Question One: In Divine Things, Is It The Essential
Question One
IN DIVINE THINGS, IS IT THE ESSENTIAL
OR THE NOTIONAL THAT IS MORE
IMMEDIATE TO THE DIVINE ESSENCE?
=i) 1.1 The question is raised whether it is the essential or the notional* that is more immediate to the divine essence?!
Arguments Pro and Con Proof that the notional is more immediate: That which constitutes the persons of a nature is more immediate to that nature than its properties are. Now the notional characteristics constitute the persons of the divine nature; they are not constituted by the essentials which are like properties of the nature. Therefore, [the notional is more immediate to the divine nature than are the essentials].
Proof of the major: A nature is immediate as regards its own person, for it is predicated of the person according to the first mode of per se predication,* whereas nature is predicated of the property, and vice versa, only according to the second mode of per se predication.* Therefore, that by which the person is formally constituted is more closely connected with the nature than any of its properties are.
Proof of the minor: The essentials are common to all three persons, consequently a person is not constituted by anything that is essential; therefore, he is constituted by a notional element. Damascene? too claims that the essentials are properties of the nature.
"If you should say 'good,' 'just,' 'wise,' or anything else," he says, "you are not saying what the nature of God is, but something about 1Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio 1, d.8, nn.167-73
(ed. Vaticana Iv, 239-43); 1, d.1, qg.1 (ed. Vives x1, 6-45).
For the references to the prologue and the distinctions of the first book of the Ordinatio and the Lectura we use the critical Vatican edition
(lI.
Duns Scotus, Opera omnia, Civitas Vaticana 1950-); for the rest we use the Vivés edition (I. Duns Scotus, Opera omnia, Parisiis, 1891-95).
2 Damascene, De fide orthodoxa 1, c.4; PG 94, 799; Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus, edited by Eligius M. Buytaert, O.F.M. (The Franciscan
Institute, St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1955), ¢.4, 21.
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the nature." And Augustine says*: "If I say he is eternal, immortal, .
. just, good, blessed and spirit, only the last of these designations [ie., spirit] seems to signify substance but the rest signify qualities of the substance."
1.2 On the contrary: That which is a pure perfection* is more immediate to the essence than that which is not a pure perfection.
The essentials are pure perfections, the notional [features] are not.
Therefore, [the essentials are more immediate].
Proof of the major: That which is a pure perfection is more immediate to the first [or basic] perfection than that which is not. The divine essence is the first [or basic] perfection, and that which is a pure perfection has more in the way of perfection than that which is not a pure perfection.
Proof of the minor: Of the essential in anything, says Anselm,* "better it than not it." But such is what is called a pure perfection.
The notional is not such, for this reason. Every one of the persons lacks some notional element [viz., that which is proper to the other persons]. Therefore a person would lack something which it would be better for anything to be than not to be. And thus each of the persons would not be simply perfect, which is implausible.
Body of the Question [2] 1.3 In answer to the question, I say: In the first place, certain preliminary remarks are necessary if the question is to be understood.
Second, the question itself needs to be solved. Third, doubts raised against the solution have to be answered.
ARTICLE: 1
Preliminary Remarks 1.4 [Clarification of terms] Since the question is concerned with the order of immediacy of the notional and essential with respect to the divine essence, what should first be explained is the meaning of the four terms in the question, viz., "essence," "essential," '"'notional," and "more immediate."
1. The Meaning of 'Essence"'
1.5 As for the first term, in the divine there must needs be some real entity, which is there by the very nature of things and is ac8 Augustine, De Trinitate xv, c.5, n.8: PL 42, 1062; CCSL 50a, 470.
* Anselm, Monologion c.15: PL 158, 162-63; S. Anselmi Opera omnia, vol. 1 (ed. F. S. Schmitt, apud Nelson et filios, Edinburgi, 1946), pp. 28-29.
QUESTION ONE
tually existing. Otherwise, nothing there would be real actually.
Either this real entity is assumed to be absolutely unique or to contain some real® or conceptual distinction. In either case, however, it will always be necessary to assume the existence of some entity which is real, first, unique, and requires no prior entity. For if everything present there would require some prior entity, none would be first and, therefore, none would be posterior.* Also this primary entity must needs be absolute or ad se, for as Augustine says': 'Every essence which is spoken of relatively, is also something apart from the relationship." And he also adds in the same place: "If the Father is not something absolute, then he can by no means be spoken of in relation to something else.'' We are faced then with this conclusion: In the divine it is necessary to assume some real entity, actually existing, which is unique, first, and absolute.
1.6 This real entity in God, since it is the primary reason for his being in an unqualified sense, is justifiably called "essence" by the Fathers. That is why Augustine says*: '""What 'to be wise' is to 'wisdom,' what 'to be able' is to 'power,' 'to be eternal' to 'eternity,' 'to be just' to 'justice,' that 'to be' itself is to 'essence.' "' And later on he adds®: ""The name 'essence' is derived from 'to be.' Hence, God is most truly called "essence" to whom "'to be'' belongs most properly, and truly. The same Augustine is the first to write': "It is clear that it is an improper form of speech when we use the more familiar name 'substance' to express essence—which is what God really is and is properly called, so that perhaps God alone should be called essence. For he is truly unique, because incommunicable, and he revealed this as his name to Moses his servant when he said: 'I am who am.' But whether one uses 'essence,' speaking properly or 'substance, speaking improperly, both are affirmed of what he is in himself and not of what he is in relation to something."
1.7 Of' this essence, or less properly substance, Augustine' says that among all the other entities in the divine, this alone is being in 5 "Real'' seems to refer to the formal distinction a parte ret. Cf. Glossary:
"Formal distinction."
6 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.zg, nn.39-156.
7 Augustine, De Trin. vu, c.1, n.2: PL 42, 934-35; CCSL 50, 247.
8 Ibid., PL 42, 935; CCSL 50, 249.
9 Tbid., c.4, n.g: PL 42, 942; CCSL 50, 260.
10 Ibid., c.5, n.10: PL 42, 942; CCSL 50, 261.
11 Ibid., c.6, n.11: PL 943; CCSL 50, 262. fi
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an unqualified sense. "The substance of the Father is the Father himself, not insofar as he is Father, but insofar as he is." What he wants to say here is that the essence is not the formal reason of his being Father but of his being, period. Damascene™? agrees with this, when he says: ''Of all the names given to God, the main one is that of 'He who is.'"" And he proves it by those words of Exodus**: "He who is has sent me." And he adds: "For like some infinite and limitless sea of substance, he contains all being in himself." Rightly, therefore, every attempt to arrange anything in the divine according to some order, will begin by taking the essence as simply first and absolute.1® 1.8 [Objections] Two objections can be raised against what has just been said about the term "'essence."
