Question Sixteen: Are Freedom Of Will And Natural
Question Sixteen
ARE FREEDOM OF WILL AND NATURAL
NECESSITY COMPATIBLE AS REGARDS
THE SAME ACT AND OBJECT?
[1] 16.1 The next questions deal with the will; first, with its action in general, second, in particular with the distinction between two intrinsic acts of the will, and third, with the distinction between an intrinsic and extrinsic act.
16.2 The first question is this: Are freedom of will and natural necessity compatible in the same subject as regards the same act and object?
Arguments Pro and Con It is argued they are not:
Necessity and freedom, it seems, are mutually repugnant. Augustine writes': "It was shown to our satisfaction that a mind becomes a slave of sinful desire only by its own will.' And soon after he adds: "If this movement is looked upon as culpable .
. then it is not determined by nature but is voluntary. It resembles in this respect the movement of the stone in its downward course, since one movement belongs to the soul, just as the other belongs to the stone. But it is unlike it in another respect, namely, that it is not within the power of the stone to check its downward fall''—which is not the case with the soul. Then he continues: "Hence the movement of the stone is fixed by nature, whereas that of the soul is voluntary.' And soon after follow these words of the disciple, approved by Augustine: 'If the movement by which the will can turn in different directions were not voluntary and subject to our control, a man ought not to be praised, blamed .
. or admonished .
, but anyone who would think that man should not be admonished, should be banished from the company of men." These words make it clear that the 1 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.1, nn.77-158 (11, 59-108); Iv, d.49, qq.g-10 (ed.
Vives xxI, 316-83).
2 Augustine, De lib. arbitrio 1, c.1, nn.2-3: PL gz, 1271-72; CCSL 2g, 272,
GOD AND CREATURES
same movement towards the same object cannot be both natural and free.
16.3 Against the preceding view it is argued:
Augustine says in The City of God*: "If by necessity we mean what is beyond our power and has its way even when our will is opposed to it, like the necessity of death, then our decisions to live well or ill obviously are not subject to such necessity.' Later he continues: "If we take necessity to mean that in virtue of which something must be so and so or must happen in such and such a way, I do not see why we should be afraid of such necessity taking away our freedom of will. We do not put the life of God and the foreknowledge of God under any necessity when we say that God must live an eternal life and must know all things." And he adds afterwards: '""When we say we must choose freely when we choose at all, what we say is true; yet we do not subject free choice to any necessity which destroys our liberty."
Body of the Question 16.4 Here three points must be investigated: (1) Is there necessity in any act of the will? (2) Is there in addition freedom in the will?
(3) Can natural necessity at times coexist with freedom?
ARTICLE!
Is there Necessity in any Act of the Will?
16.5 [The acts by which the divine will loves itself and spirates the Holy Spirit are simply necessary] As for the first problem I reply that there is simple necessity both in the act by which God loves himself and in the act by which he spirates* the Love that proceeds
[from Father and Son], i.e., the Holy Spirit.
This is obvious. God is necessarily happy; therefore, he necessarily beholds and loves the beatific object. Similarly, the Holy Spirit is God and consequently is supremely necessary in being. Therefore, since he receives being by proceeding [from Father and Son], the act whereby he proceeds from them is most necessary.
16.6 Both conclusions are proved by a demonstration of the reasoned fact* in the following way:
The infinite will is related to the most perfect object in the most perfect way possible. The divine will is infinite. Therefore, it is related to the supremely lovable object in the most perfect way that 5 Augustine, De civ. Dei v, c.10, n.1: PL 41, 132; CCSL 44, 140.
QUESTION SIXTEEN
a will can relate to it. But this would not be the case unless the divine will loved this object necessarily and adequately, and unless it spirated a Love adequate to that object. If either of these conditions were absent, it would be conceivable without contradiction that some will could be related to that object in a more perfect way, for a more perfect way is conceivable and it involves no contradiction.
It is not self-contradictory that an infinite will have an infinite act, and hence a necessary act elicited necessarily with respect to an infinite object. Were it lacking such, it would not be supremely perfect.
16.7 Also, if a Love adequate to the object can be spirated, as we believe, then it would pertain to the divine will above all to be the principle or source of that spiration. bol 16.8 [Proofs given by others] Somet adduce proofs for this conclusion which apply to every will as regards that [divine] object, whether this be seen clearly [as in heaven] or apprehended only in a general way, as it is at present.
16.9 The first proof is this: The will necessarily wills that which includes all goodness, for it cannot fail to love an object in which there is no evil or lack of goodness. Now the last end is such an object.
16.10 The second proof is based on the words of the Philosopher in the Physics*: '""The end serves the same function in the practical sciences as principles do in the theoretical sciences.' And also in the Ethics®: "As postulates are to mathematics, so is the end to matters of conduct." Now the intellect in theoretical science assents necessarily to the principles, therefore, the will assents necessarily to the last end in matters of conduct.
