Question Seven: Can It Be Demonstrated By Natural

Question Seven: Can It Be Demonstrated By Natural

Question Seven

CAN IT BE DEMONSTRATED BY NATURAL

AND NECESSARY REASON THAT

GOD IS OMNIPOTENT?

Bae] 7-1 So far we have investigated what pertains to God internally and in particular the relationships of person to person [QQ. 1-6].

Now it remains to study what pertains to God considered externally, 1.e., properties that imply a relationship of God to creatures.

Here two sorts of questions could arise, one about the subject of the relation [QQ. 7-8], the other about the term or object to which it relates [QQ. 9-11].

7.2 Iwo questions were raised about the subject, one general, the other particular. he first question is this: Can it be demonstrated by natural and necessary reason that God in general, and not just one particular person, is omnipotent?! The second question pertains to one person in particular: Has the Son or Word of God some causality of his own as regards the creature? Consider the first of these.

Arguments Pro and Con 7.3 First, the argument for the affirmative.

"God is omnipotent" seems demonstrable by natural reason, since natural reason can demonstrate that God has infinite power and, therefore, is omnipotent. Proof of the antecedent: 'The Philosopher? proves that God has infinite power from the fact that he produces motion over an infinite span of time. Proof of the implication: No power could be greater than the infinite. One could not even think of anything greater. If a power could be surpassed, it would not be infinite.

But every power which is not omnipotence could be thought of as surpassed by a power which is omnipotence.

7.4 Arguments to the contrary:

If it can be demonstrated that God is omnipotent, it can also be demonstrated that God can generate the Son. The consequent is

1 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.42 (vi, 341-49); d.2, nn.111ff. (1, 180ff.).

2 Aristotle, Physic. vill, c.5 (256a12-256b2); Metaph. xu, c.6 (1071-22).

GOD AND CREATURES

false because this is a matter of pure belief and hence cannot be demonstrated by natural reason. The implication is proved from Augustine®: "Jf the Father did not generate a son equal to himself it was because he was either unable or unwilling to do so." And he argues further: "If you say he was unwilling, you accuse him of envy; if you say he was unable, where is the omnipotence of God the Father?" His point is: if the Father could not beget a son equal to himself he would not be omnipotent. Conversely, then, if he is omnipotent, he can generate a son equal to himself, and thus if the antecedent is demonstrable, so also is the consequent.

7.5 Furthermore, if God's omnipotence could be demonstrated, it could also be demonstrated that he could create anything that could be created. The consequent is false, for an angel can be created and still it seems impossible to demonstrate by natural reason that an angel can be created by him. The Philosopher following natural reason did not assume that the Intelligences* were created by God; rather he assumed them to be necessary of themselves, that is, they were not effects produced by anything else. In the Metaphysics? he shows that a separate substance* has no magnitude on the following grounds. It has infinite power and infinite power cannot have magnitude. Then he asks whether there are one or many separate substances, and concludes there are many. According to him, then, not only the first, but any immaterial substance, is infinite, and by the same token it is necessary of itself.

Body of the Question 7.6 We must first make two necessary distinctions and then solve the question accordingly.

ARTICLE. I

The Necessary Distinctions 1. Demonstration of Simple Fact and of the Reasoned Fact

7.7 The first distinction is taken from the Posterior Analytics,® namely, there is a difference between (1) a demonstration of the reasoned fact* [propter quid; 8.7], i.e, by way of the cause and (2) a demonstration of simple fact* [quia; dr], ie, by way of the effect.

This distinction is proved by argument. Every necessary truth that is not evident from its terms, but is connected necessarily and 5 Augustine, Contra Maxim. ui, c.7: PL 42, 762.

: Aristotle, Metaph. XII, C.7 (1073a3-12); c.8 (1073414).

* Aristotle, Anal. post. 1, cc.13-14 (78a22-79a33).

QUESTION SEVEN

evidently with another necessary truth that is evident from its terms, can be demonstrated by means of this other evident truth.

Sometimes this truth is derived from the cause, sometimes from the effect, for not only can truths about causes entail certain truths about effects, but truths about effects can also entail truths about causes.

'Therefore, some true propositions can be demonstrated either (1) by means of another evident truth derived from the cause and in this case the demonstration is of the reasoned fact, or (2) by means of a truth derived from the effect and then the demonstration is one of simple fact.

From this a corollary seems to follow. Principles that are immediate or evident from their terms cannot be demonstrated by a demonstration of the simple fact. If this be true, there are some truths intermediate between the first truths and the last conclusions, and they alone are demonstrable by simple fact through such ultimate truths as are themselves evident. How a truth based on an effect can be evident, whereas the truth taken from the cause is not evident, becomes clear if one considers the way of acquiring scientific or epistemic knowledge by experience which Aristotle describes in the Metaphysics® and Posterior Analytics.' Through the experience of many individual instances perceptible to the senses, we know that an effect occurs, and yet we do not know the reason why it does so, because the cause is not given through sense perception but requires further investigation.

2. Iwo Meanings of Omnipotence 7.8 The second distinction refers to omnipotence and presupposes the following general meaning of the term. Omnipotence is not pas- [A sive but active, and not just any type of active power, but a causal one. This implies that omnipotence refers to something causable in essence that is distinct from the cause. For there is no causality except as regards something simply distinct. Hence it is a power or potency related to the possible. "Possible" is not understood as opposed to "impossible" nor as equated with "producible" insofar as this is opposed to "absolutely necessary of itself."'* Rather, "possi6 Aristotle, Metaph. 1, c.1

(g80b28).

7 Aristotle, Anal. post. I, C.19 (100a3-12).

®* Scotus' point here is to distinguish a divine person like the Son or the Holy Spirit from the divine essence on the one hand, and from something causable, like a creature, on the other. The deity or divine nature is shared perfectly and hence is possessed perfectly by all three persons. It is said to be "absolutely necessary of itself." The process whereby it is shared or

GOD AND CREATURES

ble" as the correlative of "omnipotence" is equated with "'causable"' because it represents the term of a causal power.

[As the component omni, i.e., "all" or "every," in the word indicates], omnipotence also asserts some sort of universality. This does not refer to potency, considered simply in itself (for omnipotence is not formally all or every instance of power, for it is not a power of the creature). The power's universality is not taken simply but with reference to the causable (i.e., the possible or what can be created), so that the meaning is this: "Omnipotence is that active power or potency whose scope extends to anything whatsoever that can be created." But this can still be understood in two ways. In the first sense it is taken disjunctively to mean the power can produce either mediately or immediately "everything that can be created."

In the other sense, it means the power can produce "everything that can be created," and can do so immediately, at least so far as causes are concerned.

In other words, no other active cause need intervene.°®

ARTICLE-II

Solution of the Question 7.9 In the second article we must see whether omnipotence can be demonstrated (1) by a demonstration of the reasoned fact or (2) by a demonstration of the simple fact. communicated is called a "divine procession" or "production" and is twofold. The Father, or first person of the Trinity, communicates or shares his divine essence with the second person, called the Son, or the Word, or Logos. The Father and Son, as a single principle, communicate their essence to the Holy Spirit. Because it is one and the same numerical essence that is shared or communicated in the Trinity, medieval theologians felt justified in distinguishing such divine productions or eternal processions from a causal production where not only is the cause really distinct from the effect, but the effect has a nature or essence that is numerically distinct from that of the cause. According to this technical usage, for example, the Father can be called a "producer" (producens) or a "principle or source"

(principium), but not a "cause" (causa). The Son and the Holy Spirit, conversely, cannot be called "'effects'' or said to be '"'caused'"' but they can be called "producibles" or "'possibles" (in the sense of not being something

"impossible") or principiata (singular principiatum) in the sense that they represent something "which proceeds from a principle."

* Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.8, nn.302-306 (Iv, 326-28); d.20, nn.24-34 (Vv, 313-18); d.q2, nn.8-9 (VI, 342-44).

QUESTION SEVEN

7-10 There are three conclusions about its demonstrability as a reasoned fact.

The first is*this**"God is omnipotent'

(in either sense of omnipotence) is a truth that, in itself, is demonstrable as a reasoned fact.

Second conclusion: This truth can be demonstrated to a person in the present life under certain conditions.!°

Third conclusion: This truth cannot be demonstrated to one in the present life in terms of what he knows naturally and according to the present dispensation.!!

7-11 As for the demonstrability of omnipotence as a simple fact, there are two conclusions:

The first is this: The proposition "God is omnipotent in the sense that the scope oi his power extends immediately to every possible"

1°The Latin text reads "istud verum est demonstrabile viatori stante simpliciter statu viae.''

As Scotus subsequently explains (cf. 7.19), this means that without destroying his status as a pilgrim in this life, a man

" could have, or be given, such a perfect concept of God that he would be able to use it as the middle term of a syllogism to demonstrate that God is omnipotent. Scotus considers only the beatific vision itself, or some such ecstatic or mystical experience in this life in which God is seen face to face, to be inconsistent with man's status as a pilgrim. This leaves open the question as to how such knowledge could be communicated to him. Presumably it would have to be given somehow directly by God. According to Scotus, if one had at some time intuitive knowledge* of God, this would suffice for him to form an abstractive concept of God

(so-called because it "abstracts" from the fact of whether the subject still exists or does not exist). Since God can cause immediately whatever he can cause through secondary or created causes, he could infuse such a concept directly into the human mind. Scotus' point is that given the existence of such a concept in the mind, whether it be acquired, infused, or what have you, man in virtue of his native ability or natural power to reason and to draw conclusions could use such a concept to demonstrate this truth as a reasoned fact.