First, according to the text cited from Damascene'*:
. like some infinite and limitless sea of substance, he contains all being in himself," the essence includes all divine perfection. But divine perfection as a whole includes anything that is pure perfection. For if any pure perfection were excluded, we would not have divine perfection in toto. Therefore, essence is not just that first entity which is somehow distinct from the essentials, but is one complete entity which unitively contains all the essentials. The very term "sea" seems to imply this, because of the immensity of what the sea contains unitively.
1.9 What Anselm" says confirms this: "God is that greater than which nothing can be conceived.' But one can conceive of something greater than any individual pure perfection that does not include all that is pure perfection, viz., he can conceive of an entity which does contain unitively all such perfection. Therefore, the divine essence is that which includes all that is pure perfection.
1.10 [Second Objection] In every creature essence, insofar as it is distinct from existence, it seems, is prior to the latter, just as the potential and receptive is prior to the act received. Therefore, something similar, it seems, happens in God. But according to aforemen12 Damascene, De fide orthodoxa 1, c.g: PG 94, 835; Buytaert ed., c.g, 4849.
18 Exodus 5, 14.
14 Damascene, loc. cit.
18 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.1, n.148 (1, 98-99); d.2, nn.g88-91 (Il, 34951); d.1g, nn.88-89, 94-95 (V, 113-14, 117-18).
16 Cf. supra, note 12.
17 Anselm, Proslogion c.2: PL 158, 227; ed. Schmitt 1, 101.
QUESTION ONE
tioned citations from Augustine* and Damascene,!® essence is equated with actual existence, as is clear from the quotation from Exodus which both employ: 'He who is.
. ." According to these texts, existence, not essence, is the primary entity, or at least these citations do not show that essence is the first.
1.11 [Answer to the Objections] Look for the answer to the first objection elsewhere.?"
1.12 One can also give another reply to the first objection [in 1.8].
If the argument had any value, it would run counter to what our question assumes, namely that there is some degree of immediacy of the essential to the essence, for our question asks: How much? In favor of this assumption, it is argued that every pure perfection is simply simple.* Proof: If it could somehow be analyzed into two
(call them A and B), then neither A nor B can be a pure perfection, because then neither would form a per se unity with the other, for nothing that is one per se is constituted by distinct elements unless they are related as act and potency.?!
2. The Meaning of "Essential" and '"'Notional"'
1.13 [Twofold distinction of "essential'"] As regards the second term "essential" a twofold distinction seems in order.
[First distinction] Usually philosophers use this term in one sense, theologians in another, especially when dealing with the divine. In philosophy, "essential" is commonly opposed to accidental, where accidental includes both the common accident, or accidens per accidens,* as well as property, that is accidens per se or proprium.* Essential, therefore, signifies in philosophy that which is included per se in the essence. For instance, matter and form are said to be the essentials of a real composite, and in the case of a conceptual composition
[i.e., a definition] or of something defined, genus and difference are called the essential parts.
1.14 On the other hand, the theologians apply the term essential to the divine in a different sense. The essence, being the absolutely first, as has been said [in 1.5], is common with real community to all three persons alike, for it is affirmed singularly of each person as well as of all three together. For this reason, then, anything else 18 Augustine, De Trin. vu, c.5, n.10: PL 42, 942.
19 Damascene, De fide orth. 1, c.g: PG 94, 835.
20 See Appendix, Addition 1.11.
21 He does not answer the second objection. Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.2, nn.gp5ff. (1, 137ff.).
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predicated similarly in the divine is called essential, because it is similar to the essence in the mode of predication or in community.
On the contrary, what is neither predicated in this fashion nor has such community but pertains to what is known of the distinction of persons is called "notional." In this way the theologian contrasts the essential to the notional.
1.15 On this point Augustine writes,?? "In created and changeable things, whatever is not a substantial predicate is an accidental predicate.... But in God nothing is predicated accidentally, and yet not everything said of him refers to his substance, for some relational terms are predicated of him like 'Father' which has reference to a son, or 'Son' which has reference to a father." To Augustine's mind, then, in creatures "'essential" is opposed to "accidental," whereas in the divine it is not opposed to "accidental" but to what is relative internally or ad intra (i.e., what expresses the relation of one person to another and hence pertains to the notion of one person as distinct from another). For this reason, it is commonly called "notional," in accord with the rule in the text cited above?* about what is said of God substantially as opposed to what is said relatively. Augustine, however, did not use the term "notional" but "relative" or ad aliquid.
1.16 From what has been said [in 1.14-15], the meaning of the third term, "notional," is clear. For everything notional is something relative internally and vice versa. The essential, however, is not relative internally, otherwise it would be both common
[if relative externally] and not common [because proper to a person].
1.17 [Second distinction] A second distinction that can be made in regard to the term "essential" as applied in particular to the divine is this. On the one hand, there is something essential that implies a relation to what is external, and on the other hand, something essential that does not. Let me begin by explaining the first before going on to prove the second, which some perhaps may be inclined to deny.
1.18 [Explanation of the first member] That the first [viz., there is something essential that implies an extrinsic relation] is certain; if one speaks of God in relation to something external, there has to be some proper basis why the relation pertains to him. God is only compared to something outside by reason of something intrinsic to himself, and this can be called the basis for the relation. But by 2 Augustine, De Trin. v, c.5, n.6: PL 42, 913-14; CCSL 50, 210.
23 Tbid., PL 42, 913; CCSL 50, 208-209.
QUESTION ONE
combining this intrinsic foundation (which is something real) and the external relation (which is conceptual), you do not come up with a concept that is per se or essentially one. If you have a name, then, which implies both this relation to the external and at the same time the intrinsic basis for it, then that name either does not signify a concept that is per se or essentially one or else it does not signify both components, but only signifies one and connotes the other. As applied to the divine, essential, to the extent that it involves a concept that is essentially one, therefore, does not include necessarily and simultaneously both the absolute and the external relation.
Hence, if it includes the external relation at all, it does not include it necessarily. What it does include primarily and principally and necessarily is the absolute which is its basis whereas the relation is included by connotation. In this fashion the first member of the distinction should be understood.