16.11 That in which everything else participates that the will loves is itself willed necessarily. Now the last end is such. Therefore
[it is willed necessarily].
Proof of the major: Every variable leads back to something invariable. And so the variety of acts concerned with what is ordered to an end presupposes an invariable act, and hence presupposes such an act particularly as regards that in which all other objects of the will participate.
+ Henry of Ghent, Quodl. 1, q.17, ad arg. princ. (fol. 79H); Iv, q.11 in corp.
(fol. 102R); xm, q.26 in corp.
(fol. 503F); Thomas, Summa theol.
I-lI, q.10, a.2
(II, 57-58).
5 Aristotle, Physic. Il, c.g (200a15-16).
6 Aristotle, Ethica ad Nic. vu, c.g (1151a16-17). orl
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The minor is proved by that text from The Trinity': "Take this good and that good, abstract from it being 'this' or 'that' and see
Good itself, if you can; thus you will see God who is good not by another good, but is the good of every good."
16.12 [Counter-arguments] These reasons do not hold necessarily of every will. Neither are they necessary arguments in themselves.
Proof of the first point: Given two absolute and essentially ordered natures, it is not self-contradictory that the first exist without the second.* Each of these, viz., (a) the lovable object, (b) the apprehension or vision of this object by a created intellect, and (c) the created will itself, is something absolute and naturally prior to the will's act of loving that object. Therefore, it is not self-contradictory that any one of them, or even all of them, could exist without the act of love. Neither then is its opposite simply necessary in the sense that the opposite of the self-contradictory is necessary.
16.13 Objection: The major is true only when two of the absolutes are mutually independent and are not both dependent on the third. But in the case at hand both vision and [the love or] fruition depend upon the same third, namely, the object.
Answer: God can cause any absolute immediately and yet without necessity. If he uses an intermediary cause, he can still produce it without necessity, for the intermediary cause does not force him' to cause its effect. Therefore, though both [i.e., the intermediary cause and its effect] be caused by a common cause, not only will the ultimate effect be contingent, but even if the intermediary cause be given, the effect will still be caused contingently.
16.14 Besides, if a power or potency acts necessarily as regards its object, it necessarily continues that act as long as it can. But the will, at least that of the pilgrim,* does not necessarily continue its act, as regards the end apprehended only in general, as long as it could. Therefore, it does not act necessarily in regard to that end.®
16.15 The example of the sense appetite illustrates the major. But it seems it can also be proved by reason. Whatever be the intrinsic reason a power acts necessarily will also be grounds for its acting necessarily always, so far as this depends on the power itself. Thus
' Augustine, De Trin. vil, c.g, n.4: PL 42, 949; CCSL 50, 272. Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.1, nn.83-85 (11, 62-63).
* Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.12, q.2, n.g (ed. Vives xi, 576).
°Cf. ibid., d.42, q.4, n.5 (ed. Vivés xm, 454); 1, dit, nn.g3ft.
(11, 67ff.).
S12
QUESTION SIXTEEN
it will be reason for the action continuing as long as the power can do this.
16.16 Proof of the minor: The will of the pilgrim could have continued the intellect's contemplation of the end, when it failed to do so and turned the intellect's consideration to something else or at least did not prevent some other object present from blotting out this consideration of the end. But when the intellect's consideration is discontinued, so too is the will's act as regards that object, whereas if the consideration continues, the will's act continues.
16.17 Proof of the same minor by a text from the Retractations'®: 'Nothing is so in the power of the will as the will itself."
This should be understood as referring to the will's action rather than to the will itself. It is in the power of the will that by its command another power act or refrain from acting, for example, that the intellect refrain from considering at least that object whose consideration is not required for issuing the command. Hence it is in the power of the will that it does not act regarding that specific object.
I do not understand this in the sense that the will could voluntarily suspend all its activity. It could voluntarily not will that object and still have another volition, viz., one that reflects on its own act, for instance, ''I will not elicit an act as regards that object." This can well happen; otherwise the will could not suspend any act after deliberating. Now this holds for will and intellect alike, namely, that while the will cannot suspend such intellection as is necessary for the volition by which it suspends intellection, it can suspend any other intellection. So too it cannot at a given moment suspend all volition, for it cannot suspend the act by which it suspends, but it can suspend any volition that is not necessary for this.
16.18 Furthermore, necessity in acting stems from some per se principle of action, for if the latter is not related necessarily to acting, then neither will anything else acting in virtue of it. But the recipient of the action is of itself in potency of contradiction. Therefore, if you claim the object is the reason for the necessity in volition
(for you maintain [in 16.g-11] that every will that relates to that object necessarily wills it, although no will necessarily wills every object), then it seems to follow that the object is the principal active
10 Augustine, Retract. 1, c.g (8), n.3, and c.22
(21), n.4: PL 32, 596, 620;
CSEL 36, 39.
o70
GOD AND CREATURES
factor in volition, a position not admitted by the one who proposed this argument.!?
