Question Thirteen: Are The Acts Of Knowing And
Question Thirteen
ARE THE ACTS OF KNOWING AND
APPETITION ESSENTIALLY ABSOLUTE
OR ESSENTIALLY RELATIVE?
13.1 As for creatures in particular the only questions raised concerned those endowed either with sensation or intellective life.
[1] 13.2 One question common to either form of life was this: Are the acts of knowing and appetition essentially absolute or essentially relative??
Arguments Pro and Con It was argued that they are relative because such acts cannot be thought of apart from their terms. But the absolute can be thought of apart from the thought of any term. Therefore [they are not absolute]. Proof of the major: Vision cannot be thought of apart from an object or something visible. The minor is evident.
13.3 To the contrary: Such acts are qualities. Now every quality represents a form that is simply absolute, for the categories are not intermixed [i.e., qualities are not relations]. Therefore [such are something absolute].
Body of the Question 13.4 This question is not about the act that results in knowledge, viz., that which produces, educes, or induces knowledge, but rather about the act of knowing, viz., the actual knowledge itself. If this be called an action, it does not fall under the category of "action" (for this latter is always directed to some term which somehow gets its being [esse] through the action). It is rather understood to mean the action in the sense of that operation by which the agent is ultimately perfected. For brevity's sake throughout this entire question we shall use "action" to mean the category by that name, viz., that 'Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.g, nn.537ff., 600-603
(111, 320ff., 354-56); d.6, nn.11-14 (IV, qq.2-94); d.12, nn.14-18 (v, 32-35); IV, d.12, q.3, nn.4o-41
(ed.
Vives xvil, 613-14); d.11, q.2, n.5 (ibid., 339); d.13, q.1 (ibid., 660-95); d.49, qq.1-4 (ed. Vivés xxI, 5-100).
QUESTION THIRTEEN
productive action or at least that activity which in some fashion causes its term to exist, whereas ''operation" will be taken to mean that intrinsic act by which the operator himself is ultimately perfected.
13.5 While the question could be understood as referring to the relation to either object or subject, the arguments [pro and con] seem to restrict it to the object.
13.6 Hence this meaning of the question must be discussed first.
Is actual knowledge essentially a relation to the object known, and, similarly, is actual appetition a relation to the object wanted?
13.7 There are three points to be dealt with here: First, to show that in all intellection and, in general, for any operation we are speaking of here, there is some absolute entity. Second, we must see how this absolute entity is related to the object connected with it.
Third, we must find out whether this relationship is essential to the act.
ARTICLE I
There is some Absolute Entity Involved in Every Operation including Intellection 13.8 There are three proofs for the first conclusion.
[First proof from the nature of perfection] The ultimate perfection of a living substance destined by nature for sensitive and intellectual activity is not a mere relation. But its operation is the ultimate perfection of such a substance. Therefore its operation is not 3 | a mere relation. Hence [it is something absolute].
13.9 Proof of the major: What is wanted above all else by either the natural or the free appetite of a nature whose desire is most perfect is not just a relation. But the ultimate perfection of the living nature is what such a nature desires above all else by natural desire.
Augustine's words can be understood as referring to such desire when he declares?: '""We all want to be happy." This is always true whether we actually think of beatitude or not, and yet without actual knowledge we can have no actual volition. In the same book he also says: '"Whatever else it is that anyone secretly will, he does not withdraw from this common will." This beatitude is also freely desired above all by a will that is well disposed.
13.10 Proof of the minor: There are the Philosopher's statements in the Ethics? where he wants to say that well-being or happiness,
2 Augustine, De Trin. xml, c.4, n.7: PL 42, 1018-19; CCSL 50a, 389-91.
% Aristotle, Ethica ad Nic. 1, c.g (1099a24-31); X, C.7 (1177a12-14).
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which is the ultimate end of an intellectual nature and consequently something supremely desirable, either is the best operation or it consists in such an activity. And he says the same in the Metaphysics,* speaking of God's mind: 'For if it thinks of nothing, what is there here of dignity?" And he adds immediately:
"If its substance is not intelligence, but a potency, it cannot be the best substance." By "intelligence" he means the act of "thinking," for to prove the entailment, he adds: "For it is through thinking that its value belongs to it." And he repeats the same idea elsewhere in the Metaphysics' where he says that actuality is prior to potency, not only in time and the order of knowing but also in substance, 1.e., perfection. And to prove ''act is prior in substance," he uses the example of man as prior to boy and human being to seed. And he also gives this reason for his conclusion, viz., the actuality is the end, and it is for the sake of this that the other things are acquired, which he illustrates with many examples.
13.11 Also there are many citations from authority about happiness as the ultimate and most desirable end, whether they make it consist in knowledge (as in that text from Augustine' that "'vision is the whole reward") or in love (according to his statement' that "The supreme regard is our enjoyment of him''). All these agree at least in this, that the last and most desirable end is an activity or consists in an operation.
13.12 [Second proof from the novelty of the absolute] The main conclusion is proved secondly in this fashion: A relation proper is not new unless there be in either the subject or the term some prior absolute entity that is new. But an operation can be new without any other prior absolute being present in either the operator himself or in the term of the operation. Therefore the operation is not precisely a relation proper. Hence [it is something absolute].
13.13 Proof of the major: First, from what the Philosopher says in Physics, where in Bk. V* he denies there is motion with respect to relation, and says even more expressly in Bk. VII® that acquired states of excellence or defects are not alterations because they represent relations: "Relatives are neither themselves alterations nor * Aristotle, Metaph. xu, c.g (1074b18-21).
> Ibid., 1x, c.8 (1050a3).
6 Augustine, De Trin. 1, c.13, n.g1: PL 42, 844; CCSL 50, 78.
* Augustine, De doctr. christ. 1, c.32, n.35: PL 34, 32; CCSL 32, 26.
8 Aristotle, Physic. v, c.2 (225b1-12).
9 Ibid., vil, c.3 (246b10-12).
QUESTION THIRTEEN
the subject of alteration or becoming or in fact of any change whatever.' Second, from reason: A relation proper follows necessarily once the relata, or terms, are given. Hence it cannot be something new without some novelty in one of the related terms.
13.14 Proof of the first part of the minor: A subject which passes from accidental potency to act does not receive a new form prior to the operation itself; otherwise it would have been in essential, not accidental, potency. The second part of the minor is manifest, for it is obvious that something visible does not acquire anything absolute by the fact that it is actually seen; neither then does an intelligible object, and the same is true of other objects.
13.15 [Third proof from the distinction between the relation and its foundation] Furthermore, every real relation, once the terms are given, necessarily follows or accompanies its proximate foundation or the reason that grounds it. Now the actual relation to the object does not necessarily accompany the operative potency. Consequently, the power or potency itself is not the proximate ground of the relation. Hence if an actual relationship of the operator to the object does obtain, something posterior to the potency itself is needed as its proximate ground which is a kind of intermediary between the power itself and this relationship. It seems the only medium of this sort is the operation itself. Now the proximate foundation for the relationship either is something absolute (according to that dictum of Augustine??: "Every essence which is spoken of relatively is also something apart from the relationship'') or at least is not precisely the relationship whose foundation it is. Therefore, the operation itself is not precisely the relationship of the operator to the object, and by the same token the operation is not precisely some relation.
13.16 [The operation is not a relation] From this conclusion just established we infer our intended thesis in this way: If this operation were precisely a relationship, then it would be a relation proper, for "relative," insofar as the Philosopher admits this is in someway applicable to an operation [like knowledge or perception] pertains properly to the category of "relation" and falls under the third type of the "'relative,'* as is clear from the Metaphysics." But since an operation is not precisely a relation, as the [three] reasons given above demonstrate, it follows that it is not precisely a relationship of any sort, and that, hence, some absolute entity exists there, which is our contention in this article.
