Question Twenty: Does A Priest Who Is Obliged To Say
Question Twenty
DOES A PRIEST WHO IS OBLIGED TO SAY
A MASS FOR EACH OF TWO DIFFERENT
PEOPLE SATISFY HIS OBLIGATION BY
SAYING ONE MASS FOR BOTH?
cd 20.1 Does a priest, obliged to say a mass for one person and also obliged to say a mass for another person, adequately satisfy his obligation by saying one mass for both?
Arguments Pro and Con It is argued that he does not:
One obliged to a greater good does not satisfy his obligation by performing a lesser good. But that is what happens here, for two masses represent a greater good than one does. Besides, one mass benefits a person more if said for him alone than if said simultaneously for himself and another.
20.2 Against this opinion it is argued:
He who pays more than he is obliged to abundantly satisfies his obligation. But one mass is a greater good than the two stipends that oblige him to the two persons who gave them, for the good of the mass stems from the virtue of the sacrifice which is of infinite value and sufficient for an infinity of persons. For when Christ, who offers himself in this sacrifice, offered himself on the cross he made adequate satisfaction for an infinity of sins. Therefore [one mass is abundantly sufficient for two].
Body of the Question 20.3 Here a _ preliminary observation is necessary, viz., that it seems probable that a mass has value not only in virtue of the merit or action of the celebrant [ex opere operantis|* but also in virtue of the sacrifice or work performed [ex opere operato].* In other words, its value is derived not only from the personal merit of the priest-celebrant but also from the merit of the universal Church in whose name the ordinary celebrant offers the sacrifice. Otherwise the mass of an unworthy priest, who personally gains no merit but
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rather demerit, would benefit no one in the Church. But the common opinion rejects this and reasonably so according to those words of John: "The bread I will give is my flesh, for the life of the world."! Therefore, every time Christ, the supreme priest, offers
[the sacrifice of the mass], the bread he gives (namely, his flesh) is the life of the world.
From this it follows that to solve the question three points must be studied?:
(1) Does one mass said for two have as much value for each as it would have if said for one alone, and this in virtue of the celebrant's personal merit? (2) Does it have as much value in virtue of the merit of the universal Church offering it? (3) Does the priest satisfy his debt to both persons?
ARTICLE I
The Value of the Mass in virtue of the Celebrant's Personal Merit 20.4 [Three ways in which prayer can be of benefit] As for the first point, we must recognize that of all meritorious works, the merit of prayer is more readily applicable to others, for prayer of itself conciliates and placates God, and it does this for the person for whom the prayer is being offered in particular. But we see that merit and especially prayer can be of benefit to someone in three ways:
(1) In a most special way it always benefits the person praying if he is in the state of grace, for his motive is good and he is performing a good work. This motive and this work do not belong to the person being prayed for in the same way that they do to the person praying. Neither can one reasonably give away this merit of his in favor of another, since he is obliged in charity to love himself more than another. What is more, it might even be that he could not give it to another without sinning.
(2) In a most general way prayer benefits the Church as a whole, for the one praying must have the habitual intention of excluding no one and including everyone in the Church.
(3) And in some intermediate fashion prayer must benefit the person being prayed for. That it does not do so in the most special way is clear from what was said above. Neither does it help him only in the most general way in which it benefits everyone. Otherwise those special prayers of the Church for the living and the dead
1 John 6:52.
? M2 mistakenly inserts this paragraph after 20.4.
QUESTION TWENTY
and also for different sorts of living persons, such as benefactors, friends, and others, would be in vain. Yet in the Roman Missal we find prayers for different persons and groups and states of life. Such special prayers, I say, would be in vain if they had no more value for such persons than for any member of the Church in general.
Our special problem in this first article, then, concerns this third [4] type of merit.
20.5 And we can say that one mass said for two does not have as much value for each as it would have if said for one alone.
This can be shown as follows: In full justice what corresponds adequately to finite merit is a limited reward. In addition to the good due to the Church at large and that due in a most special way to the person praying, which must always be included in the reward due to prayer, I refer only to that good which is due in that third or intermediary way to the one prayed for in virtue of the merit of the petitioner. Now this good is of limited degree. And nothing beyond this is due to anyone in this third way by virtue of the petitioner's merit. But if all of the good due in this way is awarded to one of the two, none will be given to the other. Hence, if some good is given to the latter, then it follows that all the good due in this way to the prayer will not be given to the other.
20.6 [First confirmation] What confirms this is that to an equal amount of merit an equal good or reward is due, and this is true of what is due in any of the three ways, generally, specially, or intermediately. Now as for personal merit, one who celebrates with equal devotion performs an equally meritorious work, and one can be equally devout in celebrating for one in particular as in celebrating for two at once. Therefore, in virtue of one's personal merit, the good due to a mass said for one is equal to the good due to a mass said for two. And in the latter case, if all of this were due to one of the two, nothing would be due to the other, since whatever might be given to him would not be included in that good which corresponds adequately to the celebrant's merit.
20.7 [Objections] One could challenge the major [in 20.6] on the grounds that to merit which is both intensively and extensively equal, a good equal in both ways is due. Now if one prays for two simultaneously, though his merit is intensively equal to his merit when he prays for one, it is extensively greater because applied to more than one. Hence the reward due to it though intensively equal is extensively greater, since it is bestowed on both.
20.8 A similar response may be given to the major of the first
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argument [in 20.5], namely, to the claim that to merit of a limited degree corresponds a limited amount of good. This holds good only of what is uniform in both respects, i.e., intensively and extensively.
For even though the merit is extended to many and hence the reward is due to many, it need not be intensively diminished because it is bestowed on more than one.
20.9 This is explained first as follows: Spiritual good is analogous to a spirit which is whole and entire wherever it may be and is not communicated only in part. Hence a spiritual good is communicated without division and so is not diminished although bestowed on many.
20.10 This can also be shown from an example where one would not so clearly expect to find it. For even certain corporeal things— which would be less likely than spiritual things to have this characteristic—can be communicated to many without diminution. The light of a candle illumines several objects just as brightly as it would have illumined any one of them alone; a voice strikes the ears of many listeners just as forcibly as it would strike one alone.
20.11 And thirdly, the authority [of Gratian] confirms this. In De Consecratione, distinction 5, Non mediocriter® Jerome? is quoted as saying, among other things, that "when a mass or a prayer is said for one hundred souls, each receives no less than when it is said for one alone."
