Question Nine
Question Nine
CAN GOD BRING If ABOUT THAT
AN ANGEL INFORM MATTER?
g.1 The next set of questions concern omnipotence in relation to [1] its object. There are three questions, the first of which is about omnipotence in relation to an immaterial substance and it is this:
Can God bring it about that an angel inform matter? The second question [10] has to do with omnipotence's relation to an accidental form to which it gives existence in a supernatural way and it is this: Can God convert the Eucharistic species* into something preexisting? The third question [11] concerns omnipotence in relation to an accidental form existing in a natural fashion and it is this: Can
God bring it about that while both body and place exist, the body has no ubiety* or local presence?
Arguments Pro and Con 9.2 To the first question,' the argument for the affirmative is that since God can cause a material form to exist without matter, he can also bring it about that an immaterial form be in matter and hence that an angel exist in matter and function there as its form.
The antecedent is proved in this way: God causes a material accident to exist without its subject in the sacrament of the altar.*
Proof of the entailment: There seems to be no greater inconsistency about an immaterial form's being in matter than a material form's existing without matter.
9.8 On the contrary: If an angel would inform matter, it would impart to it actuality in an unqualified sense, i.e., substantially, or give it incidental actuality. Being something that subsists per se, the angel cannot give it actuality in the first way, because it cannot combine with it to form something that is one per se. A substantial act,* however, does constitute a per se unity with what it informs. It does not give actuality in the second way either, because according to 1 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, di, q.5 (ed. Vives x1, 185-94); Iv, d.43, q.2
(ed. Vivés xx, 34-59); 1, d.8, q.un. (ed. Vivés xu, 417-22).
QUESTION NINE
Aristotle in the Physics?: "What truly is, is not incidental to anything."' But an angel is what truly is, i.e., substance. Therefore [it is not incidental to anything].
Body of the Question g.4 Here there are three points to be investigated:
First, the meaning of the question must be explained; second, it must be answered so far as possible; third, some doubts have to be solved.
ARTICLE I
The Meaning of the Question g.5 We explain the meaning briefly. The question is not whether an angel contains matter as a constitutive part, for in such a case it would not be the angel as a whole, but his form, the non-material part, that would inform matter, just as it is not fire, but its form, its other part, that informs matter. Neither are we asking whether the angel can inform matter in the sense of effectively changing the form something has, if not by his own power perhaps, at least by that of God, who would make the angel become the efficient cause of matter's information, as some? claim God makes the body act upon the spirit as an efficient cause. The question is rather about formal information, namely whether God could make the angel become an informing form.
ARTICLE II Answer to the Question g.6 [The answer is negative] As for the second point, a negative conclusion must be held. Two reasons can be given for this, the first of which is based on a middle term that would hold commonly for other situations as well, the second uses a middle term more proper to the angel. Finally we shall study some additional arguments to see if they are conclusive. g.7 [First reason] The first argument is this: What is simply subsistent per se cannot be the form of matter. The angel is this sort of being. Therefore [the angel cannot be the form of matter].
Clarification of the major: A per se being can mean three things.
2 Aristotle, Physic. 1, c.g (186b4-5).
3 Thomas, Summa theol. 1, q.51, a.2, ad 2-3 (I, 259); Richard of Middleton, Sent. 11, d.19, a.1, g.1 in corp.
(Brixial, 1591), 11, 242-43.
GOD AND CREATURES
First, it can designate something which exists in isolation or apart from a subject, in the third mode of per se referred to in the Posterior Analytics. In this sense, an accident can be a per se being when it does not inhere in a subject. Second, a per se being 1s contrasted with one that exists in another, and in this sense it is a thing which neither actually inheres in another nor has an aptitude to do so. Every substance, not only one that is composite, but matter and form as well, are all beings per se in this sense, for though a substantial form is in the matter it informs, it does not inhere in it like an accident, for "to inhere" says that it does not inform its subject per se. What inheres is neither an act simply, but only in a qualified sense, nor does it form one thing per se with the subject in which it inheres. What informs per se has the opposite characteristics. Third, a per se being may refer to one which has its ultimate actuality, so that it is simply unable to be ordered per se to some ulterior act beyond that which it has, where the ulterior actualization would belong to it per se, either in a primary or in a participated sense.> A per se being in this sense is called a suppositum,* and if it is of an intellectual nature, it is called a person. Only this third is properly said to be subsisting, in the sense the Philosopher® has in mind when he says: 'Matter is only potentially 'a this' and the form is that in virtue of which a thing is called 'a this,' but that third being compounded of both matter and form is simply 'a this.' ' In other words, something subsisting per se has its ultimate actualization so that it is unable to be ordered per se to some ulterior act. g.8 With this understanding we prove the major. A substantial form is ordered per se to the being of the whole composite. This being, however, is simply the act of the composite primarily and that of the form participatively, because a part is only said "to be" incidentally (i.e., per se participatively), whereas the whole is said
"to be" primarily. Therefore, what subsists and is unable to be ordered per se to some being cannot be a form fer se.
