Question Fourteen'
Question Fourteen'
CAN THe SOUL EEET TO lls NATURAL
PERFECTION KNOW THE TRINITY OF
PERSONS IN GOD?
ea 14.1 The next questions have to do with what pertains particularly to creatures possessing intellectual life. The first of these concern things common to men and angels; the next have to do with what is proper to man. Common to men and angels are intellect and will. Concerning the intellect two questions were raised: one, about the object of the intellect; the other, about the active cause of intellection.
14.2 The first question was whether the soul, left to its natural perfection, can know the Trinity of Persons in God.1 The same question can be asked as regards the angel.
Arguments Pro and Con It seems so: He who can know a cognitive act can also know the object of that act. The soul or the angel can know by its natural perfection the beatific act of another soul or angel and the object of such an act is God as a trinity. Therefore, [the soul or the angel can know God as a trinity].
Proof of the major: The act is a natural likeness of the object. Besides, it tends to the object of itself. From these two conditions of the act, it follows that he who knows it, knows the object.
Proof of the minor: A [cognitive] power, if unimpeded and left to its natural perfection, is able to know everything contained under its primary or adequate object; otherwise, that object would not be adequate. But the adequate object common to our intellect and that of the angel is being in general, or at least limited being. And the beatific act of the creature falls under such an object. (Therefore, the cognitive power knows it by its natural perfection. ]
14.3 On the contrary: The creature cannot know a supernatural object in virtue of its natural perfection. Otherwise, the object 1 Cf, Duns Scotus, Ord., prol., nn.1-94 (1, 1-58); 1, d.g3, nn.1-332, 569-604 (111, 1-200, 338-57); 11, dd.23-24 (ed. Vives xv, 5-53). a15
GOD AND CREATURES
would not be supernatural. The Trinity is a supernatural object.
Moreover, it is the beatific object. Therefore, [the creature cannot know it].
Body of the Question 14.4 [Preliminary observations] To understand the question, certain preliminary clarifications are necessary. The first refers to the natural perfection of the soul or the angel. The human soul in any state, be it that of original, fallen, or restored nature, has the same natural perfection, if this is taken to mean what necessity of nature demands. However, it only attains the supreme natural perfection in the third state, in which it will possess not only the supernatural perfection of glory but also the supreme perfection of its nature.'
Therefore, the question could be understood of the natural perfection it always has, or of this supreme [natural] perfection. The question raised about the first is whether the soul left [to its natural perfection can know the Trinity of Persons in God]. But in the second sense, it is more proper to inquire whether the soul elevated to its supreme natural perfection could thereby know the Trinity.
14.5 A second prefatory remark is this: For the soul to know an object may mean (a) that it can receive such knowledge or (b) that it can attain such knowledge either on its own or by the cooperation of such causes as are adapted by nature to work with it in producing that effect. The second of these entails the first, but not vice versa. For the bare capacity [to receive such knowledge] suffices for the first. A stone, by contrast, cannot know because it is simply incapable of receiving knowledge. For the second [i.e., the attainment of such knowledge], some naturally active cause corresponding to this capacity is required.
14.6 Since the difficulty lies principally with this second member, we treat the first only in brief. The possible intellect* is the proper receptive potency for any intellection whatsoever, so that, if anything prior to the intellection is required, it is not required by way of a receptive potency or as the grounds for receiving the intellection, in the way a surface, for example, is the ground for receiving the color. If this be so, one can grant that every being endowed by nature with a possible intellect can know naturally everything knowable, i.e., so far as such a thing itself is concerned, it is capable of receiving such knowledge.?
Cf. ibid., 1, d.g, nn.113-24, 185-88 (11, 70-77, 112-15); 11, d.g, q.8, n.13
(ed. Vives xi, 194-95); d.1i, n.4 (ibid., 531-32).
3 Cf. ibid., prol., nn.7, 73-78 (1, 56, 44-47).
QUESTION FOURTEEN
14.7 The third prefatory remark is this: Intellectual knowledge (and only such is in question here) is either imperfect or perfect.
By "perfect," I do not understand perfection in an intensive sense [so that the knowledge itself would be infinite], but perfection as to the object. Perfect in this latter sense is a knowledge which captures the object as such; 1.e., it is proper and distinct* knowledge of the object as it is in itself. By contrast, knowledge which only captures the object incidentally, or in some common and confused* concept, is imperfect.* 14.8 Again, distinct knowledge can be either mediate or immediate. By immediate, I mean that the object is not understood by means of some other object, in or through which it is known. Therefore, it excludes any medium that is itself known, one which would be merely a means of knowing or understanding [i.e., the medium is not itself an object of knowledge].
14.9 From this it follows that to solve the question three points need to be clarified: first, the nature of imperfect knowledge; second, the nature of perfect immediate knowledge; third, the nature of mediate knowledge. We need to know which of these a soul or angel is able to acquire by its natural perfection, taking natural perfection in either of its two meanings [in 14.4].
ARTICLE I
Imperfect Knowledge 1. Knowledge of the Terms "God" and "Trinity"
14.10 According to the Philosopher® the intellect has a twofold function. It understands simples [i.e., the meanings of conceptual terms] and it understands combinations thereof, that is to say, it joins them [in affirmative propositions] or separates them [in negative propositions]. The first kind of understanding can be had without having the second, but the second is impossible without the first.
14.11 Consequently, the first type of understanding should be our initial consideration.
Now I declare that the soul, even by the natural perfection it possesses in its present state, which is the lowest of the three, is able to know the meaning of the terms "God" and "trinity" imperfectly, even though it does not understand them perfectly.
14.12 From the k:uwledge of an individual being, the meaning of "being" itself can be known by abstraction. The same is true of 4 Cf. ibid., 1, d.3, nn.20, 25, 68 (m1, 11, 16-17, 48).
5 Aristotle, De anima 11, c.6 (430a26-28).
GOD AND CREATURES
"good." And this takes place in the way Augustine indicates when he writes*: "Consider this good and that good. Take away the this and the that and view good itself, if you can, and then you will see God."
And in the same passage he goes on to show how God can be known not only in this quasi-confused concept of good, but also in a concept that is in some sense proper to him, for example, if one thinks of the highest good or of what is good by its essence.' "If it were possible," he says, "'to put aside those goods which are such by participation, and to see the good itself of which they are a participation... you would see God."
Similarly, from a particular instance of the true, the true itself can be understood. According to Augustine®: "God is truth. When truth is spoken of, keep thinking of truth if you can, and if you understand by it not only truth in general, but truth in its essence, you already have a concept that is somehow proper to God."
14.13 To put it briefly, what I am saying is that any transcendent notion arrived at by abstraction from what is known of a creature can be thought of in its indifference [i.e., as common and unspecified] and in such a case God is conceived confusedly as it were, just as in thinking of animal, man is being thought of. But if such a common transcendent concept is thought of as qualified by some more specific perfection such as supreme, first, or infinite, we obtain a concept which is proper to God in the sense that it is characteristic of no other being.® 14.14 In a similar fashion, the notion of a "trinity" can be abstracted from a number in its properly accepted sense, viz., as discrete quantity, by concentrating on the abstract notion of discreteness. Now the nature of the soul is such, even in its present state, that it suffices for awareness of the meaning of these terms "God" and "trinity."
