Question Two: Could There Be Several Productions
Question Two
COULD THERE BE SEVERAL PRODUCTIONS
OF THE SAME TYPE IN GOD?
2.1 Once we see what, in the divine, is the order of essential and notional* features, the sequence to be followed in the questions about God is clear. If any questions had been raised about the essence or the intrinsic essential characteristics they would have been treated before the questions bearing on the persons or notional. But there was no problem about the essential except that it implies a relation to something external and everything notional is in its own way prior to any essential of this sort. Therefore, questions about the notional should be treated first. Notional features, however, are either relationships or productions.* Whether these be the same thing or not, I do not care. fA 2.2 The first of the questions about the notionals or productions is this: Can there be more than one production of the same type in God?!
Arguments Pro and Con I argue tor the affirmative:
The production of a suppositum* so far as the being of its substantial nature is concerned is called generation.* In the divine, however, there is a twofold production of this sort. Therefore, there is a twofold "generation" and hence a twofold production of the same type.
The minor is obvious since in the divine nature every production of a person terminates in his substantial being.
Proof of the major: Generation, according to the Philosopher,? is distinguished from other kinds of changes precisely because it has as its term a substance or substantial being. Therefore, [the production of a person in substantial being is generation].
2.3 Arguments for the negative:
If there can be many productions of the same type, there can be 1Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.2, nn.197-200, 212-19, 270, 375
(II, 250-51,
255-58, 287-344).
2 Aristotle, Physica v, 1 (225a10-20).
GOD AND CREATURES
many "generations'* and many "'spirations'* and consequently, many "Sons" and many "'Holy Spirits." But the consequence is false, for otherwise there would be more than three persons. Therefore,
[there cannot be many productions of the same type].
Body of the Question 2.4
All theologians accept the negative conclusion. It is necessary, however, to ascertain whether their position is based on reason or faith alone. Different authors give different reasons. In the first place, therefore, we shall treat of the reasons which some cite for this conclusion; secondly, we shall see what it is preferable to hold on this subject; and thirdly, certain doubts which occur will be dispelled.
ARG IGiske.
An Evaluation of the Reasons for the Negative Conclusion 2.5 [Reasons] Four reasons are adduced in this connection?:
First, a form of the same species or, speaking more properly in the case of the divine, forms of the same type are multiplied only by reason of matter. In the divine there is no matter. In the divine, therefore, there is but one subsistent sonship, just as there could be but one subsistent whiteness.
2.6 Second, with one simple act God understands and wills all things. Hence, in him there can be but one person who proceeds by way of "word''* and one who proceeds by way of love.
2.7 Third, the persons proceed by a natural process. But nature is determined to one [effect or mode of action]. Therefore, [there is but one person for each type of production].
2.8 Fourth, the Son is perfect because he contains the totality of the divine sonship. Consequently, there cannot be any other.
2.9 [Evaluation of These Reasons: The First Reason] The first [in 2.5], it seems, proves too much and assumes a proposition which many consider dubious or false. The major, viz., 'a form of the same species is multiplied only by reason of matter,' which they claim holds for the angel as well as for God, can be interpreted in two ways:
(i) Every immaterial form is a "this" [or singular] of itself or ' Thomas, Summa theologica 1, q.41, a.6 in corp. (Taurini-Romae, 1948)
I, pp. 210-11; Henry of Ghent, Quodl. v1, q-1 in corp.
(fol. 216X-Y and 217H-I); Id., Summa a.54, q.2 in corp.
(u, fol. 78K); William of Ware, Sententiarum 1, d.7, g.4 in corp. oe
QUESTION TWO
by reason of what it is, even as God is a "this" in virtue of his deity so that, were one to think of deity alone, it would be a formal contradiction if God were not a "'this." (ii) Some immaterial form is not formally a "this" by reason of its quiddity, yet it still cannot be realized in multiple instances because such a unique singular and individual form would contain in itself intensively and extensively the total entity of that form, as is clear from the case of the sun.
2.10 [Consider the first of these interpretations] If the major is understood in the first sense, it follows that to be multiplied in reality is opposed to, and even contradicts, the specific form of the angels. Even as "being nonrational" conflicts with the concept of man, or "being several" is inconsistent with the concept of God, so "able to be in several individuals" would not be compatible with the concept of this species. Hence whoever would postulate that angelic species could be multiplied would have in his mind notions that are formally repugnant, namely the concept of the angelic species and the idea that it could exist in multiple instances. The same could be said for those who conceive of the angelic species as having the character of a universal in an unqualified sense, viz., as being predicable of many. Indeed, by conceiving the nature as universal in this way, the intellect would contain what is formally repugnant, i.e., the object understood and the manner in which it is conceived.
2.11 This consequent hardly seems plausible, since many theologians, Catholics and others, actually think of the angelic species in this fashion. Without any opposition in concepts, they admit its universality and ability to be multiplied in diverse individuals. The Fathers too seem to favor this view. As Damascene says*: '""The unique is both incommunicable and communicable; to him pertains the communication of one species and the same divine nature is present in three persons." And he adds afterwards: "In each order of angels and virtues he created different persons; not only that, he created them in each species also so that by the mutual communication of their nature they rejoice in one another, and joined to one another by natural happiness they felt secure and amicably disposed to one another."
2.12 Besides a condemnation of this consequent seems to be implied, prima facie, in the condemnation of three articles.'
* Damascene, De institutione elementari c.1: PG 95, 99.
5 Cf. Denifle, H.-Chatelain, A., Chartularium universitatis parisiensis
(Parisiis, 1889), p. 548, n.81; p. 549, 0.96; p. 554, 0.191.
GOD AND CREATURES
The first was condemned by Lord [Bishop] Stephen [Tempier], who lists as an "error" this proposition: "Intelligences* have no matter and God could not create several of the same species."
The second condemned article cites as an "error": "God cannot multiply individuals under one species without matter."
The third condemned article is this: 'Forms are only divided by reason of matter. This is an error unless it be understood of forms educed from the potency of matter." Therefore, to say this of forms not educed from the potency of matter is an error.
2.13 [To the second interpretation in 2.9] If one accepts the second meaning of the major proposition, it follows that the specific nature of Michael [the Archangel] is not of itself an individual or a "this." Therefore, it is not contradictory to such a nature not to be just "this" or not to be in this subject [rather than "that']. Hence, this nature can be made to exist and not be in this subject by a power able to accomplish anything that does not imply a contradiction.
2.14 Perhaps it will be objected that a situation of this sort cannot occur as long as Michael actually exists. Even so this does not rule out what we wish to prove. Nevertheless, it is false. The first point [i.e., that it does not rule out our contention] is clear enough.
Let Michael be destroyed and let his nature be realized in another individual. Hence, it is not absolutely necessary that Michael be this unique subject. Evidence for the second point, [i.e., that the statement is false]: What are simultaneously within an agent's power and are not mutually repugnant can be simultaneously realized.
Such would be "this Michael" and "that Michael," if Michael's nature is not of itself just "this."