16.19 [These proofs are not necessary arguments] The second point [in 16.12], namely, that these proofs are not necessary in themselves, becomes clear if you examine them one by one.
As for the first [in 16.9], the major is untrue. Even though in some object there be the fulness of perfection, still, for the act to be necessary, the potency must tend necessarily to that object. Now whatever be the case with the created will of the blessed and the supernatural perfection by which it tends to that perfect object, we must admit the will of the pilgrim tends to it only contingently, even when it is apprehended in general. For such apprehension is not grounds for making the will love that object necessarily. Neither does the will, given such apprehension, determine itself necessarily, even as it does not necessarily continue to will, as was mentioned in the second reason [in 16.16-17].
16.20 It could be conceded, however, that the will cannot recoil from or refuse an object in which there is no evil or lack of goodness, for as good is the object of volition so evil or lack of goodness
(which is regarded as evil) is the object of nolition. And it does not follow, further, "The will cannot refuse this perfect object, therefore it necessarily wills this," for as was stated above [in 16.17] about the Retractations, it may be neither willing nor unwilling with respect to this object.'?
16.21 Against this one could argue: If it cannot be unwilling to love this object, it is because this object has in itself something to which such nolition is repugnant. Now the repugnance can only consist in the fact that it actually does love or will the object. Therefore, this love or volition exists in it necessarily. Proof of the major:
If one of two incompatible elements is repugnant to it, the other is necessarily there. Proof of the minor: A mere aptitude or habitual inclination to love or will the object would not explain why an act of nolition or positive refusal to love is repugnant to the will, because such an act could coexist with a potentiality or aptitude for the opposite act.
In answer: One could say that what is repugnant to such a nolition or positive refusal to love the end is the will's very power or 11 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.1, nn.g3-96, 134-37 (II, 67-74, g0-93).
2 Cf. ibid., nn.149-51 (I, 100-103); Iv, d.4g, g.10, nn.4-10 (ed. Vivés xx1, 330-33); d.50, q.2, nn.14-16 (ibid., 540-42); u, d.6, q.2, n.13 (ed. Vivés x1,
359); 4.43, q.2 (ed. Vives x11, 490-94).
QUESTION SIXTEEN
potency itself, for it can have volition only for what is lovable and nolition only for what is undesirable; to love or to refuse to love respectively is possible in regard to no other objects. But the end, having no evil or defect of goodness, lacks all grounds of undesirability.
Hence, "a nolition of the end" is a self-contradictory or meaningless expression, like "seeing sound." Augustine wants to say as much in the Enchiridion?®: "We so will to be happy that we not only do not want to be miserable, but are quite unable to will this." Hence just as there is something repugnant about misery being an object of volition, so there is something contradictory about beatitude being an object of nolition. The latter perhaps is even more repugnant because misery does not lack all grounds for being wanted in the way that beatitude lacks all undesirability.
16.22 Reply to the second proof [in 16.10]: The Philosopher's analogy that the end functions like a principle must be interpreted with reference to two orders: (1) that which obtains between the intelligible and lovable objects themselves and (g) that which holds between such objects and the respective potencies or faculties which tend towards them in an orderly fashion.
The first of these I understand in this way: The order of goodness or desirability between the end and what exists for the sake of the end is like the order of truth between a principle and a conclusion, which has derivative or participated truth from the principle, for what serves an end has only derivative or participated goodness in comparison to the end. And from this the second order follows, namely, that as an orderly intellect assents to the truth of the conclusion because of the truth of the principle, so an orderly will tends to what serves an end for the sake of the end.
But this second parallel no longer holds if we consider these potencies according to what they can do absolutely [i.e., not just when acting orderly]. Otherwise a will could only love a means by using it, i.e., loving it for the sake of the end. But Augustine says in the Eighty-Three Questions": "Perversion of the will consists in loving the end as means and the means as end." This implies that the will can enjoy as an end an object meant to be used as a means. The intellect, on the contrary, cannot act in this fashion. It cannot see a truth, knowable only as a conclusion, as a principle, i.e., as a proposition evident from its terms.
The reason for this difference is that the intellect is moved nat13 Augustine, Enchirid., c.28, n.105: PL 4o, 281; CCSL 96, 106.
14 Augustine, De diversis quaest. 83, q.30: PL 40, 19.
GOD AND CREATURES
urally by its object whereas the will moves itself freely. It is also clear that there is not the same necessity in each case, for the conclusion must needs be known through the principle, whereas that which serves an end need not be desired or sought just because of the goodness of the end.*® 16.23 As for the third proof [in 16.11], one can simply deny the major. If the will wills nothing necessarily, then it need not will that object in virtue of which it wills other things in any necessary fashion either. To will it contingently suffices for willing other things in the way that the will does.1® 16.24 Another answer is that the major can have two meanings.