20.12 [These objections are invalid] One can argue that these objections [in 20.7-11] do not refute the reasons given above
[in 20.5ff.], for the major premises of both arguments are simply true when interpreted both extensionally and intensionally. Equal merit no more deserves a numerically greater good than an intensively greater good. In every case of just retribution or commutation, a greater number of equal goods are considered equivalent to one intensively greater good. Therefore, if an intensively greater good is not due to this merit, neither is an extensively greater good. Otherwise the sum total of these many goods would represent a good greater than any one of them taken singly, and hence in justice would constitute a good greater than any one of them alone.
20.13 Confirmation: Otherwise a prayer offered in the third way for all the souls in purgatory would have the same value for each as if offered for one alone. And if his charity is not inordinate, every3 Corpus Turis Canonici, ed. A. Friedberg, Lipsiensis secunda, I, Graz,
1959, 1418, De consec. D.5, c.24.
4 Jerome, De regula monach., c.13: PL 30, 351-55.
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one who prays for one should pray for all, for he should ask for the good of the greatest number obtainable with a single act, if this could be accomplished without detriment to the good of any single one.
20.14 You will reply: In terms of satisfaction, prayer has not the same value for many as it has for one. The punishment due to one is not remitted if something equivalent is not paid.
Answer: If this be so, one could just as well ask that the same initial grace given to one be given to any number of sinners, for here no satisfaction of punishment is required but only a reconciliation with God and the request of a good from him.
20.15 Again, just as many separate punishments are equivalent to one greater punishment and are only remitted by a greater work of satisfaction or by several such works, so it seems that the request for many separate goods is equivalent to one request for a greater good and could be asked for and obtained only in return for several meritorious works or for one that is of greater merit. And if something suffices to obtain a good why does it not also suffice to remove what is evil? Indeed the former seems to be a greater request.
20.16 [Second confirmation] A second confirmatory argument for our thesis is this: In the case of human friendship, one who begs a favor for one person alone will obtain a greater good for him than if he begs for many. If he asks for one, he will obtain the good he asked for, whereas if he asks for many, either he will not obtain the favor for all, or else each will not receive as much as one alone would. And this happens according to the just law of friendship.
20.17 [Third confirmation] A third confirmatory argument is this: The will as meritorious cause seems to be less, not more, efficacious than when it functions as cause that elicits or commands something. For as meritorious, it plays only a dispositional role with respect to the principal agent, whereas as commanding or eliciting an act it functions as the principal agent. Now as principal agent, the will does not cause simultaneously in each of many an effect equal to what it would cause in one alone. Simultaneous friendship for many is never as intense as friendship for one, as Book VIII of the Ethics® makes clear. And when the will commands the operation of several subordinate faculties it is not with the same intensity as when it commands but one, for will's intensity diminishes in commanding several acts. Analogously, then, the will would seem to merit an intensively lesser good for each when it merits for many.
5 Aristotle, Ethica ad Nic. vill, c.7 (1158a11-14).
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20.18 You may object that this is so only when distraction about the many diminishes devotion, but if the devotion remains the same, it need not be that for the many one merits a lesser good than for a single person alone.
To this I reply: Distraction is not necessarily present because the mass is celebrated for several, for the celebrant need not actually think about those for whom he intends especially to pray. It is enough that he thought of them before and has offered such an intention to God. After that, it suffices to remember them in general, for God accepts his offering and his devotion for those for whom he earlier decided to offer it.
While it is true in this case that actual attention to each is diminished by reason of the multitude, for his attention is directed to them only in general, nevertheless his devotion (which is a movement of the mind to God) does not necessarily diminish. For example, one does not celebrate the mass for all saints less devoutly than a mass in honor of one. While he may attend less distinctly to each saint, still his attention to all of them in general suffices for devotion that is not only equal to but greater than the devotion of a celebrant who attends only to one, unless perhaps the one be he who contains eminently that which is matter of devotion to all, i.e., the Triune
God.
And so when one prays for a needy community or group to obtain what they need, a greater compassion can be present and hence a greater desire to get what is needed than if one is praying for but one indigent person. And in such a case devotion is not diminished even though one's actual or distinct attention to each is decreased.
In such a case, therefore, the reason why each receives a lesser good is not diminution of devotion but the fact that it is a limited good that corresponds to one's merit, and this is true of what is due to one in the most special way, or is due only in the most general way, or is due in the third or intermediary way.
And that is why in the case of what is due in this third way, which is the one we are speaking of, the greater the number of beneficiaries the less each benefits individually.
20.19 [To the arguments in support of the objections] Answer to the arguments to the contrary [in 20.7-11].
To the first based on the analogy with a spirit [in 20.9], I say that while a spirit may not be divided extensively, one is distinguished numerically from another. There is an individual soul for each animated body and together they possess a natural goodness that is ex-
QUESTION TWENTY
tensively greater than any one of them singly. Furthermore, such goodness is even equivalent to a goodness that is intensively greater, according to that text from The Trinity®: "Two men represent something greater than one man." Plurality in God, then, differs from plurality in creatures. In creatures two are more than one. In God, however, this is not the case. That is why Augustine adds: "The Father and Son together are not greater than the Father alone." Again, many goods of the spirit are of greater value and therefore require either more good or a greater good in return. He who by his prayer merits or deserves to bring to life one dead person does not deserve by that same prayer to bring to life all of the dead. Therefore, I say that while a spiritual good is communicated without quantitative division, extensively there is a distinction in the sense that the good which different persons receive is different, and to obtain it a corresponding different merit is required, and this is the sort of thing
I have in mind when I speak of something being "equal intensively."
20.20 Objection: At least a spiritual good is not communicated by parts; therefore, if two persons deserve a good in virtue of a mass one will not receive one part of it and another the other part.
Confirmation: Whoever receives a spirit receives the whole spirit.
Analogously, whoever receives some spiritual good receives the whole of it. to) 20.21 I reply: Augustine in The Trinity says': "In those things which are not great in mass, to be greater is to be better." Two equal goods are better than one; therefore, the goodness in them is greater, and what is greater, though it may not be actually divisible, contains many lesser goods which together are equal to it. Although the sky is actually indivisible, a greater number of smaller things would be needed to equal the whole than to equal half of it, and in these smaller things there is a distinction. Therefore, for some greater thing indivisible in itself, one could give a plurality of equivalent entities.
