Question Nineteen: Is The Unity In Christ Of The Human
Question Nineteen
IS THE UNITY IN CHRIST OF THE HUMAN
NATURE WITH THE WORD MERELY
THE ASSUMED NATURE'S DEPENDENCE
UPON THE WORD?
19.1 The next question has to do with the dependence of the assumed nature upon the Word.* Is the unity of human nature with the Word in Christ merely the human nature's dependence upon the Word? lore Arguments Pro and Con It is argued it is not:
Here there is such unity as suffices for the nature to be truthfully predicated of the Person according to that dictum: "Such is that union that it made God man and man God" (The Trinity).2 Now dependence alone seems insufficient for this. What is dependent is not always predicated of that on which it depends. This seems to be the case here, for the assumed nature [also] depends upon the Father, yet the Father is not man. Therefore, in the case of Christ there is some other unity besides the dependence of the human nature upon the Word.
19.2 Against the preceding view it is argued that if you examine all the other kinds of unity, you seem to find no other unity present here.
Body of the Question 19-3 In this question three points need investigation: (1) What type of unity must be posited in this case; (2) How is such unity possible on the part of the Person assuming the nature; (3) How is it possible on the part of the assumed nature?
ARTIGLE I
The Type of Unity to be Posited Here 19.4 [Proof that it is a unity of order] As for the first point, it is an article of faith that human nature is personally united to the Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. m1, di, q.1 (ed. Vivés xiv, 4-53).
* Augustine, De Trin. 1, c.1g, n.28: PL 42, 840; CCSL 50, 69.
QUESTION NINETEEN
Word. "The Word was made flesh," (John 1) where "flesh". means man, according to Augustine.t Also various Creeds or formulas of faith assert this truth expressly.* From this the conclusion follows that the human nature in Christ is ordered to, or dependent upon, the Word.
19.5 Proof of the implication: Every union results either from a form informing a subject, or from aggregation, or from some order.
Lest there be any altercation on the grounds that the essential perfections, notional properties, or other things are said to be united in God, let it be understood I am speaking about a unity of really distinct things.
In the case at hand, however, no union based on informing can be postulated since the Word is neither potential, informable, nor an act which informs the human nature.
Neither is there any union here resulting solely from aggregation, for the Word has this sort of union with my own nature, and the Father has such with the assumed nature [of Christ], and in general such a union obtains between any two things that are simply distinct. Furthermore, it is clear that such a union does not suffice to produce the unity characteristic of a person. All that remains therefore is the third type, namely, a union of order.
The order, however, is that of the posterior to the prior. The Word obviously is not posterior to [human] nature; hence it is the other way around. The nature is posterior with respect to the Word and thus dependent on him.
19.6 Another proof of the consequence: A union of a nature to the Word implies a real relation, not on the part of the Word but on the part of the assumed nature. Now every real relation that is neither mutual nor between equals is a kind of dependence, or at least requires in the relatum some dependence upon that to which it is related. Furthermore, we infer the nature has this sort of dependence upon the Word from this article of faith, namely, that only the Son became incarnate. From this it follows that the nature is not united to each person of the Trinity, but to the Son alone.
19.7 [Three Conclusions] From the above three conclusions follow.
First, this dependence is not properly one of caused to cause. Ac3 John 1:14.
4 Augustine, Enchirid. c.34, n.10: PL 40, 249; CCSL 96, 68.
5 Denzinger, H.-Schonmetzer, A., Enchiridion symbolorum (ed. 32, 1963), 62, 63-74, 76, 125, 150, etc.
GOD AND CREATURES
cording to Augustine*: "In the relation to the creature, however, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one principle."
19.8 Second, the formal ground or reason why the Word is that on which a human nature depends is not common to all three persons, for even prior to the actual dependence, there is always some ground in the subject for supporting such dependence and this ground is the term of the dependence. Therefore, if the ground for being that on which a human nature depends were common to all three persons, the Trinity as a whole would be the term of the dependence, which is false.
19.9 Here it is objected' that even though something be common ea to the whole Trinity, it still exists in different ways in the different persons. Hence this could be the reason for grounding the dependence in one and not in another.
Answer: In what is common to all three persons, the only distinction would be that of origin. The first person, for instance, would not have the divine nature from anyone, whereas the second would have it from the first and the third from the other two. But this does not explain how one person and not another is that on which a {human] nature depends, for this distinction would be wholly the same whether no person had become incarnate or whether they all had or whether some other, for example, the Father, had become incarnate.