[8] 1.19 [Proof of the second member] As for the second member of this distinction you may be inclined to say there is nothing essential which does not include some relation to what is external, since to be without such is the prerogative of the essence alone whereas whatever else is common to the three persons represents an external relation or includes such.?* Now the solution of our question is dependent on the aforesaid distinction between essential as something absolute within and essential as something which relates to what lies outside. Since some might think this distinction ought to be denied, proof is provided for this second member, viz., for the presence of something essential which does not include any relation to what is external. The first is an argument from authority as to what constitutes a pure perfection. The second stems from what is meant by the divine essence; a third, from the notion of the divine intellect; a fourth, from what is meant by its act or the divine intellection.
1.20 [First proof]?® The first reason is this. No pure perfection as such includes a reference or relation to a creature. But in the divine something essential is a pure perfection. Therefore, [it does not include as such any reference to the external].
1.21 [Proof of the major] Pure perfection does not include as 24 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet v, q.1
(Parisiis, 1518, photoreprint Louvain:
Bibliothéque
S.J. 1961),
fol. 150B-C; Summa quaestionum ordinariarum a.66, q.5 in corp.
(Parisiis, 1520, photoreprint St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1953), 1, fol. 215B.
25 This first reason is missing in Mz.
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such anything repugnant to the very notion of such a perfection.
Otherwise it would be better in anything, since it is a pure perfection, and it would not be better in anything, since it would include something to which the very notion of pure perfection is opposed."°
Relation to a creature cannot be a pure perfection, because it involves a term that is imperfect and potential. What necessarily requires something potential in the way that a relation requires a term
(i.e., as something simultaneous or naturally prior) is neither simply necessary nor, as a result, simply perfect.
1.22 The minor is evident from the mind of Anselm?' where he introduces this distinction: "Except for the relative, whatever there is either is such that to be it is better absolutely than not to be it or it is such that not to be it is better for some subject than to be it."
Having explained and clarified this distinction, he concludes: "Just as it is impious to suppose that anything that is not the substance of the supreme nature is in any way better than it, so it must needs be whatever, absolutely speaking, it is better to be than not to be."
He goes on to infer in particular what it is not. "It is not a body then," he says, "nor any of those things which bodily senses perceive." And after this he explains in particular the kind of thing it is. As he puts it: "It must be living, wise, omnipotent, true, just, eternal, and anything, absolutely speaking, that it is better to be than not to be." Obviously many of these things are essentials for the divine. We have this minor premise then, that something essential to the divine is a pure perfection because in anything it is better than what is not it.
1.23 Anselm's view, it seems, can be found in Augustine': "We recognize that living are to be preferred to non-living things, intelligent to non-intelligent things, just to unjust things, blessed to wretched things. And, therefore, since we doubtless prefer the creator to created things, we must confess that he lives in the supreme sense of the word, that he understands all things, that he is just, most benign, and most blessed." This inference holds, however, in virtue of the following proposition: "The creator must of necessity be everything that it is preferable for anything to be rather than not to be," or as Anselm says: "Better it than not it!"
26 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.2, nn.382-84 (1, 346-47); d.8, nn.22-23, 16768 (iv, 162-63, 239-41).
*7 Anselm, Monolog. c.15: PL 158, 162-63; ed. Schmitt 1, 28-29.
28 Augustine, De Trin. xv, c.4, n.6: PL 42, 1061; CCSL 50a, 457-68.
QUESTION ONE
[9]*® 1.24 The authority of Hilary?' can also be adduced in favor of this view. Speaking of the Father he says: "There is the complete generation of the perfect God who is your Word,* Wisdom, and Power, so that he is always inseparable from you whose birth from you is revealed through these names of your eternal attributes."
Now the Son of God [or Word] did not receive anything by birth which implies a relation that is extrinsic or ad extra.
1.25 Second, we could construct another argument with the same middle term [i.e., pure perfection] but making the major term ''conceptual relation." The major premise would then be ''Pure perfection does not include per se a conceptual relation." The minor would be the same as before [viz., something essential in the divine is a pure perfection]. The conclusion would be that there is something essential in the divine that does not include per se a conceptual relation. Now every extrinsic relationship of God to creatures is only conceptual, as is clear from what I have said in the second ordinary question.*! Therefore, something essential does not include an extrinsic relation.
This major [i.e., pure perfection does not include a conceptual relation] I prove as I did the first major based on the extrinsic relation. Pure perfection is incompatible with a conceptual relation, for such a relation, which has being only in the intellect, is "diminutive being.''* It possesses less entity than any real being.
1.26 Third, by the same middle term [of pure perfection], we can formulate another argument using as major term "relation" in general. Pure perfection is not a relation at all nor does it include per sé any extrinsic relation. [The minor premise would be as before.]
Proof of the major: The relationship of origin is not a pure perfection, as will be shown in Question Five. Now if any relation were a pure perfection, the relationship of origin would be such.
29 Lychetus says that from 1.24 to 1.31 is not from Scotus; however, it is found in M, and W.
30 Hilary, De Trinitate xu, n.52: PL 10, 467.
31 While there is some evidence that Scotus' "ordinary questions'' were eventually incorporated in the Ordinatio, as we noted in the Introduction, this does not seem to be the case here, at least if the reference in 1.25 to the "second" ordinary question is correct, for the corresponding passage here seems to be Ord. 1, d.go, vi, 169-202, whereas this contains nothing relevant to the problem discussed in 3.16 which seems to refer to matter treated in Ord. 1, d.g (Ul, 245-377).
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1.27 [Objections] These reasons which use the same middle term can be refuted as follows. It is one thing to say something is a pure perfection and quite another to say that something pertains to pure perfection. The first implies that the thing in question is essentially or quidditatively a pure perfection; the second does not imply that it is essentially perfection but only that it pertains denominatively to pure perfection.
Something pertains to pure perfection (1) if it requires such perfection in the subject of which it is predicated denominatively, or (2) if it reveals that such perfection does exist in such a subject, or (3) if it is a universal consequence of such perfection. Thus something pertains to pure perfection in three ways: as a prior condition for it, or as revealing its presence, or as a consequence of it.