In a similar way in the case at hand, a good or corresponding magnitude is equal to merit of a given magnitude. Such good is indivisible in itself, but can be equivalent to many lesser goods and, therefore, it can be divided in value insofar as several lesser goods are given instead of it. Consequently, a spiritual good is not really given by parts, but rather a number of smaller goods are given,
6 Augustine, De Trin. vu, c.6,n.11: PL 42, 945; CCSL 50, 265.
7 [bid., vi, c.8, n.g: PL 42, g29; CCSL 50, 238.
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each of which, in comparison to the greater benefit, is of partial value.
20.22 As for the confirmation [in 20.20], I say that if it were possible to distribute the value of the same spirit among many, in the way it is possible here in regard to the good due to prayer, then a lesser good would be given to each. And perhaps a spirit also would be communicated in a lesser degree if otherwise it would exceed the proportions of the body receiving it. Perhaps the soul would not vivify in the same way every part of a body no matter how great it would grow, though it is communicated equally to one that is proportionate to it. In the case at hand, the recipient proportionate to a good given for merit is a person, and what is given to him is not given by parts.
20.23 Against the examples cited [in 20.10] counter-examples can be given. I cannot carry two weights as easily as one.
You may object that where local motion is concerned I may not be able to move many objects as easily as I am able to move a few, but the situation is different in the case of change called alteration
[such as those induced by sound falling on many ears]: here one can change many as easily as a few if they are all the same distance away.
[10] To this I reply: Some changes or movements, like locomotion, are such that when they occur every part of the whole must be moved simultaneously so that one part is not changed before the other. It is to such that this text of the Metaphysics refers*: "A change is called continuous whose movement is essentially one, and the movement is one when it is indivisible.in respect to time." For if one part of a continuum would move without the rest moving, its continuity would be broken. There is another type of movement, however, in which it is not necessary that every part of the whole be changed simultaneously, and this is the case with change by alteration.
Now the "mobile" [i.e., what can be moved or altered] may be a match or less than a match for the strength of the mover or agent; if it matches his strength so that the agent could not move anything more at the same time, the mobile is called an adequate object.
Now there is a difference about the adequate objects of local motion and other forms of change. In the case of movement from place to place, what matches the strength of the mover is always an entire continuum and never just a part of it, whereas in the changes through alteration it may be some part of a larger whole that * Aristotle, Metaph. v, c.6 (1016a5).
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matches the powers of the agent, so that all he can change at one time is that much and no more. But in either case, indeed where movement or change in general is concerned, a given agent can never change at one time anything that exceeds his strength but only what matches it or is included therein. By "included therein"
I mean either a real part or its equivalent (i.e., something smaller could be said to be included equivalently in something greater even though the smaller is not really a part of the greater). If the mobile object is adequate or matches the agent's strength, then he could not change at one time anything greater. Neither could he simultaneously change this and something else. But he could alter two objects which together do not exceed what matches his strength. And of such things it is true to say that whether they be many or few, the agent does not alter many in any lesser measure than he would alter a few, because he does not alter his adequate mobile object to a lesser degree than he would alter a lesser mobile object; otherwise the adequate object would not be simply adequate or matched to his strength. And in this case I understand "'adequate'"' not to mean that the agent could alter it only by exerting all his efforts, but he could change it no matter how small the effort. Such a mobile object would be completely subservient to such an agent. That the mobile be fully under the power of the mover means that passively the mobile object is completely matched to such an agent. Now the heavens, according to the Philosopher,' is the adequate mobile object of an Intelligence,* who could move something less even though he could not move anything greater.
20.24 Answer to the examples [in 20.10]: I say that when the recipient of alteration is proportionate to the agent, every part of it will be perfected equally, at least in the sense that when one part is perfected along with another, it is not altered less than when it alone is altered, for it is the whole that is proportionate primarily to the agent, and the plurality of parts included in the whole does not keep the action in each of them from being equally perfect any more than it prevents the action being equally perfect over the whole. But if to one proportionate subject another proportionate subject be added, it would not be necessary that it be perfected to the same extent as it would if it were the sole recipient of the agent's action.
This appears clear in the examples cited there. For light, sound, and the like are of themselves propagated spherically from their
9 Ibid., xu, C.7 (1072a30-32).
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source through the intervening medium. Therefore, no matter how small the area being affected proportionately by such an agent may be, since it is spherical, it has parts, and equal parts of the same sphere surrounding a light will be illumined with equal brightness, that is to say the brightness along one diameter of the sphere will be the same as along any other. But if one takes a sphere more remote from the candle and surrounding the first sphere, its parts will not be as brightly illumined as those of the first.
Hence the claim that many illuminable objects are illumined with equal brightness is true only when they are parts of the same adequate illuminable object, for instance, when they fall within the same sphere of light or are at the same distance from the center of illumination. But in the case we are discussing, the two persons being prayed for are not per se parts of one adequate recipient of the good to be awarded through prayer, but each is per se an adequate recipient.
20.25 Against the preceding it is argued that the reason why the second sphere is not so brightly illumined as the first is that it is further from the light, not that it is illumined simultaneously with the first. Furthermore, the second would not receive any light if the first were not illumined at the same time. Therefore, the second recipient does not receive less because another receives something at the same time, but because it is further removed from the agent. Now in the present case, there is no such separation or distance but only a distinction of recipients.
I answer: The fact that two alterable objects can be equally distant from the same agent or mover necessarily implies that they represent real or equivalent parts of one adequate object. What is spherical can always be imagined to have the agent at its center, and equal areas lying at the same distance from the center are affected the same way, whereas those at other distances are not altered to the same degree.
20.26 As for the citation from Jerome [in 20.11], the gloss?® there provides a two-part answer. One is that his words refer to the celebrant himself so that their meaning would be that he does not receive less because he says mass for one or for many, for when his disposition is the same and his performance equally faultless, in a word, when he celebrates for many in the same way he does for one, the mass has for him the same value in the most special way.
10 Decretum Gratiant emendatum et notationibus illustratum una cum glossis Gregorit XIII Pont. Max. iussu editum (Romae, 1582), col. 2673.
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20.27 'he other reply of the gloss there refers to the assertion that a mass celebrated for one hundred with a joyful heart is of no less value than one mass for each of them celebrated with anxiety.
