracting community, the res publica or polis , which establishes the ius consensus. The direct application of such concepts of iustitia to God was rendered problematical by the absence of a theological equivalent to this contractual framework.

The postulation of a pactum between God and humanity eliminates this difficulty. The pactum effectively functions as the iuris consensus which is required if iustitia Dei is to be defined in terms of reddens unicuique quod suum est. Furthermore, studies of the medieval discussion of the concept of divine self-limitation (as expressed in the pactum ) have demonstrated how the theologians of the period found the terminology of canon law – particularly iustitia – to be an ideal vehicle for its articulation. 57 Under the terms of the covenant (pactum ), God is obliged to reward anyone who does quod in se est with grace as a matter of justice , in that God is to be perceived as rendering to such persons that to which they are entitled. The pactum determines quod suum est , and specifies the conditions upon which the viator may receive it.

Biel is thus able to correlate the divine justice and divine mercy by pointing out that the present order of salvation, to which God is now irrevocably committed as a matter of justice, is ultimately an expression of the divine mercy. Stante lege , God is necessarily obliged to reward the viator who does quod in se est with quod suum est – that is, justifying grace. Acting in mercy, God established an order of justice to which God is presently and irrevocably bound, not by an external necessity, but by faithfulness, consistency and integrity. What has been promised must be delivered. Failure on the part of God to honour the pactum would result in God being unjust, and acting unjustly, which is inconceivable. 58 Consequently, it is up to the individual, knowing the divine will, to conform to it in order to be justified. It is therefore clear that Biel understands iustitia Dei to refer to equity within the context of the pactum , which defines God’ s manner of dealing with humanity.

It is this understanding of the ‘ righteousness of God’ which is reproduced by Martin Luther in the earlier part of his Dictata super Psalterium (1513– 15), as may be judged from his scholion on Psalm 9:9 (Vulgate , 10:9): 59

This use of human concepts of justice, applied analogically to God, was criticised by several theologians of the twelfth century, most notably by Alan of Lille . According to Alan, every term which is predicated of God is necessarily transferred from its proper meaning (transfertur a sua propria significatione ). Recognising that God can be described as iustus only by an indirect transference of the term from its proper signification, Alan insists that this transference be understood to refer solely to the word (nomen ) thus transferred, and not to its signification (res ): when speaking of God as ‘ righteous’ , the word ‘ righteous’ is to be understood as having been transferred from its proper context to one adapted to speaking about God, in which the signification of the original context cannot be regarded as being simultaneously transferred. 62

In other words, the statement ‘ Deus est iustus’ contains the term iustus transferred from a particular human context – but the term cannot be allowed to bear precisely the same meaning in this statement as that which it assumes in that specific human context. Even though the same term iustus is predicated of God in the statement ‘ Deus est iustus’ and of Socrates in the analogical statement ‘ Socrates est iustus’ , it cannot be allowed to bear the same signification in each case. On account of its transference from its proper context, the word acquires a ‘ borrowed meaning’ which, although analogous to its original meaning, is not identical with it. 63 Thus divine justice is not the same as human justice, so that the statement ‘ Deus est iustus’ cannot be allowed to have the same point of reference as ‘ Socrates est iustus’ . This leads to the inevitable conclusion that, since the ‘ borrowed meaning’ of iustus is unknown, and almost certainly unknowable, the statement ‘ Deus est iustus’ has no meaning. If we do not know precisely what meaning the term iustus assumes in the statement ‘ Deus est iustus’ , we cannot know what the statement means. Many theologians of the twelfth century thus preferred, like the Benedictine Hugh, Archbishop of Rouen, to seek refuge in divine incomprehensibility. 64

Yet the increasing emphasis on voluntarist approaches to divine righteousness, evident in the writings of Scotus and Ockham, called into question the necessity of any intrinsic connection between natural human notions of goodness and their divine counterparts. Something cannot be said to be intrinsically correct; its ‘ rightness’ resides in its correspondence with the divine will. 65 Following through on hints within the earlier medieval tradition, 66 Scotus thus locates the theological motivation for the incarnation not in Adam’ s fall, but in God’ s desire to unite humanity with Christ. ‘ Not only is sin not a sine qua non of Incarnation; for Scotus, Incarnation is not a sine qua non for solving the sin-problem, either.’ 67 Although Scotus is critical of Anselm’ s notion of satisfaction , he does not reject this idea, but rather circumscribes its validity. God is not required to make a satisfaction for human sin by some external constraint; indeed, God could have found some other way of resolving the problem. However, God chose to act in this manner and, in doing so, established its rationality and morality. 68

Some have suggested that Ockham develops a ‘ divine command’ approach to this issue, opening up at least the possibility of a disjunction between iustitia hominis and iustitia Dei . 69 Yet Ockham ’ s demonstration of a contingent correlation of these notions does not entail their actual separation; it merely requires that it is reframed within a covenantal rather than an ontological framework. 70 In any case, Ockham avoids a potential contradiction by pointing out that God cannot command an unjust act, since the act would be just on account of the fact that it is commanded by God. 71