Chapter 11: A Fundamental Practical Theologian: Karl Barth
11
A Fundamental Practical Theologian: Karl Barth
Every Seven Days
For the pastor, Sunday comes with grinding regularity. Every seven days, whatever has happened during those seven days, the preacher mounts the pulpit and attempts to speak a word from God. For some, this regularity can be one of the less enjoyable aspects of being a preaching practical theologian. Few are the pastors who didn’t wish that people could die at more convenient times. Or that crises might unfold in a timely manner. Or that other important ministry tasks weren’t as time consuming. The routine of weekly preaching gets disturbed by important and necessary responsibilities such as funerals, counseling, and teaching.
Routine is another word for methodology. Each preacher configures their week differently but all have a method of arriving on Sunday morning with a sermon. To use Richard Osmer’s language, sermon preparation includes a descriptive, interpretative, normative, and pragmatic moment. When a routine gets disturbed, the method must accommodate. All parts remain but in attenuated form. There is a process of evaluation that happens: does this news item demand a response? Does this article add to my understanding of what is going on? Do I have enough time to read this commentary? Do I need to revise this manuscript one more time? Preaching is always the art of the good enough and we constantly evaluate our method against that standard, fitting our method into the time that we have.
While the pressures of time force an ongoing evaluation of method, they have the opposite effect on some more fundamental material assumptions that all practical theologians make. No matter what is going on, a preacher can’t rework an understanding of revelation through Scripture every single week. There isn’t enough time. When things change those things that are foundational become even more important. The freedom to evaluate and change our method comes from the fact that we have a foundation of material assumptions.
This reality, that there are fundamental assumptions that every practical theologian makes that are separate from the method of our work, often gets missed when discussing Osmer’s work. This is true both of what Osmer calls “second level of methodological reflection”228 or “the metatheoretical level of research and theory-construction”229 and of his work itself. This chapter proceeds in two steps. First, it gives an account of these second level assumptions common to all practical theologians. Second, it demonstrates how Osmer’s late career shift towards Karl Barth makes sense in light of these assumptions. Osmer’s shift to Barth points to ways that Barth might fund other practical theologians, including the preacher caught in a time crunch on Saturday night.
Fundamentals of Practical Theology
Osmer first articulated his second level reflections in the epilogue to The Teaching Ministry of Congregations and confirmed them in “Practical Theology: a current international perspective.” There are four second order assumptions:
1. the theory-praxis relationship
2. sources of justification
3. models of cross-disciplinary work
4. theological rationale
Osmer’s description of these second order assumptions is relatively sparse. Definitions are outlined but not detailed. Examples of these categories at work are more general or autobiographical. For instance, Osmer offers the example of Elaine Graham’s work that “hang[s] together” into a cohesive paradigm or interpretive framework because she is consistent across all four categories.230 In practice, Osmer and others such as Graham work out the relationship between these four constitutive parts but he has not done so theoretically.
At a minimum, “hanging together” requires consistency. Answers within one category are mutually exclusive; it is very difficult to understand the theory-praxis relationship in both neo-Marxist and neo-Aristotelian terms. This exclusiveness then bleeds into other answers. Neo-Marxists should tend to find experience more authoritative while neo-Aristotelians will usually find tradition more compelling, causing them to justify their theological projects with different arguments. Making a certain decision in one category will generally lead to complementary answers in other categories. This begs the question, “Is there a primal category that determines the rest or is it inconsequential which category a practical theologian begins with?” If there is a primal category that has logical precedence, it follows that there is actually some kind of third order reflection foundational to the first (the four moments) and the second (the four categories).
It is my conviction that when it comes to doing practical theology there is a primal category, namely the theological “tradition” from which one comes. I am moving beyond what Osmer might argue. In saying that Osmer’s category “theological rationale” is primal and logically prior to other considerations, I assume that theological traditions have both a historical component, collective and individual, as well as a material component. Each of us inhabits a historical space that we receive without having any agency in its creation. Just as no single individual created a language, no single individual created a particular way of construing the world theologically. At the same time, like language, every theologian uses the received heritage in unique ways. Collective history has a dynamic relationship with our individual history. No individual is the perfect embodiment of a particular tradition. Rather, each individual molds it and adapts it according to particular contexts. This vision of a dynamic relationship between tradition and individual agency is important to ward off the two-sided temptation of either pigeonholing individuals or despairing of any common language to describe ourselves. To pigeonhole is to give too much weight to some theoretical and static vision of a tradition. We then can dismiss someone simply by saying, “Oh that person is just a _____” and not engage in their particularity. To despair of common language is to deny the traditions that each of us operate in. While each of us exerts agency, we do so in conversation with our own tradition and therefore descriptive phrases such as Reformed or Roman Catholic can partly point to the reality of a given individual.
