Question Eleven: If Both Body And Place Remain,
Question Eleven
IF BOTH BODY AND PLACE REMAIN,
CAN GOD CAUSE THE BODY
NOT TO HAVE UBIETY?
Arguments Pro and Con [1] 11.1 As for the third question [in 9.1], we proceed in this way.
It is argued that God cannot cause a body to lack ubiety,* so long as a body and a place* exist, for the extremes of a relation cannot continue to exist without the relation between them also existing.
Two white objects, for instance, cannot exist without their being similar. Body and place seem to be terms for the intervening relationship of ubiety, as it were, according to the description in the Six Principles?: "Ubiety is the circumscription of the body which comes from its circumscription by the place."
11.2 Against the preceding opinion it is argued that body and place are related to ubiety as agent and patient are related to acting [actio] and being acted upon [passio].* Given the existence of both, God can prevent one from acting upon the other. Therefore,
[God can let a body and a place exist, without the one locating the other and hence without ubiety].
Proof of the major: Ubiety seems to be the relationship between place and a body, just as acting and being acted upon are relationships between agent and patient.
Proof of the minor: As it is said in Daniel 3,* the fire did not burn the three young men thrown into the furnace. Yet the fire was active, because the spurting flames killed those who threw them into the furnace, and the bodies of the young men were able to suffer, for it is improbable that they had the gift of impassibility.*
1 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 11, d.2, qq.5-g (ed. Vivés x1, 324-518); Iv, d.10, qq.2-3 (ed. Vives xv, 190-225).
2 Liber de sex principis (attributed to Gilbert de la Porrée; cf. ed. A.
Heysse-D. van den Eynde in Opuscula et textus, ser. schol. 7, Monasterii We 153) nVs Mek 7 ur 20:
* Daniel 3:21-25.
GOD AND CREATURES
Body of the Question 11.3 This question can be understood in two ways. In one sense,
[2a] it can refer to body and place in general; in another, to a definite body and a definite place. Both of these can be subdistinguished.
Therefore, there are four questions in all to be answered.
First, given place in general, is it repugnant for a body in general to lack ubiety?
Second, given body in general, is it repugnant to place in general not to circumscribe it, so that there will be no ubiety?
Third, given this body, this place, but this body not present in this place, is it possible that this body should lack this ubiety?
Fourth, if this body and this place exist and this body is present in this place, can it still lack this ubiety?
ARTICLE I
Given Place in General, is it Repugnant for a Body in General to Lack Ubiety?
11.4 [Proof it is not impossible] As for the first subquestion, I claim it is not a contradiction that a body exist without some containing body and, consequently, without ubiety. As a matter of fact, this is the case with the outermost heavenly sphere, which lacks a container.* Similarly, given a place, and not just any place, but one capable of circumscribing this body, it would not be contradictory that this body lack ubiety there.
The reason is this: It is not contradictory that the absolute remain without a relationship to what is not prior to it, or at least to that which by nature is neither prior to it nor simultaneous in nature with it. But place is by nature neither simultaneous with, nor prior to, body. Rather, it seems to be subsequent by nature to it. Therefore [it is not contradictory that a body be without ubiety].
From the foregoing, the reason for the second proposition can be formulated.
11.5 [Three objections] To be in a place pertains to body per se, so corporeity is the reason for its being in place. But it would be a contradiction to claim that the formal ground for something exists while the thing in question does not exist.
11.6 Besides, the located body depends on the locating body; therefore the relation of the locating to the located is a type of + Aristotle, Phystc. Iv, c.5 (212b8-10).
QUESTION ELEVEN
dependence-relation. But if an absolute by nature can have such a dependency, then it cannot be without it.
11.7 Contrary to what was said of the outermost heavenly sphere [in 11.4], it is argued that if this body moves, it has locomotion. But locomotion requires that it have some location, for locomotion means that the body is in a different place than it was before. And if one claims the heavenly body is at rest, it follows that its state of rest is opposed to some motion that it is able by nature to have and sO it is at rest in place, which is the intended conclusion.
11.8 [Answer to these objections] To the first [in 11.5], one could say that the proximate reason fundamentally for being in place is extension. And if the formal reason is understood in this way then it can indeed be separated from that relationship for which it is said to be the reason. "Separation" here refers to actuality, for extension cannot be separated from the aptitude or potency to be in a place.
