QUESTION THREE: Article I
QUESTION THREE
ARTICLE I
Is the Relation of Origin a Thing and, if so, What Kind of Thing?
[2] 3-6 ['"Thing" is an equivocal term] As for the first, one should noi give a simple answer to an equivocal question and it is clear from those who speak with authority that the term "thing" is equivocal.?
Hence its various meanings must be distinguished at the outset.
From the remarks of the authors one gathers that the term "thing" can be understood (1) very broadly, or (2) generally, or (3) very strictly.
3.7 ["Thing" in the broadest sense] Understood very broadly, it covers anything that is not nothing, and this can be given two interpretations.
Nothing, in its truest sense, is what includes a contradiction and only that, for such excludes any form of existence, either within or without the intellect. Just as what includes a contradiction cannot exist outside the soul, so neither can it be an intelligible something as a being in the soul [i.e., a concept]. Two contradictory notions cannot constitute one intelligible thing, either as a union of two objects or of an object and its mode.
In another sense, nothing refers to what neither is nor can be some being outside the soul [i.e., extramental].
3.8 Being [ens] or thing [res] in the first of its very broad meanings, therefore, covers anything that does not include a contradiction whether it be a conceptual being [ens rationis], i.e., having being or existence only in the thinking intellect, or a real being [ens reale], i.e., having some entity outside the consideration of the intellect.
3.9 Though the first of these two meanings (which together constitute the first member of the tripartite distinction) seems to extend the name "thing" exceedingly, it is sufficiently justified by linguistic usage, for we commonly speak of logical intentions and mental relations as "things of the mind" and still these cannot exist outside the intellect. Therefore the word "thing" is not restricted by linguistic usage to a thing outside the soul.
In the broadest sense, where '"'being" or "thing" means anything conceivable that includes no contradiction (whether its commonness be one of analogy or univocity, I am not concerned at present), one
2 Aristotle, De sophisticis elenchis, c.1
(165a7-22); c.7
(169a23-b18); Topic. v, passim (128b10ff.).
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could admit that being is the first object of the intellect.* For nothing can be intelligible which does not include the notion of being in this sense, since what includes a contradiction, as we said above, is not intelligible. And in this sense, any science, not only that called real, but also a rational science, is about things or beings.
3.10 In the second sense of this first member, however, we say a "thing" is what can have entity outside the soul. Avicenna* seems to have this sense in mind when he says that "thing" and "being" are common to all genera. And that this does not refer to the words in one language, for in every language there is one undifferentiated concept that applies to everything that exists outside the soul. For concepts [according to Aristotle]° are the same in all. In every language generally there is one name imposed on such a common concept, whether its commonness be one of analogy or univocity.
3.11 The first member, namely the very broad sense, therefore, we have subdivided into (a) that which includes no contradiction, whatever kind of "existence" it has, and (b) that which has or can have proper existence outside the intellect. And Avicenna takes "being' and "thing" either in both senses or at least in the second sense, as has been said.
3.12 ["Thing" taken generally] Boethius takes "thing" in its second meaning, i.e., generally [communiter], when he distinguishes between a thing and its mode®: "Have I now made clear the difference between the categories? Some indeed reveal the thing as it were, others, however, denote a kind of circumstance of the thing. The former are predicated in such a way as to show something to be a thing, whereas the latter say nothing about its being anything but ascribe something extrinsic to it." He wants to distinguish a thing, then, from the circumstances that surround it. And so for him only three categories, substance, quality, and quantity, are indicative of things; the rest are circumstances of a thing. "Thing" taken in this second or general sense, therefore, means something absolute in contrast to a circumstance or mode which expresses a way in which one thing is related to another.
3.13 ["Thing" taken very strictly] The Philosopher gives us a 3 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.g, nn.108-201
(111, 68-123); cf. infra, OMIA:
+ Avicenna, Metaph. 1, c.6 (u, fol. 72r).
5 Aristotle, De interpretatione 1 (16a5-10).
6 Boethius, De Trin. 1, c.4: PL 64, 1253; The Theological Tractates with an English translation by H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand (The Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1946), p. 22.
QUESTION THREE
third meaning in Book VII of the Metaphysics': "Accidents are called beings, because they belong to a being." And he adds: "Just as in the case of nonbeing, some say, emphasizing the linguistic form, there 7s nonbeing—not is simply—but is nonbeing; so too with quality." And farther on*: "And in the way in which the unknown may be said to be known and the word 'medical' is applied by virtue of a reference to one and the same thing, not meaning one and the same thing . .. ," so do we speak of being. And he seems to express the same idea at the beginning of Book IV.° As medical and healthy are used in many senses, so too is being. In these places the Philosopher takes "being," when stated simply and in its strongest sense, be it analogous or univocal, to mean that being to which existence pertains primarily and per se, namely, substance alone.