For it is premised by the remark"!: "The singing of five psalms with purity of heart, serenity, and spiritual joy is better than the recitation of the whole Psalter with anxiety and sadness of heart.' Then follows the text [in 20.11]: "When a mass or a prayer is said for one hundred," etc. Perhaps this second reply expresses best the mind of Jerome who wished to console the monks by telling them that if they were obliged to pray for many, they were not obliged to read that many psalms, for that would breed disgust. They would do better to recite fewer psalms and do so with joy; indeed, this would benefit the one praying even more if this could be reconciled with his obligation.
ARTICLE II
The Value of the Mass by reason of the Merit of the Universal Church [13] 20.28 [Three points to be considered] There are three things to be investigated in the second article [of 20.3]: viz., (1) Has the priest the power to apply to a certain person the good due to the Church or someone in the Church in virtue of the sacrifice? (2) Can he apply such good at will? (3) Has it the same value for that person when it is applied for him and others as when it is applied for him alone?
1. Can the Priest Apply the Merit due in virtue of the Sacrifice?
20.29 [Negative view] As to the first question, it seems the priest could not. An instrument has no power to apply the action or its effect, for this is the prerogative of the principal agent. Where the virtue of the sacrifice is concerned, the priest is a mere instrument, for he behaves like an inanimate organ. Although, as regards personal merit in celebrating, he functions as a living organ, since he merits insofar as he himself lives a life of grace, as regards the good due in virtue of the sacrifice he is an organ precisely because of holy orders, and the same effect in virtue of the sacrifice results whether he be living a life of grace or not. Therefore [the priest has no power to apply the action or its effect].
20.30 A second reason is this: He to whom a good is not due has 11 Cf, supra, note 4.
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no right to assign or apply it to another. The good due in virtue of the sacrifice is not due to the priest as celebrant; he is but the bearer of a petition by the Church. The good due in virtue of the sacrifice is not owed to him, for the virtue of the sacrifice would remain the same even if he were in mortal sin.
20.31 [The view of Scotus] But I claim that it is somehow in the power of the priest-celebrant to apply the virtue of the sacrifice. A twofold proof from authority:
In the Enchiridion!? Augustine says: 'It is not to be denied that the souls of dead are refreshed when the sacrifice of the Mediator is offered for them." Hence the one offering the sacrifice can apply it to them and they can benefit from it.
In the sermon on the Chair of St. Peter he repeats this same idea's: "I will show how they can help the souls of their dead: let each offer for his dear ones the prayers of the saints and let him commend them to God through the intervention of the priest."
[14] 20.32 There is also an argument from analogy in favor of this view. When some good has to be distributed among each of the household members according to his need, it is reasonable that the master himself does not do this directly but entrusts it to one or more of his servants. This is general practice in well-ordered families. With equal or even greater reason, then, this method should prevail in the house of God, the Church, so that not God alone but some minister of the Church distributes the good to be given there in virtue of the sacrifice. Now no one deserves to do this more than the priest offering the sacrifice. Just as it is up to him to determine for whom in particular he intends to offer the sacrifice, so also it pertains to him to dispense or dispose of the good petitioned in virtue of the sacrifice.
20.33 [To the arguments for the negative view] As for the arguments used to prove it is not the priest's role to apply the virtue of the sacrifice, I reply:
To the first [in 20.29]: Admittedly the good requested in virtue of the sacrifice is petitioned by reason not of the priest's personal merit, but of the merit of the Church in whose name it is offered and for whose sake it is accepted. Now even though the priest is a mere organ as regards the good petitioned in this way, nevertheless by reason of his sacred orders he holds a distinguished position in the Church in virtue of which it is his function to offer and deter12 Augustine, Enchirid., c.29, n.110: PL 40, 283; CCSL 96, 108.
'8 Ps.-Augustine, In cathedram S. Pet. 1 serm.igi: PL 39, 2101.
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mine the value of the oblation, and in this role he is no mere organ but a minister and dispensator.
20.34 To the second [in 20.30], I say that while the good to be given in virtue of the sacrifice is not due to the priest for himself, still it is due to the Church according to his dispensation, for by his sacred orders the priest is the messenger of the bride to the groom, offering special petitions for specific persons and thus he dispenses to them what is given in virtue of such petitions.
2. Can the Priest Apply Such a Good at Will?
20.35 [Negative view] To the second question of this article [in 20.28], viz., Is the priest at liberty to distribute the good due in virbis] tue of the sacrifice, so that it would be given especially to the one to whom he applied the virtue of the sacrifice in particular, some would say no. To be effective, his application must be made in accord with God's good pleasure, for it is God alone who bestows this good and he does so according to his own good will. It will not be given to the one for whom the priest intends it unless in making the application, the priest conforms himself to the will of God the donor.
20.36 [Scotus' own view] Against this view I argue: The priest would be devoid of any authority to apply or assign the good, it seems, if he could do so only when his intention coincided with the wishes of another, whose mind as a rule he could never be sure of.
But the priest-celebrant can never be definitely sure about the will of God as to whom he may wish to give the good due in virtue of the sacrifice. God does not reveal this as a rule in a special way; neither does Scripture have anything to say about it except in a most remote and general way, which is not sufficient to reveal God's will as regards this or that specific person. Therefore, if the priest's application would never be effective unless it were made in accord with God's good pleasure, it would mean the priest would have no authority to apply the virtue of the sacrifice except in a most general manner.
20.37 [Different cases of application] Therefore, we can say that where the teaching as to how the sacrifice is to be applied is certain, there the sacrifice must be applied in that way. Otherwise it would not be valid, perhaps, for him to whom it is applied, and it would be harmful to the one applying it, for he would be sinning.
Now prayer, as the beginning of the first article [in 20.4] points out, is applicable to someone in three ways, most specially, most gen-
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erally, and in an intermediary fashion, namely, in a way that is special but not most special. Now the first of these applications is determined, for it is always for the one who prays. The second also is determined, for it is always for the whole Church. The rule which determines these is charity, whose obligation is strongest as regards oneself and is most general as regards one's neighbor.