11 We have translated de lege communi (literally, "according to the common law") as "according to the present dispensation." This refers not only to man's natural endowments, but to such supernatural gifts as are available to the generality of mankind. What is excluded is such special supernatural or mystical experiences as those had by the patriarchs, prophets, or apostles to whom God imparted his original revelation. Such chosen individuals presumably possessed a direct experiential knowledge not given to the ordinary believer to whom they communicated what God revealed to them.

GOD AND CREATURES

is true, but we cannot demonstrate it by a demonstration of simple fact.

The second conclusion: "God is omnipotent in the sense that his power extends mediately or immediately to every possible" is a proposition that can be demonstrated as a simple fact by a person in the present life.

7.12 We have five conclusions, then, which, taken together, give a complete answer to the question.

1. Concerning the First Conclusion 7.13 Proof of the first conclusion [in 7.10] If a truth can be demonstrated as a reasoned fact from another prior truth, it possesses this property in virtue of its terms.'? "God is omnipotent" (in either sense of omnipotence) is a truth of this sort.

Therefore, [it is demonstrable as a reasoned fact].

7.14 The major is clear: A truth of this sort is the kind of truth it is in virtue of what its terms mean. Consequently, a truth that is self-evident is one that is known to be such from the meaning of its terms, and from this it follows that the truth is self-evident to any intellect which conceives the meaning of these terms.

7.15 The minor is proved. A truth that in virtue of its terms is necessary, but not immediately known, also has the property of being demonstrable as a reasoned fact in virtue of its terms. "God is omnipotent" (in either sense of omnipotence) is a truth of this sort.

Proof: That we are dealing with a truth that is both true and necessary is clear, but we do not prove it here because it is not in question. Our problem refers only to the way in which this truth can be known or proved.

7.16 There are two arguments to prove that this necessary truth is known mediately.

First, the sequence or order in which things can be known is the same as it would be were they really distinct. It makes no difference how the mental existence of one is to be distinguished from that of the other. But if nature, intellect, will, and external power were really distinct from one another, their real order or sequence would be this: (1) the nature, because it has (2) such an intellect and (3) such a will, would be (4) externally potent in the way that it is.

Therefore, no matter what kind of distinction exists between these '2 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.2, nn.14-24 (11, 131-37).

QUESTION SEVEN

things their order of knowability is always the following: (1) the divine nature, because it has (2) such an intellect and (3) such a will, has (4) the sort of potency that is omnipotence. It is obvious then not only that some medium for this necessary truth exists, but also what that medium is, namely, that the divine nature has intellect or will or both.

7-17 A second proof that this is a mediate truth would be this:

Every necessary truth is either mediate or immediate, but this truth is not immediate, therefore, [it is mediate]. Proof of the minor: One of the conclusions we arrived at in solving the First Question [in 1.44] was that the personal or notional properties pertain more immediately to the essence than properties implying relationship to the external. But the notional does not pertain to the divine essence as immediately as does something essential, as the proof in the solution of the same question shows, for the property of perfect memory is the medium in virtue of which "speaking''* pertains to the divine essence. A fortiori, therefore, omnipotence, which asserts a relationship to external things, does not pertain to God or to any divine person with an immediacy that is absolute.

7.18 To the first of these two proofs a further clarification could have been added as to just which power is formally omnipotence or, to be more exact, which is the immediate foundation of omnipotence.

Is it the divine intellect or the divine will? For our purpose, however, 1t is not necessary to determine which of these it is, since what we are trying to prove follows just as well from either alternative.

2. Concerning the Second Conclusion 7.19 [Exposition and proof] The second conclusion [in 7.10] should be understood in this way.

A demonstration of God's omnipotence as a reasoned fact (taking omnipotence in either sense) 1s possible for a person in this life who possesses nothing repugnant to his status as a pilgrim, whether this be something passing, like St.

Paul's ecstasy, or something permanent [like the beatific vision].

Proof of this conclusion: Any intellect that can have a simple concept that includes virtually an immediate truth together with another mediate truth can also know the mediate truth through a demonstration of the reasoned fact. But the human intellect in the present life, apart from any permanent or transient knowledge inconsistent with its pilgrim status, can possess a simple concept which virtually includes both the truth "God is omnipotent" as well

GOD AND CREATURES

as another truth from which it follows immediately. Therefore, [God is omnipotent" can be known through a demonstration of the reasoned fact].

7.20 This minor seems obvious at least as regards the assertion that some simple concept virtually includes the truth [God is omnipotent"] by means of another immediate truth. For this would follow from what was established [in 7.16f.] in proving the first conclusion, namely, that God's omnipotence is a mediate truth.

What still remains to be proved is that such a concept can exist in the intellect of a person in this life who has the status of a simple pilgrim, in other words, one who neither is in a state of rapture nor possesses the beatific knowledge. This is proved first by an example, second by an argument.

The example is this: Something can be understood only incidentally. For example, man is understood only in terms of something accidental to him when we think of him as "the white one"' or "the one able to laugh." Further knowledge of man would be in terms of something essential to him but still general. For example, to think of animal is also to think of man. Third, something can be understood in terms of what is both essential and specific, and yet the knowledge in a technical sense is confused. Such would be the case if I understood what a man is [in the sense of being able to apply the name correctly] but did not know how to define him or even what the more generic elements were that would enter into such a definition. Of course, one could distinguish between the absolute and the relative as the first step in that direction. However, the final step in knowing some object with scientific knowledge or, more precisely, with knowledge immediately preceding scientific knowledge, is the knowledge of its definition. For this knowledge is the most distinctive and the most specific essential knowledge one can have of it. It goes far beyond that vague knowledge of which the Philosopher speaks in the Physics* in expressing how names are related to definition. In such knowledge by definition at least we have a concept which includes evidently and virtually all the necessary truths about such an object.

7-21 This example provides the following argument. Apart from the immediate vision or intuitive knowledge, it is possible to have a most distinctive conception of an object which precedes scientific knowledge, and such a concept, which would include in the most evident way truths about principles and about conclusions, would

'3 Aristotle, Physic. 1, c.1

(184b10).

QUESTION SEVEN

suffice for having scientific knowledge of such an object. But for a person in the present life, any knowledge of God, except immediate vision or intuitive knowledge, is simply compatible with his pilgrim status. Therefore, it is possible for him to have such a concept of God that is both consistent with his pilgrim state and sufficient to know propositional truths [including that of God's omnipotence]."!

7-22 The major of this syllogism [in 7.21] is evident from the example cited above as well as from the distinction between abstractive and intuitive knowledge explained in the first article of the sixth question [6.18f.]. I repeat it here briefly. Although abstractive knowledge can be either of the non-existent or the existent, intuitive knowledge is only of the existent as existing. Abstractive and definitional knowledge of man, however, can be of the non-existent as well as the existent. This appears clear from what was said there

[in Question Six]. It is also obvious in itself, because the same knowledge is there whether the thing exists or does not exist. Therefore, this definitional knowledge which is non-intuitive is of the universal defined object.

7.23 The minor [in 7.21] also appéars clear from what was said [in 6.20]. For only intuitive knowledge of the divine essence puts man beyond the status of the pilgrim, either permanently if he possesses such knowledge permanently or for the time being if he has it only for a time. The example [in 7.20] provides proof of this.

It is also proved by argument in this way: Where any object of science is concerned, apart from intuitive knowledge, it is possible to have abstractive knowledge that is most distinct. Now God as such is an object of some science. Therefore, besides intuitive knowledge of him it is possible to have a most distinct knowledge of this sort, which was what we set out to prove. For such knowledge does not put one outside the pilgrim state, and yet it would include virtually and evidently all necessary truths about God.

7.24 Proof of the major: Every science is concerned with the thing but not precisely as existing. I understand this to mean that although the existence itself is seen to be something in the object or associated with the object, it is not necessarily required that existence actually pertains to the object insofar as the object is knowable by way of demonstration.

14 Cf, Duns Scotus, Ord., prol., nn.61-65, 141ff.

(1, 37-40, g5ff.); 1, dg, nn.25-26, 56, 58, 61 (11, 16-17, 18, 38-39, 40, 42); ibid., nn.158-61

(11, g5100).

GOD AND CREATURES

This is evident from the mind of the Philosopher'*: ""Demonstration concerns necessary truths, and definition is a scientific process.

Now just as scientific knowledge cannot be sometimes knowledge and sometimes ignorance, so neither can demonstration nor definition be sometimes the sort of things they are and at other times not the sort of things they are." From this he concludes': '"Therefore, neither definition nor demonstration is possible in relation to perishable individuals, for perishing things are not revealed to those who have scientific knowledge when they have passed from our percepLon tion. Though their meaning remains in the soul unchanged, there will no longer be a definition or demonstration." I understand the meaning of the Philosopher to be this: If there were definitions or demonstrations of the contingent or the perishable as such, these would exist at one time and not at another. For even though the concept of the perishable object remained in the soul, it would still follow that one would know it at one time and not know it another time, and there would be a demonstration of it at one time and not at another. But this is impossible.

7.25 From the foregoing, then, I obtain this proposition: Since the notion can remain in the soul even if the actual existence of the object does not remain, it follows that such existence is not essential to the object insofar as it can be known scientifically. For the scientific definition or notion cannot remain the same in the soul if what is essential to such knowledge does not remain. But whether an object that can be known scientifically is able or not able to exist in reality, at least its notion as an object of scientific knowledge can remain the same in the soul even if its existence does not continue.

Scientific knowledge, therefore, abstracts from existence in the sense that actual existence is not included in its definition as an object that can be known scientifically [i.e., by way of demonstration].

7-26 In accord with this conclusion one could draw this following corollary. It is clear how theology can exist as a science in the intellect of a person in this life who retains his pilgrim status. For the intellect that can possess a concept which virtually includes all necessary truths about that object, both those that are immediate and those which are known by means of the others, can have a complete science of that object. The intellect of the pilgrim can have such a 15 Aristotle, Metaph. vil, ¢.15 (1039b30-1940a7); Anal. post. (71b15-16)

(75b24-25).