For example, whiteness in this way is the reason for being similar, and nevertheless there is no contradiction for whiteness to exist without there being any actual similarity.
11.9 To the contrary, if extension is the proper fundamental reason for being located, then this proposition, "A body is located, just as color is seen," will be at least per se in the second mode, although not in the first mode of per se predication.* Since such a proposition is simply necessary, the subject cannot be without the predicate.
11.10 I reply: Corporeity is the fundamental reason why a body can be in place and why it actually is in place, and it is indeed the proper and proximate reason for both, for the subject of the actuality is the subject with the corresponding potentiality. But it is a necessary reason only as regards the potentiality, because the aptitude is intrinsic [to a body] by the strict definition of corporeity, but it will only be actualized by an agent which reduces this potentiality to act. Therefore, one must deny the assumption that "A body is located" represents an instance of per se predication in the second mode, although it must be admitted that "A body can be located" does. For example, "Man is risible" is in the second mode of per se predication, whereas "Man laughs" is contingent.
11.11 To the second objection [in 11.6], I say that this dependence of what is located upon its place is not simply necessary on the part of what is said to be dependent, in the way, for instance, that the caused is dependent upon its cause, although there is a kind of dependence on place as upon something that was meant by nature
GOD AND CREATURES
to satisfy a natural disposition. For the body indeed is apt by its nature to be kept in its natural place. However, absolutely speaking it can exist without its being kept in a place.
11.12 To the third objection [in 11.7], one could say that if the outermost heaven moves, it moves as locating and not as located, because it locates the body contained by it differently now than it did before. But the first heaven itself is not located any differently, for the simple reason that it is not located at all. In this way the dictum of Averroes® is to be understood, viz., "Heaven is in place through the center," because its being "in place" consists in its locating the firmament which can be in place.
11.13 And if one asks to what category does this "locating" pertain, so that he might classify the corresponding "movement," the answer is that it does not pertain to the category of ubiety or ub, because ubiety means being surrounded by a place. Neither does it fall under any other category, because then motion would pertain to more categories than enumerated by the Philosopher in the Physics,® and if you examine the other categories you will not find that it pertains to any of them.
11.14 Furthermore, if the outermost heavenly sphere could rotate although it is not contained by any body, then it could rotate if it did not contain a body either, for instance, if it were a continuous spherical body. And then this fluid form according to which rotary movement exists per se, could also exist per se without reference to either a container or content and thus would be [not a fluid form but] one that is purely absolute.* AR TICLE, tt Given Body in General, is it Repugnant to Place in General that no Ubiety Exist?
11.16 [Proof it is not impossible] As for the second question [in 11.3], I say that there does not seem to be any contradiction that a concave spherical surface should exist without any container-relationship to another body, even though there be another body which ® Averroes, Physic. 1v, com. 42 (IV, fol. 140E-140M).
6 Aristotle, Physic. v, c.2 (226a20-30).
7 [11.15] "Responstonem quaere" ('Look for the answer") is added in the Wadding-Vivés text. The editors evidently believed the two preceding paragraphs to be objections of some sort to Scotus' position. See the addition 11.15 in Appendix. However, only Mz has Responsio followed by the second article. M: and W had added Responsio (the former in the margin) but deleted it.
In our opinion no answer is required.
QUESTION ELEVEN
was meant by nature to occupy this place, for one can argue here about locating in the same way as we argued before about being located [in 11.11].
11.17 This is confirmed from the fact that the heaven is indestructible,* and even though the elements taken in themselves as a whole
[i.e., the sublunar world] are imperishable according to the Philosopher,® their indestructibility is not like that of the heaven. Since the form of an element is of the same type in the whole [i.e., the atmosphere, the hydrosphere, or fire sphere] as it is in a part [i.e., that portion which combines to form minerals, organic substance, etc.], it follows it can no more be reason for the indestructibility of the whole [sublunar world] than for a part. And even though there is no natural cause that could destroy the element as a whole, like those which transform a part of it, nevertheless to reduce to act this intrinsic possibility of an element's perishing is not as impossible as it would be to make the heaven perish. Or at least, according to the theologians, it is possible for God to annihilate the elements, which are destructible as to their form, without annihilating the heaven, which is indestructible as to its form, since to conserve the prior and more necessary there is no need to preserve something less necessary as a means to that end. Absolutely speaking, then, the elements could be annihilated without causing any change in the heaven, and if this happened, the sides of the heaven would not instantly collapse, because nature cannot cause such a transmutation in an instant. Therefore, the concave surface of the heaven could remain and nevertheless contain no body.