20.38 The third or intermediary application is sometimes determined by ecclesiastical institution or ordinance. Parochial priests are assigned to different parishes with the obligation to serve their parish and to celebrate mass especially for their parishioners. Similarly, different priests are installed in the different particular colleges to offer the sacrifice of the altar, and in particular for those who are in such a college. Of this one can understand that passage from the [Decretum Gratiani]** Causa 7, question 1 and Jerome's remark to the monk Rusticus: "Among bees there is one that is head; cranes follow one leader; once founded, Rome could not have simultaneously two brothers as kings.'' And he continues: "There is one bishop in each church, one archdeacon, and every ecclesiastical order is ruled by its rectors." Not only are rectors required in the Church to correct sinners but also to reconcile them by the prayer of the Church and the saving victim.
20.39 It also seems that justice determines the application if we consider those who provide or have provided for the ministers with necessary maintenance. In this way persons have endowed monasteries and solemn collegiate churches or minor churches so that their ministers would be obliged to celebrate mass for those whom the donors intended to help. It is reasonable that in return for temporal alms one be obliged to offer the spiritual suffrages of prayers and sacrifice, just as one must return a temporal good for the spiritual benefit of preaching, according to the Apostle: "If we have sown spiritual things for you, why should you be surprised if we harvest your material things?" It is as if he said: ''No, it is no great surprise." It is licit, therefore, and even reasonable that alms require prayers in return. He who imposes the obligation of praying for him by his alms acts reasonably, and the obligation he imposed passes on with the alms to whomsoever succeeds the original recipient.
However, no one is presumed to so oblige himself or his college that he could not give some suffrages to others. And it is with this stipu14 Corpus Iuris Canonict, c.7, q-1, C.41, I, 582; Jerome, Epist. cxxv, MsTURe
PL 22, 1080.
HO (Core, @Biut.
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lation and precisely as noted in writing that an obligation in accordance with the intention of the donor is presumed to arise, even though it is based only on a promise.
20.40 Now those whose prayers and sacrifices are determined in this way to specific persons cannot apply them at will to other persons, for they would do an injustice by taking away what they owe to those to whom they are obliged. What I mean is that it would be unjust to apply them equally to those to whom they are not equally under obligation, for in this third way there are many degrees in which the fruits of prayer can be applied. Let us consider just three, for example, where the first benefits more than the second and the second more than the third: for instance, if A benefits as much as a person other than the celebrant could, and B receives as much as one could after A, and C obtains as much as remains after B (whether by A we understand one or many for whom the celebrant wants to pray in the same degree). Now even though someone is obliged by Church law or a benefaction received to apply the mass in this third or intermediary way and to do so in the first degree for one person, this does not prevent him from applying it in the second degree to another person and in the third degree to a third party, and the same for any further degree, for an application in some subsequent degree never takes anything away from a person for whom it is applied in some antecedent degree.
20.41 [Some doubtful points] But to whom must the application be made and in what degree? Here doubts arise. Must one charged with a parish apply the mass to his parishioner before applying it to his father or mother? The obligation to his parents stems from natural law, it seems, and no positive obligation can be prejudicial to that law. Neither should anyone who puts the priest under obligation want him to oblige himself in violation of what the law of nature prescribes. One should never interpret him then as wanting the priest to bind himself in such a way that he would not always be
[18] free to give his parents what he owes to them. On the other hand, if the father and mother are parishioners of another priest, they have him under obligation to pray for them as for his other subjects and, in terms of efficacy, it seems that this spiritual filiation prevails.
20.42 But there are other priests in the Church who have no pastorate, chaplaincy, or prebend in virtue of which they must apply their masses to one or more persons. These priests are more free to apply their masses at will. However, they must conform their intention to the will of the supreme high priest [Christ] insofar as they
GOD AND CREATURES
can conjecture what this will is in all probability, which is difficult to do where it concerns this or that specific person. It is easier to do so as regards such general obligations as those to parents, benefactors, civil rulers, and prelates (according to those words of the Apostle?s: 'First of all, I urge that petitions, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgiving be offered for all men, especially for kings and those in authority, that we may be able to lead undisturbed and tranquil lives in perfect piety and dignity'') and also for the dead
(according to Il Machabees, 1217:
"It is a holy and wholesome thought to pray for the dead.") 20.43 But even so far as this general application in the third way
[19] is concerned, it is doubtful to whom the celebrant must apply the mass in the first degree and to whom he must apply it in a more remote degree, for the need is greater in some than in others. Thus it is greater in the dead, who cannot merit for themselves, than it is in the living. It is greater in sinners than in the just, who unlike sinners can merit by the grace they possess. Now it seems just first to help those who need it most. On the other hand, there is the question of utility. It is more useful to increase the grace, and hence the merits, of the pilgrim than to remit the suffering of the dead in whom neither grace grows nor merits increase. It also seems that one is more obliged to his brother who lives in a state of grace or charity than to a sinner who neither loves God nor is loved by him in the same degree as the just, since I ought to love that person more who loves
God and is loved by God than a person who lives otherwise.
20.44 Therefore, the safest way seems to be to make the general application in this way: "Deign, O Lord, to accept this sacrifice in particular for those for whom you know I am especially obliged to offer it and in the measure in which I am obliged to do so." And whether this application in particular be for one or for several, it is always safer to make it under the condition: "If it pleases you."
3. One Mass does not Benefit Each of Several as Much as it Would if Offered for One Alone 20.45 As for the third point of this article [mentioned in 20.28], we can say as we did in the previous article [in 20.5-18], that a mass applied equally to several does not benefit each as much as a mass applied to one alone.
[ 20 ] The proof is analogous to the one given above [in 20.5]. The good MS yt UTHoNs BET 17 2 Mach. 12:46.
QUESTION TWENTY
due in virtue of the sacrifice corresponds in full justice to some merit in the Church. This merit is finite and of limited degree.
Therefore, in strict justice a good of limited degree adequately corresponds to it. Consequently, if all of this is given to one, nothing in virtue of the sacrifice remains for another, for if something were given to him, it would not be the good the first received nor something included as a part thereof. Arguing from the opposite of the consequent then, we could say that if by virtue of the sacrifice some good is given to another, then the first does not receive all that is due to him. But if the sacrifice were applied to him alone, all the good would be given to him that is due in the third or intermediary way. Therefore, nothing would be given to the other.
20.46 Against this argument the objections raised in the first article could be brought to bear and they would be solved in a similar way [cf. 20.7ff., 20.12ff., 20.10ff.].