One is this: The will wills that object more or first, if it wills other things precisely because they participate in it as willed. The other meaning is this: The will wills that object first, if the other things it wills participate in the entity of that object.
Only in the first sense and not in the second does the major seem to be true. Although the color I see receives entity by participation in the First Being and visibility by participation in what is first visible, the vision of color is possible without first seeing the First Being or what is first visible, for the participation is not in something as seen but as a being or as visible. Now the minor [in 16.11] is true only in the second sense, and the argument in support of it only proves that what is willed is able to be willed or is good by partici-' pation in what was first able to be willed. It does not prove it was willed precisely because that in which it participates was willed.
16.25 [Conclusion of the Article] As regards this article, then, I maintain that whatever be the case with the created will of the blessed (i.e., whether or not it is necessitated to will the last end by something supernatural), it seems at least probable that not every created will is necessitated by its nature to will the end. This is so not only of the will considered absolutely [i.e., without previous knowledge]—which is clear——but also when the obscure apprehension of that object is given—as is the case in the present life.
16.26 As for the divine will at least this seems certain: it is simply necessitated to love its own goodness.
16.27 And if you ask: Does the divine will necessarily will any object other than God? The following answer could be given. If we rule out necessity of coercion of which there is no talk, necessity can mean two things:
(1) necessity of immutability, which excludes a 15 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.1, 1.147 (1, 97-98).
16 Cf. ibid., n.148 (11, 98-99).
QUESTION SIXTEEN
change of will in which at some subsequent moment the divine will would will differently than at present; the other is (2) necessity of inevitability or determination, which not only excludes change or succession but rules out that the divine will could have willed other than it has.
16.28 Speaking solely of the first type, we say God wills necessarily whatever he wills. For neither on the part of the act nor on the part of the object could a different state succeed the present one, for this would mean some change in God.!* That an object be willed does not imply something extrinsic to God and it cannot be willed after being not willed, nor vice versa, without a change occurring in something. Nothing unaltered passes from one contradictory state to the other. Otherwise there would be no reason why one contradictory would be more true now than before or why the other would be false.
16.29 As for the second type of necessity we could say this: Although the divine will necessarily takes complacency in everything intelligible insofar as some participation of God's own goodness is revealed therein, it does not will necessarily any created thing with a volition that is efficacious or that determines it to exist. On the contrary, it wills the creature's existence contingently, just as it causes it-contingently. For if it necessarily willed it to be in this second sense of necessity, it would cause it necessarily with a necessity of inevitability, at least at that moment when God wants it to exist.
ARTICLE II
Can Freedom and Necessity Coexist in the Will?
16.30 [Affirmative View] As for the second article [in 16.4], I claim that both freedom and necessity in willing can coexist in the will.
Proof from authority: The first is that text of Augustine from the Enchiridion*: "It was fitting that men should be made in the first place with the power to will both good and evil—if good, not without reward; if evil, not with impunity." That is to say, in that first state, man 1s capable of both merit and demerit. And he continues:
"In the afterlife he will not be able to will evil and yet he will not be deprived of his free will. In fact, his will will be much more free in that it will in no way be subject to sin." And he adds a proof, as it were: "For the will is not to be blamed nor should we say that it
17 Cf. ibid., d.8, nn.294-301
(IV, 322-26).
18 Augustine, Enchirid., c.28, n.105: PL 40, 281; CCSL 96, 106. oy)
GOD AND CREATURES
was no will or that it was not free, when we so will to be happy that we not only do not want to be miserable, but are quite unable to will this. Just as our soul is at present unwilling to be unhappy, so then it will for ever be unwilling to be wicked."
Also there is that text from Anselm in Chapter I of Free Choice*®: "Whoever has what is appropriate and advantageous in such a way that it cannot be lost is freer than he who has this in such a way that it can be lost." From this he concludes: "The will then which cannot cease to be upright is freer."
16.31 Reason proves the same point. The first is a proof of simple fact. From the preceding article we know the divine will necessarily wills its own goodness, and yet is free in willing this; therefore [necessity and freedom coexist there]. Proof of the minor: A power or potency that acts with respect to an object, not as something absolute but as related to another, acts with respect to both objects.
Thus the Philosopher argues in On the Soul? that the faculty by which we know the difference between one object and another is apt by nature to know both objects in themselves. He illustrates this as regards the common or central sense. Now the divine will relates to the end other objects willed for the sake of the end, therefore, as the same basic power, it acts with respect to both. But it acts freely as regards things other than the end, since it wills them contingently. Contingency in acting stems from a principle that is freely,
© not naturally, active. Therefore, the will as the same basic power wills its own goodness freely.