16 Aristotle, Metaph. vu, c.15 (1040a-10).

QUESTION SEVEN

concept of God. Therefore, [it can have a theology or scientific knowledge of God].

7-27 The minor is manifest. A most distinctive concept of the subject of theology (which is God) is possible apart from intuitive knowledge, and such a concept contains virtually and evidently all necessary truths about that subject. However, it cannot contain contingent truths, for these are not apt by nature to be included in the notion of any subject, for only such truths as are necessary are included sufficiently in any simple concept.

However, there are some necessary truths about contingent things, not indeed about their actuality but about their possibility.

Such truths can also be known scientifically in the aforesaid way.

Truths of this type, for instance, are "God has the power to create, the power to raise from the dead, the power to beatify," and so on, with all the other articles of faith that concern the contingent. Beyond these necessary truths about what God can do, however, nothing can be known about him in a properly scientific way so far as this property [of omnipotence] is concerned.

Therefore, a pilgrim in this present life would be a theologian in a perfectly scientific way if, in virtue of the most distinct concept of divinity obtainable apart from intuitive knowledge, he knew all necessary truths in an orderly fashion, both those which refer to intrinsic properties which are there necessarily and those which concern what is possible externally.

7.28 [The view of Henry of Ghent]!? From this it follows that if theology is assumed to be properly science in some light other than the light of glory but more than the light of faith, and that such light would be the knowledge or the concept of the object, then such an opinion would be true. But the one who defended this opinion concerning the light [namely, Henry] apparently did not understand it in this way, for according to him the light would be that in which the object would be known and not be, it seems, the formal meaning or the formal knowledge of the object itself, as is claimed here.

3. Concerning the Third Conclusion 7.29 [Exposition of Proof] Our third conclusion [in 7.10] is this.

By his purely natural endowments, man in the present life cannot demonstrate as a reasoned fact that God is omnipotent. Proof of this conclusion: A mediate proposition cannot be known as a reasoned

— 17 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. xu, q.1

(fol. 483Y-Z); q.22

(fol. 498D); Summa, a.13, q.2 (I, fol. g1T-Y).

GOD AND CREATURES

fact except by means of the appropriate immediate proposition.

This can be known simply from its terms, especially from the meaning of the subject term, namely, from the fact that the subject includes the predicate and therefore includes the truth or knowledge of the proposition immediately. Therefore, the coordinate knowledge of the reasoned fact is only possible to an intellect possessing a concept of the subject that virtually and evidently includes the whole coordination. But such a concept of God is not possible to a person in this life by purely natural means so long as he remains in the pilgrim state.

7.30 Proof of this: The only concepts such a person can have naturally are those caused by the agent intellect working with sense images, for by God's common dispensation no other factor moves the mind of the pilgrim naturally. But agent intellect and sense images cannot give rise in us to a concept so distinctive of God that it contains virtually and evidently the whole orderly sequence of demonstrable truths including that of his omnipotence in either sense.!® The proof for this last statement depends on [my] solution to the question: "In what manner is God knowable to one in this lifer?

7.31 This brief sketch of the salient points, however, can be given here. The most perfect simple concept a pilgrim can attain of God by natural means does not transcend the most perfect idea of God possible to the metaphysician, for the knowledge of faith does not yield a simple concept of God. It only inclines us to assent to propositions which are not evident from the meaning of the simple terms they contain. Faith produces no simple concept, then, that goes beyond all simple concepts of the metaphysician. Added evidence is this: A believing and an infidel metaphysician have the same concept, for when the believer affirms something of God that is denied by the infidel, they do not contradict each other in words alone but in what they mean.

[12] 7.32 Now the most perfect simple concept a metaphysician gets of God, however, does not evidently include an orderly sequence of truths extending all the way to this proposition: "God is omnipotent," where omnipotent is understood in either sense. For many philosophers have presumably had concepts of God that are the most perfect it is possible for one in this life to reach by natural

18 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord., prol., n.41

(1, 23-24); 1, d.2, n.gg

(I, 148-49);

d.g, nn.2goff. (111, 138ff.).

19 Cf. ibid., 1, d.g, nn.1-5, 10-68 (11, 1-3, 4-48).

QUESTION SEVEN

means. And still they were unable to arrive at a knowledge of this truth. But it would have been possible to do so had they had such a simple concept. Indeed, it would have been almost necessary for them to do so, for by means of such a concept they would have perceived the immediate truth of the proposition from which omnipotence follows, and by making the necessary deduction they would have reached this mediate truth.

7-33 Where is another way to prove this point. The first principle proper to God reached by the metaphysician is known to him only as a simple fact. But it would have been known to him as a reasoned fact if he could have a concept of God that included virtually and evidently the orderly sequence of truths about God. Therefore, [he had no such concept].

7.34 Proof of the first proposition, namely, the first principle proper to God reached by the metaphysician is known to him at best as a simple fact. The premise which provides the means for inferring anything proper to God is always some particular proposition in which a predicate pertaining to a created being is asserted of some being. From such a premise the metaphysician draws a conclusion in which a predicate proper to God is affirmed of some being. He argues, for instance, in this way: "Some being is caused, therefore something is an uncaused cause," or "'Some being is finite, therefore some being is infinite," or "Some being is possible, therefore some being is necessary."'"° Proof that all these conclusions follow is found in the fact that the less perfect condition cannot be true of anything unless the more perfect condition also is true of something, for the imperfect depends upon the perfect. All these inferences, it is clear, are only proofs of the simple fact.

| 7.35 [Objections] To the foregoing these objections are raised:

According to the first proof of the first conclusion [in 7.16], the will provides a means for inferring omnipotence of God by a demonstration of the reasoned fact. And the intellect of one in this life can know there is in God a will, in fact the first and most perfect will. Therefore, the intellect can also know God is omnipotent through a demonstration of the reasoned fact.

7.36 Also, every true and necessary proposition whose terms are primitive or irreducibly simple concepts is self-evident. But a proposition asserting any attribute of God is this sort of proposition,

Therefore, [it is self-evident].

20 Cf, ibid., d.2, nn.41-47 (Il, 149-215).

17]

GOD AND CREATURES

7.37 Furthermore, the known properties of a natural being imply that God has certain perfections. Imperfection in what is mobile implies perfection in the first mover. From natural effects, therefore, the philosopher of nature can know God by demonstration of the simple fact. If the metaphysician could only know of God through proofs of simple fact, his knowledge would not transcend physics or natural philosophy.

7.38 [Answer to the Objections} Look for the answers else- [14] where.?} 4. Concerning the Fourth Conclusion 7.39 Next we must consider the conclusions involving a demonstration of the simple fact [in 7.11], the first of which is about immediate omnipotence with respect to every possible. Here we shall ieee first explain what immediacy means; second, what the philosophers held; third, what our position should be.

7.40 The mediacy of a cause to an effect can be understood in two ways: (1) a cause that causes by means of some intervening cause, or (2) a cause that causes by means of some effect. For not every effect that is intermediate with respect to a further effect is also a cause of the latter. Consequently, the immediacy of an active cause to its effect can be understood either as excluding every intermediary active cause or as excluding every prior intervening effect.

7.41 If "immediacy" means both types of mediacy are ruled out, then I say that not only philosophers but also theologians would deny God is immediately omnipotent, for they admit that God cannot cause a relation without first (either in time or in the order of nature) Causing its foundation. And so he is not able to cause immediately every effect whatsoever, i.e., without causing previously, by a priority of nature, some intermediate effect as it were.

7.42 Hence the problem is limited to immediacy in the sense of excluding an intervening efficient cause. The effective intervention is understood quite generally to cover the case where the causation of the intermediate cause extends either

(a) to the main effect or (b) only to some effect that is prior or dispositional with respect to the main effect.

7-43 What the philosophers held was our second point [in 7.39].

[16 ] It seems they felt that not only was God's immediate omnipotence undemonstrable, but that it was simply impossible that he could be

*1Cf. ibid., n.2g (1, 140-41); d.g, n.65 (11, 46-47). See Appendix, two additions to 7.38.

QUESTION SEVEN

omnipotent in this way. The basis for their view seems to be this proposition: "A source or principle that is necessary and absolutely perfect is not related immediately to anything in a contingent fashion." The proof is this: No novelty or contingency could be ascribed to what immediately emanates from such a source. To begin with, this principle, since it is simply necessary, can behave in but one way. And given this uniform behavior there is nothing else needed for it to act nor is there anything to impede its action. It is not an imperfect principle and therefore it cannot be impeded or be insufficient or require anything else.??

7-44 If the aforesaid proposition (viz., that a necessary and sufficient principle could not produce anything immediately and at the same time contingently) were true, it would follow at once that it could not cause every possible thing immediately. This implication is proved, first, generally. Then it is proved specifically of motion, for it follows that God cannot cause movement immediately, whether this be locomotion in particular or, more specifically, the circular movement of the heavens.

7.45 This implication can be proved, it seems, according to the mind of the Philosopher.

First, generally, if God could cause every effect immediately without any secondary cause, he could deprive secondary causes of their proper action. But from the exegesis of the Commentator?' on a text of the Metaphysics, ""When beings have no action of their own, they have no essence of their own," it is clear the Philosopher considers it incongruous that God should be able to destroy the essences of all other things, since he holds that some things other than

God are formally necessary.

7.46 Confirmation: If God could cause any effect independently of the ordered sequence of causes in the universe, the causal order that exists between the causes would not be simply necessary. Consequently, it would not be essential either—something the philosopers would consider incongruous.