[21] 20.47 [A special doubt] But here a special doubt arises. In the case discussed in [20.5ff. of] the first article, it is clear to what finite merit the good due corresponds, for it corresponds to the personal merit of the celebrant, but it is not clear to what merit the good due in virtue of the sacrifice corresponds.
It can be said that it does not correspond to the good contained in the Eucharist, for this good remains equal when the Eucharist is reserved in a pyx as when it is offered in a mass, yet for the Church it does not have the same vaiue as in the mass. Hence in addition to the good contained in the Eucharist, its offering in the mass is required.
This is not accepted unless the one offering it is acceptable, according to the words of Genesis'*: "'"God looked with favor on Abel and his offering,'—first on Abel, then on his gifts—and of Luke
211°: "This poor widow has put in more than all the rest,' because her offering stemmed from a more acceptable will, and of Gregory in his homily on that text of Matthew 4,"° "And Jesus, walking," etc.:
"God does not weigh how much is in his sacrifice, but with what affection it is offered." Hence, if a Jew had offered Christ, willing or not, to God the Father, the oblation would not have been accepted by the Father in the way it actually was because Christ offered himself voluntarily. Furthermore, it would not have been accepted according to the words of Ecclesiasticus**: "Like a man who slays
18 Gen. 4:4.
12 Duke 21:3.
20 Gregory, XL homil. in Evangelia 1, hom.4, n.2: PL 76, 1093.
21 Eccl. 34:24.
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a son in his father's presence is he who offers sacrifice from the possessions of the poor."
[22] 20.48 This shows that just as the Eucharist is not accepted precisely because of what is contained therein, but it has to be offered, so neither is it fully accepted when offered, except by reason of the good will of someone offering it.
Now this is not precisely the will of the celebrant since this pertains to the priest's personal merit and not to the virtue of the sacrifice. Neither is it immediately the will of Christ himself, for although as contained in the sacrifice he is offered, he is not in this case the one who is immediately offering the sacrifice, according to those words in the Epistle to the Hebrews 9??: "Not that Christ might offer himself there again and again. .
. Christ was offered up but once," add "by himself.' Otherwise, if Christ himself were immediately both offerer and the offering, the celebration of one mass would seem to be equal to his passion. But this certainly is not so, even though it benefits more specifically in that there is a more special commemoration of the offering which Christ made on the cross, according to those words in Luke 22?% and I Corinthians, chapter
24: "Do this in memory of me." The mass both represents the oblation on the cross and implores God to accept through it the sacrifice of the Church. A petition is usually made by means of something more acceptable to the one petitioned than is the supplication of the petitioner himself. This is evident from common examples, for if I ask you to do me a favor for the health of my father or for the welfare of his soul, I presume his health to be more acceptable to you than my supplication and because it is pleasing to you, I want my petition also to be accepted. This is in accord with the principle: "That in virtue of which something is the sort of thing it is, is itself even more that sort of thing."
It is clear, then, that the Eucharistic offering is accepted not because of Christ's good will as the immediate offerer, but rather by reason of the will of the universal Church, and this is of limited merit. Now even if it were accepted by reason of the will of Christ as offerer, i.e., inasmuch as he instituted the sacrifice and gave it value and acceptability, the mass still would not be equivalent to the passion of Christ, nor would it be received in the same way as the latter. Hence it would be of finite merit, and to this merit corresponds the good due in virtue of the sacrifice.
22 Heb. 9:25.
23 Luke 22:19.
241 Cor. 11:24-25.
QUESTION TWENTY
20.49 [Another doubt] As accepted by reason of the general will [ 23 ] of the Church, is the Eucharistic sacrifice simultaneously accepted by reason of the will of the Church triumphant as well as militant?
On the one hand it seems that since such a sacrifice is proper to the [24 | Church militant, it is not accepted by reason of the Church triumphant. On the other hand, if it is only proper to the Church militant, then on the assumption that no single pilgrim were in the state of grace, the value of the mass would be nil. And if only one pilgrim were in the state of grace, the value of the sacrifice would be equivalent to his personal merit. Besides, how does the intention of one who is not thinking of the oblation (as would be the case with anyone other than the celebrant or his server) contribute to this merit??®
ARTICLE III
Does the Priest Satisfy his Obligation to Both by One Offering?
20.50 [Free promise vs. strict obligation] As for the third main B25") article [of 20.3], I claim a priest can be obliged to say a mass for a given person in two ways, by a promise freely given or by a strict obligation. By strict I do not mean an obligation by legal agreement or commutation of something spiritual, like prayer, for something temporal, like alms, for this would seem to be simoniacal. It does not help to claim the priest would be taking something temporal in exchange for the bodily work involved, since it is not plausible that anyone would want to pay so much for the work involved in celebrating. No, what happens is this: The alms are given freely with an entreaty for prayers. The one receiving the alms is obliged in justice to listen to the one who entreats his prayers. Therefore, he has freely obliged himself in justice to pray for the benefactor even though there is no [legal] agreement or exchange. Or if it is a religious community, the superior obliges himself for the whole community, or he obliges the whole community, or the community as a whole obliges itself. Any of these obligations can be strict, even though they are not based on an exchange of this for that. In this sense we must understand the many things said in this question and its solution.
20.51 [One bound by promise can promise as much as he wishes] If one is obliged in the first way, it was in his power to promise as much as he wanted to, and to that much and no more is he obliged.
25 See Appendix, Addition 20.49.
GOD AND CREATURES
If this interpretation can be harmonized with those words [of the Decretales], Extra de sponsalibus, Ex litteris, where the gloss at the end reads**: "The interpretation must be made according to the one making the promise, for the stipulator is free to understand the words licitly in a broad sense," then the priest pays his debt, if he gives what he intended.
20.52 [One bound by strict obligation does not satisfy his debt with one mass for two] If he is obliged to say mass for each of two persons in the second way, viz., by strict obligation, he does not fulfill his obligation by saying but one mass for both.
20.53 But there is a distinction to be made so far as the words of obligation go. Sometimes they are certain and limited to a single meaning, for instance, if one obliges himself to say mass for one along with another to whom he is obliged, or when he obliges himself to say mass for a person in as particular a way as possible for a person other than the celebrant, i.e., he wants to apply to someone in a special way as much as possible of what is due to both personal merit and the virtue of the sacrifice. In such a case where the obligation is clearly determined, it is satisfied only when carried out in that manner.