3.14 Therefore, the first or broadest meaning includes conceptual being and any kind of real being. The second signifies real and absolute being. The third, [or strictest sense], indicates a real, absolute, and per se being.
3.15 [Solution to the question] As this distinction shows, there is no difficulty about the question "Is a relation a thing?" if "thing'' be taken in the second and third sense, for a relation is neither a substance nor an absolute.
Only the first sense presents difficulty, though not as regards conceptual being, for it is clear that a relation can be thought of without contradiction. Here then the question is whether it has existence or is a thing having a real entity of its own outside the soul [or thinking mind].
3.16 [A relation is a thing] To this I answer, it is a thing. Second, I say what kind of thing it is. I prove that a relation is a thing [in God]. A relationship is real if, given real terms that are really distinct, it is there by the very nature of things. For its entity, whatever it be, is not just in the soul and consequently it is a thing in its own way and in accord with its own entity. But the relationship of Father to Son is this sort of thing, as is evident from the second ordinary question.'° 3.17 [It is relative being] From what has been said it is clear what kind of thing this relationship is. For if it is a singular thing then it is either absolute or relative. Formally it is relative or "being to another.' Neither does this determination "to another' militate
7 Aristotle, Metaph. vu, c.4 (1030a23-27).
8 Ibid. (1030a31-1030b4).
9 [bid., Iv, c.2 (1003a32-1003b6).
10 See supra, Q. 1, note 31.
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against this meaning of "thing" [i.e., as extramental], for in this sense "thing" is not contrasted with a mode or relationship or a circumstance of a thing, but it covers them all.
ARTICLE II
As Related to the Essence, is the Relation a Thing and What Kind of Thing?
3.18 [Answer to the question] As for the second article, the first point will be that the relation is real; the second will be a logical consideration of this statement: "The relation, as related to the essence, is a thing''; the third point will be to clear up the issue of the compatibility or incompatibility of the two propositions in question.
1. The Relation as Related to the Essence is a Thing 3.19 To the first point, I say that the relation as related to the essence is a thing [res]. This is proved as follows:
First proof: When components that are somehow distinct make up a third, they do so only insofar as they are interrelated and united in some way. This is clear from the case of extrinsic Causes which never function as such unless they concur some way in causation. It is even clearer in regard to intrinsic causes which never constitute a subject unless they are united in their own fashion. Now all agree a [divine] person is constituted by the essence and a relation, whatever their function as principles may be. Therefore, they do so to the extent they come together or concur, which could only happen if the relation is in the essence. From this I gather that the two constitute a person only insofar as the relation is in the essence.
But for a relation to be in the essence is for it to be related to the essence independently of the mind's consideration in the truest sense of the word. Therefore a relation does not constitute a person except as related to or joined with the essence. But it does not constitute a person except as a thing. Otherwise a person, as formally constituted, would not be a thing. Therefore, the relation as related to the essence is a thing.
3.20 [Second proof] Another proof is this. Either this relationship to the essence is the whole of the relation or it is something in addition to it—whether this be a thing or an aspect is irrelevant for my present purpose. If it is the whole of the relation, then it is also a thing, from the first article [3.16ff.], and since the relation is its relationship to the essence, then as related to the essence it is a thing.
Suppose the second is the case. No additional reference or relation,
QUESTION THREE
be it to something relative or absolute, be it real or rational, destroys that to which it comes. Rather it presupposes such. This is true of second intentions* [i.e., concepts of concepts], which do not destroy the first intentions* [i.e., concepts of things] to which they are added. Therefore the reality of a relation is not destroyed because it is related. Hence our thesis is evident.
3-21 [It is a relative thing] From this it is clear what kind of thing it is. For when anything is related to something, it is still itself, for according to the Philosopher," 'What it truly is, is never accidental to it." And even though the substance of an ox, when related to man, does not become the substance of a man, it is still a thing. And what kind? A substance. And what kind of substance? The substance of an ox. For it is what it is. And so this relation, which is essentially
"to another" [essentialiter ad alterum], is never a non-thing, neither is it ever anything but a relational thing [res ad alterum]. For the relating, as we said, never destroys, but rather presupposes, the proper reality of what is related.
3.22 [Another opinion] Others!" have a different way of speaking about the divine relations, which is this. The relation implies a relationship both with its opposite and with its foundation. One of these, its relationship with the essence, explains why it is simply real; the other, its relationship with its opposite, explains why one relation is distinct from another.
3.23 [This view is unacceptable] What accounts for any being's entity is the immediate foundation for a unity corresponding to that entity and, hence, for the distinction from anything that lacks unity.
What accounts for a relation's being a thing that is actual, not just virtual or in causa, therefore, is also the immediate basis for its being distinct from any relation that is not it.