10 Augustine, De Trin. vu, c.1, n.2: PL 42, 935; CCSL 50, 247.
11 Aristotle, Metaph. v, c.15 (1020bgo0-33).
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ARTICLE II
How this Absolute Entity is Related to the Object Connected with It 13.17 [Three points to be investigated] In this second main ar- [6] ticle we must consider three points: First, it is argued that the operation has to involve some real relationship to its object; second, we must say just how this is to be understood; third, we shall analyze the argument cited in the first section.
1. The Operation, Some Claim, must Involve a Real Relationship to the Object 13.18 [Three reasons they adduce] The first point is shown in three ways, and these correspond to the three proofs cited in the first article.
[First proof from the nature of perfection] The first proof is from the notion of perfection which was the middle term for the initial argument [in 13.8] of the first article. The last and highest perfection of an active or functional nature cannot be without a real relationship to the most perfect object it was designed by nature to have. But the highest perfection of such a nature is its operation.
Therefore [it cannot be without a real relationship to its most perfect object].
13.19 Proof of the major: If the claim were made that the highes perfection of a living nature is something insofar as it is an absolute thing, then its substance would be its supreme perfection, for according to Aristotle's Metaphysics," the substance is more perfect than any of its accidents. If one admits then that the consummate bliss of a creature is an accident of a nature able to be beatified and is nevertheless that nature's supreme perfection, this cannot refer to beatitude insofar as it is something absolute but precisely to the extent that it connects or joins the nature with its ultimate end in an unqualified sense, namely, with the extrinsic object that beatifies.
Therefore, it is its relationship to the object that is the formal reason why beatitude is called the highest perfection.
13.20 This is confirmed from Augustine,'® who, after rejecting the other definitions of beatitude, gives this as its true notion: 'He alone is blessed who has all he wills and wills nothing wrongly." From this it is argued: When there ': concrete predication* in the first mode 12 Ibid., vil, €.1
(1028. $4-,.028b5):
13 Augustine, De Trin. xii, c.5, n.8: PL 42, 1020; CCSL 50a, 393.
QUESTION THIRTEEN
per se, then it follows that the abstract can be predicated of the abstract, as is clear from this example: "The white is colored" represents a concrete per se predication of the first mode, not by reason of the subject but in virtue of the form, and hence it follows that this abstract predication, '""Whiteness is color," is also true. If then it be true per se according to the first mode that 'The blessed has all he wills well," then it follows that beatitude is, so to say, the possession of everything that is willed correctly. Now this possession or "'having"' seems to imply per se a relation.
13.21 [Second proof from the novelty of the absolute] Furthermore, the other middle term [in 13.12] of the second argument, namely, the novelty of something absolute, is used to construct this argument. In regard to an absolute form per se change is possible.
In regard to operations like knowing per se change is not possible.
Therefore [operations of this sort are not absolute forms].
13.22 Proof of the major: A subject can acquire an absolute form not just per accidens, viz., when something else is acquired, but per s€, Viz., it can be acquired on its own, because the form can be the first per se to follow its own privation.
13.23 The minor is proved from what the Philosopher says in the Physics": "The states of the intellectual part of the soul are not alterations. For the knower is above all said to be related to something." Other similar expressions found in the same section in the Philosopher's own words as well as in the commentary!® seem to show this to be his view.
13.24 [Third proof from the distinction between the relation and its foundation] What is more, from the third middle term [in 13.15], namely, the distinction between the relation and its foundation, this argument is formulated. Nothing whose substance includes a relation can be something absolute. But the substance of one of the terms, viz., the measured, of [Aristotle's] third type of "the relative" includes a relation, for an operation [like knowing or perceiving] refers to its object in this third way. Therefore [the operation is not something absolute].
13.25 Proof of the major: The absolute does not include relative in its essential meaning; otherwise it would be at once relative per se because of the respect it includes and not relative per se because by stipulation it is absolute.
14 Aristotle, Physic. vill, c.3 (247b2-4).
15 Averroes, Physic. vu, com. 20 (IV, fol. 322E-323K).
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13.26 The minor is evident from the Commentator's explanation on Book V of the Metaphysics'® to the effect that with relatives of the third type the relationship is only given in the substance of one of the terms, e.g., in the intellect, but not in the intelligible. He says:
"The relation is not in the substance of what is known but in the intellect," etc., and in the same place he explains the Philosopher's remark that "the same would be said twice' as follows:
" 'Intellect' does not refer to the one knowing but to what is known; otherwise the intellect would be constituted by the one knowing, whereas it seems to be the other way about. If it worked both ways it would follow that what is constituted by another also constitutes this other." Just as he argues that if intellect referred to the knower, it would be constituted by him, so the Commentator understands the intellect to be constituted by the intelligible to which it refers. But if the intellect were something absolute in itself, it would not be constituted by the intelligible.
2. How are We to Understand the Claim that the Operation Implies a Relation?
13.27 [A distinction between operations] As for the second point [of 13.17] in this article, I make a distinction in regard to operations that is more manifest in regard to the act of knowing, but can be assumed to be present, perhaps, also in the act of appetition.
There is some knowledge of the existent as such, such as that which grasps the object in its actual existence, e.g., the sight of color and in general of any sense perception involving the external senses.
There is also knowledge of the object, but not as existing as such, either because the object does not exist or at least the knowledge is not of the object as actually existing. One can imagine color, for example, both when it exists and when it does not.
13.28 A similar distinction can be shown to obtain in intellectual knowledge.!7
This is proved, first, since it is clear that there can be some intellection of the nonexistent. But there can also be intellectual knowledge of the existent qua existent, for the blessed will have such
16 Averroes, Metaph. v, com. 20 (viul, fol. 129G).
17 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.1, n.35
(11, 23-24); d.2, nn.139, 394 (ibid., 210-11, 352); d.g3, nn.g5-98, 41-44, 61-64
(11, 62-63, 27-29, 42-46); I, d.g, q.3, n.6 (ed. Vivés xl, 212-13); d.g, q.2, n.17 (ibid., 453); m1, d.14, q.3, 1.4
(ed. Vives xiv, 524); Iv, d.10, q.8, n.5 (ed. Vives xvi, 285); d.45, Gr27 ere (ed. Vivés Xx, 304-305).
QUESTION THIRTEEN
knowledge of the beatific object [God]. Otherwise someone could be beatified by the object even if, to assume the impossible, it did not exist. And yet there is admittedly a clear face-to-face vision of this object, since the act of knowing it tends to this object as present in itself with its own actual existence.
13.29 A second proof of the same is this: Everything that is part of the perfection of knowledge can pertain to intellectual knowledge with greater right than to sense knowledge. Now the possibility of grasping the object in its reality is a part of perfection, whenever this would not be prejudicial to the power of attaining the object because of its imperfection. Therefore, the intellect can have an act whereby the object is grasped in its real existence, at least that object which is more noble or on a par with the intellect. And if one concedes that our intellect can grasp some existing object in this way, then with equal reason we could admit it is possible for any object, since our intellect has the capacity for receiving the knowledge of anything intelligible.
13.30 [Iwo objections against this distinction] Against this distinction it is argued first that in knowing our intellect abstracts from the here-and-now and by the same token from anything concerned with the existent qua existent. Therefore, knowledge of anything as existing does not pertain to it per se.
13.31 Furthermore, if two such intellections were possible for our intellect, then it should be possible, on like grounds, to have both of these as regards the same object. And then, I ask, how would they possibly be distinguished, not only numerically (since two accidents of the same species cannot coexist at once in the same subject) but even specifically (for whether the act is specified in terms of the faculty or the object, since here the potency and object are the same for both types of knowledge, what specific difference could we claim was there)?