2.15 Let us suppose the second interpretation were correct. For the purpose of our argument it would at least be true to say that "A form of the same species can only be multiplied by reason of matter" does not rule out absolutely the possibility of more than one divine sonship. And yet such multiplication is simply impossible, since it implies a contradiction. Only if taken in the first sense, therefore, does this proposition entail the conclusion which all concede to be true. But many with good reason regard the proposition in this sense to be false, as we have said. Now it is hardly suitable to hold a most certain and necessary conclusion for a reason that would prove more than is necessary and seems objectionable on several counts.
[5] 2.16 [Objections based on the intellective soul] There are additional objections based on the intellectual soul. For prior by nature
QUESTION TWO
to its infusion into a body, it represents the end product of a creative act. Now what is primarily the term of a creative act as such is formally an individual or a "this." Therefore, in the order of nature the soul is an individual in virtue of its own singularity before its union with something material. For a similar reason, another soul is "that individual" prior to its union with matter. In virtue of its own singularity, then, this soul is just "this" and hence it is "this" rather than "that." Consequently, by this primary distinction of singularity it is differentiated from other individual souls distinct from itself. Therefore, these souls are distinct by nature before being united to matter. Consequently, they are not distinct primarily and per se by their matter.® 2.17 Proof of the first proposition, namely "That which can exist without contradiction apart from another, but not vice versa, is naturally prior in nature to the second." This is taken from the Metaphysics.' In Bk. V, chapter 11, we read: "Some beings are prior, it is said, according to nature and substance, namely such as could exist without other things, while the others could not exist without them." And at the end of the chapter, he [Aristotle] reduces all types of priority to this. In the same Metaphysics,® Bk. II, he says:
"The 'being' of substance is the first of all.' He gives as proof of this that "None ofthe others is separable from substance," i.e., none can exist without substance whereas of itself substance and only substance can exist without the others. According to the Philosopher, then, this separability implies priority* of nature. Now the soul can be without matter not only according to substance and essence, but also according to existence and as the end product of a divine creation. Therefore, it can exist without being united to matter. But if it is not singular or a "this'' by its own singularity, it cannot be in matter either by creation or in any other way. Therefore, our first proposition to be proved follows.
2.18 But suppose one objects: Admittedly it is not a "'this' by reason of matter, i.e., by its actual union with matter or by its actually being in matter, but it is singular or a "this" by reason of the aptitude it has to exist in matter; now the soul is not prior [by nature] to this aptitude. This evasion still does not invalidate the argument, for the absolute nature itself is naturally prior to the aptitude, and 6 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. u1, d.3, qq.6-7 (ed. Vives xi, 127-70); 1, d.8, q.un., n.6 (ed. Vives xiv, 364-65).
7 Aristotle, Metaph. v, c.11
(1019a1-5).
8 Ibid., vil, c.1 (1028a13-15).
GOD AND CREATURES
this soul has this aptitude to be in this body, and this aptitude for just this body is repugnant to another soul which has the aptitude to be in another body.
2.19 On this basis I argue as follows: What pertains to this, and is repugnant to another individual of the same species, does not pertain to this individual per se by virtue of something common to both of them. At least some distinction between this and that is a necessary prerequisite for this aptitude to pertain to this subject and to be repugnant to that. What is needed as a prerequisite, therefore, is some distinction between this and that. Neither the first distinction, then, nor the first singularity of this and of that stems from some aptitude they have.
2.20 Confirmation: An aptitude is not formally speaking something absolute; neither does it have the character of an actual being.
Proof of the first point: If it were conceived as an absolute, one could think of it without reference to any other term. The second point appears clear from this that an aptitude can refer to a nonexistent term. What necessarily demands something nonexistent is itself not something existing as actualized. Now this soul is something singular and absolute and it is so by a singularity that is both absolute and actualized. Therefore, its aptitude is not the formal reason for its singularity.
2.21 What we gather from this case of the soul is the following:
"A form of the same species cannot be multiplied without matter" is not an absolutely necessary proposition in the sense that its negation is self-contradictory. And even though a form does have an aptitude for matter, its ability to be multiplied is something that is prior by nature to this aptitude. Therefore, the primary reason why it can be multiplied cannot be, in all cases, materiality.
2.22 [The primary reason why something can be multiplied is not materiality] Proof that immateriality is not the primary reason why a form of a given species is an individual or a "this" and that materiality is not the primary reason why a form of the same species can be in more than one individual. That by which something exists in actuality (and not just in the mind or in its cause) is also that by which it is primarily an individual or a ''this,"' because this sort of existence pertains only to individuals. Universality or not being a "this," on the other hand, can only pertain to something in the mind.
But for any given entity, particularly one that is something absolute or nonrelative, what has actual existence is the entity itself, for this is what passes primarily from nonbeing to being. Though many con-
QUESTION TWO
current factors may be there if it is to exist, such as matter if the form is to exist or form if the matter is to exist, still none of these concomitants is the primary reason why the entity itself exists.
Therefore, it is the entity itself that is primarily a "this" and hence we must seek the primary reason why the divine sonship is uniquely individual in what such sonship is in itself and not in the immateriality which only posits or excludes something peripheral to singularity proper.
2.23 Authority confirms this.
According to Avicenna,' even though matter be the matter of the form, it is not per se the cause of the form. Now nothing seems to be "this" or individual by something that is not its per se cause. This is also the mind of Aristotle?" in his claim that the material cause as well as the formal and efficient causes all have unity and distinction that is specific and numerical in proportion to products caused by them. "Those things," he says, "in the same species are different, not in species, but in the sense that the causes of different individuals are different, your matter and form and moving cause being different from mine, while in their universal definition they are the same."
2.24 For it is necessary that the essential components of the composite be indifferent or indeterminate where the composite is indeterminate and be determinate where the composite is determinate, for the indeterminate is not made up of determinate components nor is the determinate composed of indeterminates where the indifference or indeterminacy in question is that which is characteristic of universality. It is useless, therefore, to seek the reason for singularity (i.e., the primary reason for this determinate singularity)! in something extrinsic as if it were its formal principle, since anything extrinsic would be at best a kind of concomitant cause. It is always necessary that the primary formal reason for just this singularity stem from something intrinsic per se to the singular in question.
2.25 [Evaluation of the Second Reason in 2.6} The argument for the second reason is in the form of an enthymeme, where the suppressed proposition seems to be this: "Where there can be but one unique act of understanding, there can be but one unique word* or 'speaking the word.'
This proposition happens to be true in virtue of its matter in the case of a created intellect, but it is true not 9 Avicenna, Metaph. u, c.4 (Opera latina 1; Venetiis 1508, 75v).
10 Aristotle, Metaph. xu, c.5 (1071a25-30).
11 See Glossary: '""Haecceity."
GOD AND CREATURES
because a "word" is produced by the act of understanding itself, for, as we shall show later [in question 15], a word is produced by an act of speaking* which is not an act of understanding. No, the reason is this. In us all understanding gets expressed in an act of speech and in all speech some understanding is expressed. Therefore, if the understanding is unique or one, so too is the speech.
2.26 But this proposition does not hold good for God, because not every instance of divine understanding occurs by speaking. Indeed, the Father's understanding of all objects is not by way of an act of speech. Hence, so far as the present issue is concerned, the Father might well have one unique understanding of all objects and yet speak them singly if each single object has a word of its own.