7.47 Second, the implication is shown to hold particularly of movement. According to the Philosopher, in the Physics, an infinite power cannot immediately move a body in time. If it could,

22 Aristotle, Physic. vill, c.6 (259b32-260a19); Metaph. xu, ¢.7 (1072a2025).

23 Averroes, Metaph.

1x, com. 7 (Aristotelis opera cum commentarits Averroes; Venetiis: Apud Juntas, 1562-74; Minerva G.m.b.H., Frankfurtam-Main; Unveranderter Nachdruck, 1962, vin, fol. 231H).

24 Aristotle, Physic. vill, c.10 (266a24-266b6). hye

GOD AND CREATURES

some finite power could move the body in equal time. For, as he argues there, if the motive power were increased, the time it takes to move would be shortened. Therefore, according to Aristotle's mind, it follows that God could not immediately cause motion properly so-called. For, since motion involves succession, it necessarily will take time.

7.48 Suppose this objection is raised. By an instantaneous change without any succession, God can cause the thing moved to pass to that stage to which it is moved in time by a finite cause. Answer:

This does not solve the difficulty for God cannot cause immediately the circular movement of the heavens. He cannot cause it in time as is admitted, nor in an instant, for in that instant the heavens as a whole and each of its parts would be in the same place as they were before. Therefore, in that instant the heavens would not be moved.

7.49 Third, it seems that the same point can be established as regards every material effect, for it seems that such effects are produced by a transmutation of matter. In the Metaphysics? Aristotle proves, apparently against Plato, that what is separated from matter cannot transmute matter immediately. The Commentator says in the same place?*: "It is impossible that a form separated from matter transforms matter. Nothing transmutes matter except what is in matter, and this is relevant to those who say the world is generated and that the one who transmutes it is an individual thing or something individual like a particular body."

7.50 Finally, it seems that these proofs can be confirmed from the mind of the Philosopher in the Physics.27 What he wants to say there, apparently, is that everything God can cause immediately and as total cause, he causes necessarily. For it seems that when the effect depends totally and exclusively on the agent, the only grounds for introducing contingency as regards causing or not causing is some mutability in the agent. If God could cause immediately everything causable, every one of these things would depend totally and exclusively on him, and, consequently, God would cause everything causable necessarily. From this many incongruities would follow, namely, that secondary causes would be deprived of their activity, which the first reason [in 7.45] touched on; that God would cause immediately every movement, which the second proof [in 7-47] mentioned; and that God would cause immediately every material effect, which the third reason [in 7.49] brought up.

5 Aristotle, Metaph. vil, c.8 (1033b25-1034a8).

26 Averroes, Metaph. vu, com. 28 (vit, fol. 178C).

27 Aristotle, Physic. vin, c.6 (259b32-260a19).

QUESTION SEVEN

L194 7-51 As regards the third point, it should be maintained: (a) according to the common opinion of the theologians, God is so omnipotent that without any other agent, he can cause everything causable, and still (b) this fact cannot be demonstrated even by a demonstration of the simple fact.

7-52 The first point is proved by authority: "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.''?8

7-53 A reason is also adduced to prove this. The active power of any secondary cause exists in the first cause in a more eminent way than in the second cause. Now what possesses the active power more eminently can cause the effect, it seems, without the intervention of what possesses it only in a lesser degree. To produce an effect no imperfection is required in the active power. For imperfection is not essential to acting, it is rather an impediment.?°

Confirmation: We see equivocal causes* producing effects as perfect as those of univocal causes.* This would not happen unless they possessed active power sufficient for perfect causation. But they do not possess univocal power, only eminent power. Therefore, [this eminent power suffices].

7.54 This reasoning [in 7.53], although it seems probable, would not be a demonstration for the Philosopher. For he would deny this proposition: "Everything that possesses in itself eminently or virtually the active power of the proximate cause can produce the effect of this proximate cause immediately.' For he would say a cause with such eminent power can indeed produce the effect of such a power, but only in its own orderly way, which means it functions precisely as a higher and more remote cause.

7.55 To the claim [in 7.53] that no imperfection is required for causing he would give this reply: When I say "cause immediately"

I assert two things: (1) causation—which requires perfection, and (2) immediacy or the way it takes place—which requires some measure of imperfection. Consequently, imperfection is needed in the agent, not indeed as the basis for causing but as a necessary condition for causing immediately.

For where an essential order* exists, nothing can be adjacent to the least perfect unless it is in some measure imperfect. If it were right next to the most imperfect, the perfect would be equally immediate to every other member distinct from itself. And then an essential order would not obtain among these things, even as there

28)(Geniaide 29 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.8, nn.223-306 (Iv, 279-328).

Wee

GOD AND CREATURES

would be no such order or sequence among the natural numbers if each proceeded from unity with equal immediacy.

7.56 From this it appears that the Philosopher would deny ei he more perfect a cause, the more immediately it causes," if by "more immediately' we mean the exclusion of intervening causal agents.

Furthermore, he would say, '"The more perfect the superior cause, the more the intermediary causes through which it acts." These intermediary agents are not required to contribute causal perfection.

This exists already in all its fulness and perfection in the first cause alone. They are needed to tone down the perfection gradually until the least perfect effect is achieved. Such a tempering occurs only where there is a diminution of perfection and some measure of imperfection is introduced.

7.57 Proofs for the second point [in 7.51], namely, that this truth is not demonstrable by a demonstration of the simple fact.®°

The first proof is from authority. Philosophers could have arrived at a knowledge of such truths as are demonstrable as simple facts.

Now they were unable to reach a knowledge of this truth. Indeed they held the opposite view. This hardly seems probable if the truth in question were demonstrable as a simple fact.

7.58 The second proof is from reason. Nothing about the way causes are ordered or interrelated implies the superior cause can produce the same effects with or without the inferior cause. The sun alone, for instance, cannot generate a man without a father's intervention though it can do so with the father. By the same token, then, nothing about the way causes are interrelated implies that a first cause can produce the same effect without the secondary cause that it can produce together with it.

7-59 For other kinds of causes this is even more obvious. Suppose it were true, as some claim, that an essential order exists among materials or material causes. Suppose, for instance, that the matter immediately informed by the intellectual soul is the body with its organs, and that this in turn is composed of other materials, and ultimately of matter that is primary in an unqualified sense and is the matter proper to the first substantial form. It is not necessary that this primary matter be able to be the immediate matter of every form that can inform a secondary or higher form of matter.

7-60 It is clear the same holds good of forms. There is no need that everything that can be immediately informed by a secondary form can also be immediately informed by the first form. This is

30 Cf. ibid., d.2, nn.118-20, 178-81 (1, 193-97, 234, 236); d.42 (V1, 341-49).

QUESTION SEVEN

true whether the forms be first and second in the order of generation or that of perfection.*4

[22] What was said of the material and formal causes would be more convincing if the theory of a plurality of forms, which is not at issue here, were true. For our purposes, however, it suffices that if there were such an order among material and formal causes, the first cause would not have to be the immediate cause of everything causable. Still less, then, among efficient causes where such an order does in fact exist, must the first cause be able to be the immediate cause of everything.

7-61 This also appears clear in the case of the efficient causes of knowledge. As the Physics'? puts it, principles are the causes for knowing conclusions. The first principle has truth most evidently.

It also contains eminently and virtually the truth of all the propositions that follow from it. Its ability to be the immediate cause of knowing each of these propositions, however, is not required. Indeed, to acquire knowledge of a remote conclusion it is necessary to use intermediary steps in an orderly way.

7.62 Lastly, it appears clear in the case of final causes. It is not necessary that the last in a chain of final causes be the immediate end of each of the links. An end close at hand is only linked to the ultimate end by some intervening cause. For example, the exterior organs for eating and drinking are aimed at health only by means of their own ends or purposes, namely, eating and drinking.

[23] 7.63 Although the theologians' view is not demonstrable, since it is in fact true, its opposite is not demonstrable either. For this reason the arguments adduced for the philosophers' view should be answered.

[To the first in 7.45] The theologian might well concede the first cause can deprive these caused causes not only of their activity but also of their entity, for it can annihilate them. In calling the eviternal* perpetual, however, he does not agree with the Philosopher's statement that all perpetual things are formally necessary.

For it is simply possible for the eviternal not to exist even though this is not by reason of some intrinsic passive potency like that found in perishable things.

7.64 Another answer is this: God could deprive secondary beings of their activity simply by anticipating their causality and producing the effects they might have caused. He would not need to de31 Cf. ibid., Iv, d.11, q.3, nn.22-57 (ed. Vives xvil, 388-438).

32 Aristotle, Physic. u, c.g (200a15-16). lee)

GOD AND CREATURES

prive them of their entity. They could remain in existence and yet not produce their eftects because these were caused immediately by another cause. Still they could have caused those effects. This particular fire, for instance, might remain in existence without producing fire in this wood because this was anticipated by a stronger agent which set it afire. Yet it could have caused this effect for it has the form of fire which is the source for setting things on fire.

7.65 As for the Commentator's dictum [in 7.45]: "If beings have no action of their own, they have no essences of their own," how is the antecedent to be understood? Actually or dispositionally? Not just actually! For in such a case his argument would be: "If the less fundamental is removed, so too is the more fundamental." But this would be a fallacy of the consequent, for the absence of action could be due to other factors. A stronger agent might anticipate the action or a counter-agent might prevent it. Hence his meaning must be: "Dispositionally or virtually they have no action of their own."

In such a case, it would indeed follow that they have no essence of their own, for every agent by its own form and power possesses its action virtually even when it is not actually producing it.