3.24 This is confirmed in particular for the divine relations.
Every personal relation, at least, is of itself formally incommunicable.* But what is of itself formally incommunicable is also formally
11 Aristotle, Physic. 1, c.g (186b4-5).
12 Cf, Thomas, Summa theol. 1, q.28, aa.2-3 in corp. (I, 152-54); q-36, a.2 in corp.
(I, 193-94); Giles of Rome, Sent. 1, d.11, princ. 1, qq.2-3 in corp.
(ed. Augustinus Montifalconius, Venetiis, 1521; photoreprint Frankfurtam-Main, 1968), fol. 64v-65r; d.29, princ. 1, q.2 in corp. (fol. 154r); Quodl.
1, q.6 in corp. (ed. Simon de Hungaria, Bononiae, 1481), fol. 4r; Henry of Ghent, Quod. v, q.1 in corp. (fol. 150A-154C); vi, q.1 in corp.
(fol. 218QR); Summa a.53, q.9 in corp.
(u, fol. 122B-H); a.54, q.4 in corp.
(u, fol.
137B-C); a.60, q.1 in corp. (U, 153N-157F).
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distinct of itself from anything communicable.* Therefore, the relation is distinct from everything communicable in virtue of that by which it gets the reality that makes it formally incommunicable.
3.25 Besides, if the essence, as they say, is the reality of all the relations and hence as related to the essence they do not differ in reality, then it follows that since this relationship is also in the essence, the relations do not differ really insofar as they are in the essence. Hence insofar as they are there, they do not differ at all, which is absolutely absurd, or else they differ only conceptually.
But if this be the case, then the persons constituted by these relations, insofar as these are in the essence, differ only conceptually.
But the persons are constituted by these relations, insofar as they are in the essence, as was pointed out in the first proof [3.19].
Therefore, [the persons differ only conceptually].1% 3.26 Conclusion: Therefore, on this point, it seems more reasonable to hold that the relation's reality and its distinction from the other relations stem from the same source, whatever one understands this to be. For it is nonsense to speak of a relation being real unless its relationship to its opposite is real and as such it is really distinct from its opposite. Neither can it be really distinct from its opposite except as a real relation. And in this way it is a thing, insofar as to be a thing pertains to it. Therefore, of itself it is formally a thing, and of itself it is formally distinct from its opposite. But fundamentally and radically the relation gets both these characteristics from its foundation.
2. Logical Consideration of the Statement "The relation as related to the essence is a thing."
(7) 3.27 Logically it seems necessary to clarify the statement "The relation as related to the essence is a thing.' For terms like ''as," "'insofar," "qua" and the like can have two meanings. Sometimes they indicate the aspect under which the subject they modify is being considered. At other times, however, they imply in addition causality or the reason why the predicate inheres in the subject.
Example: In the definition "movement is the act of a being in potency insofar as it is in potency,'4 the word "insofar" implies the aspect according to which movement is an act of the mobile. There are two aspects to the mobile; in one sense it is in act; in another, it is in potency to being something else. Motion is the act of the mobile
'8 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.11, nn.24-53 (Vv, 9-24).
'+ Aristotle, Physic. 11, c.1
(201a10-11),
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insofar as it is in potency. "Insofar as it is in potency,"" however, is not indicative of the cause or reason for the inherence of the predicate, for when such words as "insofar" and the like do introduce the cause, they express what is universal, according to the Philosopher.*> To say "Justice is good qua good," according to him, means
"Justice is every good." This is still clearer when it is the subject that is qualified. For from "Man as rational understands" it follows that "Every rational being understands." The same is true when the identical term is repeated as its own modifier preceded by qua.
(8] 3-28 In the first sense, then, it is the precise aspect of what is modified that is considered. In the other sense, repetition of the notion indicates the reason why the predicate inheres in the subject.
In the first sense we say: "Man considered qua man is considered more precisely.'' In the second sense we say: '""Man qua man is rational," for what follows qua is the reason for the predicate's inherence. The same could be said of "Man qua man is risible," for here we have the cause of the inherence of something predicated in the second mode of per se predication.* 3.29 Applying this to the issue at hand, I say that "The relation as related to the divine essense, is a thing'' can be given two meanings. First, that the predicate "thing" pertains to the relation considered under this aspect, namely, as related to the essence. Or it can be taken in the second sense to mean that this relationship with the essence is the reason why the predicate, viz., that it is a thing, belongs to the subject. In the second sense, the proposition is false, for this relationship with the essence is conceptual since the two terms, i.e., the relation and the essence, are not really distinct. But the mind can connect or join them so that there is a relation between them.
3.30 Hence we do not speak of this second sense but of the first.
And then the meaning of the statement is that the paternity, not only when taken precisely as paternity, but insofar as it is considered as related to the essence or insofar as it is in the essence, is a thing. For to relate it does not destroy the fact that paternity is a thing but rather presupposes this, as the second proof for the conclusion [in 3.20] of the second article shows. For example, "Man as risible understands," is not true in the sense that the ability to laugh is the reason why the predicate inheres. It is true, however, in the sense that to man, considered under the aspect of his ability to laugh, the predicate "understands" is not repugnant but suited to 15 Aristotle, Anal. priora 1, c.g8 (49a12-22); Metaph. v, c.18 (1022a14-25).