1.28 A similar explanation can be given to the dictum of Anselm [in 1.22]: "Better it than not it." This is true if we understand this of denominative predication insofar as it prerequires, reveals, or follows from such perfection. "In anything it is better to be such than not to be such," to the extent that to be such, denominatively presupposes there is being that is simply perfect, not in the way that "being white" presupposes "being colored," but in the sense that "being colored" presupposes '"'being extended." Hence it follows that if in something "being extended" is not better, then "being white" will not be better either.
1.29 The text of Augustine [in 1.23] concerning what is preferable should be explained in a similar way. As for what Anselm had in mind, you should read what he says in chapter seventeen [of the Monologion]*? about this divine substance being whatever it is essentially in one way and by virtue of one consideration, and that all these names given to it signify the same thing, namely, the names he used before like '"'good," "just," and so on.
1.30 Likewise, the argument [in 1.20] is objected to, because it infers that everything essential is something absolute, because everything essential is a pure perfection. But this entailment is invalid as is evident from the examples given by Anselm and Augustine, for Augustine speaks of him being "most powerful" and "most just" while Anselm calls him "omnipotent," "just," and so on. These terms however imply an external relation.
[10] 1.31 [Second proof of 1.19]? A second proof [that there is some82 Anselm, Monolog. c.17: PL 158, 166; ed. Schmitt 1, p.31.
83 The MSS. formulate this second proof differently, but the meaning is essentially the same as that of the Wadding-Vivés edition which we follow here.
QUESTION ONE
thing essential which does not include a relation to what is external] is the following: In God the essence is fully actualized and it is so by the very nature of things, that is to say, it is not just through the consideration of some intellect that the essence and anything necessarily included in it or in its actuality is present there. Understood in this way, the proposition is sufficiently evident from what was said at the beginning of this article [in 1.5-7] when explaining the meaning of the term "'essence."'
1.32 From this proposition follows the major premise of the proof, viz., if something is essentially the same as the essence, it exists in God as something actualized and extramental. This holds whether the essential sameness is one of adequate identity (as is the case in creatures when what the definition means is identical with what is meant by the defined) or whether it is the identity that comes from being one of its essential components (in the sense that what one part of the definition means is said to be identical with what is meant by the defined).** For it seems to be a contradiction that something should be actualized in reality, and yet that something essentially the same as it in either of these two ways should not also be actualized in reality. Intellectuality or the intellective life, however, is essentially identified with the divine essence. The meaning is this. Not only is it really the same as the essence and that by simple identity, as perhaps every attribute is considered to be the same thing as the essence itself, but if the divine essence were to be defined, intellectuality or the intellective life would be included in the definition in a way that "wise" and "'good" are not.
1.33 The major premise is evident. For according to what was Die said at the outset of this article [in 1.5], essence is present in God by the very nature of things. Consequently everything included in that essence is also there by the very nature of the thing.
1.34 The minor is understood in this way. Intellectuality represents in truth a perfection that is absolutely intrinsic to the essence and not just some attribute that is ascribed to the essence only secondarily as it were. Just as life is not something only attributed or 84M, (fol. 61rb) has the following addition in the margin with the indication it is to be inserted here:
For even though something could exist in the thing extramentally whereas a definition or part thereof would not actually be in the thing but only in the considering intellect, nevertheless what is understood through the definition or part thereof, as the signified through the sign itself, must actually be in the thing just as what is understood through the term defined must actually be in the thing.
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ascribed to God but is rather an absolutely essential feature, actually identified with and intrinsic to the essence, so too that perfect intellectual life which pertains to God alone is essentially the same thing as the first essence itself.
1.35 This minor, so understood, is established by both authority and reason. The authority is Augustine,?* who says: "The life ascribed to God is his essence, his nature itself. This life, however, is not like that of a tree, or of a beast which has senses but no intellect. But the life which God is perceives and understands all things and it perceives them mentally, not corporally, because God is spirit." What he wants to say, then, is that the life which is the divine essence is necessarily intellectual. Augustine®* also says, speaking of God, "Where the first and highest life is concerned, to live is not something other than to be, but to be and to live are one and the same thing." And explaining what kind of life it is, because it is intellectual, he adds: "[He is] the first and supreme intellect, where to live is not one thing and to understand another."
1.36 The minor premise is also proved by reason. What can be essentially one and the same as the substance does not belong to it most truly unless it belongs to it essentially. But intellectuality can be essentially identical with the being to which it belongs. This is clear from the case of creatures, for intellectuality is part of the essential definition of every intellectual substance. This is particularly obvious in the case of man in whose definition 'rational' is included. Consequently, this intellectuality (which is what "rational" means) is essentially identical with man. What is more, rationality is what is most distinctive and adds the final touch to his essence.
Therefore, since God is most truly intellectual, his intellectuality will be essentially identical with his essence.
[12] 1.37 [Third proof of 1.19] The third reason is based upon the divine intellect. No intellect possesses that being which is primary, proper, and distinctive of it by virtue of some act of thought appropriate to it or to a person. This is obvious. For every act of understanding naturally requires as a prior or concomitant condition that the intellect to which it belongs possesses that distinctive being proper to it as an intellect so that neither this, nor any thing essentially included therein, is something it has in virtue of being understood. For every act [of understanding] is posterior to what it presupposes. It is not precisely through the act of divine intellection,
$5 Augustine, De Trin. xv, c.5, n.7: PL 42, 1061; CCSL 50a, 468.
86 Ibid., vi, c.10, n.11: PL 42, 931; CCSL so, 241.
QUESTION ONE
then, that God's intellect possesses that primary, distinctive being it has as intellect. The same holds true of anything necessarily included therein. On the other hand, however, the reference of the divine essence to anything extrinsic to itself is something that owes what primary and actual being it has to the divine understanding.
Therefore, the intellect in God, insofar as it is actually intellect, includes no reference to something extrinsic to itself.
1.38 Proof of the minor: Since the reference of anything intrinsic to something extrinsic to God represents a conceptual relation, it gets its proper and primary being from the act of the intellect making the reference. But anything intrinsic to God that can be related to something extrinsic by any act of a created intellect can also be related to it by an act of the divine intellect. For the divine intellect is able to understand an object to the degree to which it is intelligible, since it is fully equal to grasping and comprehending it.
Whatever the divine mind can refer to anything intellectually, however, it actually does refer to it intellectually, for no potency in God remains unactualized where anything intrinsic to him is concerned.
