Question Seventeen: Are Acts Of Natural Love And
Question Seventeen
ARE ACTS OF NATURAL LOVE AND
MERITORIOUS LOVE SPECIFICALLY
THE SAME?
17.1 The next question raised is this: Are acts of natural love and meritorious love specifically the same?? ee Arguments Pro and Con It is claimed they are not:
Acts elicited by specifically different principles are themselves specifically different. Such are these acts of natural and meritorious love. Therefore [they differ specifically].
Proof of the major: In what issues from a principle, the difference is not less but greater than that of their principles.
Proof of the minor: The will elicits natural love by its own natural action whereas meritorious love is elicited by means of the supernatural habit of charity. Now natural and supernatural are specifically different.
17.2 It is argued against this view that the specific difference among acts is derived mainly from their per se objects. But the per se object of both natural and meritorious dilection is God loved under the aspect of the supreme good.
Body of the Question 17.3 In this question we must first see what natural love means, then what meritorious love means, and then determine the truth of the matter.
ARTICLE I
The Meaning of Natural Dilection or Love 17.4 As for the first point, note that here 'natural love" does not mean the inclination to good coeval* with nature and perhaps not distinct from it, but rather the elicited act of dilection. This inclina1 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.17, nn.129-59
(Vv, 202-15); Iv, d.49, qq-9-10 (ed. Vivés xx1, 316-83).
QUESTION SEVENTEEN
tion is not an elicited act, though it could be called "habitual love," for, like a habit, it precedes the act and remains afterwards.?
17.5 Uhe natural love we are asking about could be understood in two ways. It could mean an act elicited in accord with a natural inclination, as when the soul [mens] actually loves itself or actually loves what is advantageous. In another sense, it could be contrasted with supernatural and would refer to such natural acts as the will could perform of itself, regardless of whether it be in harmony with a natural inclination or not. Thus the will of itself could have a vicious act, even though Damascene' would style such an act unnatural [contra naturam] or anatural [praeter naturam]. In this question natural love seems to have this latter meaning, for the first argument [in 17.1] proceeds on this assumption. It should be noted, however, that the first sense of natural dilection perhaps falls under the second sense in most cases at least, for our natural powers suffice to elicit most acts to which we are naturally inclined. Not all, however, for we do have a natural inclination to the most perfect act of love for the ultimate end and yet we cannot attain that act by our nature alone.?
ARTICLE II
The Meaning of Meritorious Love or Dilection 17.6 [Relations involved in the meritorious] To the second point
{in 17.3], I say that the meritorious act is one acceptable to God in a special way, viz., as worthy of reward. I say "in a special way'' because God accepts all acts with a general acceptation. He loves them according to the measure of their goodness and orders them to himself as their last end. A meritorious act, however, he accepts with reference to some good which ought to be justly awarded it.
"Meritorious," then, implies two additional relations in the act, one to the accepting will, the other to the award that the will has assigned to the act. This second is analogous to what is involved in using something, for just as to use is to order the willed object to something else as an end, so the will to whom the act is of merit orders this act to something as its reward. Neither of these two relations is real (or non-mental), for neither pertains to the act in virtue of some new reality therein. It arises solely through the act of the will accepting it. Not only can the intellect relate an object by a re2 Cf. ibid., 1v, d.4g, q.10, nn.2-3 (ed. Vives xx1, 318-19).
3 Damascene, De fide orth. 11, c.30: PG 94, 975; ed. Buytaert, c.44, p.162.
4 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. prol., nn.12-39, 57 (I, 9-22, 35)-
GOD AND CREATURES
lationship that does not stem from the very nature of the thing, but the will can do the same. Where the intellect relates it by knowing it, the will relates it by accepting it. This ability to relate by a relationship that does not stem from the very nature of the object may be due to what these two powers have in common, their immateriality.
17.7 You may wonder whether a relation in the object produced by the will should be called a conceptual relation. One could say that if "conceptual relation" be taken strictly to mean a relationship produced in the object by an act of that faculty which is in essence rational (i.e., the intellect), then it should not be called such since it stems immediately from the will eliciting the relational act. Then it would follow that if 'conceptual relation" be taken strictly, not every relation is either real or conceptual, for a third type exists, namely, "a relation of will' which arises from the will's relating one thing to another. But "conceptual relation" could also be taken to mean any relation stemming from the relating done by any faculty that is rational either in essence or by participation, and then this third type could be called a ''conceptual relation."