2.27 Or, to put it briefly, this proposition does not seem to be necessary in virtue of its form. For even though one subject possess but one absolute form of the same kind, its active production of multiple terms could itself be multiple. For example, the sun, though it is luminous by a single light [form], can still have multiple acts of illuminating. Now to understand is the perfection of an intelligent being and perhaps it represents an absolute form. At least it is a perfection which exists in the subject thinking or functioning, and does not consist in the production of some term. Speaking, on the contrary, is said to be an action productive of a term. Therefore, this does not follow by reason of its form: "If the understanding is not multiplied, neither is speaking."
2.28 But you may object that speaking is not a transient act like illuminating. The term of the act remains within the same intellect.
If understanding in the divine intellect is unique because it is immanent, by the same token speaking will be unique.
It is true that in the divine intellect there is but one act of speaking even as there is but one act of understanding. But one who asks for the reason ought to be shown why this is so. For anyone assuming that in the divine the Son also speaks would claim there are two instances of speaking, one by the Father, the other by the Son. For it is not by the same act of speaking that the Son is produced and also produces. And still such a one would admit but one act of understanding, for understanding is communicable like everything essential in the divine. For this reason, by whatever notional acts it was communicated, the understanding would always remain undifferentiated even though the notional acts were distinct. After all, the essence remains absolutely the same even though it is communicated by different types of productions, and these are even more
QUESTION TWO
distinct than two instances of speaking would be, for they differ in their formal constitution.
2.29 On the other hand, by reason of its matter, the proposition "An intellect that has but one act of understanding has but one act of speaking" is true of a created intellect, because here the inteliection is the formal term of an act of speaking. And thus by reason of the limitation of the term itself, it is true that in the created intellect a different act of expressing would have a different formal term. But this reason does not hold in the divine, for there the formal term of the act of expressing is unlimited and hence there is no need to introduce distinctions in the term on the basis of the acts of expressing, which are the personal acts. As regards the objects, however, there seems to be some plausibility for the proposition "Where there is one understanding there is one speaking." For an intellect that can comprehend many objects with a single act of understanding can with equal reason express declaratively* knowledge of many things with a single act of expressing. From this, however, it would only follow that by reason of the objects there are not different acts of speaking even as there are not different acts of understanding.
2.30 Furthermore, to justify completely what we intend to prove, it is necessary to show that in the divine there is no other act of speaking as regards the same object whether this be the act of another person speaking (e.g., if the Son were to speak his Word) or of the same person (e.g., if the Father spoke another word).
2.31 [Evaluation of the third reason in 2.7] In the third reason the proposition: "Nature is determined to one [effect or mode of action]'' does not imply that only one person could be produced naturally or by way of nature. For not only the same specific nature, but also a unique nature found in but one singular being, can be a productive principle that is natural as regards many effects. This appears clear from the case of fire which naturally produces many fires. Consequently the meaning of the proposition "Nature is determined to one" is this: It is determined not to one producible, i.e., one in number or to one singular effect, but to one definite manner of producing, for here there is no principle like the will which remains indeterminate with respect to opposite effects.
2.32 But suppose one claims the following: The reason a nature can be the principle or source of many products by way of a natural or nonfree production is that it makes use of many materials and hence needs many things other than itself as a prerequisite condition. This producer [viz., God], however, makes use of nothing
GOD AND CREATURES
other than himself. Neither could there be many distinct materials from which more than one production could occur. An objection of this sort, however, is of no value. If a natural agent can still produce many effects when its effect is only partially within the scope of its active powers (viz., as regards form), then a fortiori an agent requiring no previous matter and having its effect completely within the scope of its active power [viz., as regards both form and matter] can produce as many or an equal number of effects. For the perfection of such power does not limit the agent as regards what can be produced. Now a natural agent whose active power extends to its effect only partially (i.e., to its form) can produce many effects of the same kind while remaining the same. Therefore, the same would be possible for an agent whose effect is wholly within the scope of its active power and who requires no previous matter.
2.33 This is obvious. As one species of agent can produce many effects simultaneously, so also can God create many at once. Therefore the reason the same producer can produce many effects does not depend solely on the fact that it does or can produce them from many passive principles. It depends rather on the active power of the agent and whether the product in question is capable of being multiplied. Hence to show that the term of a production is unique or of one kind only, it is necessary to prove it cannot be turned out by several productions of the same kind, whether these be productions out of something or out of nothing or whether the production be a natural process or [one that depends on the will].
[11] 2.34 [Evaluation of the fourth reason] As for the fourth reason [in 2.8, note the following]: The Son is perfect God and yet he does not possess divinity in every way in which it could be had. For another person can possess this same divinity, not another, and do so in a different way. From the fact that the Son is intensively* perfect, therefore, even as he is perfect God, it does not follow that he possesses all possible filiation extensively or at least that he has it in the only way it can be had. However, since filiation is not the sort of thing that can be communicated to several, there is no need to distinguish between different filiations and different ways of possessing it [so far as what we want to prove is concerned]. Indeed, just as the divinity can exist perfectly in one [person] and still exist in a different way in another, so too might filiation exist perfectly in one person and yet be possessed in a different way by another.
2.35 [Iwo Other Reasons Given for the Negative Conclusion:
he ee ts
QUESTION TWO
First Reason] Some' give this reason for the negative conclusion:
If the total fecundity destined for generating the Son is exhausted in producing one son, it would be impossible for a second son to be produced together with him, for the second would have to be produced without that fecundity destined to produce a son. But in God the fecundity for generating a son is completely exhausted in producing the Son, for the Son, the unique act by which he is generated, and the way the two are interrelated all remain the same forever. No fecundity would remain, therefore, for generating a second son unless two complete productions of the same type and from the same source would coexist. But this is just as impossible as it is for the same matter to be moved simultaneously by several movements (either of becoming or alteration) so that the end result is something identical in species but multiple in number. The Philosopher!* affirms as much when he points out that the same thing cannot be moved simultaneously by several movements of the same kind. Hence we have the minor, viz., that God's fecundity is completely exhausted in producing the Son, for this act continues in existence forever and always proceeds from the same source in the same way.
2.36 An example confirms this. If a man had but one sperm cell and this was all that was available to him for generating a man, and if from this seed this one son would be always begotten, it would be impossible for him to generate another son.
2.37 [Second reason] In brief this argument can be put as follows: If an act is adequate, that is, commensurate with its source or principle, and always remains uniform, it is not compatible with another act of the same kind proceeding from the same active principle. But in the divine the unique act of generation is commensurate with its principle and remains always. Therefore [it is not compatible with another act of the same kind proceeding from the same active principle].
2.38 [The first reason is invalid] As for the first reason [in 2.35] the word "exhausted," if properly understood of corporeal things, denotes that nothing of what was there before remains in what is exhausted, as is clear from the example of water in the well. But it i ea 12 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. vi, q.1 in corp.
(fol. 216X-Y and 217H-I); Summa a.58, q.1 in corp. (1, fol. 123G-125V); a.59, q.2, ad 1 (11, fol. 137H);
William of Ware, Sent. 1, d.7, q.4 in corp.
13 Aristotle, Physic. v, c.4 (228a3-6).
GOD AND CREATURES
cannot be understood here in this way, for in producing the Son the fecundity of the Father is not exhausted, but in its entirety it remains in him forever. Hence another analogy is needed such that "exhausted" would mean that in the Father nothing remains available for a further production or for generating another son, just as we could speak somehow of a spring being exhausted by a continuous act of drinking if no additional water remained for another act of drinking.