This understanding of tradition in relation to an individual does not exclude the fact that each tradition is made up of material content. We are bequeathed answers to commonly held theological questions. I have in mind the various treatments of doctrines captured in typologies used to differentiate traditions. Whatever we may think of Gustav Aulen’s atonement typologies or H. Richard Niebuhr’s Christ/culture framework there is no doubt that they describe different traditions from a material perspective. A practical theologian standing within a tradition which supports penal substitutionary atonement differs from one who supports a moral exemplar view. Further, these answers are tied together with other doctrinal questions. To support a moral exemplar view is to hold a particular kind of Christology which further necessitates a specific doctrine of God that is grounded in a specific doctrine of revelation and so on. This constellation of theological decisions that is both given shape and expressed within a tradition, is materially required before determining other stances such as sources of authority or interdisciplinary dialogue.
While this moves beyond what Osmer described, I believe there are good reasons to do so. Our theological tradition is the only specifically “theological” category. It should be self-evident that a practical “theologian” must include a concept of theology as a constitutive part of their work. This is true even of traditions that may take their cue from outside traditional “Christian” theology. For instance, those who operate with a “critical” understanding of theology differentiate themselves from their philosophical counterparts by making some appeal to a specific theological understanding. While I am not attempting to erect a hard and fast boundary or test for orthodoxy, there is some sense that those who self-identify as practical theologians must, to some extent, appropriate a particular understanding of theology.
The theological tradition offers a normative orienting hermeneutic for answering the other three second order questions. For instance, in determining how one might answer the question of inter-disciplinary dialogue, there is a presumed ontology at work. This ontology comes from a sense of what is real and what is real is determined by our theology. Here the connection that Margaret Archer makes between ontology and methodology is illuminating. We can only ask questions and get answers (methodology) concerning individuals and society if we already have a basic understanding of what constitutes reality (ontology). If the individual is the base unit of reality then I will exclude questions that point to causal agency rooted in structures; if I do not conceive of the individual as the base unit of reality I will only ask questions that concern structure. Working within sociology and navigating the debate between individual agency and social structure, Archer rejects both the strong individualists and the hard structuralists on ontological grounds, thus rejecting their methodologies as well.231 To consider how a theorist approaches the individual-collective question is to first answer the deeper and broader question, “What is basic reality?” Likewise, a practical theologian must answer some questions concerning the nature of reality before considering methodological concerns such as how inter-disciplinary dialogue will take place within a particular work. Our sense of basic reality, which is found in our basic sense of what constitutes theology, orients and determines valid methodological paths for us to follow as practical theologians.
There is also a sense that to justify our conclusions we depend on argumentation and rhetoric justified by our theological tradition. Certain sources of justification carry more weight, are more persuasive, than others depending on the theological tradition we operate out of. As Osmer notes in his inaugural lecture at Princeton Theological Seminary, practical theology is part of a communicative model of rationality that employs different argumentation depending on context and uses various forms of rhetoric to persuade.232 Osmer makes the connection between epistemic values, those ideas that undergird our communication, and our arguments and rhetoric. As preachers, we design a sermon depending on what we think the telos of worship is. We construct an argument, use particular forms of rhetoric, depending on what we as preachers believe is important and what listeners need to hear. The same logic applies to much of our work as practical theologians. We accept certain arguments and employ particular rhetoric because of what we believe to be true. Because sources of authority are contextual and rhetorical they are derivative from some larger tradition.
In arguing for the primacy of the theological rationale I am well aware that some may see this as a Barthian hegemonic move; because Barth assumes a primacy for “theology” and I am a self-identified Barthian, I must show that all others must do the same. The line between description, what I am attempting here, and norm, what I could possibly be accused of, is admittedly thin but still, I believe, distinct in this argument. I am not proposing some kind of litmus test that determines what is properly “theological.” All that I am arguing is that those who self-identify as “practical theologians” are making theological assumptions and that those assumptions have a logical priority over other assumptions that they make. This is true whether the practical theologian operates within the academy or some other context like the fictitious preacher caught in a time crunch. The theological in this case can interact with the other categories as much or as little as an individual practical theologian might deem warranted.