Consequently, anything intrinsic that can be intellectually related to anything else is actually related to it by an act of the divine intellect. Hence the reference of any such thing to any other such gets the actual being proper to itself from the act of the divine intellect making the reference. I do not claim this is true of every reference of the one term with the other, but only of some, since this situation does not hold formally of references made by a created intellect.
1.39 What is additionally evident from this is the second part of the minor, viz., that the relating of something intrinsic to something extrinsic owes what primary and proper actual being it has to this divine understanding, since the latter is the first understanding had of this object. First here represents not only an essential primacy or one of perfection, but also a primacy of duration, since it is eternal. For were it either simultaneous with, or posterior to, the created understanding in perfection, it would be limited and measured. Were it either simultaneous with, or posterior to, any created understanding in duration, it would follow that in God understanding as understanding would be something new.*"
13] 1.40 [Fourth proof of 1.19] The fourth argument is derived from the operation or act of understanding itself and it runs this way.
The act whereby God grasps his essence as a beatific object is pres87 See Appendix, Addition 1.39.
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ent in God extramentally as just that sort of act. But it is by understanding precisely as understanding that he grasps his essence as a beatific object. Therefore, [it exists there extramentally].
1.41 Proof of the major: Intensive infinity* is a characteristic of a real being and not of a being of the mind. My reason is this. Every being of the mind represents a conceptual relation. Now infinity never characterizes any relation, even one that is real, as will become clear later [in 5.16] in Question Five. Since what is simply infinite in perfection, then, does not include necessarily something to which infinity is intrinsically repugnant, it follows that what is simply infinite is not a thing of the mind. Neither does it include essentially a being of this sort.
1.42 [A combination of these proofs] Taking those propositions we have explained and proved [in 1.20, 1.31, 1.37, and 1.40] as the major and minor of a syllogism, the following arguments can be constructed. What is essentially the same as the divine essence is something extramentally actualized in God. But intellectuality or the intellectual life is that sort of thing. Therefore, it exists in God extramentally.
[14] 1.43 From this it follows further: Whatever is intellectual or lives an intellectual life has or can have in actuality intellect as intellect and understanding as understanding. But that God is intellectual or is living an intellectual life in actuality is an extramental fact
(the conclusion established by the first syllogism). Consequently, God has or can have in actuality intellect as intellect and understanding as understanding.
But he cannot have in actuality anything that is real or is there extramentally which he does not already have extramentally, for this would militate against his simplicity. Therefore, God has in actuality intellect as intellect and understanding as understanding, and this as an extramental fact.
But no relation of God to anything extrinsic nor anything which necessarily includes such a relation is actualized in God extramentally, because his relation to anything extrinsic is merely conceptual.
Therefore, something essential, such as understanding, is such an absolute that it neither is an extrinsic relation nor includes such necessarily.
1.44 The major of the second syllogism [in 1.43] is proved in this fashion. A nature that is truly living in reality either has or can have a vital operation that is a real being, which means it is neither a thing of the mind nor does it necessarily include such. For an opera-
QUESTION ONE
tion of this sort is the proper perfection of an intellectual nature; that is why the ultimate happiness of such a nature is supposed to consist in this operation. But the proper perfection (especially if beatific) of a nature which is living in reality cannot be a thing of the mind nor can it necessarily include such. For so attenuated is this being of the mind that it cannot constitute the essential perfection of a real being. But thinking as thinking is the operation proper to a nature alive with intellectual life.
1.45 To one insolent enough to deny such life to God, it could be pointed out that the Philosopher** concedes it to be the case here.
Where he treats the question of the divine intellect and its thinking, he speaks in this fashion: "If it (that is to say, the 'divine mind') thinks of nothing, what is there here of dignity? It is just like one who sleeps," he says. "And if it thinks, but this depends on something else (since that which is its substance is not its act of thinking, but a potency) it cannot be the best substance, for it is through thinking that value belongs to it.' Hence he says?*: 'Perfect happiness appears to be a contemplative activity. The following consideration will also make this clear. For we assume the gods above all to be blessed and happy. But what sort of actions ought we to attribute to them?" After ruling out any actions stemming from moral] virtues, he adds: "'Still, everyone supposes them to be living and active, for they ought not to be asleep." And a little later he concludes: "Therefore the activity of God, which surpasses all others in blessedness, must be contemplative. And of human activities, then, the happiest must be what is most akin to this."
3. The Meaning of "More Immediate"
1.46 A dual distinction needs to be made in regard to the fourth term [of 1.4], "more immediate." Either it refers to a mean between the first and last, and then it is more immediate posztively; or it implies that between the first and itself there are no intermediaries or 5] else they are fewer than between the first and the third, in which case it is more immediate negatively. For instance, surface is more immediate to the substance than is color, so that it represents a positive mean between them. "Able to laugh," on the other hand, is more immediate to man in a negative sense, for it does not function as a positive intermediary between extremes. Rather it excludes any intermediary between itself and man and that even more so 38 Aristotle, Metaphysica xu, c.g (1074b18-22).
39 Aristotle, Ethica ad Nicomachum x, c.8 (1178b8-11).
GOD AND CREATURES
than between man and color. In brief, one could say the positively more immediate is that which is included as a mean between two extremes and the negatively more immediate is rather that which excludes something as a means.
1.47 Since "more immediate" and "less immediate"
(or "more mediate") implies an order, and there is no order without some distinction, one could also distinguish between what is more immediate in reality and what is so according to mind. But since we are not asking how essential and notional are distinguished or how both differ from the essence, we are not concerned at present with this distinction of immediacy. Still, howsoever essential be distinguished from notional and both from essence, so may one of them, namely essential or notional, be said to be more immediate to the essence.
1.48 [Summary of the First Article] To sum up what has been said in the first article, it is the essence to which the elements whose order is under investigation are being compared. Essential and notional are the elements whose order to essence is under comparison. The question at issue is that of their immediacy to the essence.
Of prime importance for solving the question are the two distinctions of "essential" and "more immediate' presented in this article.
The first of these is the distinction [in 1.17] of essential into that whose whole actuality or ground is internal [ad intra] and that which has reference to some thing external [ad extra]. The second distinction [in 1.46] is between (a) what is more immediate positively in the sense that it is itself a mean and (b) what is more immediate privatively in the sense that it requires no intermediary between itself and the first as between two extremes.
ARTICLE II
Solution of the Question 1.49 [Three conclusions] In this second article there are three conclusions: two are brief, the third is the principal one.