2.39 Therefore, the major is conceded, for once the fecundity ordained to generate a son has been exhausted in this way, no other son could be generated. But the minor needs proof, namely, that in the Son's generation, all the fecundity available in the divine for begetting a son is exhausted. Now the proof suggested is that this generation goes on forever and stems from the same source, as it were, and makes use of the same '"'matter" or passive principle, as it were. Hence many productions cannot exist simultaneously even as several movements cannot [occur at the same time in the same matter].
2.40 This reason is not enough to prove the point in question. It can be refuted in this way. Every power which could have an additional act if its first did not remain forever is able simply to have another act. But the only reason you give why the generative power
[14] in God is unable to have another act is that the first goes on forever.
Therefore, speaking absolutely, that power is able to have another act in the sense that no contradiction is involved. If this power can have another act, however, it must have it, for there is nothing possible or noncontradictory in the divine that is not actualized. Therefore, there are many actual generations there. The conclusion is false; therefore one of the premises is also false. It is not the major, therefore it must be the minor, which was accepted, it seems, on the grounds of your argument.
2.41 The major of our counter-argument is proved by reason and example.
The proof from reason is this: Potency is naturally prior to act.
Now what is repugnant to the naturally prior only because of something naturally posterior is simply not repugnant to it. For no contradiction arises between something and the naturally prior simply because there is a contradiction between it and the naturally posterior. Therefore, if another act is repugnant to a power only because it is always eliciting the first act, it is not absolutely repugnant to it, and thus can pertain to it simply without contradiction.
QUESTION TWO
2.42 The example is this: Suppose the sun were to light up the universe with an illumination that was adequate both intensively
(i.e., it would illuminate as perfectly as it could) and extensively (i.e, the light would extend to everything capable of being illumined by the sun). Suppose further that this action continued forever so that the sun could not light up anything else. The reason for this would not be that it is simply repugnant to the sun as a source of light to be the principle of further illumination, but rather that everything that can be lighted up actually is lighted. On its part the sun, absolutely speaking, is able to illuminate more. Hence, if the sun necessarily produced all the illumination it was capable of, it would actually produce this light. The necessity of this single production, consequently, is never an unqualified necessity nor does it stem from the fact that the one production continues forever.
2.43 Confirmation of this argument:
If a potency or power, of its nature, is not necessarily limited to this act, but merely elicits it at all times, then absolutely speaking such a potency, as prior [by nature] to the act, could have another act. There seems to be no reason, therefore, why the potency elicits this act rather than the other and, consequently, since neither is less necessary than the other, either neither act or both acts would be elicited by the power simultaneously.
2.44 So far as this argument [in 2.35] goes, then, this seems in brief to be the case. Because the act always remains or because the potency cannot be actuated simultaneously by diverse acts are not sufficient grounds to establish the conclusion of the argument to the extent that it is true. What needs proof is that the necessity that there be but one production of the same species is of such a nature that even if, to assume the impossible, this production did not always continue or even if it never existed, no other production of the same type could exist in God.
If this Father did not exist, it would be wholly contradictory to speak of a Father in the divine.
Similarly if this Father did not beget by this act of generation, or, to assume the impossible, he generated by an act that was momentary rather than permanent, he could have no other generation. For not to admit that the unique production is absolutely and in every way necessary is equivalent to admitting that another production is possible and hence necessary, for whatever is possible there is necessary.
2.4% [Invalidity of the second reason] What we have said also shows the inconclusiveness of the second reason [in 2.37], the one
GOD AND CREATURES
presenting the argument in brief form, based on the act's adequacy.
The major takes adequacy either intensively or both extensively and intensively. If taken in the first sense, adequacy does not imply only one production is possible. Another might be possible although not at the same time. All that follows is that at one time only one production is possible. If the only reason one production alone is possible is that another cannot exist at the same time, then, speaking simply, another production is possible, and consequently, in this case, it would be simply necessary. If adequacy is taken in the second sense, then the minor is not proved, unless perhaps it is based on the assumption that this unique production. goes on forever, which we discussed earlier [in 2.40].
ARTICLE II
Solution of the Question 2.46 [Reason can prove that several productions of the same species are impossible in God] As regards the second article,
I maintain that the conclusion 'In the divine more than one production of the same species is not possible" is not just taken on faith but can be established by necessary reason. The argument can be formulated first in the form of a reduction ad impossibile; second, as a positive proof; and third, the thesis can be confirmed from the mind of the Philosopher.
1. Indirect Argument or the Reductio ad impossibile 2.47 The argument may be formulated as follows:
If more than one production of the same type can exist, then productions ad infinitum can exist. If this be so, then it is necessary that there be an infinity of productions, for nothing can be in God that is not there necessarily. The last consequent is clearly impossible; therefore the first antecedent is also impossible.
2.48 Proof of the first inference from authority and reason:
The authority is that of Augustine:* "Far be it from anyone to say that the Father is more powerful than the Son, as you claim, simply because the Father generated the creator and the Son did not. For it was not that he was unable, but it was not becoming." And he explains why it was not becoming: "Divine generation would be unbridled if the generated Son would beget a grandson to the Father.
For unless the grandson in turn produced a great-grandson to the grandfather, he would be impotent, according to your amazing
14 Augustine, Contra Maximinum Ui, c.12, n.2: PL 42, 768.
QUESTION TWO
wisdom. And this last would produce another, and he in turn another, and so on." And he adds: 'The series of generations would never be completed if from every one another were generated.
Neither would any one finish the series if one omnipotent is not sufficient." According to the mind of Augustine it would follow that if the one person produced by such a production did not suffice to complete the entire production, then no other, nor any number of persons, would suffice. And so whether it would be the Son that generated another son in the direct line, or whether the same Father would generate this son and that son, whatever the reason given for postulating a plurality, the same reason would always justify an infinity of such productions.
2.49 This same inference is proved from reason. Any kind of thing that can be multiplied or exist in more than one individual of the same type is not of itself limited to any certain number. This proposition is evident if you consider the relationship of something common or universal to its singular instances, or of a cause to what it causes, or of a principle to what proceeds therefrom. If instances of the same common thing can be multiplied, such a thing of itself is not limited to a certain number of such instances. Neither is a cause limited of itself to a certain number of results.
2.50 From this proposition just proved it follows that any given type of thing that can be multiplied, so far as itself is concerned, can be multiplied ad infinitum unless it is limited on some other grounds. Such limitation cannot come from a source or principle specifically the same as itself. Therefore, if some productive principle in the divine could have more than one production of the same kind, neither of itself nor by virtue of the formal principle from which it stems would such a production be limited to any definite plurality. On neither score is any given number repugnant to it.