9.9 Proof of the minor: An angel is specifically perfect, indeed it is even more perfect than some species of material substances are.
For the hierarchical order of substance is like that of numbers ac- ' Aristotle, Anal. post. 1 (73b5-9).
* The accidents receive their ultimate actualization or suppositality through the substance; "primary sense' refers to substance: "participated sense" refers to accidents.
6 Aristotle, De anima u, ¢.1
(412a6-10).
QUESTION NINE
cording to the Metaphysics.' But some material substance is in ultimate act in such a way that it is unable to be ordered per se to some ulterior act; otherwise there would be an infinite regress in material substances such that each could be part of another. Therefore, all the more is an angel subsisting per se in the aforesaid sense. g.10 This argument uses a common middle term, viz., "per se subsisting,' which would apply just as well to fire as it would to an angel; indeed it would suffice to prove our thesis of anything which is complete in any species of substance. g-11 Hence it is also clear that "unable to be united" does not represent any difference that would distinguish an angel from a soul, because it is common to the angel and to fire. g.12 Hence it is obvious also why a soul apart from a body is not a person, since it cannot be a per se being in the third sense, even though it is not apt by nature to inhere (and hence is per se in the second sense) and could also be one in the first sense, that is, it could exist alone not merely in virtue of some extrinsic cause in the way an accident or material form could, but by reason of the nature it has and because it does not necessarily depend upon matter for its own existence. Only a per se being in this third sense is called a suppositum, and where it is found in an intellectual nature, it is called a person. Thus a person is incommunicable, because it is repugnant to him that he be communicated not only as a universal is communicated to its singulars but also as a form is communicable to the matter to be actualized through it. g.13 [Second argument] A second reason for our conclusion [in g.6] is this: Whatever can be a substantial form has the immediate ability through its essence to give actuality in an unqualified sense to matter itself, for it is clear from the Metaphysics* that the only reason form can combine with matter in a per se unity is that form is per se act and matter per se potency, and no further reason can be given for either except that this has this nature and that has that.
If it is impossible then for anything to be the act of matter, this stems precisely from its proper nature.
Proof of this implication: The impossibility of being the act of matter indicates a greater measure of perfection than does the corresponding possibility. Therefore, if its ability to inform matter stems from the proper nature of the form, all the more so will the 7 Aristotle, Metaph. vil, c.3 (1043b33-1044a).
8 Ibid., c.6 (1045a23-30).
Yaga
GOD AND CREATURES
impossibility to inform matter stem from the proper formal nature of the substance. Therefore, if one knew the essential definition of an angel, he could show by a demonstration of the reasoned fact* just why it is impossible for an angel to inform matter. g.14 While this reasoning proves that if the conclusion were known, the middle term establishing it would be proper to the angel, it still does not show that the conclusion is true, so that anyone who denied it would claim it is not impossible for an angel to inform matter, and there is nothing proper to an angel that rules out such a possibility.
Hence we need this further confirmation. Rooted in the proper nature of anything that is simply act is either an aptitude to inform per se or a repugnance to do so. But the essence of the angel contains no basis for the first, therefore it has the second, and then it follows further, as was argued [in 9.13], that the proper grounds for the repugnance is the essence itself.
Proof of the minor:
An unactualized aptitude implies imperfection. g.15 [Third argument] A third argument that might be brought up is this.