13.32 [Reply to these objections] To the first of these [in 13.30] one could say that the common distinction made between intellective and sensitive knowledge, namely, that we understand the universal, but we sense the singular, must not be understood as referring to disparate but equal powers such as obtain between sight in seeing colors and hearing in perceiving sounds. Rather the distinction is one between a higher cognitive faculty and one subordinate to it, and hence the superior power can know some object or aspect thereof that the inferior cannot know, but not vice versa in the sense that the inferior could know some object or aspect of it without the
GOD AND CREATURES
superior faculty being able to know that object even more perfectly or under the same aspect of knowability [e.g., as existing]. And thus one could admit that the intellect does not know the object as hereand-now because it grasps it in its absolute quidditive form, whereas the senses cannot know the object in this fashion because the power of each is limited to knowing it under the aspect of existing.
But this does not mean the intellect is so determined that it has to know the object only in some different way than as existing, for it is not limited to knowing it in only one way.
13.33 To the second objection [in 13.31], one could admit that there are two kinds of knowledge of the same object at once, because the object of one is not distinguished from the other as essence from existence. For even if there were some distinction on the part of the object between essence and existence, it does not suffice for our purpose, because existence itself can be conceived abstractly, for just as we can understand essence so can we conceive of existence even when it is not confronting us extramentally. Hence we may say that the two kinds of knowledge are distinct, and this, specifically, because the formal grounds that move the mind to each type of knowledge are not the same, since in the case of intuitive knowledge it is the thing in its own existence that is the per se motive factor objectively, whereas in the case of abstractive knowledge what moves the intellect per se is something in which the thing has
"knowable being"' [esse cognoscibile], whether this be the cause that virtually contains the thing as knowable or whether it be an effect such as the [intelligible] species* or likeness that contains the thing of which it is the likeness representationally.
[10] 13.34 [The first type of knowledge involves a twofold real relationship] Given the distinction [in 13.27] between the two acts of knowing, one could say that the first, viz., of the thing as existing, must include in itself a real and actual relation to the object itself.
The reason is that there can be no knowledge of this sort unless the knower has to the object an actual relationship that is such that the relata actually exist and are really distinct and given the nature of the relata the relationship arises necessarily. els 13.35 But more specifically there seems to be a double actual relationship to the object in this act. One could be called the relationship of the measured or, more accurately, of the measurable to its measure. T'he other can be called the relationship of becoming one with the term to which one is united, which has the formal character of being something in between the two. And this relation of
QUESTION THIRTEEN
the uniting medium can be given the special name of reaching out and coming in contact with the other term [relatio attingentiae altertus ut termini] or a stretching out or extending into the other as term [relatio tendentiae in alterum ut terminum].
13.36 But this distinction between the two relationships, namely, of the measurable to its measure and of contact with the term, seems to be sufficiently evident, for each can be separated from the other, as is the case with essences where the superior has the character of a measure with respect to the inferior, yet the inferior does not always have this relationship of contact with the superior of which we are speaking. Also, in the case where the intellect or the will is totally causing its object, there seems to be the relationship of extending into the term of the intellection or volition, whether this relationship be real or at least conceptual, and yet intellection or volition of this sort does not have the relationship of being measurable by this object but rather that of being its measure.
13.37 As for the first relationship, that of the measurable, Aris- [12] totle in the Metaphysics** declares it pertains properly to the third type of the "'relative.''* Here it should be noted that for "something to be measured" means that it is made certain of the specific quantity by the other [i.e., the measure], so that it implies a relationship both to the intellect that gets the certitude and to the measure which imparts it. The first of these is not real, just as the relationship of the knowable to the knowledge is not real. The second relationship is of the caused, not in being, but being known, to the cause of its being known, and this relationship is real insofar as the dependence of the caused upon the cause is concerned, which dependence arises from the character of the relata and not just because of an act of the mind referring one to the other. Nevertheless, because this relationship of dependence (not indeed of the knowledge itself upon the cause of that knowledge, which is quite real, but of the object as known to the object as that by which it is known) is between the relata insofar as they have this characteristic of 'being known" [esse cognitum], it follows that this relationship is not, simply speaking, real. But neither is it a purely conceptual relation, like that of the universal to the singular or of one contradictory to another, for Aristotle does not say that a "relative" of the third type is of the measured to the measure, but of the measurable
(i.e., that which is suited by nature to be measured) to the measure (i.e., that which is designed by nature to measure).
18 Aristotle, Metaph. v, c.15 (1020b26-32).
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13.38 One could understand this as follows. Just as "to be measured" is to depend for being known actually (as is clear from what has been said), so "to be measurable" implies an aptitudinal or potential dependence for being known, which is to assert a dependence as to knowability. But everything is related to entity as it is to knowability. Consequently, the measurable refers to that underlying being which is the reason why this is measurable, and this entity is caused or "participated," so that when something in the third class of "relatives" is said to be "'as the measurable to its measure," this is understood to mean that it is dependent in entity upon that in whose entity it participates, so that there does exist a relationship of the third type on the part of the measurable that is simply real, for it is understood to be a being by participation or imitation in relation to something else.
13.39 One could say further in favor of our proposal that since something could participate in the perfection of another in many ways, so the act of knowing is also related to the object participatively in the way a likeness is to that of which it is the likeness. I am not referring here to the sort of likeness that involves a communication of the same form, as in the case of the likeness between two white objects, but rather the likeness peculiar to imitation which is the likeness of the ideate* to the idea.
13.40 [Abstractive cognition has only a potentially real relation together with another conceptual relationship] The second act of knowledge, viz., that which does not have to be of the existent qua existent, does not require an actual real relationship to the object, since this sort of relation requires real and actual terms. Still, this second act of knowlege can have a relationship to its object as something potentially real, where "real" would refer to the first relation mentioned in the preceding section [13.35], viz., that of the measurable or dependent, but would not refer to the second, viz., that of union or contact. In addition, abstractive knowledge can also have an actual conceptual relationship to the object, but for the knowledge to be of the object itself this is not required.
13.41 [Four points to be clarified] There are, then, four points to be explained here:
First, that abstractive knowledge has a real potential or aptitudinal relation, viz., of the measurable with reference to the object, even if this is not existent. Proof: Whatever has an actual relationship to an existent term and for its part always relates to that term in the same way, will have an aptitudinal relationship to that
QUESTION THIRTEEN
term when it is not existing. But an operation is this sort of thing because it is something measurable by the object, i.e., it is apt by nature to depend as to its entity upon the object, with that special sort of dependence that characterizes a likeness that imitates or participates in [the perfection of] that of which it is a likeness. But all these conditions would exist as actualized so far as the foundation goes, if the term actually existed.
13.42 Second, namely, that so far as the relationship of reaching out and contacting the term goes, one can say that neither a real nor an aptitudinal relationship of this sort is characteristic of abstractive knowledge. Proof: Such a relation does not pertain to the foundation on its part, and it would not actually pertain to abstractive knowledge actually even if the term did exist in reality, for the lat- [14] ter is not designed by nature to contact the term in its actual existence.
13.43 Third, namely, that so far as the conceptual relation present in abstractive cognition is concerned, one can understand it in two ways:
One is this: When a term does not exist extramentally but has being only in the intellect, any relationship to it must be one of reason, 1.e., conceptual, since a relation can have no truer being than does the term to which it relates. Now the object that is the term of abstractive knowledge needs only to be in the intellect. Therefore
[any relationship to it can only be conceptual].