That the antecedent should be so interpreted can be gathered from the preceding remarks of the Commentator: "These agree that no being has any natural action of its own." And he adds: "If beings have no action of their own''—i.e., naturally or dispositionally in accord with their proper nature—''they have no essences of their own." The "moderns," against whom he argues here, assume one agent produces all beings without benefit of any intermediary. But 24a this is not what Christians claim. As Augustine®® says: "God administers the things he has created in such a way that he lets them exercise their proper functions." God could have done everything. By so doing he would not have destroyed the entities of things, although he would have left them idle and barren. Still, he preferred to endow them with active powers and actions of their own even as he gave to each its entity. For he did not deprive them entirely of the perfection of which they were capable.

7-66 Answer to the third reason [in 7.49]**: The Philosopher does not deny the material form is induced in matter immediately by God. Later on, in the question [21] on good fortune, we shall dis- *3 Augustine, De civit. Dei vu, c.30: PL 41, 220; CCSL 47, 212.

4 Scotus apparently forgot the original sequence in which these objections occurred. He calls this "the second reason," and calls the second objection, which he answers in 7.70, "the third reason."

QUESTION SEVEN

cuss what Aristotle thought about the intellectual soul. But what about that text of the Metaphysics® where the Commentator is cited to the effect that nothing immaterial can transmute matter immediately? The theologian would deny this, particularly if this is understood of God, as seems to be the case from the Commentator's allusion to those "who say the world is generated.''** He repeats the same opinion later on in the third comment*?: "What moves matter has to be a body with an active quality." And he ascribes this view to Aristotle.

[25] 7-67 If the text of Aristotle can be given a sound interpretation, whereas that of the Commentator cannot, it seems better to make sense of Aristotle and argue that Averroes misunderstood him. This can be done here, it seems. For the present I will only touch the problem briefly, but it appears Aristotle here is arguing against Plato to prove the Ideas are not necessary for generation, since this individual suffices to beget that individual. What is more, the Ideas cannot beget an individual [since they are universals]. If the one generating is not an individual, what is generated will not be individual either.

7.68 Both inferences suffice to show a Platonic Idea begets nothing, but they must not be applied to the present case, namely where

God is concerned.

For if an Idea would generate, it would function as a univocal cause, for [a prototype and its effect must be] of the same species.

No univocal cause is necessary, however, unless it be composite and material like the thing generated. This is the proof of the first part of the argument, viz., that the ideas are unnecessary.

7.69 The second part, namely that the ideas cannot generate, makes this point. If the univocal generator is not an individual material composite, what it generates will not be individual.

Now God can be a cause of generation and he is required for generation, not as a univocal cause but as an equivocal cause. And in this role he acts as the supreme equivocal cause in virtue of which every other cause, be it univocal or equivocal, exercises its function.

7.70 Answer to the second reason [in 7.47]: We have to concede absolutely that both Aristotle and Averroes** denied that God could

85 Aristotle, Metaph. vu, c.8 (1033a25-1033b11).

36 Averroes, Metaph. vu, com. 28 (vu, fol. 178C).

37 Ibid., com. 31 (fol. 181G-H).

38 Tbid., x11, com. 41 (vull, fol. 323v-325v).

GOD AND CREATURES

immediately move a body. And on this point the theologian must contradict them both. They did hold, however, that God could move the heavens mediately, that is to say, by means of an Intelligence which is the proper mover of the heavens. Of this we will say more in answering the third of the arguments at the beginning of the question.

7.71 Answer to the fourth argument [in 7.50] used to confirm the first three proofs: One can say it was not the mind of Aristotle that God is an absolutely necessary cause of whatever he causes immediately, i.e, without some intervening agent. This will be discussed later in speaking of the intellectual soul in [21.45 of] the question on good fortune. Only if every medium whatsoever be excluded, be this (1) an agent productive of the effect itself or of some prior disposition towards the effect, or (2) some medium caused or prior to the effect, did Aristotle believe that God does necessarily whatever he can do immediately. Whatever can act without benefit of any intervening prior effect or previous agent, acts necessarily. And he gives this reason: Since the effect in toto depends immediately on God alone, he would say, any novelty in being or contingency it might have would be traceable in the last analysis to some novelty in God. He makes this point in Bk. VIII of the Physics.3° For if no prior effect, no other agent, no dispositional cause is involved or intervenes, this novelty in the pattern of change or in the absolutely first effect, whatever this may be, would come immediately from God.*° 7.72 But consider something God can cause immediately in the sense that he effects it directly and not just through some vicarious agent, and yet he makes use of some dispositional cause or at least some prerequisite effect. Now Aristotle would not claim it was with simple necessity that God causes such an effect. It is the necessity of inevitability* only, and presupposes the dispositional causes and prerequisite effects are given.

7-73 On neither of these points, of course, would the theologian agree with Aristotle, since he claims God by his will relates contingently and freely to every external thing that can be caused. Not only is necessity of immutability* excluded but that of inevitability as well.

7-74 Hence I admit Aristotle would in principle claim there are 89 Aristotle, Physic. vil, c.6 (259b32-260a19).

*° Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.8, nn.223-306 (Iv, 279-328).

QUESTION SEVEN

many things God is unable to cause immediately, for example, everything whose production is simply contingent and neither immutably nor inevitably necessary. But the theologian would contradict him here, as was said.

7-75 [Conclusion] Consequently, our fourth main conclusion about demonstration is this: It is true that God is omnipotent immediately as regards everything causable, but we cannot demonstrate this by a demonstration of simple fact.

5. Concerning the Fifth Conclusion [27] 7.76 [Exposition and Proof] The fifth main conclusion [in 7.11] is this: It can be demonstrated as a simple fact to a person in this life that God is omnipotent mediately or immediately. That is to say, he can cause everything causable either immediately or by means of something subject to his causality.

7.77 The proof of the conclusion is this: There must be an end to efficient causes, as Bk. II of the Metaphysics*! proves. Put briefly,

Aristotle's argument is this: The totality of effects itself has a cause which is not part of the whole, for then the same thing would be cause of itself. Hence it is something outside the totality as a whole.

Consequently, if causes cannot ascend indefinitely, not only will each effect be caused, but the whole multitude will be caused, and hence by something outside the whole multitude. And here it will end with a cause that is simply first.*?

7.78 But another proof of this conclusion can be given. It is this:

The higher the efficient cause, the more perfect its causality. Therefore, if above a given cause there is another infinitely superior in causing, this will be infinitely more perfect in causality, and hence will possess an infinitely perfect causality. But no causality that is caused or dependent in causing is infinitely perfect, because it is imperfect with reference to that on which it depends. Therefore, if the causes ascended ad infinitum, some cause will be uncaused in an absolute sense and independent in the exercise of its causation.

Hence, with this sequence of causes will end, so that this will be an efficient cause that is not itself caused or dependent in causing.

And from it a lesser cause will get all its causality or at least will cause in virtue of it.

7.79 From this our thesis follows. Everything causable mediately 41 Aristotle, Metaph. u, c.2 (994420).

42 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.2, nn.41ff. (11, 149ff.).

18]

GOD AND CREATURES

or immediately by a lesser cause can be caused by a higher cause, at least by means of the proximate cause. Consequently, the first cause is omnipotent in the sense we understand it in this conclusion.

7.80 [Objections to this argument] This argument [in mye lpeit seems, could be challenged on two counts:

First, one could say the order of efficient causes indeed ends with one efficient principle; yet this is not God but some Intelligence which moves the first heaven. All that natural reason deduces is that, beyond such a motor, God "moves" immediately, but only as final cause. The Philosopher, it seems, attributed this manner of moving to God in Bk. XII of the Metaphysics*? where he says God moves as loved and desired.

7.81 Second, one could say there is no proof that the first efficient cause, whatever it may be, has power to cause everything in some way, namely immediately or mediately. Its only power is over those effects related to it through a chain of causes. What needs proof is that there are no other possible effects outside this concatenation.

7.82 Answer to the objections: The fact that there is but one being that exists of itself and does not come from another rules out both of these assumptions. From this it follows that there is but one unique agent, independent in its acting. For what is dependent in its being, is dependent in its acting, if it acts.

Reply to the Initial Arguments 1. Reply to the Argument about Infinite Power [29] 7.83 As for the first of the initial arguments [in 7.3], two aspects must be investigated, first the antecedent and afterwards the implication itself.

[To the Antecedent] As for the antecedent, some say Aristotle thought the First Being did not have infinite power intensively. In other words, his power was not infinite in depth. It was just that what power he has is exercised over an infinite time span.*4

7-84 For the reason he gives entails only that the First Being moves with a movement that is infinite. But this movement is only infinite in duration and for this a power infinite in duration suffices.

7-85 This is challenged on two counts: first, that it misrepresents the mind of Aristotle; second, that the proof given is no good.*®

43 Aristotle, Metaph. xu, c.7 (1072a25-1072b15).

44 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.2, nn.111ff. (1, 180ff.).

45 Cf, ibid., d.2, nn.74if. (iL, 174if:).

QUESTION SEVEN

Consider the first [in 7.83]. From the antecedent "God is of infinite power," Aristotle concluded "Therefore, this power cannot be in magnitude or have magnitude, be this infinite or finite." For there is no such thing as infinite magnitude, he argued, and for any power of finite magnitude, there can be some power which is greater.

What Aristotle understood by infinite power in the antecedent, then, was something that to his mind was not consistent with the opposite of the consequent, viz., to be in magnitude or to have magnitude. To say that he thought the opposite of the consequent was compatible with the antecedent would be to claim he drew an inference which to his mind was invalid. Now a power of infinite duration is compatible with having magnitude, which is the opposite of the consequent. For it is clear the heavens have magnitude, and yet —according to him—they have a power of infinite duration. Indeed, according to his statements in Bk. IX of Metaphysics*® and Bk. I of On the Heavens and Earth,** and in many other places, he claims:

"Everything perpetual is formally necessary and thus if it is active, it has an active power of infinite duration." Hence, in the antecedent, according to his mind, Aristotle did not understand infinite power to be one of duration, but rather some other kind, one that was incompatible with magnitude. But this could only be intensive infinity. I agree, therefore, with this conclusion that Aristotle— whether or not he proved his point sufficiently—was thinking of intensive infinity of power.