[6 | The order of perfection among forms seems to depend on how far removed they are from matter, just as a more perfect act is further removed from potency.' But so far is the intellectual soul removed from matter that left to its own nature, it can exist on its own without matter. An angel, therefore, who is more perfect than any intellectual soul, should be;still more remote from matter, yet if it were not impossible for it to be in matter, it is hard to see how it could be further removed from matter. g.16 This argument, it seems, does not prove much, for there are many ways other than this remoteness from matter in which one act could excel another. Furthermore, while the intellectual soul could exist without matter, on the other hand it can be just as perfectly united to matter as an inferior form can. By the same token, then, one could claim that while an angel can certainly exist without matter in an even more perfect way than an intellectual soul, it could still exist in matter, for even though to depend on matter represents an imperfection, it is not clear that an angel's ability to communicate this actuality to matter represents an imperfection, especially
Aristotle, De anima u, c.1
(412a-413a10); De generat. u, c.1
(731b24732a10).
QUESTION NINE
when such communication could take place without his being dependent, as would be the case here. g.17 [Fourth reason] Some,!° it seems, would derive a fourth argument from the characteristic way an angel functions, viz., by understanding.
"To understand," after all, is a spiritual or immaterial function.
Therefore the intellect is an immaterial potency, and hence the intellectual nature is also an immaterial or spiritual nature. g.18 Proof of the first entailment: An operation is no more abstracted from matter than is the potency on which it depends, for the operation is in the agent by reason of some faculty of its own that is the proximate ground for the action in question. Consequently, if the faculty is material, its operation will not be immaterial.
9.19 Proof of the second entailment: A potency is no more excellent than the substance which has it, and this seems to be true chiefly of a nature that 1s purely intellectual, like that of an angel, whereas it is not so obvious for a nature like our soul, which is intellectual in a lesser degree and has sense powers as well. For our soul depends on matter for some of its operations at least, whereas a purely intellectual nature would depend on matter in no way, either for its operation or, consequently, for its being. g.20 Further confirmation that the first antecedent entails the final consequent [in g.17], can be found, it seems, in the commentary to the penultimate proposition of the Liber de Causis™: "It is impossible that there be anything whose substance is temporal, but whose action is eternal, for in that case, its action would be better than its substance." g.21 The first antecedent [in 9.17] is proved from the object, for every act gets its specification and perfection from its object. But the object of intellect qua intellect abstracts from matter, because the forms in matter are all individual but the intellect does not grasp them as individual. g.22 One might object that the argument [of g.18 and 9.19] would allow one to infer that the rational soul is immaterial because of its intellective powers and operations, yet it would be wrong to conclude that it is immaterial, i.e., it is not the perfection of matter,
[8] 10 Thomas, Summa theol. 1, q.50, a.2 in corp.
(I, 253); q.8g, a.1 in corp.
(1, 253); q.89, a.1 in corp. (1, 436).
11 Liber de causis prop. 32 (ed. C. Pera, O.P., S$. Thomae Aquinatis in Librum de causis expositio, Taurini-Romae, 1955), 146. ano
GOD AND CREATURES
though, according to some,' it is true that it is not material, 1.e., it is not composed of matter and form.
9.23 They would answer that intellective power is indeed immaterial and the soul is also immaterial in this way, since it is not immersed in matter or totally taken over by matter. The explanation lies in the fact that the more noble the form, the more it dominates corporeal matter and the less it is joined to it and the more it excels it in strength. So far as nobility of form is concerned, however, our soul is highest in the hierarchy of forms. Therefore, it excels matter insofar as it possesses some power and some operations that in no way depend on corporeal matter, and this power is called intellect.
9.24 To this it is objected that man is not man just as soul; he is man only insofar as the soul informs matter. Therefore the soul does not act with an operation peculiar to man save insofar as it informs matter. Consequently, either man does not understand insofar as the soul is the form or principle of this operation or else he understands insofar as the soul informs matter.
Proof of the first proposition: A composite only is what it is in virtue of its parts and not insofar as these are separated but qua united, as is clear from the example in the Metaphysics'* that the syllable ba is not the same as b and a, and this is in general true of whole and parts. Not only does it hold for the material parts, which the Philosopher calls elements, but also of the essential parts, which are matter and form, for the composite is one precisely because the first is matter and the second act, as the Metaphysics** puts it, that is to say, it is one because the potential part is informed and the act is informing it. g.25 A second objection [to 9.23] is that the soul informs matter according to its highest degree of essential perfection; but "to understand" cannot pertain to the soul according to some degree higher than its highest; therefore, it cannot pertain to it insofar as it exceeds matter, where '""exceeds'' means it does not inform it. The first proposition is clear, for otherwise man would not be the highest corporeal being, nor, as a consequence, would he be next to the angel in the order of species, for he would not be formally actual12Thomas, Summa theol. 1, 4.75, aa.2 and 6 in corp.