16.32 Furthermore, there are proofs of the reasoned fact* to establish our claim. The first is this: Action that has to do with the ultimate end is the most perfect. But freedom pertains to the perfection of such an action. Theretore, the necessity to be found there does not do away with but rather demands what is needed for perfection, namely, freedom.
Furthermore, an intrinsic condition for a power, considered absolutely or in relation to a perfect act, cannot be opposed to perfection in acting. Now liberty is an intrinsic condition of the will, either considered absolutely or as regards a perfect act. Therefore, liberty can coexist with that condition in acting that is the most perfect possible. Such is necessity, particularly where it is possible to have this. But it is always possible where neither of the extremes fi-e.,the subject willing and the object willed] demands contingency in the ac19 Anselm, De lib. arbitrio, c.1: PL 158, 491; ed. F. S. Schmitt 1, 208.
20 Aristotle, De anima ul, c.4 (415b15-21).
QUESTION SIXTEEN
tion between them [i.e., the willing]. Such is the case here, as the previous article proved.
16.33 How freedom coexists with necessity: If you ask, how does freedom coexist with necessity, I answer with the Philosopher}:
"Do not seek a reason for things for which no reason can be given: for there is no demonstration of the starting point of demonstration." And so I say here: As this proposition, '"The divine will wills the divine goodness," is immediate and necessary, for which no reason can be given other than that this will and this goodness are the sort of things they are, so also "The divine will contingently wills the goodness or existence of another." Again no reason can be given except that it is this sort of will and that sort of good, unless we add in general one brief remark that an infinite will must necessarily have an act as regards an infinite object, because this pertains to perfection, and by the same token it does not act necessarily as regards a finite object, because this would imply imperfection. For it is a matter of imperfection to be necessarily determined to what is posterior [i.e., less perfect] and a matter of perfection to be so determined to what is prior {or more perfect] and it implies concomitant perfection to be so determined to what is on a par with ita?
16.34 Confirmation: The division of agents into those which act naturally and those which act freely is not the same as the division of agents into those acting necessarily and those acting contingently. For some natural agents act contingently, because their action can be impeded. For like reasons, then, it is possible that some free agent act necessarily without detriment to its freedom.?*
21 Aristotle, Metaph. iv, c.6 (1011a12-13)m.
22 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.10
(Iv, 339-66); Iv, d.49, q.10, nn.2-3 (ed.
Vives XxI, 318-19).
23 Addition found in all three MSS:
But there is always this doubt: In what precisely does the essence of freedom consist? For neither the view that it consists in [the will's] determination to act nor in its mastery over its acts seems to be applicable here.
[10] One could say in reply [according to Henry of Ghent, in Summa, a.47, q.5
(u, fol. 47X-48Y)] that the statement 'The will necessarily wills" can have several meanings. Either "necessarily" refers to the fact that it must will some object and in this case the statement is true if the object in question is the divine goodness, the sole proper and per se object of that will. (Other things are not such and the will does not will them necessarily.) Or "necessarily" refers to the way the act of willing proceeds from the will, and this can be interpreted in two ways: One, that the
GOD AND CREATURES
ARTICLE III
Can Natural Necessity ever Coexist with Freedom?
16.35, [In the production of the Holy Spirit there is both] As for Eri the third main point [in 16.4], it is claimed2t that in one act of the divine will, namely, the spiration of the Holy Spirit, natural necessity is somehow involved. This should be understood to mean that the will, simply as will, is not the elicitive principle of the notional* act whereby something similar in form to the producer is produced.
Otherwise in anything where will existed, it would be the principle of an act by which something similar in form was produced, which is false in the case of creatures. The way to understand this claim, necessity is prior to the will. In other words, the will is coerced by some necessity extrinsic to itself which impels it to act and keeps it acting.
In the other interpretation, the necessity is concomitant, or controlled by the will which by the very steadfastness of its freedom imposed upon itself the need to elicit and continue the action.
In the spiration [of the Holy Spirit], however, there is {in addition] a concomitant necessity of nature, for there is a certain "force of nature" whether "nature" be taken in the primary sense of "essence" or in the secondary sense of a productive principle therein whose operation is
[not free but] natural. Some such force must assist the will in communicating the divine nature to the Holy Spirit. Hence we have a fourfold order (or degrees) of necessity. The first is that by which God necessarily lives, the second, that by which he necessarily knows or understands; the third is that by which he necessarily communicates the divine nature to the Holy Spirit; the fourth is that by which he necessarily loves himself.
In what then does his freedom in loving himself consist? I answer that it consists in the fact that he elicits this act and perseveres in it as something delightful which he has elected, as it were, to do.