I am not advocating a naïve purity for theology that determines the boundaries for other categories, as should be clear from my understanding of tradition. For instance, a practical theologian might arrive at the task with deep commitments to American pragmatism, commitments which give shape to their understanding of theory-praxis interaction (likely in some kind of mixture of tradition, community, and new circumstances), determine their sources of authority (likely experience), and their stance vis-à-vis other disciplines (likely open provided it helps the community in the moment). The American pragmatism will even shape their theological understanding of God, excluding certain traditions and including others, perhaps favoring a more open or process or moral view of God than some traditions allow for. In this case, a prior commitment to a philosophical tradition has been given normative and regulative authority to all categories. Still, once the practical theologian approaches a practical theological task, there is a logical priority acceded to these assumptions taken as a whole in relation to whatever we might conceive of as theological.
Consider how Osmer’s work “hangs together.” His theological commitment informs his interdisciplinary methodology, which in turn shapes his understanding of theory-praxis interaction and is based on his sources of justification. More specifically but still in broad categories, Osmer is committed to the Reformed understanding of God’s revelation in Jesus Christ, which is mediated to humanity through the enlightening work of the Holy Spirit acting upon us as a community and our interaction with Scripture. From there Osmer bases his arguments in Scripture first then tradition, reason, and experience (likely in that order of priority), understands inter-disciplinary dialogue as an ongoing conversation about the really real (transversally) and the theory-praxis relationship to be an interaction between human/divine interaction that takes place pneumatically.
My argument to this point is simple: all practical theologians operate at three distinct levels and there is a hierarchical relationship between them. The fundamental level is the theological tradition or rationale, the second order level includes theory-praxis relationship, sources of justification, and inter-disciplinary conversations, and the first order are the four moments.
Karl Barth
It follows that which theological tradition and what parts of that rationale practical theologians operate from makes a great deal of difference to their work. Given that Osmer has always operated out of the Reformed tradition, the late career shift to Karl Barth that he has made makes sense. From the very beginning of his academic life he engaged in substantive conversations with neo-orthodox “practical” theologians like James Smart and Shelton Smith, both of whom had significant interactions with Barth. One of the founders of the Reformed tradition, John Calvin, influenced Osmer for years. Arguably one of Barth’s major contributions to theology is his reformulation of Calvin’s doctrine of election, thus connecting the two. In working through the legacy of practical theology at Princeton Seminary, Osmer engaged with Elmer Homrighausen, an early translator of Barth. Finally, Osmer’s academic home, Princeton Theological Seminary, is also the home to Barth scholars Darrell L. Guder, George Hunsinger, Bruce McCormack, Daniel Migliore, and the Barth Centre. Osmer’s interaction with Barth was not determined by all of these things but they explain why Barth was a possibility.
“Making sense” is a long way from a “good idea.” Just as the fictitious preacher does not change theological rationales each week, there is no practical reason why Osmer had to reexamine which part of the Reformed tradition he wanted to operate from. Quite the opposite. There are many reasons why practical theologians shy away from Barth. The dominant co-relational approach to practical theology has no time for Barth. Browning’s dismissive evaluation, “[In Barth] there was no role for human understanding, action, or practice in the construal of God’s self-disclosure,” is typical.233 Following Browning, the field of practical theology has privileged certain understandings of human freedom, autonomy, and experience, understandings that by definition exclude Barth because of his arguments regarding the human-divine relationship. When practical theologians have engaged with Barth, such as Osmer’s colleagues James Loder and Deborah Van Deusen Hunsinger, they have often done so in a limited way. From different perspectives, Loder and Van Deusen Hunsinger use the Chalcedonian logic present in Barth. As valuable as this engagement is, there is much of Barth’s corpus that remains untouched by sympathetic practical theologians.234 In other words, Osmer’s engagement with Barth goes against the field that he has helped to define and into a corpus of work that has largely been unexplored to this point.
Osmer’s shift to Barth happened within his Reformed tradition but against some formidable obstacles. The tipping point was likely circumstantial. Jack Stewart, who held the Ashenfelter chair, retired. This left the Princeton Seminary faculty with no professor whose title included evangelism. Out of a faculty of forty-five, there were a few that had “mission” in their title but no one focused on one of the most basic aspects of the church, evangelism. Simultaneously, Darrell Guder also retired, leaving a hole in the theology department for an explicit missional focus.