(I, 353 and 355) ' q.50, a.2 in corp. (I, 253).
18 Aristotle, Metaph. vu, c.17 (1041b12-14).
'4 Tbid., vit, c.6 (1045b17-21); ibid., vu, c.8 (1033b16-20); ibid., vu, c.11
(1036b21-24); ibid., vin, c.6 (1045a23-25).
QUESTION NINE
ized through what is highest in the intellective soul, which is the form that is next to the angel. g.26 [An evaluation of the fourth reason] As for this fourth argument, we must first examine the antecedent, namely, that '"'to understand" is an immaterial function. This can be understood in three ways.'° [First way] "Immaterial" in this first sense would contrast it with the sense functions which are called "organic" because they are exercised through a specific organ and are thus material, requiring as they do that a distinct part of the body be structured in a specific way. Intellection, on the contrary, is a nonorganic function, for it is not exercised through some definite bodily part and, in this sense, is the act of no single part of the body, meaning by this that the intellect, unlike the sense powers, does not exercise its operation properly speaking by any specific bodily part.
But from this meaning of the antecedent, it is hard to see how the immateriality of the form is inferred, for even a purely material form like fire is not said to act through an organ, provided it be uniformly in the whole and in each part thereof. The Commentator, in explaining Bk. VII of the Metaphysics'® about the powers present in the seed, says: "These powers are similar to the intellect in that they do not act through an organ." And he adds a little further on:
"The powers which are in the bodies of animals act through specific instruments and have a part of the body as their own." But the power that forms and informs the body does not act through a specific member, and the reason is that only that form is called the principle of organic life which is somehow unlimited in its operation so that it can be the principle of different actions which can be exercised only by means of dissimilar parts. That is why whatever is perfectible through such a form must have unlike parts by means of which these organic functions can be exercised, and such a form is only a soul, which because of its superiority in perfection to inferior forms can be the principle of several operations which pertain to it as a whole. Hence it needs, as its adequate perfectible component, a body with a greater diversity of parts corresponding to its own greater potentialities as a principle."
15 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. tv, d.4g, q.2, n.g (ed. Vives xx, 39-40).
16 Averroes, Metaph. vu, com. 31 (vill, fol. 181E).
17 There is an addition in all three MSS.:
Furthermore, by understanding the antecedent in this sense, one could argue, it seems, that intellection is just as material a function as vision apa)
GOD AND CREATURES
[11] 9.27 [Second way] Another way in which the antecedent could be interpreted would be to say that 'to understand" is immaterial terminatively, i.e., it tends towards an object abstracted from matter. This seems to be the sense in which the antecedent was proved
[in 9.21] from the immateriality of its object. But this proof does not establish immateriality in an unqualified sense, not even terminatively. For all admit that the quiddity of a material thing can be the per se object of our intellect. But if all that is required is to have immateriality in the object, Le., abstraction from individual matter, then the operation of our intellect is immaterial terminatively, because it is indifferent to singular material objects. But to get the conclusion we want, one would have to show that this operation which has the universal as its object could not be communicated to matter in some way. g.28 [Third way] A third interpretation of the antecedent would be this. What is proximately and properly the recipient subject of intellection is the form and not something material, and what is more, it is not the form of the whole (which is the quiddity like humanity) but that which is simple and is the other part of the com posite.!* is. For vision can be exercised by a given part of the body, whereas intellection is primarily an operation of the whole rather than that of a specific part, since it is not the hand, but man who understands.
But suppose the soul could be the principle of understanding or intellection, not insofar as it perfects the whole, but the parts, then it could be such a principle as perfecting any part whatsoever—just as it is the principle of intellection as it perfects the whole—and then one could say that the finger understands as man does, for the finger would be actualized by the form as a principle of intellection. Consequently, if the whole is just as material as any of its parts, or more so, then it follows that this function which only pertains to the form insofar as it is in the whole, is just as material as is a function that pertains to the form insofar as it is in a part.
Now I reply to this: If the operation which pertains to a form insofar as it is somehow an unlimited perfection is communicated to matter or the whole, it is communicated to the whole as actualized by a form unlimited in this way. Now what is actualized by an intellectual soul, which has understanding insofar as it is this sort of unlimited form, is not just a part, but the whole.