Objections: According to Richard [of Middleton, Sent. u, d.38, a.2, q-1 in corp. (Brixiae, 1591), 1, p. 465], what is possessed by a necessity of nature is more glorious than what is had in some other way.
I answer: That there be an act of the will is a necessity of nature, but it is not by necessity of nature that God wills, for that would imply a contradiction. Hence, in this proposition, "It is necessary that God loves himself," which is a statement about a statement, the distinction is clear that necessity can be attributed to the act of willing in different ways.
This is not so clear in this statement of fact: "God wills necessarily."
Nevertheless, the truth common to both is this: The act is there by a necessity of nature, but he does not will the object by a necessity of nature.
*4 Henry of Ghent, Summa, a.60, q.1 in corp. (1, fol. 153H-157F).
QUESTION SIXTEEN
then, is that the will, by virtue of the divine nature in which it exists, has a certain "naturality" to produce the notional act, and is thus its elicitive principle.
By the fact that it is rooted in the divine nature or essence, the will has annexed to it a certain natural force. From this '"'naturality"' or natural force working with it, it acquires a certain natural necessity and thus becomes the elicitive principle of the notional act.
There is in the essential will-act as ordered to what is supremely loved a necessity of immutability* stemming from free will alone.
Nevertheless, insofar as the will's activity is ordered to and terminates with the production of the beloved [i.e., the Holy Spirit], a necessity of immutability accrues to it from this "'naturality" which has to do solely with the notional act elicited by the will, or rather by the freedom of the will when conjoined with such "'naturality."
In addition the point is made that this "naturality" in the will in no way impedes its freedom, nor is it the elicitive principle of the notional act (for that would militate against the freedom of that act). It is rather something consecutive, annexed to the will, something with the assistance of which the will itself by its power as will and as free is able to elicit its notional act, an act it could not elicit apart from such assistance.
The following propositions, then, are necessary in different ways:
(1) "God necessarily lives," for he lives by a necessity of nature; (2) "God necessarily understands,'—the necessity here has a different basis, for it stems from an intelligible object determining the intellect to know it; (3) '""God necessarily produces the Holy Spirit," for he does so by a natural necessity which does not precede but accompanies [the will's act];
(4) "God necessarily loves himself,"— here the necessity is a consequence of liberty's infinite [perfection] and there is no necessity of nature involved."®
16.36 [Objections] Counter-arguments: Nothing based upon someeta thing, it seems, could have additional grounds for its being necessary than that upon which it is based. Neither could there be two reasons for it being necessary whereas the foundation has only one. Otherwise, if the single basis in the foundation were removed, be this possible or not, the one in what is founded would still be there and hence the foundation would still be necessary and nevertheless no necessity remains there. Now, according to some, notional acts are based upon an essential act, and according to all, essential
25 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.2, nn.270-81 (11, 287-94); d.10, nn.10-12, 30-
58 (IV, 348-44, 352-63).
GOD AND CREATURES
acts are somehow prior to notional acts. Hence it is impossible that the essential act whereby God loves himself has but one necessity stemming from the single ground, viz., the infinity of the liberty, whereas in the act of spiration there be conjoined to this another ground, viz., natural necessity.
16.37 Furthermore, as perfect memory* in the appropriate person is the perfect principle for producing a perfect Word,* so a perfect will in the appropriate person or persons would seem to be the perfect principle of producing Perfect Love. Therefore, as memory in the Father is the principle of begetting the Son, so will in Father and Son is the principle of spirating the Holy Spirit. Neither does the co-assistance of something in addition to perfect memory and will seem necessary, in the sense that without such assistance the will could never cause the act of spirating nor the memory the act of speaking [the Word].
16.38 On the other hand, if the assistance be understood as that of object to potency, then memory would require such as much as the will. Perhaps it would be needed even more to communicate the nature by their respective acts than it would be needed to make the act necessary. For of these two principles, viz., object and potency, each is a per se reason for the necessity characteristic of the elicitation of these acts. But perhaps each is not per se a perfect reason why the resulting term is consubstantial with the producer, and then it would be true that such assistance to the essential act is not required. For although an object is required for the act, it would not be needed as the source of the communication of its own perfection.
[13] 16.39 [Solution] As for this article one could say there is no difficulty here if "nature" be taken broadly insofar as it applies to everything. For in this sense we call "will" nature and we apply the term even to nonbeings when we speak of the nature of negation. In this broad sense, necessity in any being could be called natural. And since the divine will at least has necessarily some volition by virtue of its perfect liberty, this necessity of perfect liberty could be called
"natural" in this way.
But a difficulty arises if we take "nature" more strictly, viz., insofar as "nature" and "liberty" are the primary differences of "agent" or "a principle of action." The Philosopher speaks in this fashion in the Physics*® when he divides "cause" into "nature" and "purpose."