This kind of insider baseball discussion is important, because if we return to the fictitious preacher at the beginning of this chapter, there must be some motivation for the preaching practical theologian to reconsider their theological rationale. The tyranny of the urgent will not be sufficient. In fact, the immediate crisis forces the preacher to rely more on their foundational assumptions because they need some stability to deal with the change. What Osmer sensed was a deeper change than just staffing. With Stewart and Guder retiring, there was a need for Osmer to consider how to remain true to the gospel as understood in the Reformed tradition. His previous interlocutors, such as Calvin and Moltmann, were good but did not fund the same engagement with evangelism and mission that Barth did. The challenge that Osmer took upon himself was threefold: to answer the criticisms of his colleagues like Don Browning, to build upon the work of colleagues such as Van Deusen Hunsinger and Loder, and to construct a positive engagement with Barth around evangelism. To do this required a rereading of Barth’s magnum opus, the Church Dogmatics.
From the outset of the Church Dogmatics, Barth makes an argument very similar to the one that I made earlier in this chapter, namely that material theological claims have priority over formal claims and are determinative of methodology. From the start, Barth rejects one of the main claims of the liberal theology dominant in his day. He cannot countenance its positive assessment of the human condition and our ability to know God through means other than God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ. This rejection is not made from the confines of a comfortable academy. World War I shattered faith in a progressive and positive assessment of human nature. Good liberal Christians massacred other good liberal Christians. The Church Dogmatics took shape in the wake of this disillusionment but then came into full force as World War II raged.235 Here the total depravity of humanity was on display in Auschwitz, Stalingrad, and Hiroshima. Here the horror was compounded; in addition to killing other good Christians, so-called Christians massacred millions of humans of other faiths.
Even in this rejection of humanity as the starting point for any theology, Barth explicitly includes practical theology. Humans gathered as the church do not drop from sight. Drawing on the Reformed tradition, Barth argues that God reveals God’s self through Jesus Christ, the Scriptures as they witness to Christ, and the verbal proclamation of the gospel. Theology is the discipline of the church that helps respond to this revelation. For Barth,
the criterion of past, future and therefore present Christian utterance is thus the being of the Church, namely, Jesus Christ, God in His gracious revealing and reconciling address to man [sic]. Does Christian utterance derive from Him? Does it lead to Him? Is it conformable to Him? None of these questions can be put apart, but each is to be put independently and with all possible force. Hence theology as biblical theology is the question of the basis, as practical theology the question of the goal and as dogmatic theology the question of the content of the distinctive utterance of the Church.236
God reveals God’s self in the Word incarnate, written, and proclaimed. Revelation is not a static once-and-for-all moment. Instead, it is ongoing and is found in event and encounter. This dynamism creates a need for theology for there is a continual need to reflect on the event and encounter. This reflection calls forth three distinct forms of theology: systematic, biblical, and practical. Systematic considers the current church’s witness; biblical the basis of that utterance as witnessed to in Scripture; practical in the telos of the response to that revelation in word and deed.
From these opening pages of the Church Dogmatics, Barth signals that there is an integral role for practical theology. This role is determined by material claims that affirm part of the Reformed tradition but go on to push that tradition to new places. In rejecting any human source for revelation and asserting a strong christological understanding of God’s self-revelation, Barth affirms total depravity and the sovereignty of God. By introducing the dynamic nature of event and encounter he makes the discipline of theology free to reformulate a faithful understanding of God. These are material claims that fund a much different approach to practical theology than the dominant co-relational methods. Human action happens in response to divine action for Barth. Practical theology attempts to discern the most practical way to proclaim that response. Because the encounter with God happens through Christ, Scripture, and proclamation, and is therefore event, Barth rejects any attempt to formulate universal principles. Co-relationalists like Browning cannot recognize these two moves as practical theology because they assume very different material claims. Namely, they have a different theological anthropology that places a higher value on human agency and autonomy, and a different understanding of revelation that can formulate universal principles.
This logic of systematic, Biblical, and practical theology appears throughout the Church Dogmatics. As expected of a systematic theologian, Barth makes extensive use of the theological tradition. He is in constant conversation with the great (Augustine, etc.) and Reformed (Calvin, etc.) traditions. Less predictable is the volume of Barth’s exegetical work. Long sections of fine-print scriptural interpretation, including engagement with the best of contemporary biblical scholarship, fill the Church Dogmatics. As well, Barth includes ethics in every volume and intersperses practical notes on almost every aspect of Christian life throughout. George Hunsinger describes this logic as “dialectical inclusion.”237 The relationship between the three is not sequential but concurrent. There is a dialectic between distinct forms. Simultaneously, each contains the whole of the other. Each part includes the entirety but does so from a different perspective. Dialectical inclusion has its ground in material claims but issues forth into methodological practice. For instance, a Barthian practical theologian will necessarily include engagement with systematic theology and biblical studies. This necessity is in contrast to other practical theologian’s assumptions that might lead to the necessary inclusion of the human sciences. Neither the Barthian or the non-Barthian by definition excludes various conversation partners but by logical force of their assumptions both will privilege different methodological patterns.