20.54 [A doubt] But sometimes the wording of the obligation is susceptible to several meanings so that it can be interpreted more or less strictly, e.g., if I say, "I will say one mass for you" or more generally, "I will celebrate for you.' Here, it seems, the words must be understood according to the intention of the one obliging himself. This is proved from that passage [in the Decretales], Extra de wureiurando, Veniens, where this is said of a certain A27: "As a certain individual incurred grave enmities, the friends of both parties suggested to A that in satisfaction for such, he swear to obey the commands of certain of these individuals. When he took such an oath under the conviction that nothing serious had been imposed upon him, the others commanded him under his oath never to enter the palace of the Duke except when all in general were called there by his edict," etc. "However, because A, who was a counselor of the Duke, would never have sworn in this way if he had known ahead of time about the command that would be imposed upon him, know that we [Gregory IX] have commanded such a Patriarch that if the command is repugnant to the prior oath he made licitly, he should
26 Decretales Gregorii Papae IX suae integritati una cum glossis restitutae (Romae, 1582), col. 1423.
27 Corpus Iuris Canonici 1, 364-65; cf. Decretales .
, col. 807-808.
QUESTION TWENTY
denounce it by virtue of our authority as a command not to be observed.' The Pope, therefore, did not want him to keep his oath because something very difficult which he did not intend was imposed upon him in virtue of it. Therefore, it seems he is obliged only to the easier things he intended to impose upon himself, even though those to whom he swore had in mind to oblige him to the more difficult thing they afterwards imposed upon him in virtue of his oath.
20.55 Besides, the gloss in that same place says?*: "The interpretation is made against him who should have imposed the law more clearly." Therefore, if the person to whom one is obliged does not clearly determine the words so as to express his exact intention, he must blame himself. He who obliges himself only wants to be bound, it seems, to the minimum consistent with the words.
20.56 On the other hand, it seems that the words of the obligation should be accepted in the sense in which he to whom one is under obligation understands them, according to [Gratian],"° 22, q.5
Quacumque: "No matter what the words of the one taking the oath are apt to express, God accepts them in the sense in which he to whom the oath is made understands them." And Isidore is cited there; and in the next chapter, Ecce, there is that line from a sermon of Augustine: "Who swears something false by a stone, is a perjurer. ... If you do not consider such an oath sacred, he to whom you swear does consider it such, for you do not swear to yourself, or to the stone, but to your neighbor."
20.57 [Solution to the doubt] We find the solution to this doubt, it seems, in Extra de sponsalibus, Ex litteris where it is said**: "If one may not have understood what another wanted to say, the words should be given their common meaning, and both should be obliged to take the words in the sense they have for those who understand them correctly." And the gloss on this passage from the [Digest] de Supellectili legata, Lege Labeo adds*!: "The terms must not be understood according to individual opinion but according to common usage.'
20.58 But you may ask: What is this common usage? It would seem that the person obliging the priest to celebrate for him would want what is most useful to himself provided this is licit. Now it
28 Cf. Decretales ..., col. 1424.
29 C.22, q.5, cc.g-10, Corpus Iuris Canonici 1, 885; cf. Decretum Gratiani we col 1601-92; 30 Corpus Turis Canonici 11, 663.
31 Decretales ..., col. 1424.
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would be more useful to have all that can be applied to him in virtue of the sacrifice and the priest's personal merit, and this would be licit, for it is not contrary to charity to procure for oneself as much spiritual good as possible without prejudice to another. Suppose then that he intended to oblige the priest to give him all of this.
If the priest said mass for another at the same time, he would not receive his full due in virtue of the priest's personal merits, as the first article [20.5ff.] made clear, or in virtue of the sacrifice, as the second article showed [in 20.45ff.]. If the man had such an intention, I say, then the priest who celebrated for two would not give him his due.
[27] 20.59 Answer to the arguments that the words must be understood according to the mind of the one making the promise.
To the first [in 20.54]: The presumption is that no one wants to oblige himself to what is illicit. One must presuppose this every time it is not explicitly evident the obligation is to something illicit. It is illicit, however, to want to revoke on one's own authority a previous promise licitly made, and no one should be presumed to want this in making a subsequent promise, if the words of the latter do not revoke the earlier promise explicitly. What these general words "I swear to carry out your command" imply seems to be licit, and they do not explicitly revoke a prior obligation. If, then, in virtue of such an oath, one is commanded not to observe his prior obligation, the correct interpretation has to be that he is not obliged to do this in virtue of his oath. Now this is what happened in the case you cited.
The individual A had an obligation to the Duke, as his counselor.
Consequently, the oath he swore to the citizens in order to make peace with them could in no way be interpreted as obliging him to repudiate his obligations to the Duke. To put it briefly, if he had intended to do so, his oath would have been illicit, and in so swearing he would have perjured himself and he would be found to honor not his oath, but his prior obligation. Now since he did not swear this explicitly but took an oath that was licit and general, his oath could in no sense be interpreted as covering this illicit matter. That is why the Pope did not command that he be absolved from his second oath, but that he repudiate it as incompatible with and repugnant to a previous oath made licitly, and therefore it should not be observed. I do mean the oath was incompatible by reason of its form, for that was general and had to be understood as applicable only to licit matters. No, it was incompatible by reason of the matter to which his adversaries had a mind to apply it, namely, what they
QUESTION TWENTY
imposed upon him in virtue of his oath. Therefore, as regards this particular matter he had to repudiate it. But if some other matter not repugnant to justice had been imposed, he would have had to do this in virtue of his vow as simply licit, and in such a case his obligation would have been licit.
20.60 Answer to the second argument [in 20.55]: Though it might appear that the one taking on the obligation wished to bind himself to the minimum consistent with the words accepted by the obligee, and hence it suffices to pay that minimum, nevertheless when obligor and obligee do not clearly understand each other, the obligation must be interpreted according to common usage.
[ 30 ] 20.61 [A special case] But are there some cases where a priest obliged to say mass for a person satisfies his obligation by celebrating simultaneously for him and for another?
Some say there is, for a general obligation is interpreted according to a reasonable custom. Now it is a reasonable custom that the anniversaries of the dead be celebrated in those churches where they are buried and in which, during life, they received the sacraments. If such churches have the reasonable custom of celebrating but one mass for their dead when several anniversaries fall on the same day, they satisfy their obligation to all with a single mass. So it seems that monks, the clergy of cathedral and other collegiate churches, and even pastors, though obliged to several persons to say one mass for each, satisfy that obligation by celebrating one mass for all.