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him. In this sense, no qualification under which a subject is considered that does not exclude the predicate falsifies a statement in which the predicate is affirmed of the subject.*®
3. Solution of the Principal Question 3.31 [Meaning of "The relation is an aspect') All this helps us
[9] clarify the main issue. But first we should determine what it means to say "The relation is an aspect [ratio].' There are two relevant senses in which something can be called an aspect: (1) if it is a mode or modification of that to which it is related and lacks the reality of something absolute, it is not a "thing." In this sense Boethius [in 3.12] calls relations ''circumstances'' and not "things," because they lack the sort of reality found in the things of which they are the circumstances, and to the extent something departs from perfect reality it approaches the rational. (2) In another sense, something formally mind-dependent [swb ratione] can be called a "thing of the mind" or an aspect, just as the universal "man" is said to be such when considered under the aspect of universality which is an aspect per se.
In these two ways one can admit that the relation "as related to the essence" is an aspect, for as regards the essence, it is a mode, a kind of "'circumstance,"' since it does not have the kind of entity that the essence has. And also when I say "as related to the essence," this relationship implies a mental referral as I have said before [in 3.27ff.], and paternity is considered under this aspect. Hence, paternity as related to the essence is a mental entity, because viewed as mind-dependent.
3.32 But if in either sense paternity, as related to the essence, is called an aspect, this is not to deny that paternity is a thing. In the first sense, it is its own sort of thing, namely a relational thing [res ad alterwm] even though it is called an aspect [ratio] in comparison to an absolute thing. In the second sense, it is called an aspect as related to the essence, because that aspect under which it is considered does not have entity of itself. Nevertheless, paternity is still a thing, for the aspect under which it is considered does not destroy, but presupposes, its reality. For a relationship of something to another presupposes its entity.
3-33 [Conclusion] From all this it is clear that these two conceptions are compatible, viz., that the relation itself, as related to the '6 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. m, d.11, q.2, nn.3-4 (ed. Vives xiv, 427-28); d.6, q-2, nn.3-4 (ibid., 315-16).
QUESTION THREE
essence, is a ratio or aspect in the two senses given above, and nevertheless this relation, as related to the essence, is a thing, as we have just said [in 3.29-30]. This is also consistent with the statement that the relation, as related to its opposite, is a thing, for the relation itself is this relationship with its opposite, and this relation is the thing itself which is this relationship. '""Thing" is the more common designation when it is related to its opposite; and "ratio," when related to the essence. For as related to its opposite, it is its equal and has a similar entity. Neither is it a mode of the other, nor the other a mode of it. Also the relation is its relationship with its opposite and therefore when it is said to be so related, it is not being considered under any other aspect which could properly be called ratio.
For paternity, insofar as it is being compared to sonship, is nothing else than paternity in relation to sonship, and this is specifically paternity qua paternity. Therefore these two situations coexist:
(1) paternity as related to its opposite is a thing, but not in the way it is a thing as related to the essence, for in relation to its opposite it is a thing in these two ways: (a) in contrast to a mode, it has a distinct entity like its opposite, and (b) it is a thing that is not viewed or considered formally as mind-dependent; and (2) paternity as related to the essence is an aspect for the two opposite reasons:
(a) because it is a mode of the essence, and (b) it is viewed as mind-dependent for the "relationship" itself is a "thing of the mind." But for all that, whether it be related to its opposite or to the essence, in both cases it is a thing, and the same thing, for paternity itself is a real relationship, as has been proved [in 3.19-20].
ARG Ee Ll Resolution of various Doubts 3.34 [First objection] In this third article, objections are raised to this solution.
The first is this: If the relation as related to the essence is a thing, this thing is either absolute or relative. But it seems contradictory that a relation should be in any way an absolute thing. Therefore, as related to the essence it is a relative thing. But as related to the essence, it is the same as the essence. Therefore, the relation, as identified with the essence, or as essence, is a relational thing. And to carry the argument a step farther, therefore the essence itself is a relational thing.
The validity of this inference is proved by a simile. If man as rational understands, the rational understands.
It is also proved
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from reason. A predicate which pertains to a subject by virtue of some characteristic it has first pertains to that characteristic.
3.35 [Second objection] Again, if the relation, in relation to anything, is a thing with its own reality, then for like reasons the relation in a creature, in relation to its foundation, is a thing with its own reality which is not precisely the reality of the foundation.
Hence there is an accident here with its own accidentality, for there is no substance here. And then it follows that the accidentality of the relation in the creature is one thing and the accidentality of the absolute in which it is founded is another. Thus an infinite regress seems to follow, for that accidentality of the relation has its own proper reality, and this can only be something accidental. Therefore, this too has its own accidentality. And the same thing can be said in turn of the latter, and so on ad infinitum.