1.50 [First conclusion] The first is this. Taking immediacy in the first sense, nothing notional is more immediate to the divine essence than anything essential.
Proof: What is more immediate to the first is not exceeded by the third, for it is an intermediary between the former and the latter.
But anything notional is exceeded by something essential for the essential is common to all three persons whereas the notional is not.
Therefore, {nothing notional is more immediate than something essential].
QUESTION ONE
1.51 [Second conclusion] The second conclusion is this. Taking immediacy in the second sense, something notional is more immediate to the essence than anything essential which includes a relation to something extrinsic.
Proof: An essential of this sort pertains to God only through the operation of the intellect comparing him to something external. The notional, on the contrary, pertains to the essence by the very nature of things, independently of any extrinsic comparison. A medium is required even less between the essence and the notional than between the essence and an essential requiring the intervention of an act of the intellect.
1.52 [Third conclusion] Our third conclusion is this. Something essential is more immediate to the essence (in either sense of immediacy) than anything notional.
This is proved in two ways.
[First Proof] The same order that would hold for entities were they really distinct would hold for them were they distinct in some other way, except that their intrinsic order in the first case would be real, whereas in the second it would correspond to the type of distinction that obtains between them. For instance, the order would be one of reason, if they were distinguished by reason. were it a reason'on the part of the thing or one that resulted from an act of the intellect. Now if there were a real distinction between the essence, the perfect memory* and the perfect speaking*
[of the Word], then it would be in virtue of a real order that memory is intrinsically closer to essence than is the utterance [of the Word].
Therefore, the same sequence obtains except that the order of immediacy corresponds to the type of disiinction between them.
[17] 1.53 Ihe major is proved a posteriori in this way. Where there is a distinction of reason (taking "'reason"' in either of its two senses), we deduce the order of the entities so distinguished from the order they would have were they really distinct. Second, the major is proved a priori. By their intrinsic order, I understand that which stems from the per se or intrinsic meaning of the terms. And by this I understand the essential or quidditative meaning intrinsic to them, without determining whether the referents exist in reality or in the mind. For whatever exists in either of these two ways would seem to possess an intelligible essential meaning that is independent of which way it exists. From this the major is evident, for where the intrinsic reason for the order is similar, the order itself will be similar. But in things having distinct being in reality or in the mind (call
GOD AND CREATURES
them A and B), there does remain a similar intrinsic reason for their order, namely their respective essential meanings. For it is not its being in the intellect that gives A its essential or quidditative meaning. Therefore, [a similar order obtains between them].
1.54 The minor is evident. For were the essence, the memory, and the speaking of the Word really distinct, this sequence would represent a real order. Since the essence would be a perfect intellectual nature, it would possess a perfect intellect. Furthermore, it would or could have actually present an intelligible object proportionate to itself. What is more, it could or would be a perfect memory, for what ''perfect memory" means is "an intellect having actually present an intelligible object proportionate to itself." From this it follows further that if the memory were, or could be, a principle of expression for the person perfectly possessing it, it would or could express the declarative knowledge* which corresponds to that memory. Now the first notional element (at least that which includes the first positive relation to a person) is that of speaking
[the Word]. Therefore, something essential, in both senses, is more immediate to the essence than is the first notional element, and hence is more immediate than any notional element whatsoever.
The same argument that holds for "memory" and "speaking" can be applied to "will," the "object" present to it, and the act of "spirating"'* [the Holy Spirit].
1.55 [Second Proof] A second proof of the same is this. The potency or ability to produce is more immediate to the essence than is the actual productive action. Everything notional, however, is either a productive action of some divine potency or it presupposes such, for it is either the production of a person or presupposes such a production. And action of this sort, however, proceeds from a potency that is essential, for it is an action either of the intellect or of the will. Therefore, [something essential is more immediate to the essence than anything notional].
1.56 [Summary of the Second Article] Regarding this article, then, it is clear that the notional is more immediate to the essence than an essential attribute that refers to something extrinsic in the second sense of immediacy. Nothing notional, however, is more immediate in both ways than anything essential. On the other hand something essential intrinsically (ad intra) is more immediate in both ways than anything notional, for the intellect at least is more immediate than "speaking" which is the first of the notionals, and Ya
QUESTION ONE
hence it is more immediate than anything notional. The will too is more immediate than "breathing" [the Holy Spirit] or than anything, consequently, pertaining to the procession of the Holy Spirit.
ARTICLE III
Reply to various Objections 1.57 In this third article, objections are raised against the two reasons given [in 1.52-55] of the second article for the third conclusion.*° [To the First] The argument against the first reason [in 1.52ff.] is put in this way. Where the basis for the order does not remain the same, there is no need to assume the order is the same or similar.
But in the divine, where the distinction of essence, memory, and speaking is merely mental, there is not the same basis for the order as there would be were they really distinct. Therefore, [there is no need to assume the order is the same or similar].
1.58 Proof of the minor: In a rational creature, memory precedes speaking, because it is the principle of speaking. But this is not true of God if we are speaking of memory as such, or as distinct from the essence. Furthermore, the principle of the emanation of a person is just the divine essence as an essence to which a real relation is united.
1.59 This is proved in two ways. First, the Word is expressive of everything involved as it were in the divine essence. Therefore, in the divine Word, God understands everything he understands distinctly.
In the divine intellect, then, between essence and memory, no actual distinction can be admitted that would somehow precede the production of the Word. The first [premise] is proved from Augustine*! who says that "the Word is the Father's art, replete with all living reasons.''*
1.60 Second, a conceptual distinction can only exist by an act of thought. But in God the first act of thought, which presupposes the presence of the personal property, is the source of the emanation of the Word, since the Word is produced naturally, i.e., by a nat40 Henry of Ghent, Summa a.54, q.g in corp.
(U1, fol. 104B-D); q.10, ad 2 (fol. 105K-L); a.58, q.1 in corp. (fol. 123G-125V); q.2, ad 3 (fol. 128Y132R); q.5, ad 1 (fol. 136R); a.59, q.2, ad 1 (fol. 137H); a.60, q.4, ad 1 (fol. 167M-O). Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.6 (Iv, 87-105); d.12 (Vv, 25-64); U1, d.i, q.1 (ed. Vives x1, 6-45); 1, d.32 (VI, 223-41).
41 Augustine, De Trin. V1, c.10, n.11: PL 42, 931; CCSL 50, 241.
GOD AND CREATURES
ural* [or nonfree] act of the intellect. Therefore, no distinction is possible within or without by reason of any act which would precede, as it were, the production of the Word.