This Barthian pattern was present in Osmer’s work long before he made a conscious move towards Barth. All his major books include significant engagement with both systematic theology and biblical studies. In this, Osmer’s engagement with Barth is only an affirmation of his existing practices. This makes sense given that Osmer has always operated out of the same Reformed tradition as Barth did.
Saturday Night Preacher
There are three areas that Osmer’s shift has significance both for him and for our late-night Saturday preacher. First, Osmer’s turn to Barth gives Reformed practical theology a new theoretical grounding. Reformed theology has had an uneasy relationship with the dominant co-relational approach. With this turn to Barth, Osmer offers a comprehensive way of connecting the Reformed tradition to the tasks common to all practical theologians. Practical theology, both the guild and discipline, dismisses more conservative Reformed voices such as Tim Keller in part because there seems to be a disconnect between their sixteenth-century Calvinist theology and the twenty-first-century context. Despite the fact that these voices seem to hawk an anachronistic practical theology, they are very popular because, I believe, there are few compelling alternatives. If our Saturday night preacher wants to stay Reformed, they are more likely to take their cues from the Gospel Coalition rather than the Christian Century. In moving to Barth, Osmer offers a practical theology that is both Reformed and contemporary. He gives the Saturday night preacher a viable alternative.
Second, this kind of theoretical clarity helps in making methodological decisions. For instance, Osmer has always held that inter-disciplinary dialogue is an essential component of practical theology. There have been Barthian approaches previously but in laying out a fuller picture of a Barthian practical theology, Osmer has opened up alternative possibilities. It also opens up a new and productive conversation between the theological disciplines. Rather than silos within separate guilds, systematic, biblical, and practical theology contribute to the unity of knowledge about God’s past, present, and future action in the world. There have been moves within each field towards the dialectical inclusion that Barth envisions, such as the theological interpretation of Scripture movement within biblical studies. This unity is aimed at witness and the Saturday night preacher, as the one giving witness on Sunday morning, now has a method that “hangs together” with their theology.
Finally, Osmer’s shift opens up a new area for critical reflection. One of the signs of a good scholar is not only that what they say has relevance today but that it is generative. Osmer’s shift occurred in conversation with his colleagues, most notably Darrell Guder, but also with students such as Patrick Johnson, Theresa Latini, and Nathan Stucky. Those identifying as “missional” have a way of moving past theory to practice through Osmer’s work; those invested in areas such as preaching, pastoral care, and youth ministry can relate their practice to their theological tradition. The Saturday night preacher will benefit from the work of these practical theologians. The grinding regularity of Sunday morning does not go away but through Osmer’s shift to Barth there are now companions along the way for the Saturday night preacher.
Bibliography
Archer, Margaret Scotford. Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach. Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
Barth, Karl. Church Dogmatics: Vol. I/1. Edited by G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance. London: T&T Clark, 2004.
Browning, Don S. A Fundamental Practical Theology: Descriptive and Strategic Pro-posals. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1991.
Hunsinger, George. How To Read Karl Barth: The Shape of His Theology. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
Osmer, Richard R. “Practical Theology as Argument, Rhetoric, and Conversation.” The Princeton Seminary Bulletin, 1997. http://commons.ptsem.edu/id/princetonsemi na1811prin_0-dm007.
———. The Teaching Ministry of Congregations. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2005.
Osmer, Richard R., and Malan Nel. “Practical Theology: A Current International Per-spective.” HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 2 (2011) 1–2.
228. Osmer, The Teaching Ministry of Congregations, 306.
229. Osmer and Nel, “Practical Theology,” 1–2.
230. Ibid., 4.
231. Here I am drawing on the first two chapters of Archer, Realist Social Theory.
232. Osmer, “Practical Theology as Argument.”
233. Browning, A Fundamental Practical Theology, 5.
234. There is likely a third group of practical theologians who are appreciative of Barth and use him generative ways for their projects but in a critical way. Root, for instance, in Christopraxis, would be an example of this. Ray Anderson and John Swinton might also fit this category.
235. Die Kirchliche Dogmatik I: Die Lehre von Wort Gottes 1 was first published in 1932 and the final volume, Die Kirchliche Dogmatik IV: Die Lehre von der Versohnung 3 was published in 1959.
236. Barth, Church Dogmatics I/1, 4–5.
237. Hunsinger, How To Read Karl Barth, 58.