18 Namely, the soul. This distinction between the "form of the whole" and "form of the part" is explained by Giles of Rome (who popularized, though he did not create, the distinction) as follows:
QUESTION NINE
The proximate recipient of any sensitive operation, however, is primarily composed of matter and form, as is clear from the opening passages of De sensu et sensato,'® for what is the subject of vision is not the soul itself, but the organ composed of soul and a definite part of the body. It is not the soul, nor any part thereof, nor the form of the chemical compounds that are in a definite part of the body, but it is the form of the organ as a whole which is the proximate ground for receiving the vision, like humanity is the form of man as a whole. g.29 Hence it appears clear that if we call an "organ" that part of the whole animal which is the proximate subject of sensation, we must say it is composed of the soul as the principle of the operation and of a part of the body structured in a certain way, and then it will be clear why a blind eye is an "eye" only in a qualified sense, for it is only one part of that composite which is meant to be called an eye and is missing the other part needed for a complete eye.
It will also be clear in the light of this that if a power is what is called the proximate ground for receiving an act, the visual power will not be the soul alone, but will either be the form of the organ as a whole or something that results therefrom.
It is also obvious why the soul separated from the body cannot feel anything, for it lacks the proper subject for sensation which is an organ and the formal ground for receiving the sensation which The essence in relation to the suppositum®* has the character of form, hence the whole essence and the whole nature which results from matter and form can be called the form of the whole, i.e., the form which is the whole. It is well said, then, that humanity is the form of man and that man has being or existence [esse] through humanity. Now humanity does not mean the form alone (or the soul) nor the matter alone (or the body), but rather the nature composed of and resulting from these two, viz., matter and form (or a rational soul and a body). Hence if man has both a soul and humanity, each of which has the character of form, though in a different way, because soul means a part and is the form of the part whereas humanity means the whole and is the form of the whole, then it is well said that in man there is both a form of the part and a form of the whole. And what is said of man is true of every material thing, because each happens to receive of twofold form, that of the part and that of the whole.
Aegidii Romani Theoremata de esse et essentia, ed. E. Hocédez (Louvain, 1930), 44°45.
19 Aristotle, De sensu et sensato, c.1 (436a11-12, 436b1-10).
GOD AND CREATURES
is the whole form of the organ. In the case of understanding, however, we have just the opposite, for its proximate subject and formal ground for its reception is the soul or some portion of the soul which has no matter. That is why the soul apart from the body can still understand, because the proximate recipient of intellection remains.
9.30 According to this third interpretation of the antecedent (which comes closest to the truth), understanding is an immaterial operation because it has as its immediate subject something which has no corporeal matter at least and hence it is possible to have this sort of function without such matter. Now what can function without matter can also exist without matter. Therefore, that nature whose proper function is understanding can also exist without matter.
With the aid of this middle term, viz., an immaterial operation, it is possible to infer that the nature possessing it has this sort of immateriality, namely, that it can be separated from matter, but it does not justify the further inference that the immateriality is of such a type that it is impossible for this nature to inform matter.
And it seems reasonable that if you use as a middle term the sort of intellection that is common to the soul and an angel, you can infer the sort of immateriality they have in common.
ARTICLE It
Some Objections and their Solutions 9.31 [Objections to the first reason in g.7ff.] In the third main
ER article, we consider some objections raised against our first argument.
[First objection] According to the Metaphysics?°: "Being pertains more to the form than to the composite." Therefore, form is not ordered to the being of the whole as to something more perfect.
9.32 [Second objection] Another objection has to do specifically with the soul, since this seems to be something per se subsistent, for it functions per se. Any function which is an operation of the composite per se does not pertain to the form alone. But to understand does pertain to the soul when separated from the body.
9-33 [Third objection] The being of the soul is the composite's being. Therefore, the being of the soul is not ordered to the being of the composite.
Proof of the antecedent: The human soul retains its being when 20 Aristotle, Metaph. vu, c.3 (102ga6-7).
QUESTION NINE
man as a whole is destroyed, which is not the case with other forms.
This is only because the being of the whole man is the being of the soul, which is not so with the other forms.
9.34 [Fourth objection] This drop of water can be part of a larger body of water and thus can be ordered to something more perfect in which it participates. Hence this drop of water is not now something which subsists per se.