1.61 If you ask them how are intellect and will distinct in God if their distinction is not presupposed by the production of the persons, they answer: Assuming such productions, viz., the speaking and spiration, by the essence as the sole formal principle of both, the intellect can compare them to something similar in the creatures. The production of the [mental words* by the] intellect in creatures is similar to one of the [divine] productions, viz., to speaking [the Word], because it does not presuppose any other production. The production of the will is similar to the other [i.e., to breathing the Holy Spirit], once the "speaking" is presupposed.
Thus by comparing them to something extrinsic, the intellect conceives one of these productions as a kind of production of the intellect, the other as a kind of production of the will, because of their resemblance to acts of the created intellect and will. For this reason the intellect conceives the [single] principle of these productions under two aspects, that of intellect and of will.
1.62 [To the Second] What was just said also militates against the second reason.
For it is the essence itself and not memory as memory, or as intellect, that is the principle of the "speaking." For it is correctly conceded that the essence is prior to the notional. But from this it does not follow that something essential, which is somehow distinct from the essence, is more immediately related to that essence than anything notional is.
[19] 1.63 [Reply to the Objections in 1.57-62] There are many ways of refuting this first objection. It does not seem that two different kinds of productions, particularly where one presupposes the other, can be reasonably assumed to stem from one and the same formal principle. Also, if there is but one formal principle of this kind, and its productions are [not voluntary but] necessary, there seems no reason why they should be limited to any definite number. But I postpone going into this until the following question. Here, I merely reconfirm my first reason [in 1.52ff., against which this first objection is directed].
1.64 The claim was made [in 1.57] against the first reason for the major, that where the grounds are not the same, the same order does not prevail. I grant this to be true where it is a case of the first and necessary cause or reason for the order. Admittedly this holds good of the first and necessary reason for the order of anything. Ac-
QUESTION ONE
cordingly, and arguing to the contrary, I assume this major: Where the first, necessary grounds for the order remain the same, the same necessary order prevails. But the first necessary grounds for the order in question (namely, of "memory" and its "'speaking'') stem from what they necessarily mean, viz., that memory is memory and speaking is speaking. Howsoever they be conceived, be it as having really distinct or only conceptually distinct existence, it appears at once from their very meaning that memory is more immediately related to essence than is speaking. Therefore, whether they have real or conceptual being, so long as these necessary reasons present themselves to the mind, the necessary basis for the order will always remain the same or similar.
1.65 Another point: in the minor [at 1.58] the claim is made that the meaning of "memory" and "speaking" does not remain the same for the divine as for creatures, since there is nothing in the divine corresponding to (1) a source or principle and (2) what proceeds therefrom. Let us grant that the essence is the basis for the order.
That is to say, let it be the formal grounds of the acting or action principle. For my purposes this suffices, since, as Augustine*? says
"just as our 'word' is born of our knowledge, so was that Word born of the Father's knowledge." What he wants to say is that to be born of knowledge that exists in the memory is what it means to be the Word. Throughout the text the Word is said to be born of the memory. Now the Son, whose "being produced"' consists in his ''being spoken," is the Word, according to him. In question 63 of his treatise Eighty-Three Questions,*? Augustine considers the expression "in the beginning was the Word" to be an excellent translation of the name "Second Person.' Memory then is the productive principle for the second person. Consequently the basis for an order between "memory" and "speaking" remains.
1.66 Of this I add a confirmation. If the second person proceeded not from the memory as memory but from the memory as essence, what greater need is there for ascribing the production to an act of memory rather than to an act of the will? Essence as essence is not more memory than will. What its production is in reality then is not more a "speaking" than a "breathing" or spiration, nor is what is realized through such a production more a Son or Word than a Holy Spirit, all of which is clearly contrary to the mind of Augustine.
42 Ibid., xv, c.14, n.24: PL 42, 1077; CCSL 50a, 497.
43 Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus 83, q.63: PL 40, 54.
GOD AND CREATURES
1.67 [Reply to the proofs for the minor in 1.59f.] We turn now to the reasons given for saying that the formal principle for the production of the Son is the essence under the aspect of essence, to which however a real relation is conjoined.
[20] [To the first in 1.59] Whatever God understands by a distinct intellection, it is claimed, he understands in the Word, once the latter has been produced. Now it is true the Word is produced from all eternity, but we are not inquiring here about the order of duration but about the order of origin. And if the meaning of the statement above is that the Father, as prior in origin to the Word, does not understand things distinctly in themselves, then it is false. It runs counter both to reason and to Augustine,*# who declares that each person on his own remembers, understands, and loves, and thus he infers that "if it were by the Son alone that the Father understood, he would not be wise of himself, but only through the Son."
1.68 This allows us to formulate our first counter-argument [to 1.59]. Whatever perfection the Father can have, he has as prior in origin to the Son, for he possesses it in himself. For he can possess no perfection except in virtue of himself. If the Father then can comprehend actually and distinctly everything that can be understood, he must know it as prior in origin to the Son. Consequently his distinct knowledge of anything understandable is not, precisely speaking, derived from the Son.
1.69 Augustine also makes this clear*®: '""Though he knows this also in the Son, God the Father knows everything in himself. He knows this in himself as he knows himself." From this a second counter-argument [to 1.59] can be formed. The Father, insofar as he is prior in origin to the Son, knows himself not only through his memory (or im actu primo)* but also through his understanding (or in actu secundo).* Proof: the order of origin of Father to Son holds alike for their having perfect understanding and their possessing perfect memory, since it is universally true that one who has perfect memory has perfect understanding also. If it is not precisely through the Son but in virtue of himself as prior in origin to the Son that the Father knows himself through memory, as it were, then the same holds true of the actual knowledge that comes from understanding. It follows further that what the Father as prior in origin to the Son has in virtue of his unbegotten understanding is not only
44 Augustine, De Trin. xv, c.7, n.12: PL 42, 1066; CCSL 50a, 475-76.
* Tbid., xv, c.14, n.23: PL 42, 1077; CCSL 50a, 496.
QUESTION ONE
an actual knowledge or intellection of himself but also actual knowIedge of every distinct thing.
1.70 I concede the claim made in the proof [1.59] that the Word is expressive of everything involved as it were in the divine essence.