7.86 The second point about the proof [in 7.84] remains to be discussed, namely whether it is any good. About this I say: One can infer as much about the perfection of a power from what it is able to do as from what it actually does. Now Aristotle's [proof of the] antecedent, namely, '""God moves with a movement that is infinite," is false according to the theologians. Nevertheless many of them concede that he could have moved with a movement that was infinite. They admit this also as regards the past, even as all concede he can continue future movement ad infinitum. Where they part company with the Philosopher, however, is in his assumption that this power is necessarily actualized. For between two related extremes each of which is immutable in itself, the relationship that holds is absolutely necessary. Such are God and the heavens. They are necessarily related with a necessity of immutability. From this it follows further that the movement caused in the heavens by God

6 Aristotle, Metaph. 1x, c.8 (1050b6-8, 20-22); c.7 (1072b10-15).

'7 Aristotle, De caelo 1, c.12 (283b6).

GOD AND CREATURES

is also necessary, though not with the necessity of immutability but with that of inevitability; therefore, it cannot cease. The theologian not only disagrees with Aristotle's first proposition that a necessary and absolute relation holds between God and the heavens. He also rejects the second proposition [about the necessary motion of the heavens], for the theologian does not assume that God moves the heavens necessarily. He only claims that God could produce movement for an infinite period of time. Now one could conclude that his power is infinite from the fact not only that he does move in this way but that he can move in this way.

[31] 7.87 But does this imply the power is also intensively infinite? I say it does. For no power can move for an infinite time unless it does so of itself or in virtue of another power. Even if we assume the latter, we must eventually end up with some first power which moves of itself. Therefore, Aristotle argues that the power of the first mover is such that it moves of itself and not in virtue of another.

From this it can be inferred that such a power is intensively infinite.

Something that has active power of itself also has entity of itself.

What possesses something of itself possesses it in all the fulness it is possible to have. For nothing possesses a limited amount of anything unless it gets it from some agent which limits it to that specific degree. Suppose one being possessed of itself the plentitude of entity, whereas another of itself had only a limited entity. There would be absolutely no more reason why one rather than the other had the plentitude of being. On the contrary, it would seem to be pure chance that this is so, and there can be no chance in things which exist of themselves. From this, then, it follows that the first mover moves by itself and hence exists of itself. Since the fulness of active power and of entity is not possible without intensive infinity, it follows that the first mover possesses infinite power intensively.

7.88 An objection is raised to assuming in proof of the antecedent [in 7.3], that the first mover moves with infinite motion. According to you, the intended conclusion would follow just as well if the first mover moved with infinite motion but did so of itself.

I grant that the main strength of the argument comes from the fact that it moves of itself. However, the argument based on infinite movement has some evidence in its favor for, according to Aristotle, the first movement is primarily infinite, and that is why it is more appropriate to the first mover. Now it is the primacy of movement that provides the means for inferring the intended conclusion, so that in the assumed proof of the antecedent the proposition

"'it

QUESTION SEVEN

moves with an infinite movement" must be understood of the first infinity, namely, that which is not derived from the infinite movement of another but exclusively from the mover's own power. toad 7-89 [Yo the implication] Let us consider the implication in the first main argument. Although an infinite active power is truly omnipotence, this inference does not follow: "Natural reason can prove

God has infinite power, therefore natural reason can prove God is omnipotent." For it is not known by natural reason that infinite power is the same thing as omnipotence in the sense that the scope of God's power extends immediately to everything that is possible.

7-90 Consider the proof for the implication [in 7.3] that infinite power is omnipotence, namely '""No power can be greater than the infinite; one cannot even think of anything greater. But every power which is not omnipotence could be thought of as surpassed by a power which is omnipotence.' The Philosopher's answer would be this: The power that is supreme is not omnipotence as we understand omnipotence. Nevertheless it is infinite power. Because it is intensively infinite, we cannot even think that it is surpassed in intensity. Even though one could somehow think of it as being exceeded extensively (for it is not omnipotence as we understand it), one could not really think this in the technical sense of "to think' or "to understand," since we cannot do so without contradiction.

For the Philosopher would claim that the very idea of one and the same subject being omnipotent immediately as regards every possible is self-contradictory, since it would do away with the essential order of causes.

7.91 While it is true that the supreme or infinite active power ts omnipotence, it is not known by natural reason that the highest power possible, even if it be intensively infinite, is omnipotence properly so-called, namely, the power of causing immediately everything possible.

2. Reply to the Argument about the Generation of the Son 7.92 [Causal vs. Productive Powers] As for the first negative argument [in 7.4], namely, the one referring to the generation of the [ 33 ] Son, I have this to say: Active power can mean two things: (1) a causative power whose correlative is the possible, i.e., the causable

—and this is the proper sense of the term—or it can be understood in a wider sense as (2) a productive power whose correlative is the possible, i.e., the object producible. Therefore, omnipotence can be understood in two ways: (1) As a causative power of everything causable and (2) as a productive power of everything producible.

GOD AND CREATURES

If it is understood in the second sense, only the Father is omnipotent. He is the fruitful source for producing anything producible.

The Fathers of the Church, however, do not speak of omnipotence in this sense. They speak of it only insofar as it implies causative power in regard to everything causable, i.e., possible.** In this sense, neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit is a "possible," although they are producible, for they are not able to be caused or produced with a distinct nature of their own. If we take omnipotence as the Fathers of the Church understand it, i.e., as a causative power of everything causable common to all three persons, it must be admitted absolutely that omnipotence does not refer to an intrinsic notional act [productive of a divine person]. Therefore, even if it could be demonstrated that God is omnipotent, it could not be demonstrated that he is potent as regards such notional acts.

7.93 [To the authorities cited] It does seem, however, that the texts cited from Augustine [in 7.4] and Richard [in 7.94] conflict

[ 34] with what has just been said. To the citation from Augustine used against us, it can be replied, "If the Father cannot generate the Son, or cannot generate a son equal to himself, he is not omnipotent," is not a formal consequence or implication in the same way that an argument from the destruction of a quantitative part to the destruction of the whole would be a formal consequence.?® But it is [a material consequence] from the destruction of something posterior which follows necessarily, to the destruction of what is prior. If the Father could not generate the Son or an equal son, it would be because this ability is neither a part of his essential perfection nor a personal property of his. The second possibility is excluded because that person [i.e., the Father] exists of himself, and therefore it is not repugnant to what is peculiarly his own to produce something actively. If the first alternative is the case, he would not have the perfect nature which in some person is able to produce everything producible. Therefore, even though the denial of the notional act does not formally entail the denial of omnipotence, by reason of its matter the consequence is valid for this person for whom such a notional act is compatible by reason of what is proper to him as a person.

7-94 Against this it is objected that, according to Richard,*° the 48 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.20, nn.24-34 (Vv, 313-18).

49 For the distinction between material and formal consequences see E. A. Moody, Truth and Consequences in Medieval Logic (Amsterdam,

1953), pp. 70-80.

°° Richard of St. Victor, De Trin. 1, c.25: PL 196, go2; ed. Ribaillier, 106.

QUESTION SEVEN

proper object of omnipotence seems to be God or a divine person.

He says that if there were two omnipotent beings, one would make the other completely impotent. This would not follow unless the object of one's omnipotence was the other omnipotent.

7-95 Uhis can be answered as the argument from Augustine was [in 7.93]. The inference 'He is omnipotent, therefore he is powerful as regards another God or omnipotent" does not hold like the consequence about the whole in quantity. For, if another God were assumed to exist, he would not be the object of omnipotence properly so-called, but would exist of himself necessarily. However, the consequence holds for extrinsic objects. With his will one omnipotent agent could produce all possibles, and everything that could coexist with them. The other omnipotent agent, however, could by his will impede the production of the same set of possible objects. Therefore, the second would render the first totally impotent, not by acting or doing something to him but to the objects of his power.

7.96 If you say the two could always agree with each other about the objects to be willed, I answer: Although this seems to be pure fiction as regards objects to which both wills relate contingently and with an equal degree of independence, it would still follow that one omnipotent could make the other completely impotent, because there cannot be two total causes for one and the same effect. Either the effect would receive existence twice, or else each cause as distinct in itself would not be the complete cause. But this omnipotent, who, according to your assumption, would agree with the other about the objects to be willed, could by his own will be their complete and total cause. Therefore, the other could not be a distinct total cause of the same set of objects. And what holds for two objects, holds for all. Just from the standpoint of the objects, then, the will of one omnipotent agent could reduce the other to impotence in the sense that the second would be unable to actualize anything since the will of the first as a distinct and total cause of the same would prevent the second from doing anything.

7.97 To these answers [7.93f.] to the authorities of Augustine and Richard this objection is raised: The following are all formal consequences: "If the Son is omniscient, he knows of the generation of the Father," "If he wills all things, he wills this generation." Simi- [ 36 J larly, then, ''He is omnipotent, therefore he can generate the Son" is a true and formal consequence and not just one that holds by reason of its matter.*?

7.98 In answer one could say that the distribution in all these 51 Giles of Rome, Sent. 1, d.g0, princ. 1, qq.1-2 in corp. (fol 114-15).