9.35 [Fifth objection] If it is impossible for an angel to inform matter there must be just one reason why this is so, for when one thing is inconsistent with another there is always one reason why this is so. Hence there are not two reasons for this inability of the angel to inform matter, one common, as the first argument [in 9.7] assumes, and the other proper, as the second argument [in 9.13] claims.
9.36 [Sixth objection] According to the philosophers,*! the heavens seem animated, yet we cannot assume they have an intelligent soul, because something intelligent that is less than an angel can only perfect a body by reason of the vegetative and sensitive perfection it possesses, or if these be distinct principles, they would have to be perfecting the body at the same time.
9.37 [Seventh objection] There are times when an angel takes on a body and performs vital functions in it. Therefore, since "'to act" presupposes "'to be,' the angel must give the body living being, and therefore must inform it.
9.38 [Answer to the objections] [To the first in 9.31] To the first of these objections, I say that "more" like "prior" refers here not to perfection but to superiority and independence, because the being of a superior principle is independent of what proceeds from that principle or what is inferior to it.
9.39 [To the second in 9.32] As for the second objection, although the basis for the conclusion seems to be the intellective soul's subsistence, the soul is not subsistent, it seems, in the third sense mentioned [in 9.7]. Furthermore, when joined to the body, it is not subsistent [in the first way] either, like the accidents [or appearances of bread or wine] in the sacrament of the altar, for then the soul would not inform the body [any more than accidents of bread inform the body of Christ], since what is per se in this sense is not informing anything. Consequently, if the soul were a per se being like
21 Aristotle, De caelo u, c.2 (285a28-286a2); Metaph. xii, c.5 (1071a1-4); Avicenna, Metaph. 1x, cc.2-4 (I, 103r-105r).
GOD AND CREATURES
them when joined to the body, [so far as intellection goes] it would have the same mode of being whether it was informing or not informing [the body as a vegetative or animated form]. g.40 As for the reason given there [in 9.32], we could argue that intellection as an immanent operation of the agent could be said to belong per se to something in two ways. Either that something is a proximate subject or it is a remote subject. For example, a surface is called white in the first way, but not in the second way, whereas we can say man is white in this second fashion. Now the soul is said to understand per se insofar as it is the proximate recipient of intellection, but when it is united, the soul is not just a recipient in this first way, since it is then also the reason why understanding pertains to man as a whole in virtue of his form. But man is only said to understand per se as a remote subject, for he is the recipient of intellection only because the soul, his form, receives it proximately.
Therefore, when it is assumed in the major that what acts per se, subsists per se, this is true only of a first agent, i.e., one which so acts that it is not that in virtue of which some further subject acts by that operation. Now if something were not subsistent, but was a form functioning as such, then it could not be in operation without being in addition the reason why the whole is said to operate in this way. But in this sense, the minor is false, viz., that the soul understands per se, since this is not true except insofar as the operation pertains to a form as its immediate recipient.
[15] 9.41 From this it becomes clear in what sense intellection is immaterial, namely it is not that intellection does not pertain to the soul as informing matter, but because it pertains to the soul alone as immediate recipient, whereas the whole composite is the remote subject of intellection but is so in virtue of its form.
9.42 [To the third in 9.33] To the next objection, I say that what has absolutely the same being as another would not be simply imperfect, it seems, if it were not communicating that being to another. If it is true then that the being of the soul is the same as the composite's being, then why should the soul's mode of being when separated from the body be imperfect since it is deprived of nothing except that it is not communicating its being to another? And why would the soul be imperfect in being whereas the whole is perfect in being, if they both have the same being? Or how does being of the whole remain, if the whole itself does not?
9.43 I claim therefore that the being of the soul remains the same
QUESTION NINE
as long as the soul is a thing with that being, and this is true whether it is joined to or separated from the body. Analogously, the being of the whole only remains the same as long as the whole continues to exist with that being, for the actual being of nothing remains the same unless the subject which has that being continues to exist. It seems, therefore, that we must deny that the being of the soul is the composite's being, since the soul with the being it has seems to be only a part of the whole with its being. Analogously, then, the being of one is but a part of the being of the other.