3.36 [Third objection] Similarly in the divine, if the relation, as related to the essence, has its own reality, this is either substantial or accidental. It is not the latter, for nothing is accidental in God.
Recall Book V, chapter five of The Trinity.1' Therefore, the relation has its own proper substantiality. And then the Father, by virtue of his paternity, would have per se or substantial being, which is incongruous, for then there would be three substances in the divine for there are three relations. But there is only one unique substance in God, as Augustine points out when he says'*: '""The substance is that whereby the Father is, and whereby the Son similarly is, although it is not that by which the Father is Father."
3.37 [Reply to the first objection] I reply to the first [in 3.34]:
The answer is evident from the distinction [in 3.27-30] made in the second article concerning the proposition: '""The relation, as related to the essence, is a thing.'' This is true if ''as" indicates a restriction, specification, or a consideration of paternity under this aspect which is its relationship with the essence, whereas it is not true if the cause of the predicate's inherence in the subject is what it indicates. If one asks then what sort of thing is it on the first interpretation, one could say it is a "relational thing," because to relate paternity to the essence does not make its own reality, which is a relational reality, inconsistent with paternity. But the statement must not be taken to mean that paternity as related to divinity is a relational thing or a "being to another," where the 'other' refers to divinity, so that the sense would be "Paternity is a thing that relates
17 Augustine, De Trin. v, c.5, n.6: PL 42, 914; CCSL 50, 210.
18 Thid., vi, c.6, n.11: PL 42, 943; CCSL 50, 262.
QUESTION THREE
[the Father] to divinity." The sense is rather "Paternity, as related to the essence, is an aspect, and paternity in itself is a relational thing,' namely, it is a "being related to the Son." For one who relates paternity to divinity by excluding or not including the Son, does not relate paternity unless he has two contradictories in his intellect, for paternity, by virtue of what it is, is essentially "being related to the Son." And though paternity is not of itself related to divinity, but to the Son as its correlative, nevertheless paternity as including "being related to the Son" can be related by an intellect to divinity, for the intellect by its act can relate something to that which is not its extramental correlative per se. In this sense one can say that paternity, as related to the essence, is a relational thing.
3.38 And when one infers [in 3.34] "Therefore, the relation, as identified with the essence, or as essence, is a relational thing," this may be admitted on a similar interpretation. And when you say fur- [13] ther, '"Therefore, the essence itself is a relational thing," this can be understood in two ways: (1) by identity or (2) formally.' In the first sense, it could be admitted and the meaning would be "Divinity is a relational thing because it is a paternity.' But one must not admit formally that divinity according to its form is relational. There was a formal predication in the antecedent, however, in saying "Paternity as related to the essence is a relational thing." But if one infers from this that there is a similar predication in the consequent, "Divinity is formally relational," the validity of the inference must be denied. For if the specification does not indicate the reason for the predicate's inherence in the subject, then the predicate need not pertain to the specification in the same way that it pertains to the subject it specifies, which is the case here.
3.39 From this it is clear how to answer the proof given [in 3.34] for the validity of the inference, viz., "If man as rational understands, the rational understands." Here the inference is valid because the word "as" introduces the cause of the predicate's inherence in the subject, which is not true of the phrase "as related to the essence.' The same for the proof that follows. If you have a case where the predicate can be affirmed even more truly of the ground for its inherence in the subject than it can of the subject itself, this is so only because the words "as," "insofar as" or the like are properly reduplicative. But they are not taken that way here, as we said in the logical analysis given in article two [3.27-30].
3.40 You may object: If something is formally in a thing, it can 19 See Glossary: 'Formal distinction." aa
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denominate or name that thing. If the relation, as related to the essence, is in the essence, the essence can be named after the rela- [ 14] tion. Hence the essence formally refers to something else. To this I answer: Some denominative or concrete terms are predicated of their subjects in the first mode of per se or essential predication;* others are predicated in the second mode of essential predication or they are predicated accidentally. A concrete or denominative term derived from the form, for instance, is predicated in the first mode of essential predication of the composite of form and whatever receives that form, particularly if the subject term is a concept that is per se one. It is in this way that man is said to be rational or living. But the body, which is the other part of the composite, is said to be living denominatively, but in the proper sense of denominative (which is either per se predication in the second mode or is per accidens predication), for the body is not a whole which includes this form, but the subject which receives it. Wherever there is a form, then, there must be a formal predication of the whole which is in the first per se mode. Also in creatures there should commonly be a predication that is properly denominative where the recipient of the form is given a name derived from the form. In the divine the first type of predication is not denied, for the Father begets or the begettor begets. The Father is a kind of composite which includes essentially that form which is predicated of him. But there does not have to be a denominative predication in which a name derived from the quasi form [i.e., the relation of paternity] must be applied to the quasi recipient of that form [i.e., the essence].