17.8 What is more, "meritorious" connotes or demands as a kind of prerequisite that the act issue from a double principle, as it were.
One is the will as freely eliciting or commanding the act, for nothing is accepted as meritorious unless it be freely in the power of the agent. Further, what merit and demerit have in common, viz., imputability, demands this relationship to a will as master of its acts.
For nothing is imputed to anyone as deserving reward or punishment, and hence as praiseworthy or blameworthy, unless it lies in his power. The other requirement in the act is its relationship to a supernatural form which renders the person or operative power acceptable and is assumed to be grace or charity.> No act is accepted as worthy of reward unless the person performing it is acceptable.
As Genesis puts it®: "God looked with favor on Abel and his offering,"' first on Abel, then on his gifts, for the offering of one unloved is not pleasing. Hence, Genesis adds: "But for Cain and his offering he had no regard."
17.9 It is not clear, however, just what relationship to charity is needed in the act for it to be meritorious. It seems enough that char- *Cf. ibid., n.18
(1, 12-13); 1, d.17, nn.ig2ff.
(v, 207ff.); mm, d.19, q-un., n.7
(ed. Vives xiv, 718-19); d.18, q.un., n.q (ibid., 663-64); 1, d.7, nai (ed. Vivés x11, 386-87); Iv, d.6, q.6, n.2 (ed. Vivés xvi, 578-79).
8 Genesis 4:4.
QUESTION SEVENTEEN
ity exist in the agent, since his act would be especially acceptable if he is especially loved because of charity. Thus we see one person's prayer accepted whereas another's supplication is not, yet there is no difference between them in anything that functions actively in the act of supplication. It is just that one suppliant is especially loved, the other not.
17.10 Against this view it is argued that a person possessing charity can sin venially. Reply: Such an act is unacceptable since it contains something reprehensible. But if there be nothing offensive about it, the person's acceptability suffices to make the act acceptable.
17.11 What militates against this reply, it seems, is that a person possessing charity can still elicit an indifferent act.7 There is no apparent inconsistency about such a person eliciting an act without directing it to the ultimate end either actually or virtually (that is, by virtue of some act that is directed immediately to that end). Such an act would not be meritorious, but neither would it be sinful, since no precept exists obliging one to order all his actions to God either actually or virtually in the aforesaid way.
17.12 [Conclusion] One can say, then, that the mere possession of charity does not suffice to make a person's act meritorious. In addition, the act must be elicited in accord with the inclination of that charity. For God, who loves only himself for his own sake, can give to a creature some Godlike form; he who has such is loved in a special way, and the work it inclines him to do is itself especially acceptable to the degree it accords with that inclination.
ARTICLE III
Solution of the Question 17.13 [Natural and meritorious love are not specifically different]
To the third main point [in 17.3], one can say that meritorious and natural love do not differ in species if we are speaking of a per se difference in what their essential concepts mean, though not if we are speaking per accidens of a difference, namely, some concomitant factor such as a difference of objects or something similar, including even some specific difference in the natural being of the act.
17.14 Proof of the conclusion understood in this way:
One absolute form is not distinguished from another by a relation alone but by some absolute difference within the same genus, ac7 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 11, d.41, q.un. (ed. Vivés xl, 431-36).
GOD AND CREATURES
cording to that dictum in the Categories*: "When genera are coordinate and different, the differentiae will differ specifically."
Therefore, the absolute is not distinguished specifically by something relative. Now the act of love is an absolute form (as was shown [in 13.8-16] in the question on this matter), whereas the meritorious, as we said [in 17.6-8], only implies a relation. Therefore, {the act of love is not distinguished specifically by a relation].
17.15 Even if one of the premises of this argument should be denied, these two propositions at least seem to be true: "No specific difference is produced by a conceptual or non-real relation alone,' and, as it was said [in 17.6-7], "Meritorious only implies formally a relation or relations that are not real, i.e., to the accepting will and to the reward with reference to which it is accepted."