13.44 The other way to understand the conceptual relation is this:
—The act of knowing an object abstractively can itself be grasped in a reflex act. For since this intellection by reason of the object known is a natural likeness of the object, it can be known by reflection, and the intellect that grasps this intellection in this way can relate it to the object. But this intellection which is related in this fashion through the act of the intellect is being related by means of a conceptual relation.
13.45 There is a difference between these two conceptual relations, for just as the second can be a relationship to a nonexistent object, so also it can be a relation of a nonexistent cognition, just as long as this cognition remains known through reflection or is related by the intellect. But the first relation can only hold for an existing act, and not just for it as an object known through some reflex act or as the relatum in the relating mind.
And from this difference follows the other, viz., that the second relation is one of reason on the part of both extremes, where-
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as the first conceptual relation is one of reason only on the part of the object, but on the part of the act it is real, because it is seen to follow from the nature of the act, and does not pertain to it only insofar as it is an object of the intellect or is related.
13.46 Against this it is argued that a real being does not require that anything not real follow or accompany its nature. Hence the real act of knowing has no relation of reason that follows from its nature.
I reply: Through the act of knowing the object has "known being"
[esse cognitum]. Therefore, some relation which refers to the object as having such "'being"' can follow the nature of the act.
13.47 From this the fourth point becomes clear, namely, how the conceptual relation is a necessary concomitant, because this is true of the first relation of reason [mentioned in 13.43], for abstractive knowledge could exist without the second relation [in 13.44], viz., as a direct act without the following reflex act. And a fortiori the object could be the term of such an act without having to have the conceptual relation to the act. The second relation is caused contingently after the direct act of intellection. Therefore there was no necessary ground in the object for it having to be the term of this reflex act.
3. Analysis of the Arguments in the First Section 13.48 Now in this third section of this article, we must reply to the arguments given in the first section [13.18-26] to the extent that they seem to be inadequate.
As for the first [in 13.19-20], I concede that the operation which represents the ultimate perfection of a functional nature must involve a relation. For instance, if we speak of the beatific operation of a man or an angel, this relation must exist, for if this operation refers to cognition, this is intuitive, and if it refers to volition, this is necessarily associated with intuitive knowledge. But when it is said [in 13.19] that the operation is the ultimate perfection precisely insofar as it unites one with the object, I answer that "ultimate perfection" can mean either some supreme perfection that is per se one or else a perfection which consists of the supreme perfection together with all that necessarily accompanies it.
13.49 In the first sense, I say that the operation itself is the ultimate perfection and it is simply more perfect than anything accompanying it, including also that relationship which the union formally implies, for if I could have the operation without the relation, I
QUESTION THIRTEEN
would still be beatified. I would not possess consummate bliss, however, if I had the relation without the operation.
13.50 This is clear as regards God's beatitude, which formally consists in an operation, according to those words of the Philosoper'? where he is speaking of God's mind: "For if it thinks of nothing, what is there here of dignity? It is just like one who sleeps, and if its substance is not its intelligence," i.e., actual thinking, "it is not the best substance." And he proves the entailment:
"For it is through thinking that its value belongs to it." His beatitude, however, does not require a conceptual relationship between the operation and its object, for even though his intellect could relate its act with the object, still such a referral or conceptual relation is not included in the operation itself, which in its own right is beatific. For it does not seem reasonable that there are stronger reasons for saying that God is formally happy by an operation that includes a conceptual relation than for saying that an angel's beatitude includes such a relation.
13.51 Created beatitude, however, does necessarily require a relationship to the object, and this is a real relation. The reason for this is that the operation can have no greater unity with the object than the unity of a relationship. But God's operation has a true union or identity with the object, and therefore no relation is required there for the operation alone and as something absolute to be fully beatific.
13.52 And here we see one way in which divine beatitude excels created happiness, because as something absolute, it is fully God's ultimate good, whereas created happiness is ultimate only where there is a relationship conjoined with it. Consequently, when it is claimed that the perfection is ultimate precisely insofar as it unites one with the object, the added qualification can refer either to the relation or to its foundation. If the first is meant, then the statement must be denied, because the beatitude is not the ultimate perfection precisely insofar as it is formally a relation. If one takes the second
~I — sense, then it can be conceded that beatitude insofar as it connects, i.e., insofar as it is the proximate connecting foundation, is the ultimate perfection.
13.53 The same distinction makes it clear how to answer the confirmation [in 13.20] that "He alone is blessed who has all he wills, etc." For if 'has' is understood there as implying a relation, then
19 Tbid., xl, c.g (1074b17-18).
ZO1
GOD AND CREATURES
either something necessarily accompanying the beatific operation is being described, or else the word "beatitude" does not imply precisely something absolute but includes a relationship to the object.
But if "has" refers per se to the operation by which God is possessed, in the sense Augustine"® says: "To have God is nothing else than to know," then the beatific possession does not imply per se a relation, but this latter only accompanies it.
13.54 [Objections and their solution] Against this it is argued that there is no contradiction that the absolute should be separated from the relation, as prior from the posterior, particularly if the relationship is not one of essential dependence. Therefore, if the operation that beatifies is something absolute, it could be separated from the relationship to the object by the divine power, and then one could be beatified with no connection with the object.
13.55 Besides, according to the Philosopher,? where generation [18] or becoming is concerned, the posterior is more perfect. But a relation, if it be other than the absolute operation, is posterior in becoming. Therefore [it is more perfect].
13.56 Look for the answer to the first objection elsewhere.??
13.57 To the second objection, I say that the principle of the Philosopher must be understood to refer to the same order, for if something is posterior in becoming in another order or genus, there is no need that it be more perfect. Otherwise an accident would be more perfect than the substantial form. But it is only in this latter way that a relation is posterior to the absolute for it does not advene* to the absolute as its proper complement in the same order, but only when the absolute with its own complete perfection is given, does the relation arise from this perfection.
[19] 13.58 [To the second proof in 13.21-23] As for the second argument based on the Physics,?* it seems that Aristotle, according to the Commentator,** is expressing not his own view but the opinion of Plato, for he says at the end of his comment: "Aristotle does not want to expound his own opinion here but to show the strength of this particular view." And the view seems to be that which Augustine?> and Aristotle?* impute to Plato, namely, that "To learn is
20 Augustine, De diversis quaest. 83, q.35, n.1: PL 40, 24.
*1 Aristotle, Metaph. 1x, c.8 (1049b19-22, 1050a3-5, 1051a4-5).
22 See Appendix, Addition 13.56.
23 Aristotle, Physic. vil, c.3 (247b2-4).
24 Averroes, Physic. vil, com. 20 (vu, fol. 323H).
25 Augustine, De Trin. xu, C15, nn.24-25: PL 42, 1011-12; CCSL 50, 377.
*6 Aristotle, Anal. prior. 1, c.21 (67422); Topic. u, ¢.4 (11 1b27-31).
QUESTION THIRTEEN
nothing other than to remember." For Aristotle says?': "The original acquisition of knowledge is not a becoming or an alteration...
. For the terms knowing and understanding imply that the intellect has reached a state of rest and has come to a standstill
. just as when one awakes from sleep." And the Commentator®® explains (and in the alternate translation the same view is expressed) that the soul is not changed in the first acquisition of knowledge, just as it is not changed when, after the impediment of sleep or drunkenness, one can use the knowledge he could not use before.