3-41 Both reason and authority make this clear. Reason in this way: What is understood as the quasi recipient of the form in God is unlimited as regards the opposite forms or relations, but it is not distinguished by them. What is denominated or named after some form, however, is thereby singled out as distinct from its opposite.
Since in this case the form has no proper recipient but one which is common to it and its opposite, and since such a form could only denominate a proper recipient, for only such can be distinct from its opposite, it follows therefore that the relations are not predicated denominatively of the essence.
3.42 Damascene*® confirms this where he says that the relations distinguish the persons, not the nature. Therefore they are noted for singling out that of which they are predicated concretely, because they relate it to, and distinguish it from, its opposite.
0 Damascene, De fide orth. 1, c.10: PG 94, 838; ed. Buytaert c.10, joe Bile Wa
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3-43 As for the form of the counterargument [in 3.34], the inference "The relation is in the essence, therefore the essence can be named after the relation" is invalid. The reason has been stated [in 3.40]. When it is claimed that every form can denominate that in which it is, using '""denominate" in an extended sense to cover both essential denominative predication of a concrete term
(e.g., "Man is living'') and denomination proper (e.g., "Man is risible" or "The wood is white" or "A man is thinking"), one can admit that every form denominates that in which it is in one of these two ways, because at least it is predicated of the composite as a concrete term, although this is broadening the meaning of '"'to name" or "'to denominate." But if you take it to mean that the predicate is predicated denominatively in the proper sense of the term of a subject which receives or supports the form, it must be denied, unless this sustaining factor is limited, or the denominative predication implies that it is a proper subject and distinct from its opposite.
3.44 [Reply to the second objection in 3.35] To the second:
Though it would pose a serious difficulty as regards what is per se, I will let it pass because it is not relevant to this issue. I concede, however, that a relation, which in creatures is an accident, has its own accidentality, for it is a thing in itself and yet it is not the thing on which the relation is based nor is it a thing that is being per se, as substance is. Therefore, one should admit that in itself a relation is a thing with its own accidentality which is not the accidentality of an absolute being but that of a relational being. For just as the absolute and relative entity is not the same, so neither is the accidentality of an absolute accident the same as that of a relative accident.
3.45 And when it is argued [in 3.35] that this entails an infinite regress, I reply that one must stop with the relation itself and not go farther. For example, if whiteness is the foundation for a relationship of similarity, this similarity has some accidentality of its own distinct from the accidentality of the whiteness, even as "'relation" is a category distinct from "quality."
3.46 But if you ask: Is the accidentality of similarity something distinct from similarity itself? I say: No. For the similarity is its accidentality towards the foundation, and it is the similarity itself that "befalls" [accidit] the foundation just as it is the similarity itself that relates to the opposite [i.e., the object to which it is similar].
For it is always the case that whatever pertains to something in such a way that it would be a complete contradiction for former to exist
GOD AND CREATURES
without the latter, then the latter is really identical with the former.
And by contrast, where there is no such contradiction, there is no need for it to exist at all. Now there is a contradiction, however, that there be similarity which is unrelated either to its foundation or to its term. Therefore, its accidentality with reference to the foundation is identical with itself just as its similarity or relationship to its opposite.
3.47 Hence the regress stops, for the accidentality of the similarity is not a thing distinct from the similarity itself, but similarity is one thing and the whiteness another, for the relation as well as the accidentality of the whiteness can be asserted to be a certain kind of thing distinct from the whiteness, since whiteness is a kind of absolute thing and an absolute accident can exist apart from a subject without contradiction. Therefore, whiteness is not the same as [16] its relation to a subject, nor does it befall the subject itself. This proposition then is false: "The same reason why the accidental similarity of whiteness has an accidentality other than whiteness, also guarantees that the similarity's accidentality will have an accidentality that is other than the similarity itself.' This is also false: "The same reason why the accidentality of the similarity is the same as the similarity, also guarantees that the accidentality of the whiteness is identical with the whiteness,'' for whiteness is an absolute being, whereas similarity is a relation.
3.48 From this it follows that for whiteness to exist with no relation to a bodily surface is not a contradiction, although it is a contradiction for similarity to exist with no relation to its foundation.
Hence its relationship to the surface is not the same as the whiteness, whereas the relationship to its foundation is the same thing as the similarity. For similarity to exist means nothing else than that this relationship to the foundation exists. I do not claim, however, that whenever a relation is related to anything, it has this relationship of itself, for it can be related by a mental relationship which is not the same as itself. Perhaps it can also be related by a relationship that is not itself and yet is really distinct from it, as proportionality based on proportion. But this much I do say: If the relation is related to something without which it would be a contradiction to exist, then it refers to this of itself and not by means of another relationship."