Therefore, either such productions could be, and hence would be, infinite (which is the conclusion we draw), or else their limitation to a certain plurality would be on grounds other than what they are in themselves or what their productive source is. But in God there is nothing that could account for such a limitation. It could not come from anything posterior [in nature] to the production, for nothing gets its entity, and hence its unity or plurality, from the posterior. Neither can it stem from something simultaneous in nature with the production, for the same reason why one type of production is not of itself limited numerically applies with equal force to what is simultaneous in nature. Neither can the limitation arise from
GOD AND CREATURES
something prior, whether this be the subject or person who does the producing or the formal principle by means of which the production is accomplished. The formal principle cannot account for the limitation, as is clear from the proof of the major, for a productive principle of the same type is not limited of itself to a certain plurality of productions of the same kind. Neither can the limitation come from the person who produces, for the person is able to have as many productions as the productive principle he possesses is capable of. If there is no limitation on the part of the productive principle, therefore, then there is none on the part of the producer.
Thus the absurd consequence of denying the. thesis we wish to prove seems clear. If in God there could be more than one production of the same type, then an infinity of such would exist.
2. The Positive Proof 2.51 The second or positive proof is this:
In the divine what cannot be restricted in some way to a certain plurality cannot be multiplied at all. But a production of the same type in the divine cannot be restricted to a certain plurality. Therefore, it cannot be multiplied at all, which is the thesis we set out to prove.
2.52 First I shall explain the major and then I shall prove it.
I speak of a "certain plurality,' for instance, two, or three, or four, or some other definite given number. That it be restricted to a certain plurality by something that is posterior or simultaneous [in nature] I claim is impossible and includes a manifest contradiction.
2.53 Understanding it in this way, I prove the major as follows:
If something, so far as itself is concerned, cannot be restricted to a certain plurality, then so far as it itself goes there is a possibility of any number of instances of it, for there is nothing contradictory about any given plurality being exceeded and this ad infinitum. But in the divine nothing can be multiplied beyond any given plurality, because then it would be necessarily multiplied in this way and thus an infinite multiplicity would exist there.
2.54 Proof of the minor: What does not presuppose several different types of principles that restrict it to a certain plurality cannot be limited at all to a smaller number of the same. A production of the same type in the divine does not presuppose several different types of principles which might restrict it to a certain plurality.
Therefore it cannot be limited at all to a certain plurality.
QUESTION TWO
2.55 I prove the major and minor of this argument.
For the major the proof runs as follows: If the same sort of thing can be multiplied then it is not of itself limited to a certain plurality.
This was proved [in 2.50] by the indirect argument ad impossibile.
For the same reason, individual instances of the same kind are not [19] of themselves restricted to being just so many. As fire of itself is not restricted to any specific number of fires, so neither are the individual fires of themselves limited to any specific number so that there must be just so many. If what can be multiplied is necessarily limited to a certain plurality, this restriction comes from something other than itself. This is not some factor that is either posterior or simultaneous by nature, as we said in the ad impossibile argument.
Hence the restriction must stem from one or more factors prior by nature. And this prior factor cannot be the same kind of thing, for such would not impose a certain plurality on things that are the same in kind, as we said earlier in the reductio ad impossibile. The restriction, then, must stem from some prior factors no two of which are of the same type. Otherwise the same question would arise in regard to them. Neither could they account for the limitation if they were the same in kind. Hence we have this proposition: What cannot be restricted by some prior plurality of factors, each different in kind, cannot be limited to a certain plurality at all.
Proof of the minor: Those different productions which are assumed to be of the same type only presuppose two principles, namely the producer and that formal principle by which the production is accomplished. Neither presupposes as a necessary prerequisite a plurality of factors, each different in kind, which might limit these productions to a certain plurality. Obviously the formal principle does not, since the productions are assumed to be of the same kind.
Neither is such a plurality required in the person who does the producing, at least not the sort of plurality that would restrict the production to a certain plurality. This follows from the fact that the person can have as many productions as his productive principle is capable of.
2.56 Summary: The positive argument just established can be summarized briefly.
Every necessarily finite plurality is either of different kinds of things or, if not, it necessarily presupposes some such plurality as its limiting factor. Every plurality in the divine is necessarily finite.
Therefore, it is either of the first or the second sort. But neither
GOD AND CREATURES
allows a plurality of productions of the same kind. Therefore, as regards the productions, a plurality of the same type is not possible.
The major of this argument was clearly established in both the reductio ad impossibile [in 2.50] and in the positive argument [in 2.55].
The minor of the first syllogism is evident enough. In the divine, possibility entails necessity, and therefore necessary infinity is entailed by possible infinity or even by the lack of necessity for any specific finite number.
The minor of the second syllogism, namely that neither alternative allows a plurality of productions of the same kind, is evident, for they are neither of different kinds, being productions of the same kind, nor do they necessarily presuppose a plurality of different types that might limit their number.
3. Confirmation from the Philosopher (20] 2.57 Third, the conclusion is established from the mind of the Philosopher?® in the Metaphysics where he argues that "many heavens cannot exist because there cannot be many first movers.'' He proves this as follows: '""Those which are many in number but one in species have matter; the first mover has no matter since it is pure act; therefore, the first mover and immobile being is one in kind and number." From this he infers: 'There is but one heaven."'
2.58 This position of the Philosopher seems to confirm the first reason of article one [in 2.5], namely that every immaterial form of the same type has a natural unity. But if we examine what Aristotle
Says in various places, we see he takes "matter'' here in a different sense, one that seems to confirm our thesis without lending any strength to the first reason.
2.59 Sometimes he calls matter the receptive principle which with act or form makes up a composite being, as when, in the Physics and many other places,1* he says matter and form are two principles. And by contrast he calls form that other principle which has the character of act and with matter constitutes the composite.
In other places, however, the quiddity or essence is called form; 15 Aristotle, Metaph. xu, c.8 (1074a32-1074b). Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. u, d.3, q.7 (ed. Vives x, 159-70); 1, d.2, nn.270-81, 300-303
(11, 287-94, 305309); d.7 (IV, 107-51).
16 Aristotle, Physic.
1, ¢.7
(1gobig-21, 191a8-23); I, C3 (194b24-30):
Metaph. v, c.6 (1016b32-33); vil, c.g (1037b5); xu, c.8 (32-38); De coelo 1, c.g (277b27-278b8).
QUESTION TWO
and matter, by contrast, is whatever serves to restrict or delimit that quiddity. Thus in relation to a specific essence the individual difference, whatever it may be, is called matter. Therefore, sometimes he calls matter that which receives an informing form; sometimes, that which contracts or determines an indifferent quiddity.
But such a contracting or determining factor can be understood in two ways: one, as intrinsic to the inferior or determinate member falling into such a common class; the other, as something presupposed, as it were, in the determined. For example, the individual difference of Socrates contracts man in the first way, for it is intrinsic to Socrates. But this body contracts whiteness or color in the second way, for in another body there is another whiteness, and according to this if there could be but three bodies, only three whitenesses could exist. The contracting element in the second sense, however, can be reduced to matter in the first sense or at least it includes a quasi-matter.
Therefore, wherever there is a plurality of the same kind, it is necessary to postulate matter, not in the sense of a recipient, but as a contracting factor in one sense or the other. For there is no way the same kind of nature could be multiplied if there were nothing to contract it in one way or the other. Conversely, where there is no "'matter'' in this sense, a plurality of the same kind is impossible.
But even this sort of "matter" is not possible in the divine productions, for there could only be such contracting or determining factors if the determination is to a certain plurality and hence presupposes a plurality of different kinds. But no plurality of different kinds prior to the divine productions can be postulated. And in this sense what the Philosopher wants to say is relevant to the conclusion we wish to prove.