13.59 One can put it another way, however. If Aristotle was expressing his own view when he said this, he still did not affirm that movement and change exist per se with respect to any form except that which can be acquired on its own. Hence he did not claim there is any change as regards a form that can be acquired only by first getting something else, which is the case with acquiring a relationship. What he wants to say in the text cited is that there is no alteration in qualities that occurs only when other factors are altered, i.e., the alteration takes place in other things: "Though it may be true that every such becoming is necessarily the result of something's being altered, the result, for instance, of the materials being condensed or rarified or heated or cooled, nevertheless it is not the things that are coming into existence that are altered and their becoming is not an alteration.''?° Afterwards he says*°: "Thus bodily excellences such as health and a good state of body we regard as consisting in a blending of hot and cold elements within the body in due proportion in relation either to one another or to the surrounding atmosphere." And, therefore, health is not properly the term of the alteration, but some other alteration ends with a certain degree of heat or cold, and this is in harmony with the other bodily qualities and thus health results. Now if it were evident that knowledge or the actual consideration of something were a relation only, then it would be sufficiently apparent that, according to the mind of Aristotle, these states would undergo no change or alteration. But we proved in [13.8ff. of] the first article that an operation is not just a relation, and by equal or even greater reason, neither is habitual knowledge a relation.
13.60 Hence it seems that something further should be added, namely, that Aristotle admits qualitative alteration only as regards
27 Aristotle, Physic. vu, c.3 (247b10-18).
28 Averroes, Physic. vu, com. 20 (IV, fol. 323H).
29 Aristotle, Physic. vil, c.3 (246a2-10).
30 [bid.
GOD AND CREATURES
a quality that can be acquired first, that is to say, a quality which neither follows incidentally some induced form the way a relation does, nor is it induced necessarily given the induction of some prior form. And then this conclusion of his [in 13.23] is not true of any alteration except that which is immediate to the first thing producing the alteration in some order. And so knowledge or the consideration of something does not involve this sort of alteration because the external object is the first thing to produce an alteration in the order {of knowledge], but the knowledge in the intellect itself is not caused immediately by the object but by something inside. For we exercise our knowledge when we wish to, as the De anima** puts it, whereas sensation does not depend on our wishes. The reason for this is that an internal object is needed for understanding, but sensation requires an external object.
13.61 That Aristotle had this sort of alteration in mind is shown from the fact that just before he admitted that the senses are changed, declaring that the senses themselves are altered, since they are acted upon, for sensation results from a bodily movement and the sense being acted upon. Here [in the Physics],3? however, he denies that the intellectual part of the soul is altered, and the reason he seems to give is that intellectual knowledge is not received immediately from an external object, which is the first cause of altera-_ tion in the order [of knowledge], but it requires the mediation of sense knowledge. Hence, to prove that knowledge is not the result of a movement or change, properly speaking, he says: "It is when it meets with the particular object that the soul knows it in a universal manner."' Thus his words there that "the knower is said above all to be related to something," is to be understood in the sense that "related to something" refers to the object inside and not immediately to the external object which is the first cause of the alteration.
And this conclusion, understood in particular of the first alteration, suffices for his purpose here, since he intends to prove by enumerative induction for each case of movement the conclusion that the mover and moved are simultaneous. And it is especially in regard to alteration that he seems to have an instance of those qualities not immediately induced by the first cause of the alteration, for although what is altered here exists at the same time as its proximate cause, it does not exist at the same time as that which more obvious31 Aristotle, De anima Ul, c.5 (417b24).
82 Aristotle, Physic. vil, c.3 (247b1ff.).
QUESTION THIRTEEN
ly seems to be the first cause of the alteration in this order [of knowledge, viz., the external object].
13.62 The third way to understand Aristotle's dictum [that the states of the intellective soul are not alterations] would be to take
"alteration" as referring to motion, or if the alteration is not divisible, then it refers to a change terminative or continuative of motion, or at least to a change that a natural agent can produce in a mobile or mutable subject. None of these situations holds good of the intellective part of the soul, for it is not divisible and hence it is not the recipient of motion which requires a divisible subject. Also, being indivisible, it is not locally present to any natural agent, since it does not occupy a place. A physical agent, however, only acts on a patient locally present to it. By contrast, the sense can be said to be altered, because in this something composite receives something extended and from a natural agent locally present.
13.63 Though this third interpretation is true enough, it is not clear how it can be derived from what Aristotle says here.
[22] 13.64 [To the third proof in 13.24-26] As for the third argument, one could say that just as in the first two types of relatives the relationship is admittedly in the substance of both relata, so in the third type we concede it is to be found in the substance of only one of the terms. That is why the Commentator* says here that "a relation occurs in two ways; either in the substance of both terms or in the substance of only one of them." However, in the first two types of relatives,* the relationship is not included essentially in either term, for each is something essentially absolute. But the relation in this case is said to be in the substance of both terms in the sense that the proximate basis or reason for grounding the relation is in both, whereas in the third type of "relative''* this is characteristic only of one relatum.
13.65 The other translation [of Aristotle]** makes this even clearer: 'Relative terms which imply number or potency,' —i.e., relatives of the first and second type—"'are all relative because their essence includes in its nature a reference to something, not because something else involves a reference to it; but that which is measurable or sensible or thinkable is called relative, because something else involves a reference to it." What he wants to say is that, in the first two types, what is related is of itself relative and is not just said to 33 Averroes, Metaph. v, com. 20 (vu, fol. 129G).
34 Aristotle, Metaph. v (1021a27-30).
GOD AND CREATURES
be related because something else is related to it. In the third type, however, only one term has essentially the basis for the relationship, whereas the other is only said to be related because the first is related to it.
[23] 13.66 To put it briefly, the difference between the two cases is that in the first two types the relationship is mutual, so that in each extreme there is a reason for grounding one relation and being the term of the other. In the third type, the reaction is non-mutual, and the foundation for the relationship is characteristic only of one relatum, whereas the other has the aspect of being the term of this same relation.
13.67 What the Commentator*> adds there about "the same would be said twice," and so on, can be understood in the sense that we can speak of a thing being constituted by that on which it depends essentially, even if that on which it depends is not intrinsic to ity and it is in this way that a thing is constituted by its measure.
Therefore, if the intellect referred to the knower as its measure, then it would be constituted by it in this fashion. But the knower is constituted by the intellect as by its form. Hence there would be circularity as regards their constitutions, even though they would not be constituted in the same way. But such circularity is impossible if each depended essentially on the other in this way, because there can be no circularity where essential dependence is concerned. This seems to be the sense of the Commentator's words there: "The same would be stated twice and then the same will be both cause and effect of the same identical thing." The text of Aristotle here, however, is more easily explained according to the other translation. For if "intellect" would refer to the knower as its measure and to the intelligible as its measure, then we would be saying the same thing twice, i.e., we would be saying twice how it is measurable by referring it to each as its measure. Where the latter are disparate, however, it is simply incongruous that each should be the complete measure of the thing.
ANRAIVICIAE, TUL
Is a Relationship to the Object Essential to the Act of Knowing or Appetition?
(24] 13.68 [The manner in which relation can be connected with something absolute] As for the third main article [in 19.7], I say
85 Averroes, Metaph. v, com. 20 (vu, fol. 129G).
QUESTION THIRTEEN
that .a relation can be involved with something absolute in three ways:
(1) contingently and accidentally, as for instance similarity as regards whiteness; (2) necessarily, as the relationship of a creature to God; (3) according to true identity, as the personal relation in the divine to the essence. It does not seem possible, however, to have any greater identity that could be called, in any proper sense,
"essential identity," for neither can the relationship be included essentially in the absolute (otherwise the same thing would be essentially absolute and essentially relative), nor can the absolute and relative be included in anything that is one per se, so that it would come under a single genus and there would be a proper concept of it that is one per se and would be classified essentially under one category. For just as disparate elements do not combine to form a thing that is one per se, unless they are related properly speaking as act and potency in the same genus (as is clear from the Philosopher in the Metaphysics)**, so also nothing can have a concept that is one per se and still include per se distinct conceptual elements unless one of these is per se potential and the other is per se actual, delimiting the potential. A relation and an absolute, however, cannot have concepts such that one is per se determinable and the other per se determining. For if some absolute concept were indifferent, then it could be contracted by some absolute concept until it became the most specific of absolutes. Similarly, a relational concept could be made the most specific of relations. Neither concept, then, is per se a specification or determinant of the other, for each is apt by nature to have a most determinate concept in its own order.