14.15 [Proofs] First proof: An infidel and a man with faith in contradicting each other as regards the proposition: "God is three and one," not only contradict one another in words but in concepts as well. Unless both have in mind the concepts in question this would not happen.
14.16 Second proof: The faith which distinguishes the faithful from the infidels is not a habit which inclines one to assent because
® Augustine, De Trin. vii, c.3, n.4: PL 42, 949; CCSL 50, 272.
7 Ibid., n.5: PL 42, 950; CCSL so, 273.
8 Ibid., c.2, n.3: PL 42, 949; CCSL so, 271.
° Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.g, nn.58-60 (111, 40-42).
QUESTION FOURTEEN
the terms are known. Neither then is such faith the basis for knowing [the meaning] of the terms.
Rather it presupposes such knowledge.
14.17 Third proof: The abstraction of the notion "being" from this individual being and the abstraction of the notion "highest" from this highest among sensibles is a natural process. Neither is there anything repugnant to joining these two notions. "Highest being,' therefore, is not an idea that is false in itself in the sense that the Philosopher defines?®: "What is false in itself includes contradictory notions and cannot be conceived by a simple act of the intellect." By contrast "highest being' can be so conceived because its elemental notes are not mutually repugnant.
2. Knowledge of the Proposition "God is a Trinity"
14.18 What remains to be seen is how a soul, possessing knowledge of the terms "God" and "'trinity," could by its nature know that "God is a trinity" is true. Since propositional knowledge may be either a matter of belief or of epistemic* knowledge, and if epistemic, it may represent knowledge of the simple fact* or knowledge of the reasoned fact,* we must see which of these could occur in the case of this proposition "God is a trinity."
14.19 [Belief by acquired faith is naturally possible] As for belief in the proposition, I say that this is possible even in this life and on natural grounds, at least by acquired faith.
Proof: As Augustine puts it": '""When things are not present to our senses, we are unable to know them on our own authority, so we seek out and believe witnesses to whose senses, we believe, these things are or were present." And again?: "Far be it from us to deny what we have learned from the testimony of others; for otherwise, we would not know that there is an ocean; we would not know that there are lands and cities which the most celebrated fame commends."
14.20 These and similar texts of Augustine indicate that belief in the testimony of others can be so firm as to warrant its being called
"knowing." The more truthful the witness, then, the more we can and ought to believe him. And a community can be trusted even more than an individual. The Catholic Church is a most truthful community, however, for it condemns lying and commends truth in 10 Aristotle, Metaph. v, c.29 (1024b17-20).
11 Augustine, De civit. Dei x1, c.3: PL 41, 318; CCSL 48, 323.
12 Augustine, De Trin. xv, c.12, n.21: PL 42, 1075; CCSL 50a, 493. on9
GOD AND CREATURES
the highest measure. Therefore, its testimony can be believed with the greatest of certitude, especially where it damns a lie the most, in matters of faith and morals.** 14.21 The pilgrim, then, having heard and understood the Church's common teaching, is able by nature to assent with firm belief to what she teaches about morals and faith. Most important among such teaching is what she has to say about the trinity in the divine. To such acquired faith the Epistle to the Romans** seems to refer when it states: "Faith comes from hearing" (i.e., the salvific doctrine of Christ). For it adds: "Hearing depends on the word of Christ." To faith of this sort Augustine's words can be referred when he writes!®: "I would not believe in the Gospel, did not the authority of the Catholic Church compel me."
14.22 [Belief by infused faith is not naturally possible] In addition to this acquired faith, however, we possess a faith that is infused. And while man can naturally dispose himself to receive this,*® his intellect is unable to attain it in virtue of its intrinsic nature, even with the cooperation of all the causes that move it naturally.
God alone can infuse it, and he does not function as a cause that moves any created intellect in a natural* fashion.
14.23 [How acquired and infused faith agree and differ] Comparing infused and acquired faith to the act of belief, we see they agree in this: When both are present in the same soul, one and the | same act of belief is elicited in accord with both inclinations, for where two forms naturally incline the same agent towards action, they do so necessarily and always so far as they are concerned. Consequently, whenever the act is elicited, it is in accord with the inclination of both. And if "An act of belief is based on faith" is taken to mean that the act is elicited in accordance with faith's inclination, then the act of belief must admittedly be based on both faiths.
14.24 So far as eliciting the act is concerned, however, one difference between the two is this: An act of belief could be elicited by acquired faith, even if it alone were present, in the same way that we believe certain articles to which no infused faith inclines us simply because testimony of the witness deserves to be believed. A here13 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. m1, d.2g, n.4 (ed. Vivés xv, 7-8).
14 Romans 10:17.
15 Augustine, Contra epist. Fundamentt, c.5, n.6: PL 42, 176; CSEL 25, 197.
'® He speaks of a remote disposition. Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. m1, d.23, n.14
(ed. Vives xv, 22); d.25, q.1 (ed. Vives xv, 57-158).
QUESTION FOURTEEN
tic disagrees with one article while believing in others. He does so not by virtue of infused faith since it cannot coexist with heresy about any article [of faith]. On the other hand, no one can elicit an act of belief by infused faith alone. This refers to God's general dispensation, for he could, of course, assisting infused faith, move the intellect to assent in fact to something to which such faith merely inclines it. But even in this case, perhaps it would be the divine movement and not the mere inclination of infused faith that is responsible for eliciting the act. Still less in God's ordinary dispensation can infused faith alone give rise to an act of belief. The case of the baptized child makes this clear, for should he subsequently be raised by infidels or grow up in a deserted place, receiving no instruction in the articles to be believed, he would never elicit a correct act of faith.
The reason is that infused faith inclines one to believe in propositions in cases where evidence for them does not derive from their terms, or if the meaning of the terms can be ascertained from sense perception, there is no evidence of their connection.
14.25 One could object to this reason that such evidence is not supplied by acquired faith either. Look for the answer to this objection elsewhere."? c71 14.26 Another difference [between the two faiths] stems from the point of view of the act based upon them. Infused faith is unable to incline one towards something false since it inclines in virtue of the divine light of which it is a participation. Thus it inclines only to what conforms to that light. The act of belief, then, insofar as it is based upon infused faith, cannot tend towards something false. Acquired faith, on the contrary, is generally based on the assertion of some fallible witness. Consequently, there is no guarantee that the act of belief based upon it cannot extend to something false. Still, it is frequently the case that such belief is not false, namely, when the witness upon whose testimony it is based is truthful. I said "generally" advisedly, for one could believe by acquired faith something revealed immediately by God,1* unless what it means for a truth to be revealed by God is that God immediately causes the act of belief or knowledge in the person to whom the revelation is given.
14.27 When both infused and acquired faith incline towards the same act of belief, acquired faith cannot incline towards what is false. Not that the impossibility stems from the acquired faith as 17 See Appendix, Addition 14.25.
18 Cf, Duns Scotus, Ord. m1, d.2g, nn.15, 18 (ed. Vives xv, 22-23, 26-27). yal
GOD AND CREATURES
such. It is due rather to the infused faith which concurs with it. The act of belief then rests on (a) infused faith as upon a rule that is certain and absolutely infallible, one which excludes any possibility of the belief being false; and (b) acquired faith as upon a less certain rule, one which does not exclude all possibility of the act being false or of its being concerned with a false object.