2.60 But if we ask how and where, according to the Philosopher, would it be generally true, it seems that he would say that in the divine, or in anything immaterial, matter even in the second sense cannot be admitted. Hence he writes!': '""The essence and the thing itself are in some cases the same; i.e., in the case of primary substances...
. By 'primary' substance I mean one which does not imply the presence of something in something else, 1.e., in something that underlies it which acts as matter. But things which have matter are not identical with their essence.'
2.61 Here he does not want to say that in material things the essence and the subject which has it are not the same, though some
17 Aristotle, Metaph. vu, c.g (1037a34-1037b5).
GOD AND CREATURES
interpret him in this way, contrary to his own mind as we could show by expounding chapter seven (which I will forego doing here):
No, his point is that in nothing "material," i.e., which can be multiplied in any way, is the essence and the thing itself absolutely identical, for the thing itself includes "matter," i.e., something which contracts the essence but is not included in its formal notion. We agree with the Philosopher, therefore, in this that a form without matter in the second sense cannot be multiplied, and this suffices for our thesis, viz., that-there cannot be multiple productions of the same type. But this does not entail that what has no matter in the sense of a real part in a composite cannot be multiplied. Hence the Philosopher's statement, '""The first mover has no matter since it is pure act," [in 2.57] must be understood of matter in the second sense. For it has no "matter" to contract its essence so that it is "this," for it is a "this" or singular in virtue of what it is.
2.62 The question whether that which lacks matter in the first sense may have matter in the second sense would probably be answered differently by the Philosopher and by theologians. At present I am not concerned with this except to say that in the argument from the Metaphysics** the middle term substantially is not "has no matter in the first sense''-—which is how the proponents of the first reason in [2.5 of] Article One understand it—but "has no matter in the second sense.' In this sense both philosophers and theologians would admit the major and the minor premise are true. And therefore, since the divine nature cannot be multiplied in diverse subjects, so far as our purpose is concerned, both premises are true of a production of the same type, and hence the conclusion is true.
ARTICLE II
Objections and their Solutions L224 2.63 In this third article, objections are raised to what has been said, first to the conclusion and then to the premises.
2.64 [Two objections to the conclusion] Of the twofold objection to the conclusion the first is this:
Where the principle is of the same type and where the formal term is of the same type, there the production will be of the same type. But a divine essence of the same type is both the productive principle and the formal term of every production in God. Therefore, every production there is of the same type.
18 Tbid., xu, c.8 (1074a33-35).
QUESTION TWO
2.65 Proof for the major, it seems, is found in the Physics,!® for productions seem to be distinguished solely in terms of their formal principle or their term.
2.66 Proof of the second part of the minor, that which concerns the formal term. Everything produced gets its essence from the production. Just as the Son has nothing, says Hilary,?° unless he is born, i.e., he has only what he receives by being born, so the Holy
Spirit has nothing but what he receives by proceeding [from Father and Son]. He receives the essence, however, only as a formal term.
Augustine"? confirms this: "As the generation from the Father bestows essence on the Son, so his procession from both bestows essence on the Holy Spirit." What is bestowed or communicated can only refer to the formal term of the production. And since the essence is the source or principle of everything, it is as the first formal term and not as the consequent of another formal term that we must understand its communication through a production.
2.67 From this the second part of the minor is proved, namely that the essence is the formal principle of both productions. The formal term cannot be in any way prior to the formal principle of the producing. If then the essence is the formal term of the production, as we have just proved [in 2.66], and if it is the first being in the divine, as we have established in [1.5 of] the first question, then it follows that the essence as such is the formal productive principle in any production.
2.68 Another proof of both parts of the minor is this: That in which producer and produced are alike, especially when the production is univocal,* is the formal principle and formal term. But in the divine, the essence as such constitutes the first likeness between the producer and the produced. Therefore, it is the formal term of the production and the formal principle of the producing.
2.69 The second objection to the conclusion is this: What has a perfect formal principle for producing can produce with it. But the Son possesses perfectly the formal principle for generating or "speaking." Therefore [he can produce with it].
—— 2.70 Proof of the major: The reason a person can act is that he possesses a principle of acting and one that is most perfect.
Proof of the minor: Perfect memory is the first principle for gen19 Aristotle, Physic. v, c.1 (224b5-8).
20 Hilary, De Trin. vil, n.26: PL 10, 222.
21 Augustine, De Trin. xv, c.26, n.47: PL 42, 1094-95; CCSL 50a, 528.
GOD AND CREATURES
erating or ''speaking." But it is obvious the Son has memory like the Father ("Every person remembers himself'),?? and his memory is perfect.
2.71 [Objections to the premise] Third, the proposition that the first finite distinction has to do with things of different kinds is challenged on two counts.
First, a lessér distinction is closer to unity than is a greater distinction. But a distinction between things of the same kind is a lesser distinction than one between things that differ in kind. Therefore,
[it is closer to unity. ] Second, more than one thing of the same species can be immediately created by God. Therefore it is possible that a plurality of the same kind [of productions] would be absolutely first and immediate to unity. What holds for cause and caused applies equally to a principle and what issues therefrom.
2.72 [Answer to the first objection to the conclusion] There are three ways of answering the first objection [in 2.64].
[ 24 ] First, against the major.*® Even if the essence were the eliciting principle, so far as each production goes it would be a distinct principle with distinct determinants, such as this or that relation. And then the major would be false, namely where there is the same kind of elicitive principle, there is the same kind of production, unless the determinative principle is also of the same kind, which is not the case here.
2.73 [This answer is not cogent] Against this reply it can be said that if the elicitive principle without the determinative principle does not suffice, the same question will arise here as before. By what is the essence, which is the indeterminate elicitive principle, determined to this or that determinant? For if the same sort of principle cannot be the per se principle of different sorts of things, then neither can the essence, which is the root or basic elicitive principle, be the immediate source of several determinative principles of different kinds. For the same reason why different kinds of things stem from the same source must be given for these differences as for the others. And if these further differences are preceded by others, there will be an infinite regress. Or if this is impossible, then differentiation by relations as the determinative principles is insufficient.
22 Thid., xv, c.7, n.12: PL 42, 1066; CCSL 50a, 476.
*8 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. m1, q.3 (fol. 50I-M); Summa a.54, gy; ad 7 (u, fol. 133C-D); Thomas, Summa theol. 1, q.41, a.5 in corp. (I, 210). ay
QUESTION TWO
2.74 Besides, these relations are themselves productions. Now the same thing does not determine itself to itself. To say the essence is determined to active generation by a relation which is nothing other than the active generation itself, as will be shown later [in Question
Four], is to claim it is determined to generation by generation, and thus the same thing is a determinative principle of itself.
20) 2.75 [Another answer to the first objection in 2.64] The second solution also denies the major. Even though the essence is the sole productive principle, the productions themselves can be of different types, for some plurality can be first, but none can be actually, or even potentially, infinite. Now only a plurality of different types, or one which presupposes such, can be necessarily finite. Therefore, given a first, some plurality in the divine must be absolutely first and immediate to the unity. And so one could just as well assume it concerns the productions as anything else. Therefore, the major
(viz., where the principle is the same and the term is the same, there the production will be of the same kind) is false in the divine. It holds for creatures, however, of which the Philosopher speaks. For there the formal productive principle is either limited to one type of production, if it is a principle of the same kind [i.e., univocal*], or if it is an equivocal* principle and thus productive of several things different in kind, the formal term of its productions is limited, so that the same thing cannot be both the principle and the term of several different kinds of things. But in God neither can be the case, for here both the principle and the formal term are unlimited.