13.69 [The relation is not essential to the act] Applying this to our case, we claim that in the act of knowledge under investigation there is some absolute entity as the first article proved [in 13.8ff.].
There is also some relationship there, as the second article showed [in 13.17ff.]. Now from what we have just established in the present article, we conclude that the absolute and relative in this case cannot constitute something that is one per se; at least they cannot consist of something that pertains to the same category, namely, that has a concept that is one per se.
13.70 From this it follows that either the act of knowing is not something per se one pertaining to a single genus, or else it does not 36 Aristotle, Metaph. vu, c.8 (1033b16-19); ibid., c.11
(1036b21-24); vm, c.6 (1045b20-21); see also vill, cc.1-6 (10424-1045).
GOD AND CREATURES
include per se the two elements which were proved to concur in it.
But the first article, especially the first proof [in 13.8-11], seems to establish that the absolute element is included essentially. Consequently, the act does not appear to be essentially relative in the sense of including the relation per se. Or if it may be called a kind of whole which includes both, then it is not something that is one per se, but is a kind of accidental unity which includes the other part "essentially" only in the loose sense that a white man is essentially white. For this is an improper way of speaking, since properly speaking nothing is predicated essentially of anything that is not in itself essentially one, just as nothing can be true of that which is false in itself. For [according to Aristotle] the false in itself is something whose concept includes incompatible elements, and since it is not possible in itself, nothing possible can be asserted of it or nothing is possible for it. So in the case at hand, nothing can be truly or essentially identical with something that is not essentially [per se] one.
13.71 [Three proofs that cognition and appetition fall under the category of quality] But it may be asked: Supposing that the operation is essentially [per se] one, and consequently is generically one, under what category does it fall? It can be said that it pertains per se to the category of quality.
You will find proof of this if you run through the different categories.
It obviously does not fall under substance, nor under categories other than quality, relation, action, and passion.* Now it is not a relation, as the first article proved [in 13.8ff.]: neither is it action or passion.
My first proof makes use of that common middle term, namely, [the notion of perfection used in 13.8 of] the first article. Just as the ultimate perfection of an agent or functional nature is not a relation, so neither is this perfection anything that falls under the categories of "action" or "passion." But this operation is [the agent's ultimate] perfection. [Therefore it does not pertain to the categories of "action" or "passion."'|
13.72 Furthermore, action is the transmutation of another as other, even as an active potency, according to the Philosopher,?? "is a principle of transmuting another qua other." Passion is also the transmutation by another qua other. An operation like knowing or appetition, however, is neither a transmutation of another nor one that is by another. Although this seems obvious enough, it can be
37 Tbid., v, c.12 (1019a15-20).
QUESTION THIRTEEN
proved in this fashion. Active and passive transmutations both end with a term that receives being by the transmutation, for the patient or the one affected now exists differently than before in virtue of the formal term of the transmutation. The operation, however, bears no relation to a term which receives being through it. Indeed, to the extent that there is a term toward which it tends, the operation does not produce it or educe it from the potency of the patient or induce it into the patient. Rather it presupposes this term. Now every action in the category "'action" either produces, educes, or induces its term. Indeed by the very fact that one postulates action of this sort in the divine, such as "'generation''* or "spiration,'* one also postulates there is some term that receives being through the action, such as the suppositum* generated or spirated.
13.73 A third proof is this: He who acts with an action falling under the category by that name never becomes simply more perfect through that action. Rather from the fulness of its perfection such an agent acts by communicating perfection to another. Now an operation is simply the perfection of the one operating.
Therefore, it follows, by default, that the absolute entity in the operation belongs to the category of quality.
13.74 [What type of quality is it?] And if one asks: To what species of quality* does it belong? One could say that if you consider the different types, it seems more reasonable to place it in the first species, for it cannot fall under any of the others. It clearly does not belong to the second or the fourth. And if the third includes only sensible qualities, as the Categories*® seems to say and as the Physics®® also seems to imply, then it is also obvious it does not belong here.
All spiritual qualities also seem to fall under this first species whether they represent being at rest, like habits,* or are dynamic
[in fieri], like operations. Or perhaps one*? would want to say that operations pertain to the third species and are spiritual affections, or passions, and would go on to explain that while the Philosopher expressly mentions there only the bodily affections as being the more obvious, one ought to understand also the spiritual affections underlying them. It is possible in the soul to distinguish an operation proper from an affection, like delight or sadness in the will
(because an operation proper tends as it were to the term of the 38 Aristotle, Praedicam., c.8 (ga29-10b25).
39 Aristotle, Physic. vu, c.3 (247b7-8).
40 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.15, q.un., nn.8ff. (ed. Vivés xiv, 572ff.).
GOD AND CREATURES
operation, whereas the affection is, as it were, caused by the term in the subject, as sadness in the will is caused by something able to make it sad). Nevertheless, spiritual operations and affections have this in common that both represent a dynamic state [im fier:] of the subject, and as such each could be called an affection pertaining to the third species of quality.
But whatever is to be said about its belonging to the first or the third species, this much at least seems probable, namely, that an operation is in the category of quality.
[26] 193.75 [Six objections to the view that operation is a quality] The words of the Philosopher seem to oppose this interpretation. In the Metaphysics** he says: "Where there is no product apart from the action, the action is present in the agent, for instance, the act of seeing is in the seeing subject and the act of theorizing in the theorizing subject.' His purpose is to distinguish between immanent and transient action.* What he wants to say here, then, is that some action is immanent, and he gives as examples vision and speculative thinking. Both of these, however, are operations. Therefore, according to him an operation is an action.
13.76 In the De anima,*? the Philosopher says: "Thinking is a kind of passive affection," and so on.
13.77 Also in the Ethics** he says: "If pleasure is not a quality, it does not follow that it is not a good, for the activities of virtue are not qualities either, nor is happiness."
13.78 Also in the Physics*t he speaks of having scientific knowledge and knowing as asserting a relation, where the Commentator*® adds: ''It is better to think of these as belonging to the category of relation than to that of quality."
13.79 There are in addition arguments from reason. An absolute is not specifically distinguished by something extrinsic but by some absolute intrinsic difference of its own. Operations, however, are distinguished specifically by objects that differ in species, for there is a greater distinction between operations that have specifically different objects than between those which have to do with the same species of objects. But the latter differ numerically; therefore, the former differ by more than a numerical distinction. Hence they differ specifically.
4 Aristotle, Metaph. 1x, c.8 (1050a33-1050b).
#2 Aristotle, De anima il, c.4 (429b13-14, 429b26).
48 Aristotle, Ethica ad Nic. x, ¢.2 (1173a14-16).
44 Aristotle, Physic. vil, c.3 (247b4-5).
5 Averroes, Physic. vil, com. 20 (tv, fol. 322F).
QUESTION THIRTEEN
13.80 Furthermore, an operation derives its peculiar perfection and nobility from the object, as seems sufficiently obvious. It is also proved by this passage from the Ethics'*: "In the case of each sense, the best activity is that of the best-conditioned organ in relation to the finest of its objects.''47
13.81 [Answer to the first objection in 13.75] To the first of these objections I say that an operation has two conditions it shares with action. The first is that it is always in a state of becoming [in fier], not in the sense of being in a state of succession, because the operation is not [temporally] divisible, but it is in fieri in that it is in continual dependence upon the same cause and in the same way that an object conserved depends on the cause that conserves it, which we explained earlier in the question [Twelve] which dealt with this matter. The second condition is that the operation, as it were, passed into the object as its term, although the latter does not receive being from the operation but its being is presupposed.