3-49 [Reply to the third objection in 3.36] When it is claimed (17 ] *1 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1v, d.1z2, q.1, n.5 (ed. Vives xvii, 534); Cee Ale Wa
(573-74); 1H, dia, q.4, nn.g-16 (x1, 96-112); 11, d.8, q.un., n.17 (xt, $77).
QUESTION THREE
further that the relation in the divine is substantial, my reply is this: Although the Philosopher distinguishes first substance from second substance in the Categories?? nevertheless in the case at hand the essence functions in both ways insofar as it is related to anything. To the extent that it is common it has the aspect of secondary substance. Not, however, in the sense that it is a universal, i.e., divisible or able to be multiplied, for it is common by a community that is real, says Damascene?*: "There is a community of substance, which is not merely one of reason" [i.e., created by the mind], as is the case with a created nature. It has the characteristic of primary substance, however, to the extent that it is just this being or singular, for the divine essence is singular of itself.2* I do not say that it is incommunicable being, for this would imply imperfection. But apart from the essence in God there is no other feature of substance in any sense of the term unless it would be incommunicability. In the divine, however, incommunicability cannot have the meaning of substance per se, according to the common opinion which we generally follow in these questions. But we do not raise this issue here, because whatever is there, not only substance, but also what is absolute, is communicable. It is clear then that a relation in God does not have the characteristic of substantiality, but only that of incommunicability, which is neither the meaning of secondary substance, nor that of primary substance—so far as its perfection is concerned, which is to be a "'this'' or individual. For this the essence has of itself.
3.50 [Counterarguments to this reply] It may be argued against this that whatever pertains to the first substance has some per se characteristic of substantiality. Incommunicability, which is there solely in virtue of a relation, is such. Therefore, [it has some per se characteristic of substantiality |.
[18 ] I answer: Understanding incommunicability in the sense that it pertains to the first substance, viz., the incommunicability characteristic of singularity, we can say the minor is true only of creatures, not of God. The reason is that in creatures that which ultimately contracts the nature to singularity or incommunicability is the same sort of thing as the contracted nature, and hence taken in its formal meaning it pertains to the genus or category of substance. In God
22 Aristotle, Praedicamenta c.5 (2412-19).
23 Damascene, De fide orth. 1, c.8: PG 94, 827; ed. Buytaert c.8, p. 43.
24 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. u, d.3, q.1, n.g (ed. Vivés x, 54-55); q.6, n.5
(ibid., 130).
(fs)
GOD AND CREATURES
this is not so, as has been pointed out earlier [in 3.49 |. Nothing that belongs to the genus or quasi-genus of substance, as we said before, can contract the divine nature to incommunicability, since everything substantial in God is communicable
|or capable of being shared by all three persons |.
3.51 But someone may still say: Whatever you call it in God that does the contracting or restricting required for incommunicability or the incommunicable, considered formally, it is either substance or accident, since there is nothing in between. Obviously it is not an accident.
Therefore, it is a substance and hence has its own substantiality.
I reply with Augustine?' that not everything in God is predicated by way of substance or accident. For there are things said of him, especially relational assertions, that express something that is neither substantial nor yet accidental.
3.52 But you might still reply: What makes a divine person incommunicable formally is the sort of thing to which "to inhere"' either (1) does or can pertain formally, or (2) is formally repugnant.
If the first, it is an accident; if the second, then, since that to which "to inhere in another" is repugnant is substance as contrasted with accident, it follows that what makes a person incommunicable is essentially substance, and hence has its own substantiality, which is the thesis proposed.
I answer: According to Avicenna,"® "not to inhere" and "unable to inhere'' is not the essential meaning of substance insofar as substance is a genus or category. Neither is "to inhere'"' the essential meaning of accident nor any genus thereof, for ''to inhere'" means to have being or actuality in a qualified sense and implies something which is already a being in an unqualified sense. But substance is that substrate to which "not to inhere"' is appropriate or 'to inhere"' is repugnant, whereas accident, be it quantity or quality, is a nature to which "'to inhere" is appropriate. Therefore, lét the second alternative hold for God, 1.e., "What makes a divine person incommunicable formally is the sort of thing to which 'to inhere' is formally repugnant." For it cannot give qualified being to something that is simply being already. This does not imply it has its own substantiality by definition, because "not to inhere'"' does not express the complete meaning of substance as contrasted with the other categories.
3.53 A fourth counterreply might be: There is one common rea25 Augustine, De Trin. v, c.6, n.6: PL 42, 913-14; CCSL 50, 913-14.
26 Avicenna, Metaph. ul, c.1
(U1, 74Vv).