17.16 [Objections and Answers] It could be said that while these reasons imply that the natural act of love is not distinguished from that of meritorious love in terms of its nature, it can still be distinguished in terms of its moral dimensions. For the latter distinction is based on a relationship, since circumstances indicate relations, and perhaps some, like that of the end or purpose, are not real relations. For that someone wills this act for that end implies no more in the act, it seems, than the relation of having been willed and related to such an end by an act of the will.
[7] Against this it is argued: What is properly potential to a specific form is not specifically distinct from the species itself, for insofar as it is potential, it is not a complete species. Now the natural act of love, as we speak of it here, is properly potential as regards the meritorious act. For the natural act, regarded as being in the power of the will, is capable of the ordering that "meritorious" implies. For instance, if an animal were constituted only by the form of animal and not by a specific form under the genus of animal, it would not be specifically distinct from any species under the genus animal, for it would be properly potential as regards the specific form. The same can be said of the nature of the act when compared to those additional conditions which "meritorious" implies.
17.17 One might object that the moral act could still be said to be specifically distinct from the meritorious act in the moral order, because it belongs to the species of moral virtue whereas the meritorious act belongs to a specifically different virtue, namely, one that is supernatural. Now these two virtues differ specifically; consequently, the corresponding acts also differ specifically in the moral order.
8 Aristotle, Praedicam., c.3 (1b17-18).
QUESTION SEVENTEEN
Now the act of a moral virtue is natural in the sense that it is within the native powers of the will, for the act does not exceed the totality of its power [as does the supernatural act].
I answer: The act with all the circumstances required for moral virtue is still potential with reference to that virtue which is meritorious [i.e., the supernatural virtue]. It is even more immediately potential than is the natural act, where "natural," refers to the bare nature which moral virtue presupposes. For it is reasonable that a merely natural act first receive such perfection as that of moral virtue which does not transcend nature's powers, and only then, that it receive further such perfection as is simply supernatural. Hence the reason given above [in 17.16], viz., that the potential is not specifically distinct from that in relation to which it is potential, not only holds for a purely natural act with respect to moral perfection but also for the perfectly moral act, for under the major premise, we could include a minor which would apply not merely to the natural act but also to the moral act.
17.18 When it is argued: "Moral virtue differs specifically from charity; therefore their respective acts differ specifically in the moral order," the entailment is not valid if we are speaking of subordinate virtues. Although it would seem that the acts of opposed virtues would be specifically distinct, at least in their moral being, nevertheless when one virtue is superior and the other subordinate there is no need that the goodness which the act derives from one be absolutely distinct in species from the goodness derived from the other. It is rather that the higher virtue gives additional goodness which completes, as it were, that given by the subordinate virtue.
Thus charity is said to be the form of the other virtues because meritorious goodness—which stems somehow from charity—brings to perfection any other goodness in the act.
17.19 Against this it is argued: Although the act insofar as it is meritorious or stems from charity is not in a disparate species from the species of the act qua moral, it will at least be in a higher species that is more complete than that in which it would be if it were merely moral, and a specific difference of this sort suffices for our proposal.
Here one could concede the conclusion, and then we would say that a meritorious act of love possesses a certain specific element lacking in a natural act of love qua natural, even though the numerically identical act be natural when regarded as the presupposition for the meritorious aspect. Hence the meritorious factor is what
GOD AND CREATURES
brings the preceding goodness to completion as a species, but it is not a disparate specific difference. Neither do the arguments [in 17.16 and 17.18], based on "what is properly potential" or "the perfection that completes the goodness," prove anything more. If the supreme virtue and form of the other moral virtues were general justice, however, then something similar to what has been said of charity would be true of it.
17.20 Putting it another way, we could say that the meritorious is not a specifying and completing factor in the moral order, because it does not indicate some intrinsic goodness or rectitude in the agent but it only presupposes such and bespeaks in addition a relationship to the accepting will. However, if "meritorious" does not just presuppose moral goodness in the act but the goodness charity gives, then, since the latter is more complete than moral goodness, it follows that a meritorious act does have some specific goodness beyond that of moral goodness. For while the meritorious does not imply such ulterior goodness, it does presuppose it, and this seems probable, for otherwise an act with only natural goodness could be meritorious.