And because of these two characteristics an operation can be called "action," just as it is because of these that it is expressed grammatically by an active verb and is referred to as a "second act." *48 Thus this distinction of action in this sense into immanent and transient is not one of a genus into its species, but of a word into its meanings. For a transient action is a true action in the category of 'action,' whereas an immanent action is a quality and it is called
"action" equivocally because of the aforesaid conditions.
Actions of the genus "action" can also be divided in another way into immanent and transient actions, as a superior class into its inferiors.4® For not only does "action" in the category of that name refer to the form induced by the motion in a patient other than the agent, but it also applies to the form induced by the change into the agent itself. For this absolute form insofar as it is something new is the term of some action proper by which it receives its being.
Therefore, when the form that is the term of the action lies outside the agent itself, then this action is transient; when this form is in the agent itself, however, the action is immanent.
13.82 The difference between these two ways of understanding immanent action is clear. What is called an immanent action in the first sense is called "term of an immanent action" in the second sense. And it is an immanent action in the second sense that we have
46 Aristotle, Ethica ad Nic. x, c.4 (1174b17-20).
47 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.3, nn.65ff. (1, 4off.).
48 Cf, Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.3, nn.600-603 (III, 354-56).
+9 Cf. ibid., nn.524-27 (II, 312-14); Iv, d.11, q.2, n.5 (ed. Vives xv, 339).
GOD AND CREATURES
in mind when we use the verb "'to elicit" in speaking of a power eliciting its operation, and when we use the verb ''to speak" in declaring that the memory,* or the person through the memory, "speaks the Word,*"' and when we use "'to spirate'"' in saying that someone spirates love through the will.
13.83 What the Philosopher meant by the distinction of immanent and transient action, however, was the first, not the second, meaning, even though the latter distinction exists. This is clear from his words in the Metaphysics*: "There is no product apart from the action." He calls the product the term of the operation [operatum].
But in addition to that action by which the operation is induced or educed, there is some product, that is, the operation itself which 1S the product of the one operating. And he continues: "The action is present in the agents; for instance, the act of seeing is in the seeing subject.' Here he makes it clear that he is calling vision the immanent action, and not something else of which vision is the end product.
13.84 [Answer to the second objection in 13.76] To the second, one could say that just as to be white is to have whiteness as a form, so to feel or be sentient is to have sensation as a form. Hence, if the object or God caused the sensation as efficient cause, they would not be said to be sensing, but the sense in which the sensation is subjectively received would be sensing. To sense, then, is to receive or have the sensation, and in this way to think is to receive thought, for even though the intellect were to cause the thinking in itself by some operation, it would not be said to think or understand insofar as it causes the thinking. However, one could very well indicate this fact in addition by using a word that would signify such an action or causation denominatively, for instance, by coining such a word as "J-am-producing-the-thought"' [intelligifico]. Therefore, the statement that 'Thinking is a kind of passive affection" does not prove that thinking falls essentially into the category of "passion" but only that it is formally designated by a term indicative of the fact that the thinking is received by something as a subject, so that the meaning would be, to think is to receive understanding and to "receive" is a kind of passive affection or passion.®4
13.85, [A twofold answer to the third objection in 13.77] As for the third objection based on the Ethics,®? one answer could be that 5° Aristotle, Metaph. 1x, c.8 (1050a33-34).
*t Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.g, nn.386, 537 (11, 235, 320-21).
62 Aristotle, Ethica ad Nic. x, c.3 (1173a14-16).
QUESTION THIRTEEN
the "operations" or activities that stem from a virtue are called the actions which elicit the operation proper, and such actions are good because the production of a good is good. But these actions are not qualities, but belong properly to the category of action. This can be inferred from the words of the Commentator,®* who to prove that "the activities of virtue are not qualities" says this: "Although an operation is an operative movement, the motion itself is not a quality." Here "operative movement" could be the name of the motion that results in the existence of the operation.
13.86 And if one objects to this on the grounds that [in 13.77] he adds the rider "'nor is happiness," one could say that just as "operation" is taken less properly to mean the action which ends with the operation proper, so happiness could be taken more broadly to refer to the action which ends with happiness. It was enough for Aristotle to take the activities or "operations" of virtue and happiness to mean something which would suffice to counter the claim that "every good is a quality," which is what he intended to challenge.
13.87 The citation in question could also be explained away in this fashion: Aristotle only intended to speak here of qualities which do not have their being in flux [in fiert], since he says: "Neither are the activities of virtues qualities." This is clear from the fact that he denies that this follows: "Pleasure is not a quality, therefore it is not a good," and proves this from the counter instance that "The activities of virtues are not qualities.' For the antecedent of this entailment, "Pleasure is not a quality," is true only if one is referring to a permanent quality, for pleasure is truly a quality but one in a state of flux [in fieri]. Therefore, it is enough for his purposes to object that the "activities of virtues" are no more permanent qualities than pleasure is. But that pleasure is truly a quality can be proved from what he says in the same context:
'For speed and slowness are thought to be proper to every movement, and if a movement .
. has neither speed nor slowness in itself, it has this in relation to something else; but of pleasure neither of these things is true. For while we may become pleased quickly, we cannot be pleased quickly."
What he wants to say is that pleasure is not something one attains quickly but progressively; hence it is not a movement. But if one could be transported or changed quickly into this state, then pleasure could be the end of a rapid transformation and hence could be the term of a change. But according to the Philosopher in the 53 Averroes, Ethica x, ¢.3 (Il, 145L-146M).
GOD AND CREATURES
Physics*+ there is no motion per se as regards action or passion; therefore, pleasure is neither acting nor being acted upon. And if you run through the rest of the categories, you will see that it is a quality.
13.88 Hence those who would argue for this entailment, viz., "Pleasure is not a quality, therefore it is not a good," presuppose the following to be true: "Every good is a quality with quiescent being;
[ 30 ] pleasure is not such; therefore [it is not a good]." And it is to this major of the [first] enthymeme that the Philosopher replies with the counter instance of the operation or activity of virtue. And he proves that not every operation is action proper with these words from chapter 5 of this same book [of the Ethics]:°> "One might think that all men require pleasure," which he supports with the argument "because they all desire to live; but life is a kind of activity." And then he goes on to show how life or living could be called an action in the category "action."
13.89 [Answer to the fourth objection in 13.78] As for the other objection based on the Physics,°* we claim the words of the Philosopher must be interpreted as follows according to what was said
[in 13.58-60] of the second article. Scientific knowledge necessarily includes a relation to an internal object and this is not produced immediately by the first cause of the alteration [viz., the external object]. Consequently scientific knowledge does not represent an alteration acquired first. As for the Commentator's explanation*:
"It is better to think of these as belonging to the category of relation than to that of quality," this can be given another interpretation that we shall take up in answering the initial argument [in 13.101].
13.90 [Answer to the fifth objection in 13.79] As for the first argument from reason, one could say that the acts are distinguished by objects only insofar as these are a more manifest indication of a more fundamental difference in the acts themselves and that we learn of this distinction of acts from the more obvious distinction of their objects.
13.91 This is confirmed from the De anima.** As the Philosopher there wants to distinguish the acts by their objects, so he also wants to distinguish the powers by their acts. To the extent that the ob54 Aristotle, Physic. v, c.2 (225b14).
55 Cf. Aristotle, Ethica x, c.4 (1175410).
56 Aristotle, Physic. vil, ¢.3 (247b-10).
57 Averroes, Physic. vil, com. 20 (tv, fol. 322F).
°6 Aristotle, De anima U1, c.4 (415a17+22, 418a10-17).