26 Aristotle, Physic. 11, c.5 (196b17-22).
QUESTION SIXTEEN
"Of the former," namely, those things performed for the sake of an end as are all actions of a per se cause, "some are in accordance with deliberate intention, others not." And he adds a little later:
"Events that are for the sake of something include whatever may be done as the result of thought or of nature." To these two per se causes he reduces the two incidental causes of chance* and fortune.* He speaks of this distinction again in the Metaphysics?" when he indicates the way rational and irrational powers perform their acts: "As for potencies of the latter kind,' —i.e., irrational powers—
"when the agent and patient meet in the way appropriate to the potency in question, the one must act and the other be acted upon, but with the former kind of potency''—i.e., the rational—''this is not necessary''—i.e., even if agent and patient meet, it is not necessary that one must act and the other be acted upon. Of this distinction
Augustine speaks in The City of God*s: "There is a fortuitous cause, a natural cause, and a voluntary cause." And he explains each.
16.40 This division of 'active principle" is expressed by different names not only by different authors but by Aristotle himself as is clear from the Physics.?° After having remarked, 'Some are in accordance with deliberate intention, others not," he adds: "'as the result of thought or of nature." In the Metaphysics*® he speaks of "'rational" and "'irrational potencies."
By the three expressions: "not by deliberate intention," "by nature,' and "irrational potency,' Aristotle understands the active principle we commonly call "nature." By the other three expressions
[viz., "by deliberate intention," "as the result of thought," and "rational potency''] he understands the active principle in which intellect and will concur with regard to an extrinsic act.
16.41 But each of these two potencies, taken in itself, has its own way of functioning as a principle. The intellect does so by way of nature [per modum naturae]. Hence, in relation to its own act it is nature. Thus the Son in the divine Trinity is produced by way of nature, although the productive principle be "memory." The will, on the other hand, always functions in its own peculiar way, viz., freely. That is why when it concurs with the intellect, as in the production of artifacts, the whole effect is said to be produced freely and intentionally or with deliberation, since the intention is the su27 Aristotle, Metaph. 1x, c.5 (1048a5-7).
28 Augustine, De civ. Det v, c.g, n.4: PL 41, 151; CCSL 47, 139.
29 Aristotle, Physic. u, c.5 (196b17-22).
30 Aristotle, Metaph. 1x, c.5 (1048a5-7).
GOD AND CREATURES
perior and immediate principle of the extrinsic production. If at times some naturally active power concurs with the will as one of the subordinate potencies we use in acting, the action, insofar as it stems from the natural active principle, is properly speaking "natural." But since the act as a whole falls under the will, we employ the subordinate potency freely and we are said to act freely by virtue of the higher power. In this way Aristotle speaks in the Metaphysics?! where he wants to introduce some determining factor besides intellect, such as desire or conscious force. Otherwise the intellect would produce simultaneously contrary effects, for knowledge itself at once reveals contrary effects and insofar as itself is concerned, it would be a principle that acts naturally and would cause necessarily everything to which it is in potency: "The rational potencies produce contrary effects, so that if they produce their effects necessarily, they would produce contrary effects at the same time. But this is impossible. There must be, then, something else that decides,''*?—1i.e., something that determines the potency to one of the contraries. And he adds: "I mean by this 'desire' or 'conscious choice.' ''%3
[15] 16.42 [Conclusion] As for our proposal, I say that even if in the will's action some principle might concur (the object, according to some; the intellect, according to others) and would do so as naturally active, so far as itself is concerned, the will per se is never an active principle that acts naturally. To be naturally active and to be freely active represents a primary division of '"'active principle." The will is a freely active principle, which is precisely why it is called
"will." It can no more be naturally active than nature, as other than will, can be freely active.
16.43 But here the question arises: Why is it that the will, although it acts necessarily, does not act naturally, since nature could no more determine it to act than does the fact that it has to act?
Answer: Every natural agent either is first in an absolute sense, or if not, it will be naturally determined to act by some prior agent.
Now the will can never be an agent that is first in an absolute sense.
But neither can it be naturally determined by a higher agent, for it is active in such a way that it determines itself to action in the sense that if the will wills something necessarily, for example, A, this volition of A would not be caused naturally by that which causes the will even if the will itself were caused naturally, but once the first
81 Tbid. (1048a10-15).
82 Tbid., 1x, ¢.5 (1048a5-10).
33 Ibid., 1x, c.5 (1048a10).
QUESTION SIXTEEN
act by which the will is caused be given, if the will were left to itself and could have or not have this volition contingently, it would still determine itself to this volition.