14.28 One might object to this last difference that when the same act rests upon a fallible rule, although an infallible rule concurs with the fallible rule, that act is not infallible. Proof by analogy: No necessary conclusion follows from two premises, one of which is necessary, the other contingent. The reason is this: What depends on more than one is no stronger than its weakest support. Now every act of belief, however, depends for its elicitation upon the motivation of acquired faith. If the latter be fallible, no act elicited from such a source could exclude the possibility of the belief being false.
14.29 To this I reply: Anything to which the light of infused faith inclines is definitely true. If something else, which if left to itself could incline one to err, inclines one to assent to this same definite truth, the impossibility of deception does not stem from this second factor but from the light of the infused faith.
14.30 A third difference, connected with the first, could be adduced. I do not perceive myself to be inclined to an act [of belief] by reason of infused faith, nor am I aware that I elicit an act in accord with it. All I perceive is that my assent is in accord with my acquired faith or the source from which it stems, namely, the testimony I believe. If I perceived that my act stemmed from infused faith and knew that only belief in what is definitely true is consistent with such faith, I would perceive that my act could not be false.
From this it would follow that I would perceive that the object of that act could not be false. Hence I would know it epistemically, ie.,
I would recognize it infallibly as being true. But no one, I believe, experiences personally when he possesses both faiths or when he gives his assent in accord with both. It is only in this general principle, then, that we believe, namely, that one could not err about a proposition if he tends to assent to it under the inclination of infused faith. But nobody, neither he who possesses infused faith nor anyone else, knows or experiences with certainty when someone tends to assent to a proposition by reason of infused faith.
14.31 An objection to this: In the De Trinitate,'® it says: "Faith *9 Augustine, De Trin. xi, c.1, n.g: PL 42, 1014; CCSL 0a, 383.
QUESTION FOURTEEN
is not so seen in the heart in which it is, by him whose it is, but we know most certainly that it is there and our conscience proclaims its existence.
... We cannot see that which we are commanded to believe; yet when the faith itself is in us, we see it in us."
14.32 I reply: What [Augustine] means is that faith is seen in the same fashion that he admits the soul knows itself at all times. He does not mean that there is at all times an elicited act, but that an object able to be known actually is fully present at all times. Hence he adds*°: "The faith of things that are absent is present [and the faith of things that are without is within, and the faith of things that are not seen is seen]."" In other words, where we would say the soul is in proximate accidental potency* to know something, Augustine would speak of this as something the soul "knows."
14.33 Another way to answer this objection would be to say that Augustine takes "faith" to mean the act of belief, of which he says a little later": "But sometimes our faith," 1.e., our act of believing,
"is accommodated even to false things."
14.34 [Epistemic or demonstrative knowledge of the simple fact is not naturally possible] So far as epistemic knowledge of the simple fact* [scientia quia] is concerned, I say that no one can acquire such knowledge of the divine trinity in the present life by natural means. For no one can prove by a demonstration of simple fact
[demonstratio quia] that a cause possesses some characteristic which, if eliminated, would still leave the cause with all it needs to produce that effect. But if being a trinity were eliminated, to assume the impossible, God would still have all that is required to produce a creature. For the formal principle of production, complete and perfect, together with a subject [swppositum]* which has it, would remain, as is evident from an earlier discussion of this matter [in Question Eight]. A perfect subject possessing a perfect formal principle seems to be all that is required for causation."
14.35 [Epistemic knowledge of the reasoned fact is not naturally possible] As for epistemic knowledge of the reasoned fact* [screntia propter quid], I say that the soul cannot acquire naturally such knowledge as regards 'God is a trinity." Knowledge of what is most proper to a subject is virtually contained in a primary and evident way only in a per se and proper concept of that subject or in the subject itself which is conceived in this way. But so far as God is concerned, to be a trinity is this sort of thing. Hence it can only be
20 Ibid.
21 Tbid.
22 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.4,n.11
(Iv, 5-6).
GOD AND CREATURES
known as a reasoned fact if one has such a concept of God. But such is not had by God's ordinary dispensation in the state we are at present,** as is clear from our first conclusion [in 14.13] which had to do with the simple understanding of the meaning of the terms.
Proof of the major: One would know such a proper attribute either as belonging to the subject conceived properly and per se
(in this case the truth of the major would be evident) or else as belonging to the subject conceived in a universal fashion or indistinctly
(and in this case one could have such knowledge by a demonstration of the reasoned fact only if one had as middle term a concept of it that was proper and distinct). For example, one could not prove by a demonstration of the reasoned fact that the predicate
"first figure" belongs to the subject "some figure" in general except by a proper middle term, namely, a term which gave the meaning or definition of a circle. Nor is this surprising, for to know syllogistically the reason why a proper attribute [i.e., one which belongs necessarily to this and only to this subject] inheres in its respective subject, what is needed is a middle term that expresses what that subject properly is. It was just such epistemic knowledge of the reasoned fact that we were looking for as regards the first two conclusions in [7.10 of] the question on omnipotence earlier; but these conclusions themselves, though true, are not relevant to our present problem since we are here concerned with what kind of knowledge it is possible for us to have in this life on purely natural grounds.
ARTICLE II Perfect Immediate Knowledge [10 — 14.36 [The Trinity cannot be known naturally by immediate and perfect knowledge] We come now to the second main point [of 14.9, the possibility of immediate perfect knowledge]. Although knowledge that is per se, proper, and immediate could be either intuitive or abstractive (a distinction we dealt with earlier [in 13.27ff.]), the following conclusion seems to apply to both types:
The soul by its natural perfection, considering its nature in any state, is unable to attain knowledge of God that is immediate and proper, even with the cooperation of all the causes that naturally move it to know. The same should be said of the angel. The reason is this: Any such intellection, namely, that which is per se, proper, and immediate, requires the presence of the object in all its proper
°3 Cf. ibid., d.g, nn.56-57 (11, 38-39); d.2, n.183
(11, 237-38); prol., nn.
167-68 (1, 109-12).
QUESTION FOURTEEN
intelligibility as object [propria ratio objecti]. If the intellection is intuitive, this means in its own existence it is present as object. If the intellection is abstractive, it is present in something which represents it in all its proper and essential meaning as a knowable object.
But only if God wills it, is he present to any created intellect in all the proper and essential meaning of divinity [swb propria ratione divinitatis].?+ That God is not really present to it appears clearly from the commentary of Ambrose on Luke?*: '"Though it is not of his nature to be seen, it 1s within his power to be seen. If he wants it, he is seen; if he does not want it, he is not seen." He puts it excellently when he says "It is not of his nature to be seen," (i.e., by the creature), because his nature is not a naturally active cause of this vision. Neither can any created nature by its natural activity produce this vision or make this [divine] object perfectly present, since it cannot contain within itself in a perfect way this divine essence, neither in its entity nor as an intelligible object.
14.37 For the same reason, it is clear that no created being can be the cause of the abstractive presence of God in the intellect, for it cannot cause any representation which of itself and properly presents the divinity in all its essential meaning as a knowable object.
Such a representation could only be caused by the knowable object itself or by something containing it perfectly in all its intelligibility.
Consequently, even though God could be known through something which represented him, only God himself could produce this, and he would do so by means of his will.