2.76 [This answer is not valid] Against this is the argument adduced in the first question [in 1.65ff.]. In such a case there is no more reason why the first person produced should be in reality a word rather than a Holy Spirit or why the Holy Spirit should be a Holy Spirit rather than a word.
2.77 Also for a person having the same formal principle for several productions there would be no priority in what he could do through it. Thus the first person could produce the Holy Spirit in the same order as he does the Son, and thus the Holy Spirit would not proceed necessarily from the Son.
2.78 [A valid answer to the first objection] The third solution [to 2.64] concedes the minor, namely that the essence is formal principle and formal term of both productions, but not so completely that nothing else is included per se in each. Indeed the essence is included in the formal principle, which is perfect memory and _ perBS
GOD AND CREATURES
fect will. The essence is also included in the formal term, which is the perfect Word and the perfect Holy Spirit. And perhaps in each
"case, the essence functions as a principle, and this with respect to what concurs with it, viz., intellect or knowledge and will or love.
Because of the identity of essence, that by which the producer produces and the formal term are the same. But because of the distinction between intellect and will which concur with the essence as productive principle, this and that [total] principle suffice for productions of different types and for terms that somehow differ in kind. Thus we have in the principle essence and intellect, essence and will; in the term, on the other hand, we have essence and knowledge, essence and love. What is identical in the formal term communicated is accounted for by what is identical in the formal communicative principle. What is distinct in the principle is the formal reason for a distinct production and explains why that which concurs in the term is formally distinct.*4
2.79 But of these two concurrent components, you may ask, is not [ 26 ] one the formal principle and the other only a concomitant factor, so that the principle could be said to be either formally identical or wholly different? I reply: The two elements that concur in the principle, namely, in the perfect memory, essence and intellect, in the perfect will, a will and a lovable object, are related neither incidentally nor per accidens, nor as remote and proximate principle.
But this whole, viz., an infinite intellect with an infinite intelligible object, constitutes one per se principle, so that neither factor without the other is producing principle. Hence there is simply one unique productive principle, not two distinct ones. The same holds for will and object as regards spiration. The situation is similar as regards the terms of the productions.
2.80 Why, you may ask, cannot the essence alone, as distinct from will and intellect, be the source for the communication of itself? I reply: An essence that is merely intellectual is not a principle of any production unless it coincides with memory and will.
2.81 [Answer to the second objection] A reply to the second obesti jection [in 2.69], first to its content, then to its form.
2.82 'To its content, a twofold reply can be given.
First: A form that is a producing principle in one person of a production commensurate with that form, cannot be a principle of producing in another person. Now memory is the producing prin- ** Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.z, nn.270-81, 300-303
(11, 287-94, 305-309); d.7, q.1, mn.1-g1
(IV, 107-48).
QUESTION TWO
ciple in the Father of a production commensurate with that principle.
Therefore, [it cannot be a producing principle for another person].
2.83 The major is proved by an example in this way. If the heat in fire were the source or principle for warming wood with a heat production commensurate to itself, and if that same heat were then communicated to the wood, it could not be for the wood a principle of heating. Proof: It would not be heating up itself, for then in the same subject the heat would be [both the effect and] the [cause or] principle producing it. Neither would it be heating another, for by hypothesis its present heat production is all it is equal to producing. And this proof is based on what complete commensurability means, namely the impossibility that the action be [less or] greater than the formal principle of acting. And under this interpretation, the minor is manifest. For just as the Father's memory has such an adequate "'speech act" [dictio] in the person of the Father that it is impossible for the "speech principle" [principium dicttvum] to speak more, so is it impossible that in God there be more than just this one "speech act,' for it is of itself singular. This is clear from the solution of the question. For everything in the divine that does not of necessity presuppose a plurality of different kinds is of itself just this or singular. But the "speech act" in the divine does not necessarily presuppose such. Therefore it is of itself just this one, and hence its source or principle has this "speech act" that is in every respect commensurate with it. Therefore, memory cannot be a principle [of production] in the Son.?°
2.84 [Second] The same point can be proved by the following proposition which has roughly the same meaning as the other [in 2.82]. A person or subject receiving a form by a production equal to that form cannot in turn produce by that form. The Son receives memory by a production equal to that memory. Therefore, [he cannot produce by means of it]. The minor is explained as in the previous argument.
2.85 Proof of the major: If the person or subject would produce by it, he would either produce himself or another. Not himself, for this is impossible according to Augustine.?* Nor would another be produced, for the production is, by assumption, equal or commensurate with the productive principle. Thus there is no need to look for some concomitant determinant factor that would limit the elicit25 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.g, nn.401-553 (UI, 245-330); d.7, nn. 191
(IV, 107-48).
26 Augustine, De tininet, G1, ni. Pie 42) 820:CES ro, 28.
GOD AND CREATURES
ing principle to just one "speech act." Nor, as a formal principle of this sort, can there be anything negative about it. Now granted that the essence or any other positive entity that has been received is, in the Father, the formal reason for "speaking" or generating [the Word], it still cannot be such in the Son. For it functions as an adequate principle of production already in the Father (as the first reason puts it) and is communicated to the Son by that production (as the second reason says).?7
2.86 As for the form of the argument [in 2.69], some objection could be made to both the major and the minor. For have or possess can be given many meanings according to the postpredicaments,* even though it is not proper to speak of something having a form in the abstract, if the form is not possessed in the manner it was meant to be by nature. Thus it would not be proper to say 'someone has whiteness" because he has it enclosed in his purse, for whiteness is meant to be by nature a [quality or] form inhering [in a subject].
2.87 Furthermore, when an abstract noun signifying a principle of action is constructed with a gerund signifying some action, it indicates that the principle of action is apt by nature to be possessed in such a way by its subject that the latter can use it to perform the action. I have a power for seeing for example. This power is apt by nature to be possessed by me not just as a form, but as a principle for performing the action that goes with that form. This is what such an abstract term [as ''a power' or "'a formal principle''] with a gerund [like "for seeing" or "for producing''] means.
2.88 Linguistic usage, also, sanctions this grammatical interpretation. Although "The Son of God knows of the Father's generating" is a true proposition, "The Son has the knowledge for generating" is not. The only reason for this is that the grammatical construction indicates that the subject has the abstract entity [i.e., the knowledge] not only as a form, but also as a principle for performing such an operation himself. Similarly, the proposition "Michael knows
God created the world and that the world is created'' does not mean he knows how to create the world.
2.89 If in the major "What has a perfect principle for speaking can speak with it," then, "has" is understood properly in the sense that when we speak of having something abstract, it means it is had as the form of the subject, and that when we put the word signifying the principle for the acting with a gerund signifying the action, we mean that in this subject it is a principle for acting in this
27 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.7, nn. 1-91 (Iv, 107-48).