11.18 [Three objections] Against this it is argued that a vacuum is simply impossible, as Aristotle proves in the Physics.1° But if a concave surface existed without a body, there would be a vacuum.
Therefore [this is simply impossible].
Proof of the major: One reason the Philosopher'! gives in the chapter about place against those who argue that place is empty space is this: There would be an infinity of places, he says, and to prove this follows, he adds: "For when water and air change places, all the portions of the two together wil] play the same part in the whole which was previously played by all the water in the vessel."
® Aristotle, De caelo 1, c.g (270a12-22); I, c.1 (283b27-32).
9 This seems to be a consequence of the Philosopher's view that matter is eternal.
10 Aristotle, Physic. Iv, c.7 (214a15-217b).
11 Tbid., c.g (211b20-23).
GOD AND CREATURES
11.19 Besides, there is nothing between the sides of a vacuum, but according to the Philosopher,'? these sides that have nothing between them are together. Therefore, if a vacuum existed, the sides would be together and not be together.
11.20 Besides, it is contradictory that there should be two separate moments of time with no interval of time. By the same token, then, it is contradictory that there should be two things locally separated with no body in between.
11.21 [Answer to the objections] As for the first {in 11.18], although the Philosopher's proof of the implication is explained in many ways,'* whatever the explanation chosen, it only holds on the assumption that a vacuum is empty space with actual dimensions, although lacking any natural qualities. For as long as one assumes that there are actual dimensions, according to the Philosopher there will always remain a reason why this is not compatible with another body unless one causes the other to part. But the vacuum that is assumed in this article to be possible to God is not a space with positive dimensions, but all that is there is the possibility of having such together with a lack of any dimensions in actuality.
And in this way one can answer all the arguments given there by the Philosopher. They are valid only against the notion of a vacuum in one sense, viz., an empty space without a body but with actual dimensions, and thus prove nothing about the sort of vacuum that we claim is possible for God.
11.22 To the second objection [in 11.19], I say that "in between" can refer to something positive and actual or privative and potential, and for the sides to touch and be together, there must be nothing in between in either sense. Though the boundaries of a vacuum have nothing in between in the first sense, they do, however, have something in between in the second sense, because the intervening space could hold a body only as large as that which would be there if that space were actually filled. It follows then that what is in between is a privation, because there is lacking as large a content as could be placed within these boundaries.
11.23 To the third objection [in 11.20], one could say that without motion there could be rest even in the proper sense of the term.
For if no body were in motion, there could be some body that has uniform existence, just as after the [last] judgment, the body of the blessed could exist unmoved, even though no body would be any different, since there is no need that some less perfect body be dif12 Ibid., v, c.g (226b21-22).
13 Averroes, Physic. 1v, com. 76 (Iv, fol. 165L-166I).
QUESTION ELEVEN
ferent for the blessed to remain unchanged; nor does this latter require that some other bodies would have to be in motion. For even to this uniform immobile existence there corresponds a proper measure, which is time. And between any two imagined instants of this duration there could have been an interval of so much movement, and so, if we call time the measure of flow or motion, then this immobile existence would have a time period, although the flow of time would not be actual or positive but only potential and privative. Hence, if a mind aware of actual positive time were to use it to measure this period of uniform duration, it would know how long it was, namely, the positive extent of time that would have elapsed if time had been positive.
11.24 Now something analogous occurs in the case of positive and privative local distance. As a privative space of time measures the successive parts of something, so privative extension measures its permanent parts. This is so because privation is equal in its way to its corresponding possession. Hence the previous argument can be adapted to confirm our thesis as follows: It is possible to have some interval between moments that is quasi-temporal, although no positive time intervenes, i.e., there is no measure of actual movement.