19.10 From this the third conclusion follows, namely, that the formal ground for supporting the dependence of [human] nature is the personal or hypostatic* entity of the Word.
Proof of this: A real union requires some kind of real entity, be it that of the formal term itself or that of the ground for supporting
[the dependency]. But every entity in the intellectual nature of which we are speaking is either one that is essential or pertains to the [divine] nature, or a hypostatic or personal entity. Now it has been proved [in 19.8f.] that the ground for supporting this dependency is not an entity pertaining to the essence or nature of God.
Therefore, it will be hypostatic. In short, the dependence is not a relationship to something communicable* but to something incommunicable or subsistent. This serves essentially as the supporting
* Augustine, De Trin. v, c.14, n.15: PL 42, 921; CCSL 50, 223.
"Henry of Ghent, Quodl. xm, q.5 in corp. (fol. 526F); Richard of Middleton, Sent. 11, d.1, a.1 in corp. (1m, 6-7); William of Ware, Sent. u, d.1, q.1.
QUESTION NINETEEN
term or ground for the dependency of the dependent nature as communicable or communicated.
19.11 Objection: The same kind of union could exist with the person of the Father. Consequently, the union would have the same kind of formal term. But the hypostatic entities of the different persons are different. Therefore [it is not a union with any incommunicable subsistent entity].
Answer: One could reply in terms of what is common to the divine persons. For if one posits some other real feature they have in common, then one could grant that each of the three has this same common, not proper, ground for supporting such a relationship to himself.
Thus the first point [in 19.4ff.] appears clear, viz., that the union of the [human] nature with the Word is a certain kind of dependence and consists in the sort of dependence a communicable nature has upon something incommunicable and subsistent.®
ARTICLE II
The Possibility of Such a Union on the Part of the Assuming Person 1. First Proof 19.12 [Statement of the Proof] As for the second main point [of 19.3] we must see how such a union is possible on the part of the term, i.e., how this incommunicable subsistent [person] is able to be the term on which something depends. This can be explained somehow as follows: If there were any impossibility involved, it would stem from the fact that [what the human nature depends upon is] either (a) a person or subsistent subject; (b) or a divine person; (c) or this particular person, who alone is said to be the term of this dependence.
19.13 But on none of these three counts is such a union incompatible with this person. There are two proofs for this;
First, there is nothing contradictory about something independent being that upon which something else depends. Although it has an independence of its own, there is nothing repugnant about something depending upon it.' Entitatively the Word is independent, even so far as his personal entity is concerned, and this independence is something proper to that entity. Therefore, in none of these
8 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 11, d.1, q.1, n.3 (ed. Vives xiv, 8-9).
9 Cf, ibid., n.4 (ed. Vivés xiv, 11-12).
GOD AND CREATURES
three ways is there anything contradictory or incompatible about [the Word] being that on which a human nature depends.
19.14 Proof of the minor: Whatever formally excludes imperfection also formally rules out any kind of dependence. The formal ground for excluding one will also be grounds for forbidding the other. This is evident since dependence is either formally imperfection or has imperfection as a necessary adjunct. Now the hypostatic property of the Son formally precludes any imperfection and is for him the formal ground why it cannot be present. For there is no feature of the divine reality that is compatible with imperfection.
Otherwise it would be possible for some imperfection to characterize that particular feature. And assuming it did, it could still remain imperfection and if it remained intrinsic to God, then some imperfection could be intrinsic to God, which is impossible.
19.15 [Objections] Against this argument objections are raised.
The first is to the major. If independence implies the possibility of being the term upon which something depends, then any independence of this sort could support any dependence of the same sort.
But the consequent is false, as is evident from the following cases.
Take substance and accident, for instance. Every substance is independent; it lacks the sort of dependence an accident has on its subject. Yet not every substance can support any sort of dependence an accident might have upon a subject. A stone, for example, cannot sustain wisdom.
19.16 It is clearly the same as regards the dependence of the whole upon its parts. There are many things whose nature simply precludes being dependent in this way, and yet they cannot be that on which something else depends in this way. Every simple being which is neither a whole nor a part is such.
19.17 The dependence of caused upon cause illustrates the same point. An angel is independent of every created cause and yet it cannot be that upon which everything caused depends.