20.62 For they are not bound to the impossible or to something not convenient for the church to which they minister, as would be the solemn celebration of several masses for the dead on the same day. And the difficulty does not arise because they have done something illicit, for it was licit for them to oblige themselves to celebrate in their church the anniversaries of those who belonged to it, and this obligation must be understood according to the reasonable custom of such churches.
20.63 It is different as regards the members of mendicant orders or priests who are not charged with a parish or collegiate church, for they are obliged to celebrate individual masses for individual obligations. The custom of not celebrating several masses on the same day would not apply to them, for they have no excuse for promising what they cannot fulfill, since they have no reason for accepting anniversary masses in this way. They may oblige themselves only to what they can be fully certain of satisfying.
GOD AND CREATURES
20.64 [Another way of handling the special case] One could answer differently by pointing out that any one, if he wishes, can give up his right and permit the priest to say but one mass for him and others. And even though one does not relinquish his right in so eg many words at the time the obligation is imposed, one must assume that both the obligee and the obligor have a tacit agreement to that effect whenever the obligee is well aware of the custom in that church of celebrating but one mass a day no matter to how many it is under obligation. Consequently, it seems probable that if a canon of such a church decides to celebrate an anniversary mass on a day when several anniversaries coincide, he satisfies his obligation to all by saying simultaneously one mass for the lot.
On the other hand, if someone, unaware of the custom of this church, has every intention of binding its priest as he would a simple cleric not charged with the care of souls, then the priest would not satisfy his obligation, at least in collegiate churches, unless he gave what a nonparochial priest would give the obligee, namely, a mass of his own. The reason is that the custom is special and unknown to the obligee and that through no fault of his own, since he is not obliged to know the special customs of each church. Hence it must not be to his disadvantage as it would be if a priest by reason of such a custom were less obliged than another priest might be in similar circumstances.
If the priest wants to take advantage of the custom, he should explain it to the ignorant, and if the person agrees to be satisfied in this customary way, well and good.
20.65 As for the claim [in 20.61] that general obligations are a2] satisfied according to reasonable custom this can be said: Although, considered simply in itself, it could be a reasonable custom to celebrate in this church the anniversaries of the dead buried there and, absolutely speaking, it could also be a reasonable custom to say but one mass that same day for the dead, nevertheless there can be cases where these two customs cannot be reasonably combined, namely, where justice requires individual masses be said for individual obligations, for justice requires the same of collegiate churches as it does of a simple priest unless the obligee wishes to cede his right, at least implicitly, by agreeing to accept the custom of this church, something he must never be presumed to do unless he knows about it.
20.66 As for the claim [in 20.62] that no one is obliged to the impossible, 1 answer: While two obligations, at least in this case, may
QUESTION TWENTY
be opposed to each other in the sense that they cannot be justly fulfilled at the same time, nevertheless they can be fulfilled in all justice separately, and what is said of just fulfillment should be said of what is proper or becoming. Therefore, I say that if it is unbecoming to celebrate several masses for the dead on the same day by a custom approved of in a particular church, then no one is allowed to acquire obligations in justice of saying several masses on the same day. Hence if one is already obliged to say a mass on that day, he should not take on an additional obligation to celebrate, for the new obligation would not refer to the mass he already owes but to another which it is inconvenient to say in such a church.
20.67 To the allegation [in 20.61] that the celebration of anniversaries in one's own church is a reasonable custom, I reply: something may be reasonable in itself and still not be reconcilable with something else that is absolutely reasonable in itself. Thus it would be absolutely reasonable for an anniversary to be celebrated in a particular church as long as the fulfillment of the donor's intention could be harmonized with the custom of that church, that is to say, if a mass could be celebrated for him alone. But when both cannot be reconciled, as is the case here, it is reasonable that the anniversary not be celebrated in this church, and if the priest wants to accept the obligation of this anniversary mass and still observe the custom of his church, then he should see to it that another priest celebrate the mass for the second anniversary.
20.68 The same must be said, it seems, of endowed churches whose ministers by reason of a church ordinance or of alms already received are especially obliged to say an appropriate number of masses or a certain number of suffrages for those who made the endowment or gave the alms. For it does not seem that such priests can licitly oblige themselves to masses or suffrages for others unless they intend to have other priests, not already totally obliged, to satisfy these obligations individually.
20.6g [Conclusion] To the third point of this article [20.61] one can say that in the case proposed the priest does not satisfy the Church, for where complete obligations, requiring payment in full, are concerned, if there are several obligations to perform the same kind of action, then distinct acts are required to fulfill them, as is clear from the gloss.** It is different when the obligations refer to the same individual action, as happens when I am obliged by different precepts to fast on this Friday, for example, by my [Francis32 Decretales ..., col. 1424.
GOD AND CREATURES
can] rule and also by Church law because it is an ember day and is also the vigil of an apostle that is a day of fast. Because all these obligations refer to the same individual act of fasting, they can be satisfied by a single act. It is different, however, where the distinct obligations refer to the same kind of action. Now the reason for the distinction seems to be that no one is obliged to the impossible. No matter how many obligations I may have to perform the same numerical act, I can only satisfy these by doing that particular action, and { am not obliged to perform another act.
But where there are several obligations to perform an act of the same kind, these can be satisfied by different acts. Now in the case proposed here, there are several distinct obligations payable in full to do the same kind of thing, namely, to say a mass. Therefore, they are not satisfied unless each one receives distinct payment.
20.70 Confirmation: The obligees had different reasons and incentives for inducing the priest to oblige himself, and hence he seems to be bound to perform different acts corresponding to these different reasons.
Reply to the Initial Argument P54) 20.71 To the argument at the beginning [in 20.2]: The answer appears clear from what was said in [20.45 of] the second article.
The value due in virtue of the sacrifice is not equal simply to the value of the good contained in the Eucharist. It corresponds rather to a definite measure of merit of the Church. Neither is it simply equal to the merit of the passion of Christ, as was said later [in 20.47f.], but it approaches it more insofar as the mass represents the passion more specifically and, by its special value, it placates God and asks for a good corresponding to the general merit of the Church.