But it is not just the Word that is such. These things are not revealed only in the Word; they shine forth with equal distinctness in the understanding of the Father qua Father. As for the text they cite from Augustine*® to prove this is revealed solely in the Word, their interpretation is refuted by Augustine'? himself when he speaks of the Word as the art of the Father even as he is the wisdom of the Father. Explaining how he is the wisdom of the Father, he says: "The Son is called the wisdom of the Father in the same sense as he is called the light of the Father. That is to say, just as he is light of light and both are one light, so He is understood to be the wisdom of wisdom and both are one wisdom."
1.71 If one asks why it is the Word rather than the Father himself who is called the Father's Art, I reply: To be declarative knowledge pertains to the second person because of the way this person is produced, namely by an act of the "memory" which expresses knowledge of this sort. Those things which pertain to the perfection of actual knowledge, consequently, are "appropriated"* to the Son.
But he is called Wisdom, to use the Apostle's** designation, more properly than he is called Art, as Augustine is wont to do, for his production represents a declarative knowledge of things eternal rather than of things able to be made.
1.72 [To the second proof] The second argument [in 1.60 for the minor of the objection] is based on this proposition: "The first act of understanding in the divine is the proper principle for producing the Word." This proposition is false on two counts. First, the productive principle for the Word is not, properly speaking, an act of understanding. Second, it is not the understanding's first act as the objector interprets this.
1.73 Proof of the first point: What is usually meant by an act of understanding is the operation itself that is called intellection.
Therefore, if the first act of understanding, as the objector [in 1.60] interprets it, were the principle of emanation, it would have to be understood in one of these two ways: either (a) it is the formal principle of the production of the Word in the way the heat in a heater
46 Ibid., vi, c.10, n.11: PL 42, 931; CCSL 50, 241; cf. supra 1.52.
47 Ibid., vl, c.1, n.1-2: PL 42, 933-36; CCSL 50, 244-49.
481 Cor. 1:24.
GOD AND CREATURES
is the principle of heating, or (b) it is the principle of emanation, as for instance, an act which produces heating is called the productive principle of the heat produced. Neither of these ways makes sense, however. For understanding is the work of intelligence itself.
As Augustine*® says: "I call intelligence that by which we understand when we are actually thinking." To produce the Word, or to possess the formal principle for doing so, is something that pertains to [his mind] only to the extent that it is also "memory."
[22] 1.74 Proof of the second point [1.72, viz., that the Word is not produced by the first act of the understanding in the sense that the objector interprets first act]: This seems clear from what has just been said [in 1.70]. The distinct intellection that pertains to the Father in virtue of his own unbegotten intelligence is prior in origin to the production of the Word. The Word, then, is not produced by the first act of understanding as he interprets it [in 1.60], viz., as first in origin.
1.75 When he infers this on the grounds that the Word is produced naturally [i.e., not voluntarily or freely], his argument is invalid, for if the intellect is the source or principle of any act at all, it exercises this function by way of nature [i.e., not as a free agent].
1.76 Or, in brief, one can say to the second proof: If one is speaking of the first productive act, then the Word would be produced by the first act of the intellect. This act, although it is one of the intellect, is not precisely an act of understanding. But the Word is not produced by the intellect's first operative act which properly speaking is an act of understanding. The act of understanding insofar as it is an act of paternal intelligence is prior in origin [to the productive act]. In such an anterior act, the Father understands distinctly his own essence. He does not understand it in the produced Word.
This distinction between the productive and operative act will appear clear later in Question Thirteen. The operative act has no product [i.e., it does not produce anything] but the act or operation itself is the ultimate term, as is evident from Books I and X of the Ethics.°°
On the other hand, the productive act is always productive of some term as such, a term which derives its being from the productive act.
1.77 [Answer to the objection to the second reason in 1.62] What *9 Augustine, De Trin. xiv, c.7, n.10: PL 42, 1044; CCSL 50a, 435.
6° Aristotle, Ethica ad Nic. 1, c.1
(1094a-18); 1, c.g (1099a24-31); X, €.7
(11774a12-b5).
QUESTION ONE
we have already proved [in 1.64ff.] refutes the objection raised against our second reason. Essence as such is not the immediate principle of producing [the Word] if memory as memory is excluded from what is meant by the total principle.
Reply to the Initial Argument L23)) 1.78 Answer to the argument at the beginning [in 1.1]: It assumes the divine person is constituted by something notional. For the time being let us grant this. Then I reply to the major with a distinction. Sometimes the person is constituted by something that falls into the same genus [or category] as the nature itself does. In this case, the major apparently could be conceded, for not only is the nature more immediate in some sense to the person, but also to that formal element that makes it a person. But if the person were constituted by something generically different and more remote from the nature than is the genus of a property of the nature, the major would be false. If it were a relation that formally constituted the personality of Socrates, then this would not be more immediate to his humanity than quantity or quality, since a relation is more removed from the genus [or category] of substance than either quality or quantity.
1.79 Now suppose a divine person or suppositum™* is constituted by a relation. Then one must admit that the person is not constituted by something in the same genus as the nature (in the sense that one can speak of class or categorical distinctions in God). It is constituted by something relative, whereas the nature is something absolute.*! In some sense, then, this constitutive element is more distant from the nature than a property of that nature would be, for if there were strict generic distinctions in God, wisdom would belong to the genus "quality" and paternity to the genus "relation."
Therefore, in God a property in its own way can be more immediate to the nature than the element which is constitutive of the person.
1.80 Suppose one asks why this person cannot be constituted by something pertaining to the same genus as the nature. This question
[24 | has to do with something already presupposed by our question, namely, what constitutes a person, and hence is not to the point. For the present, however, I grant what it presupposes. 'hen one could say that where there is something that is [a "this''] of itself, but which is not incommunicable, no further determination, save to 51 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.26 (vi, 1-61); d.go (vi, 169-202).
GOD AND CREATURES
what is incommunicable, makes sense. But the divine essence is just this [i.e., something singular] of itself and yet is communicable. If some further determination with respect to person should be considered, it must needs be something which is basically incommunicable, since person is incommunicable.
It cannot be something absolute, because—on this hypothesis—everything absolute in God is pure perfection and therefore communicable. What constitutes the person, then, must needs be generically different from nature; not with just any kind of distinction, but with that which obtains between an absolute thing and a relative thing.
The proof cited for the major premise of the initial argument {in 1.1] is invalid except in the case where the element that is constitutive of the person is in the same genus [or category] as the nature.