[ 16 ] 9.44 And the proof adduced for the antecedent, namely, that unlike other forms, the soul retains its being when the whole is destroyed, does not prove what it was set up to do, but rather its very opposite. The reason the soul retains its being is that that being is completely incorruptible both per se and per accidens. Now if its being were the same as that of the composite, then it would be corruptible, it seems, since the composite truly perishes. For just as what comes to be appears to have as its term the being of what is generated, so the being of what perishes seems to be the terminus a quo* of the corruption and, hence, the term which does not remain. Other immaterial forms, however, do not retain their being once the whole perishes, but not because their being is not distinct from that of the composite which perished, but rather because they are corrupted per accidens. This happens either because the corrupting agent, in producing a form contrary to them, affects them incidentally as contraries, or at least this agent affects the composite causing it to perish, and these other forms are unable to exist apart from the composite. Neither of these situations however is true of the intellective soul.
9.45 Those who raise the objection [in 9.33]?? claim the intellective soul is incorruptible, because being per se belongs to a form that is act and whatever pertains per se to anything is inseparable from it.
Therefore just as it is impossible to separate the form from itself, so it is impossible that a subsistent form should cease to be. Now
I claim that if this be the reason why the intellective soul is incorruptible, then it is not so because its being and that of whole are identical, for its being, though inseparable from it, is separable from the whole.
22 Those who reason according to the third objection; cf. supra, 9.33; Thomas, Summa theol. 1, q:75, a.6 in corp.
(I, 355); 4.50, a.5 in corp.
(I, 257):
GOD AND CREATURES
[17] 9.46 [An answer to both the second and third objections] To understand more clearly the answers to the arguments [in 9.32 and 9.33], we can distinguish two senses of "being" [esse]. "Being" can mean that by which anything first departs formally from nonbeing.
Now anything departs primarily from nonbeing by whatever makes it something extramental and something more than a mere possibility in its cause. In this sense anything that lies outside the intellect and its cause is properly being. In another sense, "being" means the ultimate act, viz., that to which nothing further is added giving being in an unqualified sense, and that is said to have being simply to which being in this sense primarily pertains. And I say "primarily" to exclude the idea that it is [a form] which gives to something else grounds for being by such being. And in this sense only the composite specifically complete is called being, a part of the composite on the other hand is called being only incidentally [per accidens] or, more properly, participatively [participative], sharing as it does in the being of the whole. Taking being [esse] in this second sense, only the composite is a per se being [ens]; the intellective soul, however, is not called subsistent except improperly and in a qualified sense, although it is called a being [ens] and one that is per se, taking being [esse] in its first meaning. And this would be the answer to the first argument [in 9.32].
9.47 The same distinction would solve the second [viz., that in 9-33], for in the first meaning of "being," that of the form and of the composite is not entirely identical, whereas it is identical in the second sense of "being," but then it is not the being of both the soul and the composite in the same fashion, for it is primarily of the composite and participatively of the part.
(18] 9.48 From this it is also clear in what sense the separated soul is said to be imperfect in being, since to the extent it is united, it can be called perfect in being, not indeed essentially or primarily, but participatively, for in its own being it is equally perfect whether separated or united, but when it is united it is perfected participatively, though not primarily, by the being of the whole, whereas in separation it is imperfect insofar as it lacks this being of the whole.
And one could call this imperfection simply imperfection because it lacks that being which is simply perfection, though this be not proper to itself alone. Indeed this perfection is an even greater one than is the soul's own perfection, because it includes that of the soul.
Consequently, the soul is not called an imperfect form solely beZon
QUESTION NINE
cause it does not communicate its perfection to another, even as it is not perfected by its communicating, but it is called imperfect in its lack of the perfection of the whole being, which lack is something concomitant, i.€., associated with the fact that it does not communicate its being to the composite.
9.49"* [To the fourth in 9.34] As for the fourth objection, something [like a drop of water] can become an integral part of a homogeneous whole. And while it participates in the being of the whole when it is in the whole and does not do so when it is outside the whole, it is not called imperfect when it is separated from the whole, for the being it has [e.g., as water] is equally perfect as that being of the whole with which it fuses. Hence it is not properly said to be able to be ordered to the being of the whole, in the way that an essential part is apt by nature to be ordered to the being of the composite that is meant to have it by nature; neither can such an essential part be the same sort of thing as the composite. g.50 [To the fifth in 9.35] To the next objection, I say that there can be several independent reasons in the same subject why something is repugnant to it. And in this case any one of them can be formal grounds why the subject as a whole cannot contain the thing in question. For example, it is repugnant for man to be whiteness by reason of his substance, even prescinding from everything else; it
[19] is also impossible for him to be whiteness, because he is rational.