QUESTION THIRTEEN
jects are prior to the acts, the more one ought to treat the distinction of objects before that of the acts. But none of this refers to essentials, for the act is essentially posterior to the power, and what is posterior is not the essential basis for distinguishing what is prior.
Hence neither should the distinction of acts by their objects be understood here of an essential distinction.
[31] 13.92 Another answer could be this: The unity of anything, and hence its distinction, stems from the same source as its entity. As an effect receives its entity from any per se cause, so it receives its unity and its distinction from it. The same is true of anything dependent with respect to that upon which it depends essentially. This is particularly true when it depends upon anything as a proper cause or that which properly supports its dependence, for when there is only a common term upon which both this and something else depend, the unity or distinction in such a common term provide no grounds for unity or distinction in what depends upon it.
Now the act does depend upon the object in a proper sense and, therefore, one can admit that acts are distinguished by their objects as through something extrinsic upon which they are properly and essentially dependent. However, they are not distinguished by the objects as their formally distinctive characteristic, nor, which is relevant to our thesis, are they differentiated by them insofar as the objects are the terms of the relations included in the acts. And when it is said that absolute things are distinguished by intrinsic features, this is true so far as the formally distinctive characteristics are concerned. If, however, one were to accept the principle that absolute things are not distinguished by intrinsic features, this is true so far as the formally distinctive characteristics are concerned.
If, however, one were to accept the principle that absolute things are not distinguished by extrinsic factors, this would have to be admitted if it is understood to mean that they are distinguished not through their correlatives and by the essential terms of a relation, for no absolute requires anything extrinsic essentially as its correlative or per se relational term. Nevertheless, absolutes can be distinguished by extrinsic things as things caused are distinguished by their proper causes or by those things upon which they depend properly for their unity and entity. Now objects bear this relationship to operations [like knowing and appetition].
13.93 [Answer to the sixth objection in 13.80] The answer to the other argument is evident from the foregoing, for even though the act is not essentially relative, nevertheless, to the extent that it is a1)
GOD AND CREATURES
the essential means whereby the potency is united with its object, it could be called more perfect as its object is more perfect. But this perfection does not stem from the object as an intrinsic, but as an extrinsic, principle, or at least it derives from the object as something extrinsic upon which it depends essentially.
ARTICLE IV
The Question Understood as Referring to the Subject 13.94 As for the fourth main point [viz., the alternate meaning of the question mentioned in 13.5], it can be said that this quality, which is either the operation itself or is included in it, does not have
(32) a relationship to its subject that is any more essential than that of other qualities. And, therefore, if one does not assume that the other qualities, not now in question, are essentially related to their subject, then neither will this quality be so related.
13.95 If it is objected that this operation has being in flux [esse in fier] and, therefore, is bound up more essentially with its subject than qualities whose being is not in a state of becoming [7m facto esse], I answer: This does not change the dependence-status of the quality on its subject; it only alters the sort of being the form has in itself or at least in relation to the cause which gives it being.
Reply to the Initial Argument 13.96 As for the argument at the beginning [in 13.2], it can be answered that if some word were imposed to signify precisely that absolute entity, pertaining to the category of quality, which the operation either is or includes, then the meaning of that word could be understood without thinking of its object-term. But the words imposed by common usage to designate operations do imply relationships either directly or by connotation. The reason for this is that we commonly think of the operation under its [intentional] aspect as tending to an object, and it is this aspect of it that is usually signified.
13.97 For example: The intelligible species* is an absolute quality. At least this much must be admitted by anyone who maintains the species to be the formal reason for understanding, viz., that which essentially initiates the act [ratio per se principiativa actus].
Yet it is commonly called a "likeness of the object," not because it is a relation, which this name "likeness" essentially implies, but because by its nature it is a certain imitative and representative form of the object. Therefore, it is called this sort of likeness, viz., one of imitation. Even when it is designated by the term "species," what is
QUESTION THIRTEEN
signified is not just its absolute aspect, but the relationship under which it is commonly thought of is included as well. Hence a "species" is said to be a "species of some object." The situation is similar with words used to signify an operation.
13.98 [Objection] You may object that some operation, for instance, that which is not concerned with the object as existing, has only a potential relationship to the object. However, it is necessary that one understand at the same time the object also as the term of an actual relation, because one who understands the act of knowing must at the same time understand the object not only as knowable but also as something actually known. Therefore, "to know" implies an actual relation.
13.99 [Answer] I reply: A relation, which would be actual so far as its foundation goes, but is only possible because of the term's nonentity, is frequently asserted of the foundation or subject as though it were actually present, so to say. For example, the soul separated [from the body] admittedly is said to be not only potentially but also actually inclined towards the body, and still there is no actual inclination present because its term does not actually exist. But for all that, the soul is spoken of as being actually there because, so far as the soul is concerned, it would be there actually.
Similarly, we say practical knowledge 'directs,' even though there is no actual direction by it going on: for instance, where no power besides the intellect is operating, this knowledge is not actually directing anything.
(334 In like fashion, we speak of whiteness as the measure of all colors and the first thing in any category as the measure of all that comes after it, even when there is no actual mensuration because no term exists.
One could say analogously here that since the relation of the operation to the object would always be actually there, so far as the operation is concerned, it is actually thought and spoken of as if the relationship were something actually inhering in it, and so the object is understood at the same time as the term of an actual dependence.
13.100 What has been said would be true if the object were always thought of as the measure, because the relationship of measurable is there potentially, as was said above [in 13.35-38]. Now, however, it is necessary in understanding the operation to know at the same time the object as that which is attained through the operation.
To speak more truly, then, one should say, it seems, that object
GOD AND CREATURES
must be thought of simultaneously with the act as the term of an actual union rather than as the term of dependence or measurability. This union or attainment of the object, however, is a conceptual relation in an abstractive act of knowledge, but one usually thinks of this relationship of attainment as one of actual union, even though it is not the actuality of something real but the actuality of a conceptual relationship. Consequently the operation is usually signified as one of an actual relationship of this sort, and the object must be thought of at the same time as the term of this actual relationship.
13.101 [Reply to the authority of Aristotle] From what has been said [in 13.96ff.] it is obvious that Aristotle's statement in the Categories*®: "There is nothing to prevent the same thing being predicated of several genera," does not hold true of anything that is per se one, but only of what is one accidentally, which at times is also designated by a single name, as is perhaps the case with the name
"knowledge." But this does not make it properly one in the sense that it is one according to its essential formula or definition. As he puts it in the Metaphysics®*: "We have a definition not where we have a word and a formula identical in meaning (for in that case all formulae or sets or words would be definitions). And he proves that this follows: 'For there will be some name for any set of words whatever, so that even the /liad will be a definition [namely, of the word 'Iliad']." And from this one could understand Averroes' statement,® "It is better to think of these as belonging to the category of relation than to that of quality" [which we promised in 13.89 to reinterpret]. For this is perhaps true of what is more formal in the meaning of name that signifies both the absolute and its relationship or the accidental combination as a whole.
13.102 And from this one could perhaps also understand that statement in the Metaphysics® that according to their genus some things are called relative, "as medicine is a relative term, because its genus, science, is thought to be a relative term.'' While the name
"species," perhaps, is imposed precisely to signify the quality without reference to its proper correlative [Rekethe object], the same
"genus" here is not imposed precisely to signify the genus or quality, but to signify it as something related.
59 Aristotle, Praedicam., c.g (1b21-22).
60 Aristotle, Metaph. vu, c.4 (1030a7-10).
61 Averroes, Physic. vil, com. 20 (Iv, fol. 322F).
62 Aristotle, Metaph. v, c.15 (1021b3-5).