17.21 Against this it is argued: An act which is morally complete even specifically can exist in the absence of a virtuous habit. In general such is the act of choice by which a moral virtue [or habit] is generated. By the same token, then, all the goodness the act would
~ have when charity is present could be there when it is absent.
Answer: The argument proves that the act could have all that rectitude because the same conformity to a rule or true dictate of reason is there. Hence it would have the same moral goodness, for such rectitude is either moral goodness itself or, at least, cannot exist without it. Besides its rectitude or conformity to directive knowledge, however, the act of charity has a goodness of its own because of the fact that it is in accord with the inclination of charity.
Indeed, to be in accord with such is precisely what it means to have charitable [or supernatural] goodness. This is not the case with the other moral virtues.
17.22 [Other objections] The conclusion [in 17.13] defended in the solution of the question, however, is challenged on this ground.
[10] The natural knowledge of God and that of infused faith are specifically different acts of the intellect. By the same token, then, natural love and the dilection that is charity are specifically distinct acts of affection.
QUESTION SEVENTEEN
17.23 Proof of the antecedent: The infused act of faith is necessarily veridical, whereas belief acquired from natural sources can be false. Now cognitive acts that are necessarily veridical differ specifically from those which are not. This is clear from Bk. VI of the Ethics,? where suspicion and opinion, which can be false, are specifically distinguished from those intellectual virtues which must be veridical states of knowledge.
17.24 Another proof of the antecedent is that natural scientific knowledge of God manifestly differs specifically from any kind of belief.
In proof of the entailment there is: (1) an argument from analogy, for there is a similarity between these acts of the intellect and those of the will; (2) an argument from causality, for when the antecedent acts of knowledge differ specifically the subsequent acts of the will do too, for things of the same species do not have specifically different presuppositions.
17.25 [Answer] The antecedent [in 17.22] can be denied of natural and supernatural acts of belief, for supernatural belief is an act elicited in accord with the inclination of infused faith, whereas natural belief is elicited in accord with the certainty derived from some witness. Now we said in [14.23 of] one of the earlier questions that with one and the same act one can believe something on the testimony of a witness and at the same time do so in virtue of infused faith, if it be present. Hence it is the same act in reality. As natural, it is potential as regards the perfection received from infused faith.
But the potential is not different in species from its respective actualized or perfected entity, even though the latter has a perfection of its own in addition to that of the potential.
17.26 As for the proof of the antecedent [in 17.23] one can grant that certain knowledge, which has its own intrinsic grounds for certitude, be they the terms of the proposition or the object which includes the knowledge [virtually] or some per se causal factor, is specifically distinct from uncertain knowledge. For instance, knowledge of a premise gets its certitude either from itself or from the object or from some other principle which is in turn either manifest of itself or is at least evident in virtue of the terms which are the per se cause of the principle which includes them. A conclusion, on the other hand, is certain in virtue of the premise which is the cause of its certitude. An act of infused faith, however, is certain in neither
9 Aristotle, Ethica ad Nic. vi, c.g (1139b15-24).
GOD AND CREATURES
of these ways; its certainty stems from some extrinsic factor. For the light of infused faith, because it is a certain participation of the divine light, can incline the intellect only to some definite truth. Hence that certitude in the act is derived from a certain relationship to some infallible extrinsic factor to which it corresponds. It does not stem from any intrinsic perfection of the act, for the latter, were it elicited by acquired faith alone, would be equally perfect as regards anything intrinsic to it.
17.27 Against this it is argued: At least it has this certitude from its per se cause and this suffices.
Answer: Whatever be infused faith's causality in an act of belief, at least it does not make the intellect any more certain than if infused faith had not caused it. For certitude is apt to exclude from the act of the intellect in which it exists not only deception but doubt. This occurs only if the intellect perceives why its act is certain, for if it can see no grounds for being certain, it would appear it could still doubt. But in the case of infused faith, the intellect does not perceive the principle which produces the certitude.