Consequently, we have to deny the principle that when one thing is inconsistent with another, there can only be one reason for this inconsistency. And if one goes on to add, "there can only be one unique reason that is first," one can still make a distinction inasmuch as the ground of the impossibility [insofar as this is a positive entity] will be congruous with only one of the extremes (that which has this reason as something positive) whereas it will be repugnant to the other.24 Therefore, either (1) the primary refers to this congruence, and then the primary reason for the impossibility will be that which is primarily congruous with one and repugnant to the 28 There is a slight discrepancy in the MSS., none of which follows the Wadding-Viveés text, regarding the order of paragraphs 49-53 inclusive.
However, there is no substantial difference of sense. We have altered the sequence of Wadding to a minimal degree consistent with the continuity of meaning.
24 For example, to be quantity is repugnant to man because he is a substance. The positive reason for the repugnance or the substantiality pertains to man and is repugnant to quantity.
GOD AND CREATURES
other, or (2) the primacy refers to the incongruity, and then the first reason for the impossibility will be whatever is diametrically opposed to the "reason" in sense (1) and pertains to the second extreme.
With both (1) and (2) one can further distinguish between (a) a primacy of community [i.e., of the several said to have this "'reason" one has it primarily] and (b) a primacy of perfection [i.e., one is primary because it has more independent grounds for the impossibility]. g.51 "To be quantity" is first repugnant to substance before it is to animal, if we are speaking of a primacy of community, whereas the opposite is true of a primacy of perfection, for an animal includes more reasons for the impossibility than substance does.
[20] [9.52 Similarly so far as primacy of community is concerned, "to be a substance"' pertains to man before "'to be rational" does, whereas the reverse is true of the primacy of perfection.]?®
However, if we stay within any one meaning of primacy, it is true that for any two things that are inconsistent or mutually repugnant, there is but one unique reason that is primary. From this it follows that the two arguments we gave [in 9.7 and g.13] do not each cite a primary reason for the inconsistency, in the same sense of primary, which I readily grant.
9-53 But if you object: The same [positive predicate] pertains to the same [subject] only in virtue of the same reason; therefore, the same holds good for inconsistency or mutual repugnance, I reply that the two cases are not on a par. The same predicate, at least one that is nonessential, does not pertain to several things commonly, unless they all have the same common ground for it. On the other hand, a predicate can be repugnant to several things without all of them having the same common ground for it. For example: ''to be an angel" is repugnant both to man and to whiteness. And though both man and whiteness may be, perhaps, ''a being" or ens in a common univocal sense, this is not the reason for the impossibility, since it pertains to the angel as well. A clearer example is this. It is impossible that a stone, whiteness, or a chimaera be God, but it is obvious it is not because they have something in common.?¢
25 This paragraph, found in M: and W but omitted in Mb», seems to fit in best here; cf. note 23.
26 The answers to the last two objections are missing; cf. supra, 9.36-37.
See Appendix, Addition 9.53.
QUESTION NINE
Reply to the Initial Argument [21] 9.54 As for the argument [in g.2], I deny the consequent follows from the antecedent on this ground. The reason something is unable to be present in a certain subject may represent a prior aspect of that subject, namely, wherever it would be posterior by nature to that subject, if it could be there. Thus man is incapable of braying and the reason for this is to be found in that which makes man formally a man. Nevertheless, if he has that ability [as a donkey does], it would be posterior to man in the sense that any attribute is posterior to [or presupposes] its subject. There is a priority, then, about the simply necessary cause of the incompatibility (namely, that it would be contradictory for the subject to have this predicate), whereas the reason why some posterior predicate is suited to the subject is not so necessary, namely, that it would be contradictory for the subject not to have what is suited to it, for it is not a contradiction for some prior absolute to be separated from something posterior.
9.55 Applying this to our case, we can say that for matter to be separated from form requires only that form is not an absolutely necessary reason why form be united to matter, and such is actually the case, since form is an absolute entity, and hence prior in nature to its union with matter. But that some immaterial form like the angel be capable of union with matter would imply a combination of different elements, one of which—as was shown in the solution to the question—is the ground for the impossibility of such a union.
250)