GOD AND CREATURES

terms "omnipotent," ''omniscient," and "willing all" is not over acts but over objects of the same act. That is why one can infer formally that they hold for this object, for that object, and hence for any object whatsoever of such an act. Now the notional act is a simple object of the divine knowledge and will of any divine person; but the notional act is not an object of omnipotence. That is why

"omniscient" and "willing all" formally entail the knowledge and volition of the notional act whereas "omnipotent" does not entail the power of producing that act. The reason for this difference is that the notional act is something that can be known and willed, but it is not simply a possible insofar as "possible" means "'causable." For although the notional act has the characteristic of being good and true, it does not have that of being causable or caused.

3. Reply to the Argument about the Creation of the Angels 7.99 As for the second argument [in 7.5] about the creation of the angels,®? I concede that just as the proposition "God can cause everything causable mediately or immediately" is demonstrable, so [37] too one can demonstrate specifically that God can cause a particular causable, but only when the minor by which the conclusion is to be inferred is evident and demonstrated; not otherwise. As the Philosopher says®?: "It happens that every mule is known to be sterile. But it is not known to hold for this mule, unless the minor 'This is a mule' is known to be true."" Now the minor that allows one to conclude "God can cause an angel" is the proposition "The angel is causable."

7.100 [T'wo Questions: Is it demonstrable that the angel can be caused? What did Aristotle think about this?] Some say this minor

[in 7.96] is merely believed but is not demonstrable. Hence the conclusion is merely believed even though the major be demonstrable.

7-101 Second, it is claimed that, according to the Philosopher, one must deny the minor and hence the conclusion also. For they say it is clear from the Metaphysics®* that the Philosopher held that since every Intelligence is necessary, each exists of itself. What is caused by another, however, is of itself nonbeing and in itself is only possible. On the other hand, the simply necessary is in no sense just a possible. Aristotle consequently did not hold both of these two con52 Thomas, Summa theol. 1, q.46, a.2 in corp. (I, 237-38).

°8 Aristotle, Anal. post. 1, c.1

(67a33-36).

>4 Aristotle, Metaph. xu, c.7_ (1072b10-15).

QUESTION SEVEN

tradictory propositions, viz., "An Intelligence is necessary" (a point he clearly held) and "Nevertheless it is caused by another."

7-102 Some*? also say Aristotle held that an Intelligence is infinite, and from this it follows that it exists of itself, for finite is only what exists by means of another. Proof of the antecedent: In the Metaphysics, Bk. XII, chapter [7],°* Aristotle states again that it was proved that the first mover cannot have magnitude because he has infinite power and no finite being has infinite power. And immediately afterwards, at the beginning of chapter [8],°7 he asks whether it is necessary to postulate one or several substances of this sort and decides that there are several depending on the distinct number of celestial movements. Therefore, his intention, to put the two conclusions together, is to show there are many substances without magnitude because many have infinite power. And farther on in the same chapter he says**: "It is clear then that there must be many substances which are of the same number [as the movements of the stars] and in their nature eternal and in themselves unmovable and without magnitude, for the reason mentioned above," in the previous chapter, namely, that they have infinite power, which cannot exist in finite magnitude; neither can it exist in infinite magnitude since there is no such thing.

7.103 We ought not to attribute to any author a false or absurd opinion, however, unless he states such expressly or unless it follows evidently from what he does say. Now the proposition "An angel is a being which exists of itself" is not only false (as is obvious) but is absurd as well (since its opposite can be demonstrated, as we shall see). Since no text of Aristotle expressly states such a proposition, it seems unreasonable to attribute it to him.

7.104 [Answer to the First Question: It is demonstrable that the angel is causable] In opposition to what has been said, therefore, I make two observations regarding this minor '"The angel is causable.'"' First, it is demonstrable; second, Aristotle admitted it.

Proof of the first: Two intellectual natures that are simply infinite cannot coexist. But an intellectual nature that exists of itself or is uncaused is simply infinite. Therefore, there cannot be several intel55 Henry of Ghent, Quod. vi, q.14 in corp.

(fol. 253); Summa a.25, q.3 in corp. (1, fol. 154H).

56 Aristotle, Metaph. xu, c.7 (1073a4-12).

57 Ibid., c.8 (1073415).

58 Ibid., c.8 (1073a37-b2).

GOD AND CREATURES

lectual natures that are simply uncaused. Now the first intellectual nature is uncaused, otherwise it would not be first. Therefore, every other nature is caused.

7.105 The first proposition of this deduction [i.e., that two infinite intellectual natures are impossible] is proved at length in the question on the unicity of God.*® Here I will touch on only one proof.

[ 39 J Each of these natures would understand the other most perfectly, that is to say, in all its intelligibility and comprehensibility. Similarly, each would love the other insofar as it is capable of being loved. Each would also comprehend and love himself in the same way. Thus each would be beatified in intellect and will not only by himself but by the other as well. And yet it is impossible that one and the same potency should simultaneously comprehend two objects each of which is infinitely adequate, for each would be fully equal to the total strength of that potency. Furthermore, one and the same power or potency cannot have two objects that are first to the same degree. But the essence of one would be the first object of his intellect; the essence of the other consequently could not be its first object, but neither could it be its secondary object. For since it is just as infinitely perfect as the first, it could not be posterior to it in entity. Consequently, it could not be posterior to it in intelligibility either. It is also impossible for one power to comprehend the essence of the other nature as perfectly as its own, particularly if its own nature does not include the other nature eminently, or if the other is not essentially dependent upon it, or if the two natures are not the same sort of thing. Yet all of these situations would be true on the assumption that God and an Intelligence were both infinite.

7-106 The second proposition of this deduction [in 7.104], ie., nature which exists of itself is infinite, appears clear from what was said above [in 7.87] about how the Philosopher proved the prime mover to be infinite because it has its power of itself and hence has the plentitude of power.

7.107 [Answer to the Second Question: According to Aristotle, the angel is causable. Proof from the Metaphysics] Proof of the second point, namely that Aristotle admitted this minor [in 7.104, ie., that the angel is causable].

First proof from his mind in Bk. XII of the Metaphysics.®° He admits all things have an essential order to one another and even more so to one First Being. Now the intensively infinite cannot

59 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.2, nn.157-go (11, 222-49).

6° Aristotle, Metaph. xu, c.10 (1075a18-19).

QUESTION SEVEN

be subordinate to another as its end, for an infinite good does not exist for the sake of some other good. The good of the whole universe, however, is subordinated in two ways, namely, (1) in the way one being is ordered to another and (g) in the way they are all ordered to something best which exists apart. Neither can the infinite be subordinated to some higher source for its active power is infinite. And also, according to him at the end of Bk. XII, "Things refuse to be governed badly, therefore, one ruler let there be."

7.108 It may be objected that Aristotle admitted an order among beings that have no matter because the second cause, although it is not produced by the first, still depends upon the first cause, as happens in the case of species of numbers and figures.*?

7.109 Answer: Nothing depends for its being on anything that is not some kind of cause. The same holds true of its continuing to exist. What is said of number does not contradict this, for a lesser number taken potentially or materially is a part of a greater number. But a part functions as a material cause, as one gathers from Bk. V of the Metaphysics®*: '""Parts are causes of the whole in the sense that they are that out of which the whole is made.' And Aristotle adds in the same place: '""The parts are causes in the sense of being the substrate." If the smaller number be taken actually and formally, however, it is not a part of the larger number nor does the latter depend upon it for its being.

7.110 Furthermore, in the same Bk. XII of the Metaphysics* Aristotle declares that the first mover moves as the object of thought and desire. What can be known and loved, however, moves without being moved. It is in this way that God moves the Intelligence closest to him. Therefore, he is the cause of this Intelligence's intellection and they say this intellection, according to Aristotle, is identical with the substance of the Intelligence.

7.111 It may be objected that "to move" in this case is understood metaphorically and that properly speaking it does not mean

"'to cause something.' Answer: Every intellection not identical with its object is caused by that object, and according to the Commentator,®* it appears this means it is caused efficiently, for he says there:

"The bath insofar as it is in the mind moves as an efficient cause, and insofar as it exists outside the mind it moves as a final cause."

7.112 [Proof from the Physics] 'The same point [in 7.104] can be 61 Ibid. (1076a-5).

62 Tbid., v, c.2 (1013b18-25).

68 Tbid.; cf. Zlzad 11, 204.

64 Tbid., xl, c.7 (1072a27-28).

65 Averroes, Metaph. xu, com. 36 (vu, fol. 318I-K).

19]

GOD AND CREATURES

proved from Aristotle's mind in Bk. VIII of the Physics.** Here he shows that an infinitely powerful mover cannot move immediately.

Now the heavens are moved; therefore they are moved immediately by someone with finite power. Such a proper mover is an Intelligence. Therefore, Aristotle wants to say the Intelligence is finite and hence does not exist of itself. The validity of this implication was established earlier [in 7.86ff.].

7.113 Another argument from the same Bk. VIII is this: There the Philosopher wants to show that a mover of infinite power moves the heavens with an infinite movement. But, as we said [in 7.47], he does not do so immediately; therefore, he does so mediately, i.e., by means of an Intelligence. And the Commentator" affirms it to be the mind of Aristotle that a finite mover moves the heavens immediately and the infinite mover moves it mediately. So far as the heavens go, therefore, there are two ordered movers.

From this I argue that wherever several agents are essentially ordered, what the second receives from the first is either (a) its existence (e.g., the heavens and the sphere of fire) or (b) some influence, if not its existence (e.g., to put a ball in motion a bat must be given movement by the hand), or (c) both produce the same effect immediately, but according to a certain order, namely one is the major, the other the minor agent, but both achieve the same effect

(e.g., the father and mother in the generation of offspring according to the opinion that maintains the mother plays an active role).