14.38 Against this argument it is objected that a power or potency is able to attain naturally anything which comes under its first natural object; otherwise, the first object would not really be adequate but would rather transcend the capacity of the power in question. But being [ens], which is the first natural object of the intellect, applies most truly to God himself. Therefore, [the intellect can attain God naturally].
14.39 In reply one could say that "first natural object" can be understood in two ways. In one sense, it means the object to which the potency is inclined; in another, it means the object which is within the natural reach of the power, namely where only natural causes are operative. Now while "being" taken commonly (whether its commonness be one of univocation or analogy, I do not care at pres24 Cf. ibid., 1, d.3, q.g (ed. Vivés xu, 201-19); 1, d.3, 1.57
(II, 39).
25 Ambrose, Ex positio Evangel Lucae 1, n.24: PL 15, 1543; CCSL 14, 18.
GOD AND CREATURES
ent) may be stipulated for any created intellect to be its adequate object in the first sense, it is still not its adequate object in the second sense, no matter in what state it exists. Only "finite being" is adequate in this second sense, since this is all that any created intellect can reach by virtue of causes which naturally move it.
14.40 [What is to be said about the natural object of the human intellect] Some?* claim that the natural object of the human intellect is not "being" in its generality but is restricted to the essence or quiddity of a material thing. They adduce this argument: A power or potency is proportionate to its object. Cognitive powers are assumed to be threefold: one, completely separated from matter both in its being and in its knowing (e.g., the intellect of a separate substance)*; another, united to matter both in its being and in its functioning (e.g., an organic power like the senses); a third, proper to that form which has its being in matter, but does not use either matter or a material organ to function (our intellect is this sort of thing).
Proportionate to this threefold power is a threefold object. Quiddity completely separated from matter corresponds to the first; to the second, the singular that is completely material; to the third, corresponds the quiddity of a material thing which, though it exists in matter, is not thought of as limited to this particular matter.
14.41 But against this view one®' can argue that if this means the material quiddity is the proper object of our intellect insofar as it © is the power it is, then it follows that the quiddity of material things is also the adequate object of the blessed [in heaven], or if it is not, then their intellect is no longer the same potency or power it was.
But both alternatives are false.
14.42 It cannot be countered that the intellect is elevated by the light of glory. No habit which elevates a power can have an object that transcends the primary object of that power. Otherwise it would not be a habit of that potency but it would represent a power or potency in its own right, or else it would transform our early power into another power entirely, for it would have a different primary object.
14.43 The commensurate object naturally within the reach of our intellect in its present state may indeed be the quiddity of material things or, more precisely, the quiddity of a sensible thing, meaning
26 Thomas, Summa theol. 1, q-12, a.4 in corp.
(I, 54); q.84, a.2 in corp.
(1, 414); q.85, a.1 in corp. (1, 416).
7 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.g, nn.110-24 (111, 69-77); Iv, d.49, q-11, n.g (ed. Vivés xx1, 389-90).
QUESTION FOURTEEN
by this not just that of the sensible proper but also the quiddity of what is essentially or virtually included in the sensible. Still, I maintain that if we consider the nature of our intellect as a power or potency, its adequate or commensurate object is no more restricted than that of the angel. Whatever can be understood by one can be understood by the other.
14.44 This at least is what would have to be admitted by a theologian who claims our present state is not natural and that our impotence in regard to many intelligible matters represents a penal, not a natural, situation, according to [Augustine] in De Trinitate?*:
"Things that are certain are revealed to your interior eyes by that light," namely, that eternal light of which he has spoken. 'What is the reason, then, why you are unable to see it with a steady gaze except indeed your infirmity; and what has brought this upon you except sin?'' About this he had written earlier?®: "And you, o my soul, where do you feel yourself to be? Where do you lie down?"
And he adds: "You recognize that you are in that inn to which that Samaritan brought him whom he found half dead from the many wounds inflicted by robbers."'
14.45 The Philosopher, however, would say this present state is simply natural to man, having experienced no other and having no cogent reason for concluding another state exists. He perhaps would go on to claim that the adequate object of the human intellect, even by its nature as a power, is simply what he perceived to be commensurate to it at present, [i.e., the quiddity of sensible things].*°
[13] 14.46 [An objection to 14.41-44] Against this, however, it is argued that the object which naturally moves a created intellect is being [ens], not merely limited being but also unlimited being.
Thus being in its indifference to either is the object that is naturally commensurate to it, in other words, any such object is able to be attained by the action of a cause that is acting naturally.
The first proof cited is this: The way in which the same first object, taken in all its indifference [or broadest extension] moves the potency or power to which it primarily refers, understanding that type of potency in all its indifference [or broadest sense], is the same, i.e., either it always moves naturally or it always moves nonnaturally [or voluntarily]. Now the unlimited being naturally moves some intellect, i.e., the divine intellect. Therefore, it moves every
28 Augustine, De Trin. xv, c.27,n.50: PL 42, 1097; CCSL 5oa, 533.
29 Ibid., PL 42, 1096-97; CCSL 50a, 531, 532.
30 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.g, nn.115, 123-24 (IM, 71-72, 76-77). pat!
GOD AND CREATURES
intellect in this way. Or this other minor premise could be used:
Some being moves the created intellect naturally. Therefore, every being moves it in this way.
Proof of the major: This is proved first inductively, i.e., by considering each type of potency and its object. A second proof from reason is the following: The proper object taken in all its indifference is the object that is adequate or commensurate, and what it refers to properly is the potency or power taken in its broadest or generic sense. Consequently, there is some proper way in which these two terms, namely, object and power, relate to each other in general, a way that would also hold good for any particular instances falling under these general terms. For particular terms include [in their definition] the first or more general terms, and consequently they relate to or confront each other in the same way as do these first terms.
14.47 [Second proof] Every act prior to the will-act is merely natural [and therefore is not free but necessary]. But any action of the divine essence, even when it functions as an object which moves a created intellect, is prior to the will's act. Therefore, [it is a merely natural act, not one that is free or voluntary].
Proof of the minor: The beatific object is the essence as essence, not the essence as will or as willing. To move a created intellect to the beatific act, therefore, is a function of essence as essence and hence as prior to any action on the part of the will.
14.48 Confirmation of this argument: If, to assume the impossible, God were not a voluntary agent, his essence would naturally move the intellect to perceive it. Hence it will also function in this same way at present, since it is not as a voluntary agent that God moves or functions as first object.
14.49 [Third proof] Every object begets actual knowledge of itself. 'This production or generation is natural, [not voluntary]. That is why Augustine*! speaks of what is generated as "offspring." It is in a natural fashion, therefore, that the essence produces a vision of itself in the intellect of the blessed.
14.50 [Fourth proof] If the will must cooperate with the essence as motive principle for the beatific act of a created intellect, how—
I ask—are essence and will functionally related? The will cannot be called the motive factor and the essence reduced to second place, moving as it were only in virtue of the will. It would have to be the other way around, then, so that the essence would be the prime
*t Augustine, De Trin. 1x, c.12, n.18: PL 42, 970-72; CCSL 50, 310.
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mover. As such it would have to have its own proper way of moving. For it is not determined by, but determines itself to move, the second mover. Thus we see that what acts naturally so far as it depends on itself, acts necessarily, whereas if its action is subject to the will, it does not act necessarily. Its action can either occur or not occur. But this is not something it has of itself. Rather it stems from the contingency characteristic of the will's action. Conversely, if in acting the will were subject to some other principle, it would naturally be determined by the latter to act in a definite way.