17.28 While the other proof of the antecedent [in 17.24], that which has to do with a scientific act of knowledge, is based upon what is obviously true, the implication there must be rejected. For bea this is a non sequitur: "If the intellections are not specifically distinct, neither are the volitions.'" What needs to be added in the antecedent is that the intellections, precisely insofar as they are per se preconditions, are specifically distinct, that is to say, to have such volitions there must be a specific distinction in the intellections.
Such is not the case here, for if two persons elicit an act of love of God, one because he naturally knows God to be good, the other because he believes this to be so, neither the scientific* act of knowledge nor the act of faith regarded individually is required per se to have the act of love. Both are needed for what they have in common, namely, both reveal the existence of the object to be loved.
17.29 A similar response could be given to the other proof of the antecedent [in 17.23] based on the difference between infused and acquired faith.* Although such acts differ specifically, they do not do so precisely as preconditions for love. That is to say, they are not preconditions because they are specifically distinct. For example, if one person were shown demonstratively and another dialectically that a given object must be loved, their resulting acts of love would not differ specifically, for the specific difference in the knowledge is not part of its being a precondition for the love.
QUESTION SEVENTEEN
Reply to the Initial Argument [13] 17.30 [An invalid reply] Some answer the initial or main argument [in 17.1] as follows: A habit is not the cause of the substance of the act but only of its mode, and one could admit that this mode differs specifically in its way from the substance of the act.1°
17.31 This answer seems to have some plausibility (a) if we are referring to those characteristics conferred by the habit such as that the act is performed delightfully, easily, promptly, and expeditiously (for an acquired habit commonly confers such a mode, if it be one, or such modes of action), or (b) even if we are speaking of that additional mode conferred when the habit is a virtue, which consists in acting righteously or virtuously. None of these, however, is actually proper to charity or to the meritorious act. For, as we said
[in 17.6], "meritorious" refers to an act accepted by the divine will in relation to reward. Now that the act be accepted by the divine will, or that the [divine] will accept the act in just this way, are one and the same thing, and nothing caused can be the formal reason for this (where "formal reason" means something which mediates between the possibility of acceptation and its corresponding actuality). Therefore, charity can hardly be called the source or principle of this mode in the act to which it properly corresponds.
17.32 [Valid answer] Consequently, the argument can be answered in another way. The major, viz., that acts elicited by specifically different principles are themselves specifically different, is true only of the principle as a whole, for acts receive their total entity from such and, therefore, also their unity and distinction. It is equally true of partial principles if they are disparate and are required precisely insofar as they are disparate. But if the principles are subordinated one to the other, or if it is not required as such that they be disparate, then the acts need not be specifically distinct.
Now charity is neither the total principle of the will's act nor is it a disparate principle. It is rather a subordinate principle, for the will uses charity and not vice versa. Neither is charity required per se for the substance of the act nor for the act to be meritorious. It is only a precondition for the act's being accepted.
17.33 But even for this it is not a necessary precondition if the necessity referred to be that characteristic of an essential order of causes. It is needed only because of a disposition of a will that con10 Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl. 1, q.4 in corp.
(ed. Pelzer in PhB u, Louvain, 1904, p. 94)-
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tingently decided not to accept the act unless it be elicited in accord with such an inclination. But to specifically distinguish the act, the principle must be either its per se principle (and hence that which gives the act such real being as it possesses in itself) or at least the source of its being specifically distinct, or if it is only a dispositional distinguishing principle, then it must be so per se, i.€., it must so dispose per se that the effect as something distinct be caused according to an essential order of causes.* But none of these conditions accrues to the act in virtue of the habit of charity.
17.34 In this connection note the order that obtains between (1) the bare act to which blame or praise is imputable, (2) the virtuous act, which stems from moral virtue, (3) the charitable act, and (4) the meritorious act.
The first expresses a relationship to the potency which freely elicits the act; the second adds to this a relationship to the virtue which inclines to such an act, or rather to the rule of virtue, 1.e., a dictate of right reason; the third expresses a relationship to charity which inclines the will to such an act; the fourth adds a relationship to the divine will which accepts the act in a special way. The third adds some goodness over and above that conferred by the second and is itself required for the fourth, not indeed by the very nature of things, but rather by a disposition of the accepting will.