Potential time, or time taken privately, is sufficient to create a quasi-temporal interval which justifies speaking of one moment occurring before or after the other. Hence, one can say the same of place and local distance.
11.25 If one argues against this that there is no distance unless there be something in between in which it exists, which is not the case here, this answer could be given. Formally, distance implies a relationship between two extremes, but the relationship to the other term exists in one extreme. Now in the case we are discussing, although there is no positive medium in between them, the two extremes are positive. Now if this suffices to call the relation positive,
I admit there is positive distance here. But if for this a positive medium is further required, then at least our intended thesis can still be saved, for even if actual distance does not exist, its privation does and positive distance is there potentially.
ARTICLE III
Given this Body, this Place, but this Body not Present in this Place, is it Possible that this Body should
Lack this Ubiety?
11.26 [Proof this is possible] As for the third question, it is obvious that if this body is not present to this place, it is not circumig a et
GOD AND CREATURES
scribed by this place and hence has no ubiety there, even though this place could exist, since it is the innermost surface of the containing body. This is clear from what was said in [11.16ff. of] the second article."!
Also, if the body is not in this place, in the natural course of things it will be somewhere else, but not in two places at once.
Hence it will not have ubiety here.
11.27 [Objection] Against this it is argued that "containing" is part of the definition of place, since the container's inner surface alone, apart from the notion of "containing," is not a place. But,
"e since "containing" expresses a relationship, it will not remain, it seems, if the term contained is not the same. Therefore, when this content replaces that, apparently the place is no longer the same.
But when this body is no longer present to this place, the content is not the same.
11.28 [Solution] In Physics,!® the Philosopher claims the place remains the same despite the successive replacement of bodies. From this it seems clear that this place does not become another place simply because it contains another body. As for the argument about the relation of "containing to the contained," one could grant that place implies, in addition to the surface, a relationship of containing, as is indicated by the words "the innermost
. of what contains" (i.e., what proximately and immediately contains) in his definition [viz., "The innermost motionless boundary of what contains is place''}. It follows then that either (a) we must say that a change in the content does not alter the relationship of the container, that is to say, it does not alter the way in which the container is related to what it contains, because the per se term of this relationship is not this particular content, but some content in general; or (b) we could say that as the content varies, the corresponding relation also changes, so that "containing this" differs from "containing that," although the term so related does not vary, since the container remains the same, and so we have the same place. An example of this:
If, because of its whiteness, a body is similar to many objects, then it has many similarities, because their number corresponds to the number of related terms. But the body remains one similar thing, not many similar bodies, just as it is one knower who knows many things. For concrete subjects are not numbered solely on the basis
14 In 11.26 we follow the order of M; and Mbp, not that of W or Wadding.
15 Aristotle, Physic. Iv, c.4 (212a20).
QUESTION ELEVEN
of the number of their forms [or qualifications} but we must consider along with these how many subjects have them.1*
ARTICLE IV
If this Body and Place Exist and this Body is Present in this Place, can it still Lack this Ubiety?
11.29 [Three possible meanings of the question] The fourth question, it seems, can be understood in three ways: first, if this body is quantitatively present in the place without another body being there in the same way; second, if two bodies are both copresent there quantitatively; third, if this body is present to this place but not quantitatively.
11.30 [Proof that the answer to the first meaning of the question is negative] As for the first, it seems clear that presence of this sort could no more exist without ubiety than it could without the body's being circumscribed by the place, for this circumscription apparently adds nothing to the fact that the body is present in this place in a quantitative way, i.e., as coextensive and coincident with the place.
11.31 But then this doubt comes to mind. Formally this circumscription or presence seems to express nothing more than a relation, and hence ubiety itself would be formally just a relationship. But this consequent seems false, for there is no per se motion with respect to relation, according to the Philosopher in Bks. V and VII of the Physics," yet in Bk. II** he tells us there is per se motion with respect to the category of place or ubiety.
11.32 And should someone claim that ubiety implies not only a relative but an absolute, and it is the latter that distinguishes it from other categories which simply imply relationships but with distinct foundations, one can counter with this argument. An absolute and a relation do not form one concept per se, but the concept of any category is one per se; therefore [an absolute and a relation do not constitute the category of ubiety]. Neither does an absolute contract
"relation" per se to form the genus of "ubiety" or that of any species under that category, and this for the same reason, viz., that an absolute and a relation do not form a concept that is one per se.