[14] 14.51 [Before answering these arguments, a word on how the various movements are interrelated] Keep in mind that the absolutely first movement in things has to be natural, for every voluntary movement presupposes another. And if there is some movement among things that is not natural, all the more will the movement of the will not be natural.
14.52 It is also conceivable that some movement is directed towards a goal that is simply infinite. On the other hand, there is movement that tends to a finite goal or to an infinite goal. That which tends toward the simply infinite, however, is the prior movement, since the infinite cannot have the finite as a presupposition.
14.53 If we take motion in an improper or extended sense, we can arrange the varied movements of things in some sort of order. If motion be understood in a broad sense, the first thing movable by a natural* movement, absolutely speaking, is the divine intellect.
Hence it is the divine essence as primary object of God's intellect which first moves with a movement that is natural.'? Consequently, the movement that is absolutely first would be the natural movement of the divine intellect by its object, the divine essence. What moves naturally, however, moves the movable as far as this is possible. Hence the object in this case can move the unbegotten intellect of the Person in whom the essence exists primarily, not only to actual knowledge of himself, but also to the actual knowledge which he begets. Though it moves naturally to both types of knowledge, it does so according to a certain order. For if, in a given subject, something is the source of both an immanent activity and an operation that produces a product distinct from himself, the former function is somehow prior.
14.54 Should you object that, in the divine, the production is just as immanent* as is the activity, I reply: The production is not im32 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.z, nn.231-34, 311-12 (II, 265-68, 314-15).
229.
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manent so far as its term is concerned; the operation, on the contrary, is immanent in every way.
14.55 The essence is also a natural mover for knowing all simple intelligibles, but only after the essence is possessed by all the Persons. This does not mean that [the essence] would be deficient as an active principle apart from this condition. It only means some order is required on the part of the terminus of its action.%*
Hence that action which is purely natural as regards the absolutely first or infinite term is thus complete. The absolutely first movement, in this case, is that of eliciting knowledge, as it were, in the intellect of the Father. Next to this is the movement of begetting the Word.* 14.56 This is followed by an action which, by nature, has to do with the absolutely first term, namely with the communication of the first essence. Though it is not natural, this action is absolutely necessary. It is a movement of the will and is twofold, as it were: one, to simple loving; the other, to Love proceeding [as the Holy
Spirit]. This twofold motion of the will parallels the twofold natural motion said to be in the intellect, the one to simple knowing, the other to '"'speaking''* [the Word].
14.57 Objection: Given the same subject, natural action precedes that which is not natural. According to you, however, it is by a natural action that the divine intellect knows what can be created.
Hence, this action precedes every action of the will and hence that of ''spirating''* or breathing the Holy Spirit.
I answer: The major is true where the same order holds for the terminus of the action. In this case, however, the order of the first term is different from that of the second. Hence the natural in one order follows the non-natural in another order. In distinguishing orders, one looks first to the nature of the terms and only second to the way in which the principles function.
14.58 On the contrary, replies my objector, the order based on principles is prior to that based on the terms, even as principle is prior to term, for the term is produced or communicated by the principle.
I answer: The antecedent is true of something that is a term in the fullest sense of the word, namely something which receives existence in an unqualified sense. It is not true, however, of a formal term, which is given being only in a qualified sense [as is the case with possible creatures in the divine mind].
$8 CL ibid:ai, dia; qt, nie-4 ie
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14.59 Once the whole process of origin is complete as regards the first term (namely, the divine essence to be communicated), another order follows as regards the second term of the essence (namely, of what is able to be created). In this second order, it is the divine essence itself that first moves the divine intelligence, insofar as this is present in all three persons, to the simple awareness of every intelligible. It does not move the intelligence to a distinct knowledge of the truth of every proposition, however. For if it would move it to know definitely one of the two possible statements about any future contingency, since a natural mover moves necessarily, it would follow that the divine intellect would know in a necessary fashion which of the two contradictory statements will be true. Hence, either it can err or the opposite could not occur, and then what is assumed to be contingent is really not contingent but necessary.**
14.60 Since the way everything intelligible is ordered to the first intelligible seems to be the same, why does not the first intelligible
[namely, the divine essence] move [the divine intellect] with equal necessity to whatever it knows? My answer is this: It does move naturally, and hence in a necessary fashion, to whatever it is possible to know naturally and in a necessary way. Such are all simple objects and all necessary truths. A proposition about the existence of something contingent, however, is not this sort of thing. There is nothing in the nature of a contingent event that requires it to be true.
14.61 You might ask, why does the divine essence not move the divine intellect necessarily to have such knowledge as it is possible to have about such a proposition? I reply: either it would move it to a disjunctive type of knowledge so that it knows only that the event will either occur or not occur, but does not know which will be the case, or else, if it did move the intellect to a definitive knowledge of one of the two, it would follow that that alternative was necessarily determined.
14.62. Contingent movement, therefore, is subsequent to the whole order of necessary movements. It is not possible that contingent movement proceeds from a principle of natural motion, since it is characteristic of such to move in a necessary fashion. Hence will must be postulated as the source of such movement. Such contingent movements have their own order. 'The first is internal, for if the will itself did not decide to will one of the two possibilities,
84 Cf. ibid., 1, d.g8, nn.5-6 (v1, 304-305); Lectura 1, d.g9, nn.62-65 (xvu, 500-501); Ord. 1, d.40 (VI, 309-13).
33]
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nothing definite would ever take place in the world outside. Hence his will first determines itself to will what will be; second, his intellect, seeing this infallible determination of the will, knows that this will be. Contingent and necessary movements, therefore, are inversely related. In necessary movements nature is the first principle, therefore it is first naturally determined to its own action. In contingent movements, however, the first principle is free. Subsequent to its action in the first order is the natural movement.
14.63 Motion in regard to what is external is subsequent to all contingent movement that is internal. All such external motion consequently is contingent and hence has God's will itself as its immediate principle. No created intellect, consequently, is moved in a natural fashion by the essence as essence. All knowledge of this essence, not caused by anything created, is caused immediately by the divine will.** 14.64 [Reply to the arguments in 14.46-50] The answer to the counter-arguments cited earlier now becomes clear. The major of the first argument must be taken to mean that the object moves uniformly any potency that can be moved immediately by it. As for the [17] first minor, the divine essence immediately moves the divine intellect, not the created intellect. For the divine intellect is the absolutely first thing that can be moved, and therefore is moved first by the . motive form that is first. There is nothing else able to be moved immediately by this first motive form, for it is only able to move immediately according to the first type of movement, and there is nothing else that is suited by its nature to be moved in this fashion.
If you wish to conclude, therefore, that the divine essence moves every intellect in the same way, one may grant this holds true of any that it moves immediately. But the only instance of this is the divine intellect, as is obvious from what has been said [in 14.53].
14.65 Now the other minor proposed, namely, that a created object moves in a natural manner, is true only of the intellect it moves immediately. It would be false, however, if it were to move some intellect by means of an act of the will, for it would not move it naturally. Such would be the case if my will could freely cause in you knowledge of my essence. But perhaps this kind of knowledge is not characteristic of any created essence and will, since every such essence is capable of moving immediately a created intellect, and hence would do so by a movement that is natural. On the other hand, no created will moves to perfect knowledge of any essence as 85 Cf. ibid., Ord. 1v, d.4g, q.11, n.g (ed. Vives xx1, 417-18).