In which of these three ways, I ask, are these two agents related to each other in moving the heavens? Certainly not in the third way, for it would follow immediately that the finite and the infinite power would move for an equal time, indeed for the same time period, since both cause the movement immediately as their proper effect.

If it be thé second way, we have what we intend to prove, since nothing receives from an Intelligence anything other than its essence, according to Aristotle. If they are related in the first way, this is clearly our proposal. Obviously then Aristotle conceived these agents to be so ordered that the second came from the first. The first, in such a case, would move mediately and would give being and power to the immediate mover. And because it would give these perpetually, the first agent would be the cause of the perpetuity of the motion whereas the finitude of power which is not distinct from the angel's nature would be the cause of the succession

66 Aristotle, Physic. viii, c.6 (259b32).

67 Averroes, Metaph. xu, com. 41 (vil, fol. 323v-325v).

LS2

QUESTION SEVEN

in the movement, for the mobile could offer some resistance to a finite power, something it could not do to an infinite power.

[42] 7.114 [Confirmation from Averroes and Avicenna] A third proof for our claim [in 7.104] is to be found in what Averroes thought of the matter. Speaking of Aristotle's mind in De substantia orbis,®® he writes: "The heavenly body not only needs the power of locomotion but also a power which gives it being, substance and eternal permanence," etc. Then he adds: "Some have said that he, viz., Aristotle, did not say that the sky had an efficient cause, but only a moving cause, and this was most absurd." Aristotle, then, maintained that the heavens, like the Intelligences, were formally necessary. For he held as a universal principle that every perpetual substance is formally necessary. This is obvious from Bk. IX of the Metaphysics®: "Nothing perpetual is potential," etc. What his mind was on this subject appears obvious enough from Bk. XII of the Metaphysics.*° That God be the cause of the being and substance of the Intelligence, then, is just as consistent with the mind of Aristotle as is the view that he caused the being and substance of the heavens, which Averroes interpreted him to mean.

7.115 Furthermore, it is the express view of Avicenna' that every Intelligence is caused by the First Being. And perhaps he not only did not contradict Aristotle here but explained the manner and order of their production, which Aristotle did not go into. If it be maintained that Aristotle thought that every Intelligence was produced immediately by the First Being, then Avicenna would indeed contradict him as to the order of their production, but not as regards the conclusion we set out to establish, namely, that the Intelligence is produced.

On this they would agree.

As for the way it was caused, we know well enough that Avicenna did not think of it as involving change or novelty. According to him, the complete being of the Intelligence would be always emanating from the First but its essence would be distinct and separate. It would be similar to the way we believe the Son to be always proceeding from the Father except that Father and Son have the same essence. Or, according to Aristotle, it would be like the perpetual light in transparent bodies that never fall into the shade of any body that could cause shadows in the universe. And still the sun would effectively cause this continual

68 Averroes, De substantia orbis c.2 (1x, fol. 61; 7A).

69 Aristotle, Metaph. 1x, c.8 (1050b7-10, 15-30).

70 Ibid., xu, c.7 (1072b10-15).

71 Avicenna, Metaph. 1x, c.4 (104v-105r).

GOD AND CREATURES

light in the luminous bodies, for such light is not said to exist of itself. If it did, it would not be the same kind of light as that in a part of a transparent body which is not always illuminated. For when it is illuminated anew, this is certainly caused by the sun. What is caused, however, is not the same in kind as what exists of itself."

[43] 7.116 As for the proof that Aristotle thought the angel was not caused, because he held it to be formally necessary, I say that Aristotle did not consider "caused" and "formally necessary" to be mutually repugnant, since he says in the Metaphysics": "The principles of perpetual things must be always most true, for they are the cause of truth in other things." Hence he admitted that perpetual things, which are formally necessary, have principles. Again he says in the chapter "On the necessary" in the Metaphysics': "There is nothing to prevent some necessary things from having other causes." This also appears clear from the case of principles and conclusion, namely where the principle is the cause of the conclusion being true.

7.117 As for the argument [in 7.101] that the caused is of itself nonbeing and properly speaking is only possible being, we must reply that this means it is not being of itself or, better, it is not being which exists in and through itself. Thus what is required is that it does not have the mode of being characteristic of the self-existent, not that some kind of nonentity pertain to it. A negation of this first sort, however, is compatible with the necessary whereas negation of entity is not.

7.118 As for the dictum "The caused is of itself only possible" [in 7-101], if "possible" means that subdivision of being that is opposed to "'actual," then this is not necessarily found in everything caused, but only in such cases where the caused is something new. Causation and novelty were not necessarily connected for Aristotle, nor are they for those theologians who claim God could have produced something from eternity. Yet everything caused is a possible in the sense of being an object of a causative power, but this "'possibility,"' although it is incompatible with "necessity of itself," was not repugnant to "formal necessity" according to Aristotle.

7-119 'The opinion attributed to Aristotle [in 7.102] about an Intelligence being infinite, however, must be rejected. The opposite

72 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.8, nn.232-62 (Iv, 282-302).

73 Aristotle, Metaph. u1, c.1

(993b26-g0).

™ Ibid., v, ¢.5 (1015bg-15).

QUESTION SEVEN

is not only true but it is demonstrable in itself and, as we have shown above [in 7.104-116], it represents the mind of Aristotle,

7-120 [Reply to citations to the contrary] Therefore I answer those texts adduced by those who would ascribe this opinion to him.

Reply to the first [in 7.102]:7° The final conclusion [of chapter 7] is not that the first mover is without magnitude because it is of infinite power, but rather another conclusion which he says has been proved earlier, viz., ''It is impassive and unalterable, for all other changes are posterior to change of place."7* Now this substance is not capable of local motion, as can be proved from what he had said before. Then he concludes, therefore, it cannot be moved by any movement that presupposes local motion, and thus it is unalterable.

Next follows his question at the beginning of the subsequent chapter: "Is there one substance of this sort or more than one, etc.?"77

Hence this refers to the unalterable being of which he was just speaking and not to a being of infinite power mentioned earlier. For what continuity would his words have if they did not refer to what he had just been talking about, but to something he has said previous to that?

Or if he was referring to the earlier remark, one could say it must be the conclusion he meant, namely that it has no magnitude. And I concede that there are many things without magnitude just as there are many that are unalterable and impassive.

7.121 To the other text,'* I have this to say. By demonstration of the reasoned fact, a negation can be inferred of some subject using as many media as there are causes why the opposite affirmation is repugnant to that subject. Now if some single thing were the adequate cause of such repugnance, it would be an adequate means of establishing such a negation. Intensive infinity is one cause why it is impossible to have magnitude but it is not an adequate cause. 'To have intellectuality without matter, however, is adequate. For the middle térm to be sufficient, however, it is necessary to have both intellectuality and immateriality conjoined, since intellectuality 75 Cf. ibid., xu, c.7 (1073a2-12), where he says that the first mover cannot have magnitude because he has infinite power. Cf. supra, 7.102.

76 Ibid., xu, c.7 (1073410).

77 Cf. ibid., c.8 (1073415).

78 Cf. ibid., c.8 (1073437), where Aristotle says such substances are "in their nature eternal and in themselves unmovable and without magnitude, for the reason mentioned above." Cf. supra, 7.102.

GOD AND CREATURES

alone does not suffice according to Aristotle (as is clear from the case of man); neither is immateriality alone sufficient (as is clear from the case of the heavens).

7.122 Consequently, my answer to the text in question would be Or this. Absence of magnitude can be inferred from infinite power. It is in fact so inferred in the penultimate conclusion [of chapter seven]"" and also in Bk. VIII of the Physics.8° But it can also be inferred from immateriality together with intellectuality. Something purely intellectual [i.e., without matter] cannot have magnitude. The intellectual form itself cannot be extended, but if something intellectual is also something quantitative, it is because it has matter perfected by an intellectual form. It receives quantity, not because of its intellectuality, but because of its materiality which is perfected by an intellectual form as is the case with man. "A nature with infinite power has no magnitude" is a true proposition, but this proposition is also true: 'An intellectual nature that has no matter has no magnitude." In the passage cited toward the end of the [seventh] chapter,*! it is proved that the first mover has no magnitude because he has infinite power. But this means is not adequate so far as this predicate goes. In the previous chapter,*? near the beginning, it is stated that immovable substances must be without matter because they must be perpetual and if something is perpetual in actuality, it is without matter in actuality. Later on, at the beginning of the [seventh] chapter** it is explained how these moving substances are intellectual natures.

7.123 From these two we have a second means for eliminating magnitude, namely intellectuality without matter. And so far as this predicate is concerned, this middle term is adequate. Therefore, when it is said [in chapter 8]** that there must be many substances without magnitude "for the reason mentioned above," this must be taken to refer to the adequate cause (i.e., intellectuality without matter, which was mentioned at the beginning of both chapters six*® and seven)** and not to the proposition about infinity of power at the end of the [seventh] chapter.*? This interpretation does not do violence, it seems, to the words of the text, for intellectuality with79 Thid., c.7 (1073a2-12).

*o Aristotle, Physic. vil, c.10 (266b7-8).

"1 Aristotle, Metaph. xu, c.7 (1073a2-12).

S2 bide GOs (o7alb 2a).

88 Ibid. (1072b16-25).

*4 Tbid., c.8 (1073430).

85 Ibid., c.6 (1071b21).

6 Tbid., c.7 (1072a20-25).

*7 Ibid., c.7 (1073a2-12).

QUESTION SEVEN

out matter is the proper cause, indeed the adequate cause, as regards this predicate [i.e., 'to be without magnitude'']. "To have infinite power," however, is not its proper or adequate cause, because this predicate pertains to every intelligence whereas the middle term [viz., "to have infinite power''] pertains to God alone, to whom be honor and glory into ages of ages.

↑ Back to top