16 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. u1, d.2, q.6, nn.7-8 (ed. Vives x1, 331-33).
17 Aristotle, Physic. v, c.2 (225b10-19); vil, c.3 (246b10-14).
18 Tbid., 1, c.1
(192b13-16).
GOD AND CREATURES
[13] 11.33 Using this same reason one could argue further that you may take both of these per se concepts [viz., one absolute and the other relative], and if each is common, then it is predicable of several things in quid,* and therefore upon analysis will yield one ultimate most general concept that is predicable per se of everything under it. And thus the analysis of both the absolute and the relative notions will end with the concept of that ultimate category proper to each concept.
11.34 [The distinction between "relation" and the last six categories] One could resolve this doubt along these lines. If, as is commonly claimed, the distinction between the ten categories ought to be preserved, then the last six ought not to be brought under the category "relation."' But on the other hand, since they seem neither to be absolute forms nor to imply both an absolute and a relation, for the reason given [in 11.32], one would have to say that they are essentially relationships, yet do not fall under the category "'relation." Hence, we need a distinction between relations even at the categorical level. But we can distinguish the relationships implied by the last six categories from those in the fourth category, properly called "'relation," if we accept the common statement that relations in the fourth category are intrinsically advenient,* whereas those in the last six are extrinsically advenient. We can interpret this as follows. No relationship advenes* to an absolute so intrinsically that it pertains to it per se or qua absolute, for then it would not be a relation, since the very notion of a relation is "of one to another."'
Therefore that relation is said to be intrinsically advenient which is a necessary consequence of its foundation once the terms are given, because a relation cannot be more intrinsic to an absolute than that. By contrast, a relation is extrinsically advenient which is not a necessary consequence of the foundation even if the terms are given.?® [14] 11.35 [Interpretation of Aristotle] If this be true, then one can reply to the testimony of the Philosopher in the Physics?° [referred to in 11.31]. He denies motion only with respect to relation proper, viz., that which pertains to the fourth category, but not with respect to every relationship pertaining to the last six; in fact he admits there that change occurs in ubiety, and it is commonly admitted
19 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. tv, d.1g, q.1, nn.g-11 (ed. Vives xv, 668-69) ' d.6, q.10, nn.3-4 (ed. Vivés xvi, 617-18).
20 Aristotle, Physic. v, c.2 (225b11-12).
QUESTION ELEVEN
that this does not involve motion with respect to any absolute form, for ubiety, as we have seen, is not an absolute form but the relationship of the contained body to the place that contains it.
11.36 But the reason why "relation" and the other six relationships are different in regard to motion seems to stem from the fact that a relation proper, since it follows necessarily once the extremes are given, can never be acquired in the other related term. Now the Philosopher"! denies that motion can terminate per se in what is acquired only accidentally, viz, when another entity has been acquired. A relationship, however, that is not a necessary consequence of the extremes can have a novelty of its own apart from any novelty in one or the other terms, and hence can be acquired per se. Now this seems to be the case with ubiety, for God can conserve the identical localizable body as well as the place, and still the latter need not circumscribe the former, because the body can be absent from that place, and nature itself can do this by putting another body in its place. Therefore these two extremes of "place" and "'localizable"' do not necessarily entail ubiety. Consequently, ubiety can be new with its own novelty and can be acquired by the body without anything absolute being added to either the body or the place.
11.37 But one may ask: How can the acquisition of a relation be successive if there is no succession as to anything absolute? The answer is that the body makes its several parts successively present to the same part of the place. Similarly, the same section of the body makes itself successively present to different segments of the place, and thus both the divisibility of the body and that of the place result in the fact that the bodily circumscription by the place is also divisible into parts, and this segmentation is successive when one part is acquired only after another. Hence there is no divisibility in the relationship [of ubiety] without some divisibility in what is absolute, but there is a succession in the relationship of circumscription without any succession in the absolute form of the body or the place.