QUESTION FOURTEEN
such, for it does not contain any essence in an eminent and unitive way. But to whatever extent created objects move intellects naturally, it is clear from what was said above how the principle applies to the divine essence, for it moves immediately the first intellect and no other.
14.66 My answer to the second argument [in 14.47] is this: To move [a created intellect] to the beatific vision is not the act that properly characterizes the divine essence, nor is it prior to the will.
Properly speaking, it is an act of that will. Though the essence, as in some sense prior to the will, is the first and immediate object that is seen through that vision, it is not the immediate moving object.
Only remotely does it move, to the extent, namely, that it moves the divine intellect to that vision which precedes the volition by which the intellect of Michael is moved to the vision [of God].
14.67 This shows clearly how the confirmatory argument [in 14.48] is to be answered, for if that essence was not formally a voluntary agent as well, it could cause absolutely nothing outside itself, since it could only cause naturally. But since everything extrinsic, formally speaking, is only possible, it could only proceed from something necessary in a contingent fashion.
14.68 As for the [fourth]** proof [in 14.50], one could say that, properly speaking, essence and will are not related as higher and lower motor causes in the sense that both act upon what is moved.
Only the [divine] will acts on the created intellect. As a presupposition for this action, however, the movement of the divine intellect by the essence is required. The essence functions as a "mover" in regard to the created intellect's vision of itself only to this extent: before the will can move the created intellect, the divine essence must have moved the divine intellect to this vision of itself.
14.69 But suppose one argues against this as follows: Will as will can only move an intellect to envision the will as will. It cannot move to a vision of essence as essence. To see the will as will but not the essence as essence is not to see the beatific object. Proof of the minor: The beatific object of the divine and created intellect are the same. Now the divine intellect is not beatified by a vision of the will as will. The will is not its primary object, and the intellect is only beatified by obtaining its primary object. Proof of the major: The (19 ] will, as a property, is posterior to the nature as it were. As such it cannot be the causal principle of a perfect vision of the essence as 36 Scotus changes the order of the arguments in his answers to them. Cf.
Supra, 14.50.
Odo
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essence. For the latter is somehow prior and more perfect according to the words of Damascene®': "Like some infinite and limitless sea of substance, he contains all being in himself."
To this objection I reply: The will is perfectly identical with the essence. Consequently it can be the moving principle of a vision of the essence as essence. Therefore, the major must be denied. The affirmative claim that the will can be the moving principle of a vision of will as will is certainly true, but the negative claim that it cannot be the principle for seeing the essence as essence is false. 'To the proof of the major, I answer: The priority here is a kind of priority of foundation. But not only is this foundation perfectly identical with what is thought to rest upon it but the latter also possesses the formal perfection of being formally infinite. For this reason it contains the perfection of its foundation in a perfectly identical and unitive way. Hence, the will can be the source that communicates the essence since it possesses in a completely identical fashion the same perfection as does the essence.
14.70 To the remaining for third proof in 14.49] one could say that Augustine*® is speaking, in the text referred to, of that knowledge which is the Word.* Hence, after having pointed out that "the offspring that is born is knowledge itself of the Trinity," he adds at the end of the chapter: "There is a certain image of the Trinity the mind itself and its knowledge, which is its offspring and the Word about itself, and love as a third." Consequently not all actual knowledge of the object represents its Word but only that which is born of it as offspring, i.e., that which not only is its natural image but is begotten naturally* by being born of it.3? Actual knowledge produced by the will, therefore, is not the Word of that object, for although it be the natural image of the object it is not begotten naturally.
14.71 There is another way one could answer the citation from Augustine*® where he says: "Everything we know begets in us the knowledge of itself." These words could refer to what we know naturally, namely, by means of causes which naturally move our intellect. Certainly things either in themselves or in their causes "beget."
That is to say with natural fecundity and of necessity each causes *7 Damascene, De fide orth. 1, c.g: PG 94, 835; ed. Buytaert, c.g, 49.
88 Augustine, De Trin. 1x, c.12, n.18: PL 42, 970-72; CCSL 50, 309-10.
89 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.g3, nn.569-604 (11, 338-57); u, dd.16 and 24 (ed. Vives xi, 23-47, 177-84).
*° Augustine, De Trin. 1x, c.12, n.18: PL 42, 970; CCSL 50, 309.
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in us knowledge of itself as its natural image. The word is generated in this way only by the memory.* There is no need that an object which is made known by an act of the will have prior existence in the memory, or at least it does not act insofar as it has such prior existence. In this way, then, we can preserve the proper meaning of "Word."
On the other hand, if 'everything' in an extended sense refers also to the divine essence, then what follows, namely, "begets knowledge of itself' must be understood either (a) formally as referring to an object which moves naturally, or (b) equivalently as referring to the uncreated object since this, either by itself or by something identical with it, causes in us knowledge of itself. This knowledge, so far as its perfecting the intellect is concerned, is equivalent to an offspring that is naturally begotten, because it is a likeness leading naturally to knowledge of the object, just as it would if it were produced naturally by the object.
14.72 From what was said, it seems to follow that before the vision of the essence is caused in Michael the essence is not, by any priority of nature, representative of itself so far as Michael is concerned. All the more, therefore, it is not representative of anything else. Both the essence as well as other things are contingently represented by an act of the will so that its representation does not precede in any way the actual understanding of the object said to be represented.
14.73 But this raises a question. For in God the representation that is in some sense prior to actual understanding is found only in the memory. And strictly speaking, there is nothing in the divine memory besides the object (which, as it were, has given it its first actuality), something that is immediate to the second act (i.e., to actual understanding). But that which actualizes in this way is the presence of the first object in its entirety, namely, the divine essence. If this be the case, how can the blessed see a secondary object in the essence if it is not somehow represented there? It is not represented to him in the will either, even if one grants the will does the revealing, since the will is not a mirror in which it might be seen.
I answer: A stone is seen in the divine essence but not in the way an object present is reflected by a mirror, for prior to the act of understanding the divine essence represents only itself and only to its own intellect. The stone, however, is seen in the divine essence in the way a secondary object is perceived in the first object. The
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first object [the divine essence], however, does not move [the intellect of the blessed] to a knowledge of the second object in the same way it moves its own intellect or in the way a principle moves our intellect to draw a conclusion. Another factor is involved, namely, the will. This moves the intellect towards two objects of knowledge according to a certain order, so that they terminate the act of the intellect as a primary and a secondary object.
ARTICLE It
Mediate Knowledge 14.74 [The Trinity cannot be known naturally by mediate knowledge] As regards the third main problem [in 14.9], I affirm that by their natural powers neither the angel nor the soul in any of its states can have mediate knowledge of the divine essence in all its proper meaning, so that the sense or meaning of that essence would be grasped in knowing or by knowing some intermediary object.
Nothing can be known in itself distinctly in this intermediate fashion unless it be contained in the medium essentially or virtually, and this, perfectly, i.e., in all its knowability.*1 But nothing else contains the divine essence in this way. Therefore, [it cannot be known in this way by an angel or by the soul]. Proof of the minor: Nothing distinct from divinity contains it perfectly under the aspect of entity; neither then does it contain divinity perfectly under the aspect of knowability. Proof of the major: If an object moves to any knowledge, it moves most effectively to a perfect and proper knowledge of itself. Hence it cannot move to knowledge that is simply more perfect than this. Neither then can it move to proper knowledge of a more perfect object.