QUESTION TWO
way, then I concede the major, since the subject includes all that is required for affirming the predicate of it. For when one has a form as his own form and as his own principle for acting, then he can be a principle of acting by means of it. But then the minor is false, for although the Son has perfect memory in some sense of "has," he does not have it as form, or if he does have it as form, he does not have it as a principle for acting, for reasons given [in 2.82].
2.90 As for the proof of the minor [in 2.70], one could say that "Perfect memory is the perfect principle for speaking" is an elliptical statement. Something in the dative case should be added to indicate for whom it is a principle for speaking.
2.91 Or, because the statement as it stands is indifferent and not specific, one could admit the memory is a principle of uttering a word, absolutely speaking; the minor says no more about the memory. That the Son has perfect memory [in this unspecified sense] is manifest.
2.92 To conclude, then, the statement "The Son has a perfect principle for speaking,' which was the minor of the first syllogism
[of the objection in 2.69], is a fallacy of amphiboly, or figure of speech, or of the consequent.
Amphiboly, because the major leaves unspecified the subject from whom the act signified by the gerund proceeds, since nothing definite is set down there as subject of the sentence. That the act is proceeding from some formal principle is all that is indicated, for that is what is set down as subject of the sentence. In the conclusion, however, both the definite subject and the form are designated, and therefore by virtue of its grammatical construction the conclusion indicates that the act is not only referred to its formal principle but also to the subject, as proceeding from someone.
Figure of speech, because of verbal similarities between the act signified by the gerund in the premise and in the conclusion the relation of the act to a formal principle is changed to a relation of act to the person or subject acting. Thus an essential quality or form is changed into this something, a subject.
A fallacy of the consequent, because the act signified by the gerund universally is not compared to any person or subject whereas in the conclusion it is related to a definite person or subject. Now this does not follow: '"The act is by this principle, therefore it is by this subject."
2.93 [Answer to the first objection in 2.71 to the premise] As for [ 30] the third objection: The proposition "The first plurality necessarily
GOD AND CREATURES
finite is of different types" is true, for every plurality that is necessarily finite, if it is not of different kinds of things, of necessity presupposes a plurality of this sort by which it is necessarily determined, as is clear from the second article [in 2.55]. Now the first plurality in the divine is both first and necessarily finite. That it is first is obvious. That it is necessarily finite is also clear, for in the divine only that which is actual is possible. Therefore the conclusion follows, namely that the first plurality in the divine is necessarily one of different types, and hence this is closest to unity.
2.94 As for what the major assumes [in 2.71], namely that a lesser plurality is closer to unity than a greater one, I have this to say.
"Greater" or ''lesser'' can be understood intensively or extensively.
"Lesser intensively" would mean that there is less reason or ground for the distinction. Thus the middle is distinct from the end to a lesser degree than one contrary from another. "Lesser extensively," whether it refer to a distinction or to a plurality, would mean fewer members. Thus triplets would be less of a plurality than quadruplets. And in this sense, the major is true, for a binary is closer to unity than a ternary or quaternary. But intensively the binary is not a "lesser plurality" than a ternary, for its two members are no less distinct from each other than are the three members in a ternary.
Extensively, however, it is, for pluralities or distinctions proceed in, an orderly fashion from unity. For the smaller number extensively or numerically is closer to unity or the unit which is the principle or starting point for numbers. And thus I concede that the distinction or plurality in God, although it be a distinction of types, is the least, for there are only two productions and there is no lesser plurality than duality.
2.95 But if we speak of a distinction or plurality that is intensively lesser or greater, this can also be understood in two ways. Either bold it is understood per se, i.e., with reference to the formal reason or ground for the distinction, or else per accidens, i.e., it expresses that the things to be distinguished have a greater or lesser entity or are more or less incompatible. For instance, in terms of reality and incompatibility, Socrates and Plato are more distinct from each other than are the meanings of genus and species, for the latter can concur in the same thing, e.g., color. And the entity of the two factors distinguished is less in the case of "genus" and "species" than in the case of Socrates and Plato. But if the major premise is understood of a distinction that is materially less, perhaps in some case it is true.
A conceptual distinction comes closer to something that is primarily
QUESTION TWO
one than does the real distinction. It is also less than the real distinction in terms of the entity and incompatibility of components distinguished. In the case at hand, however, there is no need to be concerned about this kind of majority or minority, for we are not claiming a conceptual distinction as closest or immediate to that from which all multitude proceeds, viz., to the essence itself.
2.96 If we interpret "greater" in a second way, however, namely intensively but per se or in terms of the formal reason for the distinction, then the major [of 2.71] is simply false. A distinction of different types has to be closest to the first one from which any distinction whether real or conceptual proceeds, for some distinction must be finite and what is primarily finite is a distinction of different types, as it was argued. This is clear, for according to the common opinion, when a conceptual distinction follows immediately a real unity, those facets that are mentally distinct are presented as distinct in kind, not as the same sort of thing but numerically distinct.
And this distinction [closest to unity] is greater in terms of the formal reason for the distinction, although it is lesser in two other ways, namely in number and in terms of the reality and incompatibility of the distinguenda.
2.97 [Answer to the second objection in 2.71 against the premise] From what has been said the answer to the objection based on a plurality that comes immediately trom God is clear. In creatures where specific natures are multiplied in different subjects none is necessarily determined. There are this many or that many solely by the will of the agent, so that there is no repugnance that the natures be in more than one individual. If therefore several such things of the same type come from God immediately, they are finite in actuality because the divine will impose finitude upon them. But they are not necessarily finite, because there is nothing intrinsic to creatures to which a greater or lesser plurality is contradictorily opposed.?*
28 He does not answer the initial argument. Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.10, nn.1-62 (Iv, 339-66); d.13, nn.1-103 (Vv, 65-124).
Question 'Three
ARE THESE TWO COMPATIBLE: A RELATION
RELATED TO ITS OPPOSITE IS A REAL THING;
AND, AS RELATED TO THE ESSENCE,
IT IS ONLY AN ASPECT?
3.1 Questions about the relations follow the discussion of the productions.* The first concern relations of origin* [viz., QQ. 3-5] the second, common relations* [viz., Q. 6].
3.2 The first question on the relations of origin concerns their tie in with the essence; the second, how they are bound up with the person; third, their own measure of perfection.
3.3 The first question then is this: Are these two compatible: a relation as related to its opposite is a real thing [res]; and, as related to the essence, it is only an aspect [ratio]?!
Arguments Pro and Con It is argued they are not:
If it is only an aspect as related to the essence, this is because it merges with the essence. But as related to its opposite, it remains the same thing it was, for as an aspect it is the same thing as the essence and the divine simplicity rules out the possibility of its being in any way not the same. Therefore, if it is only an aspect as related to the essence, then it has to be such as related to its opposite.
3.4 The argument for the opposite is this:
As related to the essence it is an aspect; the divine simplicity proves this much. But as related to its opposite it is not an aspect, but a thing; otherwise it would not constitute a really distinct subject. Therefore, both situations coexist.
Body of the Question 3-5 Here there are three points to be investigated: (1) In itself is the relation of origin a thing, and if so, what kind of thing? (2) As related to the essence, is it a thing and of what kind? (3) How certain doubts raised by the solution to the question are to be resolved.
'Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, dd.4-5 (Iv, 1-86).