11.38 [As for the second meaning of the question, the answer is also negative, but not all accept this] As for the second meaning
[given in 11.29] to this article, viz., whether this body can lack ubiety in this place if there is another body copresent quantitatively with it, it might seem that one could claim it would not have it here, because if it could, the other body could also have it here. But two
21 Ibid., c.1 (225a20-225b13).
GOD AND CREATURES
ubieties in the same place are impossible because one place has but one circumscription.
11.39 Also, the located body separates the sides of the container.
But the second body that comes to this place will not be able to separate these sides, for they have already been separated by the body that came here first.
11.40 Confirmation:
If both caused the sides to separate, both would constitute a medium between them. But where there are several per se media, there would seem to be several distances, and thus there would be a double distance between the sides.
11.41 [Scotus' own opinion] But one can say that in such a situation, both bodies would have ubiety in this place, for when both would be placed here as coextensive and coincident with the place, then either both will be located there, which is our contention, or neither will, and then the place would be vacuous in which two extended bodies were placed, which no one would maintain. Similarly, if either of the two was removed leaving the other, the remaining body would have ubiety here. But for its part the body would not be here any differently than it was before as regards the way it 1s extended throughout the container.
11.42 This appears clear if we contrast a body with an angel. For if an angel were together with a body, it would not have ubiety proper in that place, whereas the extended body would have it. The reason is that the angel is not coextensive and coincident with that place nor does it displace anything. Hence if the body were removed and the angel alone remained, the place could properly be called empty. And the opposite would be true if two bodies coexisted in the same place.
11.43 You may ask: How can a place already filled be filled again? I answer by refuting the arguments for the other view.
11.44 [Reply to the counter-arguments] To the first [in 11.38] according to our view which asserts that there can be many relations of the same type to different terms in the same subject and with the same foundation, I would have to admit that the same place could actively circumscribe more than one body, and that corresponding to this there would be in the several bodies distinct passive relationships of being circumscribed.
11.45 To the other objections [in 11.39], one could point out that "separating the sides'' could be understood in two ways: either effectively, in the sense that an agent forced the sides apart, or quasi-
QUESTION ELEVEN
formally, and thus anything in between them could be said to separate them. In this second sense, it must be admitted that each body existing extensively would separate the walls of the place because each is in between them. In the first sense, however, neither of the two bodies forces the sides of the container apart, but this was done by the agent that first divided one surface of the container from the other. And this also makes clear how each body can fill the place, for they do it formally, not effectively. For it is no more incongruous that a place already filled acquire a new body that fills it formally than that a container with a body commensurate to what it can contain should acquire another similar relationship to a second body.
11.46 As for the confirmation [in 11.40], one may say that if distance be taken to mean the way in which one distant object stands in respect to another, then there is but one distance between the same terminal points whether the intervening bodies be one or many, and in this sense it is not true that where there is another per se medium, there is another distance per se, unless one take ''another per se medium" to mean whatever is required in addition to fill in the intermediate distance, but in the case under discussion the second body does not fulfill this function. If, however, one took "'distance" to mean the total size of the contents that have been packed between the sides of the container, then one would have to admit that with two bodies between the walls, the "distance'' between them has been doubled.
11.47 [As for the third meaning of the question the answer is pos- ~I cee itive] The third sense given [in 11.29] to this article was whether a body can lack ubiety if it is present to this space but not in a quantitative way, i.e., not as coextensive or coincident with the place. To this we can say that the body under these conditions would not have ubiety here properly speaking. For ubiety proper is a form that is divisible as such, because there can be a per se motion with reference to it. For this reason ubiety pertains only to something divisible with a corresponding mode of existence there. A body, however, that would not be coextensive with place, but was so present there that the whole of it was in each part of the place, would not have a divisible mode of existence with reference to that place, and consequently it would not have ubiety proper there. However, if we extend the meaning of ubiety to this sort of simple presence according to which an angel is said to be here, then one would have to concede
GOD AND CREATURES
that a body present in this way could be said to have ubiety improperly, because it is truly in this place but is not circumscribed by it.
Reply to the Initial Argument 11.48 To the argument at the beginning [in 11.1]: If the major is accepted as true, then it holds good only for "relation" properly speaking. The relationship, however, which ubiety implies is not of this sort. This is clear from what was said [in 11.34] when treating the first sense of the question in the fourth main article.