QUESTION THREE
son why "to inhere" is repugnant to anything. But such repugnance is the mark of substance or anything in that category, and according to you, it is also characteristic of an incommunicable property in the divine, and therefore they have some reason in common why this is so. This is not the note of being, for "to inhere" is not repugnant to a being; neither is it anything that comes under the heading of being except substance. This is evident if you run through the possibilities. Therefore an incommunicable property to which "to inhere" is repugnant as such has the mark of what is essential to substance and so has its own substantiality, which is the point at issue.
I answer: An imperfection can be repugnant to something either because the latter includes only pure perfection or because it includes some other imperfection incompatible with the first. For there are many imperfections that are mutually incompatible, e.g., it is repugnant for God to be white and it is repugnant for black to be white; to God, because of his pure perfection, which is repugnant to any kind of color, or for that matter to the entire category of quality and to the whole class of things that are caused; to black, on the other hand, white is repugnant because of its limited perfection within the genus of color, which limited perfection necessarily has imperfection conjoined with it. But this imperfection is distinct from and of a different degree from the imperfection associated with the perfection of white. Therefore we must deny this idea expressed in the major, namely, that the reason why the same imperfection, such as "'to inhere'' or "to be dependent on substance," is repugnant to anything is that there is something which is the same in each. On the contrary, their repugnance to the same thing may stem from what is proper to each of them.
Applying this to the case at hand, "to inhere" or "to depend on substance" is an imperfection. To substance it is repugnant, then, because substance is the sort of entity to which any diminished or lesser form of entity is repugnant. Substance gives being or existence in an unqualified sense, which is the opposite of the qualified
"being" implied by "to inhere." "To inhere" can also be repugnant to the divine relation. For though the relation does not give per se being or existence in an unqualified sense, nevertheless it is the sort of entity to which it is repugnant to be a diminished form of being or something that is actual only in a qualified sense. On the other hand, "'to inhere" is repugnant to the divine essence because it is pure perfection. And even though the divine relation is not pure
GOD AND CREATURES
perfection, nevertheless by reason of what it is, it cannot be an imperfect entity either, and "to inhere" can only pertain to what is dependent and consequently imperfect.
Reply to the Initial Argument 3.54 To the argument at the beginning [in 3.3]:
The claim that the relation as related to the essence is an aspect, because it merges with the essence, can have an interpretation, as to both its parts, that is either true or false. ea For an "aspect" [ratio] can mean something opposed to a thing or being outside the soul, and then the claim is false. For regardless of to what a divine relation is related, it is always a thing outside the soul, with its own reality, which is that of a relation. On the other hand, an aspect can be taken to mean what Boethius [in 3.54] calls a "mode" or "circumstance of a thing," and then one must admit that the relation with reference to the essence is this sort of thing.
3.55 Similarly, one can understand "it merges with the essence"' to mean that it does not have an entity of its own which is relational, and in this sense it is false. In another sense, to "merge with the essence' may mean it does not remain really distinct from the essence.
And although the question here is not about the identity or distinction between the relation and essence (which is more difficult than the question under discussion), it can still be admitted that the relation, as related to the essence, is an aspect in the second sense, that is, it is a mode or modification of the essence and merges with it, not in the first but the second sense. And in this way, it does not remain really distinct. But for all that, it is a thing outside the soul with its own reality that is relational. Thus "it remains," to the extent that "remains" excludes any merging that is destructive of its proper reality.
3.56 Similarly, if in the conclusion, it is inferred that the relation, as related to the essence, is an aspect (Add: "with respect to the essence," for it is taken in this sense in the premise), this is conceded, for it cannot be related to anything which would deprive it of its status as a mode of the essence. Nevertheless, this does not follow: "Therefore, as related to its opposite, it is not a thing," for to be an aspect in the sense of "mode" or "circumstance" is not opposed to its being a thing.
3-57 If it is argued: "With respect to the essence it is a thing, therefore it is another thing," I answer: The question about the real-
QUESTION THREE
ity of a relation is not a question about its otherness. The first pertains to "the problem of genus or accident," the second to the "definitory problem of the same or different," as is clear from Bk. I of the Topics." It is also clear from this example. Man, with reference to Socrates, is a thing. Indeed, even Socrates, with reference to Socrates, is a thing. Proof of both lies in the fact that real identity is the identity of a thing with respect to a thing, and it is obvious that ''a man" [referring to Socrates] is really the same thing as Socrates, and Socrates is the same thing as Socrates (it is understood that the same Socrates is being compared to himself). And still neither man nor Socrates, with reference to Socrates, is another thing than Socrates. In the question at hand, therefore, these are compatible, viz., that the relation, as related to the essence, is a thing, and yet it is not another thing.
3.58 If it be asked whether it is the same thing as the essence or is it something other than it, let us concede that it is really the same.
But it is not necessary to discuss this for the question raised here.
It suffices to say that it is a thing which relates to another. Therefore, no matter what it be related to, it merges with the essence and remains a relational thing.
27 Aristotle, Topica 1, c.4 (101b17-25); ibid., c.5 (102a30-102b27). a9