14.75 [Objections] To begin with, exception is taken to the argument itself. All that is required of a cause is that it contain virtually that of which it is the cause, not that of which it is not the cause.
Whatever moves to distinct and perfect knowledge of the divine essence, however, only needs to be the cause of that knowledge, not the cause of the essence itself. Admittedly, as the proof shows, no cause contains the divine essence itself. Still, it could contain knowledge thereof, if it were more perfect, for instance, than the knowledge, in the way that a substance is more perfect than an accident.
This would suffice for moving the intellect to knowledge of this sort.
Such knowledge, it seems, could be contained eminently in the angel's or the soul's substance, since this substance is much more
41 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 11, d.g, q.g (ed. Vivés x11, 201-19).
QUESTION FOURTEEN
perfect than is its knowledge, and far closer in the essential order [of perfection] to the [divine] object itself.
14.76 Two further objections are raised to the conclusion. The first is this: An object, it seems, can be known distinctly by means of its own image. Thus the sense of sight knows distinctly the object in the mirror. According to Augustine,#? however, both the angel and the soul are the image of God. Even by their natural powers, both can know themselves distinctly. He affirms this of the soul where it is not so obvious**: "Just as it comprehends that it always knows itself and always wills itself, so it also comprehends that it always remembers itself and understands itself and loves itself, even though it does not always think itself to be different, etc.'"" And he adds, in the same work**: '""The mind of man, we said, knows itself.
For the mind knows nothing so well as that which is present to itself, and nothing is more present to the mind than the mind is to itself." In chapters six and seven he has much the same to say.
14.77 A second objection to the conclusion is that the created intellect of the blessed can know its beatific act naturally. Through it, therefore, the object of this act can be known naturally. Proof that this follows: (1) the act is a natural likeness of the object. Indeed it seems to be a more express likeness than the intelligible species,* if there be one. Hence, the object can be known distinctly through it as through a natural likeness.
(2) It hardly seems possible to know the act as envisioning this object, unless one knows this object as envisioned by the act.
[22] 14.78 [Answer to the objections] To the first of these [in 14.75] I say: Nothing contains knowledge virtually in an adequate way unless the knowable object is represented there either properly (i.e., formally) or else virtually. The proper species of an object, even though it be a lesser entity than is the object itself, still contains the latter in the first of these ways, namely, the object is formally represented by it. Even when the medium is not a formal representation of the object, it must still contain such a proper representation virtually. And when it performs this representative function only to the extent that the medium itself is known as object, then it must contain this other object that has to be known through it.*°
14.79 As for the other two arguments [in 14.76f.], a tempting 42 Augustine, De Trin. xiv, c.8, n.11: PL 42, 1044; CCSL 50a, 436.
43 Ibid., x, c.12, n.19: PL 42, 984; CCSL 50, 332.
44 [bid., xiv, c.4, n.7: PL 42, 1040; CCSL 50a, 429.
45 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. u, d.g, q.9, n.5 (ed. Vives x11, 205-206).
BO,
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solution would be to deny that a soul or an angel could know itself or even its beatific act by its natural powers. But since both seem to fall within the scope of what is a proper object for both the angelic and human intellect, and indeed a proper object naturally attainable (namely, a limited or finite being), another way to answer the objection might be this: While it may be true that both angel and soul are able to know themselves naturally for the absolute things that they are,*® they cannot know themselves naturally to the extent they are images of God. In other words, they are not aware that they are the image of God. Augustine'? seems to favor this solution:
"Those who see their mind and behold the trinity in it, viz., memory, intelligence and, will, and still do not believe what they are knowing is the image of God, see indeed the mirror but still do not see through it. That is to say, they do not know the mirror they see is a mirror, 1.e., a likeness."
14.80 This answer can be objected to on two counts, the first of which is this: Either the image-relation is identical with the soul's or the angel's essence, or it is at least a necessary consequence of its nature. Through a knowledge of the nature, then, the relation itself can be known. Proof of the antecedent: A relationship of essential dependence is either the same thing as the dependent nature or a necessary consequence thereof. If it were only contingently connected with the nature, the nature could exist without it, and hence be essentially independent. The image-relation, however, seems to be a dependence relationship of the imitation upon what is imitated.
14.81 The second objection is this: A cognitive power can know naturally anything contained under its first natural object. Now the image-relation is an instance of limited being, which is the first natural object of a created intellect. For this relation is not infinite, since it is rooted in the finite.
14.82 To the first of these objections [in 14.80]: A relation can only be known when both terms are known. If the meaning of the term is not included in that of the foundation, knowledge of the latter is not a sufficient reason for knowing the relation. Such is the case here. From the claim that the relation is a necessary consequence of the foundation, it does not follow that the relation can be known perfectly by means of its foundation. Only an absolute entity could be known perfectly in this way, since this presupposes knowledge of no further term.
14.83 But this is no solution, for what includes another's entity in- '6 Ibid., qq.8-9 (ed. Vives xu1, 179-233); d.g, q.2 (ibid., 427-518).
47 Augustine; De Trin. xv, c.24, n.44: PL 42, 1091; CCSL 50a, 522.
QUESTION FOURTEEN
cludes it as something knowable. Now the foundation includes the entity of this relation which is a necessary consequence of it. Hence it also includes it as something knowable.
To this I reply: It includes the relation's entity not as total cause, but only as a proximate cause which presupposes another cause, viz., the term. For the foundation itself requires this other cause.
In like fashion, I grant that the foundation includes the relation as something knowable, but only if the other cause of its knowability be given or presupposed. If this be given simply, the relation is simply knowable; if it be given only to some, only for such is the relation knowable. But to the knower in this case, viz., the angel or the soul, the term or object is not given as something naturally knowable, in the sense that the knowing is a natural process or results from causes that move naturally. Consequently, even though the foundation can be known naturally by such a knower, it does not follow that he can know the relation naturally.
[24] 14.84 Answer to the second objection [in 14.81]: A finite being, considered either absolutely or as related to another limited being, is a natural object for the created intellect. But an entity which is essentially a relationship to something unlimited, even though it be limited in itself, is to the created intellect no more intelligible naturally than is the [infinite] term without which the relationship itself is unthinkable.
14.85, [Counter-arguments] The foregoing replies seem, in all probability, to do justice to this fact. The soul might well have natural knowledge of its absolute entity or of its beatific act, and still be unable by nature to understand its relationship to this term, so that God need not be known as the term of the relation. Nevertheless, those arguments about the soul and its beatific act [in 14.76 and 14.77] pose this further common problem. An object may be known by means of its natural image, even if this reveals no knowledge of the image-relationship itself. For example, one sees something white by means of the [sense] species of white in the eye, and still the relation of this species to the white object is not seen. The same is true of the intellect in the case of the intelligible species. For the formal reason for knowing the object is not the relation grounded in the sensible or intelligible species but the form grounding that relation.
In the case at hand, therefore, the soul's or the beatific act's relation to God may be unknown naturally and nevertheless, since the foundation is the sort of thing that is of itself a likeness of the object, it could be the means of knowing that object.