16.44 To the claim, then, that a natural principle cannot be more [ 16 ] determined than a necessary principle, I say: Although the necessary be most determined in the sense that it excludes any indetermination as regards an alternative, nevertheless one necessary thing may in some way be more determined than another. That fire be hot or the heavens be round is determined by the cause which produced simultaneously the being of the heavens and its shape. A weight, on the other hand, is determined to descend. Still it does not receive from its progenitor the act of descending, but only that principle which naturally causes it to descend. But if the caused will necessarily wills anything, it is not determined by its cause to will such in the way the weight is determined to descend. All it receives from the cause is a principle by which it determines itself to this volition.
16.45 You might object, if the descent is caused by the body's intrinsic heaviness, then the heavy body moves itself. But why then is it not just as free as a will moving itself to a volition which it causes necessarily?
To this I answer: Causation by gravity is natural whereas the will's causation is free, and the reason is the will is a will and the weight is a weight.
16.46 To put it briefly then, like a form and its mode of being, so an action and the mode of acting are inseparable. Just as there is no reason why this being has this mode of being except that it is that sort of thing, so also there is no reason why this agent has this mode of action (i.e., free, though necessary) except that it is that sort of active principle.*# Reply to the Initial Argument [17] 16.47 The argument for the negative view [in 16.2] can be answered in this way: Augustine's intent in the text cited there was to argue against Cicero**—who denied God's foreknowledge—that the admission of such knowledge did not commit him to a denial of our
34 Cf, Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.10, nn.6-9, 30-58 (IV, 341-42, 352-63); d.z, nn.327-44 (Il, 322-32).
35 M. T. Cicero, De natura deorum 1, cc.26ff. (Opera omnia, ed. C.F.A.
Nobbe, Nova ed. stereotypa Ix, Lipsiae, 1849, pp. 144ff.); De divinatione 11, €.37 (IX, 250-51); De fato, c.10 (1x, 2goff.).
GOD AND CREATURES
freedom. Augustine®* shows how to reconcile the two by this argument: "If God be certain of the order of all causes—which Cicero himself admitted—the fact remains that all our choices fall within that order, for human choices are the causes of human acts. Hence he who foreknew the causes of all things could not be unaware that our choices were among those causes." And he adds later#": "How then does it follow that the order of causes, known for certain, though it be in the foreknowing mind of God, brings it about that there is no power in our will, when those very choices have such an important place in that order of causes?" And in the following chapter he says**: "It does not follow then that there is no power in our will, because God foreknew what was to be the choice in our will.
... If he who foresaw what was to be in our will foresaw, not nothing, but something, it follows that there is a power in our will, even though he foresaw it."
His answer seeks to show the compatibility of (a) that necessity which foreknowledge requires in the foreknown and (b) the fact that the foreknown is in the power of our will. This would not be true if there were such coercion in the will as he refers to when he says: 'It has its way even when our will is opposed to it, like the necessity of death." But if it be the sort of necessity of which we are wont to say: "Something must be so and so or happen in such and such a way," there is no need to fear our liberty will be destroyed if such necessity characterize our act as foreknown. Although the necessity* of the foreknowledge or of the foreknown as foreknown is one of immutability, it is not simply a necessity of inevitability* or absolute determination. It is only inevitable on the assumption that God foreknows that this will take place.
[18] 16.48 To show not every necessity destroys freedom Augustine adds:** "We do not put the life of God and the foreknowledge of God under any necessity.' Had he restricted himself to God's foreknowledge, it would be easy to see why no necessity repugnant to freedom is imposed upon it, for any item of that knowledge is something God knows freely and contingently; yet assuming he does foreknow it, that foreknowledge cannot change.
16.49 But the phrase "the life of God and the foreknowledge of God" is more difficult to explain. Still two answers are possible. One
3° Augustine, De civ. Dei v, c.g, n.g: PL 41, 150-51; CCSL 47, 138.
37 Tbid., n.4: PL 41, 151; CCSL 47, 139.
88 Tbid., c.10, n.2: PL 41, 153; CCSL 47, 141.
39 Augustine, De civ. Dei v, c.10, n.1: PL 41, 152; CCSL 47, 140.
QUESTION SIXTEEN
takes "'life'' to mean the beatific act, as in John 17%: "This is eternal life, that they know you." As the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics*: "The activity of the mind is life." By the same token the will's activity is life and even in God this life does not fall under that necessity which excludes freedom.
16.50 But if "life" refers to God's own natural life, it must not be taken to mean that life considered simply in itself but rather as something accepted by the divine will. Something may well be necessary in itself with a necessity repugnant to freedom and still be accepted freely and even contingently. For instance, if one voluntarily dives off a cliff and, while falling, continues to will this, he falls necessarily with the necessity of natural gravity and yet he freely wills that fall. Thus God, though he lives necessarily by a natural life and with a necessity that excludes all freedom, nevertheless freely wants to live such a life. Hence we do not put the life of God under any necessity if we understand "'life'' as loved by his free will.
20 John 1723:
41 Aristotle, Metaph. xu, c.7 (1072b25-30).