[25] 14.86 The point made about the act [in 14.77] also appears to be
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cogent, since the act seems to be a formal likeness of the object and one that is more in a state of actuality than an intelligible species would be, if such existed. If the object could be distinctly grasped or known through the species, then a fortiori or a pari it could be grasped through the beatific act.
14.87 The other point mentioned there also appears to be well taken, for there does seem to be something contradictory about the act being recognized as envisioning this object and yet the object, as envisioned by the act, remaining unknown. The beatified soul, however, by its natural endowments could recognize what the beatific act is all about, and hence perceive it as envisioning the beatific object. For even though this act is not something the soul has of its own nature, still it can reflect upon it once the act is there and it can do this in virtue of its natural powers.
I prove this first from Augustine**: '""He who says 'I know that I live' knows one thing. If he were to add 'I know that I know I live,' he knows two things." And the text continues: "And so he can go on to add a third, a fourth, and countless other items, until he has enough." Now if it is up to him to continue with such reflex acts, then—I say—he can do so by reason of his natural endowments.
A second proof for this: If something supernatural were required to reflect upon an act, then for each new act a new supernatural factor would be needed. Now since it is possible to continue such reflex acts ad infinitum, supernatural factors ad infinitum would be required. Proof: The third act in relation to the second would be like the reflex act in relation to the direct act. If, given the direct act, the soul can only reflect upon it by virtue of some supernaturally elevating factor, by the same token then its third act, a reflection on the second, is made possible only through some additional supernatural factor.
A third proof for this: The intellect by its nature as a faculty can perceive and experience its own act in all its proper perfection, just as, when I see, I perceive that I do so by a natural power. I could do this by the visual power itself if it were reflective the way the intellect is.
[26] 14.88 [Reply to the counter-arguments] In answer to these I point out that a "medium of knowledge" or "means of knowing" can have two meanings: (1) the medium itself is known so that by knowing it something else is known, as is the case when a conclusion is
48 Tbid., c.12, n.21: PL 42, 1074; CCSL oa, 441-42.
QUESTION FOURTEEN
known by means of a principle; (2) the medium itself is not known but it merely functions as a means of knowing, in the way, for instance, that the sensible species in the sense faculty is a means of knowing.?® +9 There is an addition that is found in M: and Mb». M;, inserts it here;
Me adds it at the end of 14.91:
An example from sense perception makes this clear. When a ray of light passes through a piece of red glass, it causes red to appear on the opposite wall. Now the red on the wall is not a means for seeing the red of the glass properly, but one sees the red of the glass only in a derivative sense or perhaps not at all, for there is only some similarity between the red on the wall and that of the glass. But when a sensible species is the reason for perceiving an object properly, then that species itself is not seen by the senses, as is clear in the case of direct vision where nothing intervenes between the color and the eye and still the color is transmitted through the intervening space.
An objection to the contrary: While what was just said may be true of direct vision, it is not so in the case of reflected visions, for there the species or likeness itself seems to be seen, for what is seen is obviously seen in the mirror, and yet in such reflex vision the likeness in the mirror is the reason for perceiving the object in itself, for the object is seen under its proper aspect as something visible. Therefore, analogowsly in the question at hand, God would be seen by means of something in which is mirrored and yet he would be seen under an aspect proper to himself.
Answer: Alhacen in his Optics, book four, chapter four, declares explicitly that the species or likeness is not in the mirror as its subject or as terminating the act of vision. This can be shown quickly in one experiment, for that which exists somewhere is seen in itself by an eye in this place and also by another eye at another place, just as long as the medium is illumined and nothing opaque intervenes. But the eye which is at one place will see a white object in the mirror whereas one located at a different place will not see it, for vision only takes place at that point reached by the reflected ray. This reflected ray is always in the same surface as the incident ray and with the latter constitutes an angle equal to that angle formed by the incident ray and the body upon which it falls.
Our point is also proved from the fact that some mirrors like polished steel or polished silver or gold are not formally transparent. Bodies seen in such resemble bodies seen in mirrors, yet the color is not received in the polished metal, for color is only apt to be received by something transparent; therefore, it is received only in the air next to such mirrors.
Insofar as it exists in the air, however, it cannot be itself an object of
GOD AND CREATURES
In the first sense, nothing can be a means of knowing another object unless it contains the other's knowability and, to the extent it does, the second is known through the first. If the object exceeds the medium in knowability, then no matter how perfectly the medium is known it will lack something of the knowability of that object.
In the second way, however, something can be the means of knowing another even though its own knowability is inferior to that of the other, provided it is designed by nature to lead one to know the other.
14.89 This distinction provides an obvious solution to the first counter-argument [in 14.85]. Suppose the soul is an image of God.
This does not say it is designed by nature to be a means of knowing God in the second way, but only in the first way, as one could gather from Augustine's words, "Those who see their mind," etc., cited above [in 14.79]. But if medium were taken in the second sense with reference to the medium known [i.e., the soul as known], it would be something which properly and formally represents the soul itself
[in other words, it would be the concept of the soul]. And what would be the most perfect object that could be represented by it?
It would be the soul itself, not God in the fulness of his intelligibility. In something which merely imitates or participates in his intelligibility, God could only be dimly mirrored.*°
14.90 The same reasoning applies to the second counter-argument [in 14.86]. The [beatific] act is a likeness that is itself known.
It no more suffices to know that of which it is an act than an intelligible species in one person's intellect, if perceived by another intellect, would suffice for the second mind to know perfectly the object it refers to.
14.91 On the contrary, you may say. In the intellect in which it exists, this act is reason for attaining perfectly the object made present through the act. Anyone who perceives the act as present, then, could attain the object by means of the act he knows. For in and through the act the same object is presented to him. vision although, when it is received in a transparent mirror of glass, the vision does not terminate there but in some opaque substratum, such as the lead backing or something similar. Therefore, I claim that in such mirrored reflections the species or likeness itself is not seen, but it is only the means for seeing the object of which it is the species, and that not directly but by a reflected line which converges with the direct line at that point where the visual ray converged with the perpendicular line.
5° Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. u, d.3, q.g (ed. Vivés x11, 201-209). fe ve
QUESTION FOURTEEN
I answer: Only in the intellect in which it exists does the act function as the proximate reason for attaining the object, but it presupposes the object's own presence. One who merely perceives this act
[as object] does not possess the act in such a way that it functions as the proper reason for attaining the object. To have an act which functions in this fashion two things are needed: the object's own presence and another act.
14.92 As for the third counter-argument [in 14.87], one could deny the claim that the soul by nature could reflect upon the beatific act as beatific. It is certainly true that the soul can reflect upon it, but only by that in virtue of which it possesses the direct act.
The text from Augustine [in 14.87] proves no more than this, since he does not claim the soul could continue to reflect by its nature alone. All he maintains is that once the soul has the act, it can reflect upon it. This might be in virtue of its nature or in virtue of that by which it has that act.
There is no incongruity of an infinite regress here because the supernatural factor suffices for the direct act and all the reflex
ACLS. "= How to answer the third proof [in 14.87] based on the sense of sight is also clear. For it is not through the power of sight that I perceive that I see. But neither is it through some lesser power. Perhaps it is due to some superior potency whose function it is to know the act of vision.
51 [bid., 1, d.g, nn.5 54-604 (Ill, 330-57).