19.18 It is also clear in general of the property we are dealing with here. Since the personal property is absolutely independent, it could support any form of causal dependence a creature has upon God, which is manifestly false. For the formal basis of causation is not a personal property but something common to all three divine persons, as was said above [in 19.7] in the quotation from Augustine.?° 10 Augustine, De Trin. v, c.14, n.15: PL 42, g21; CCSL 50, 223; cf. supra,
19.7.
QUESTION NINETEEN
19.19 Therefore, this counter-reply is made to the major. Although it is not inconsistent that something independent, in virtue of its independence, should be that upon which something else depends, its independence alone does not suffice to make the other depend upon it. It must have in addition an essential priority or primacy as regards that dependent, since dependence relates what is essentially posterior to what is essentially prior. It is also necessary that the prior have some perfection lacking in the dependent.
As for the case at hand, the personal or hypostatic entity has no essential priority in respect to creatures, for an essential order* obtains per se only between essences
(in contrast to hypostatic entities), since it is "forms (i.e., essences) that are like numbers.''
Besides, the hypostatic entity is not, simply speaking, perfect and is not a pure perfection,* as was said [in 5.16ff.] in the question on this topic.
19.20 The minor would be denied for the same reason, for if some entity were the reason why every imperfection is excluded, it would be a pure perfection. If the hypostatic entity then is not a pure perfection, it follows that the hypostatic entity is not the formal reason why all imperfection is excluded and consequently a divine person does not derive his independence formally from this entity.
19.21 [Solution of the objections] To the first [in 19.15]: Dependence can be distinguished in two ways:
(1) formally, or specifically, as it were, on the basis of the distinct formal reasons for the dependence; or (2) materially, as it were, on the basis of the distinction among the things that are dependent, whether these belong (a) to the same order, or (b) to different orders.
To support several dependencies distinct in the first way demands in the supporting term formally different grounds or if there is but one ground, this must be as it were unlimited, containing virtually or eminently such formally distinct grounds as are required.
But where the several dependencies are distinct in the second way all that is required is that the dependent entities be distinct. Sometimes these will be of the same order, namely, when they depend with equal mediacy or immediacy upon the same thing. At other times their order will be different, namely, one will depend mediately whereas the other will depend immediately.
Although these two propositions are false, "Something independ11 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. vii, c.g (1043b33-1044a14); Ord.
1, d.2, n.77
(11, 172).
GOD AND CREATURES
ent in a specific respect can support any kind of dependency whatsoever" and "Something independent in a specific respect can support the dependency of any dependent whatsoever," still this proposition seems probable, "Something independent in a particular respect can support something dependent in this same respect or in some prior respect, and it can support such either immediately or at least mediately." And this seems even more probable, "Something independent in every respect can support any dependent whatsoever, or at least can do so with regard to some dependent and with respect to some form of dependence."
The truth of these two propositions would be more apparent if we knew that every entity is prior or posterior per se to any other entity. And it seems we can know this from the interconnection and unity of things or from the unity of the universe which is a unity of order according to the Philosopher,'? for any entity which lacked any per se order of priority or posteriority would appear to have no connection with other things.
19.22 When it is argued that "If independence implies the possibility of being the term upon which something depends, then independence in a given respect could support dependence in this same respect,' one way of replying would be to deny the entailment, for if something independent in a given respect could not support dependency of this same sort, this would be because of its limited independence which could have some imperfection conjoined with it.
But this would not hold good of what is independent in an unqualified sense, because in something of this sort there would at least be no imperfection.
The entailment fails on another count, for it does not hold unless one understands in the antecedent that independence in an absolute and unqualified sense entails the possibility of supporting any kind of dependence. But this is not what we claim. We only say that what is absolutely independent could support some sort of dependence.
This suffices for our purpose, since by the way of elimination, it follows that the sort of independent of which we are speaking, namely, the person or personal entity, if it cannot be that on which something depends causally, or as measured, or in some similar fashion, then it can be that upon which a nature depends insofar as a nature is communicable to something that exists incommunicably
[i.e., as a person].
19.23 Another answer would be to concede the consequent in 12 Aristotle, Metaph. xii, c.g (1075a3-10). foe
QUESTION NINETEEN
the sense explained above [in 19.21], viz., that something independent in such and such a respect can support something that depends in this same respect or in some prior respect.
19.24 With this, the answer to the objections made above becomes clear.
As for the first [in 19.15], substance can support the dependence of some accident, namely, that which by nature can inhere in it. And even though there be some substance like the divine nature which is not susceptive of any accident, nevertheless it can support some prior dependency, for instance, that of something caused upon which the accident depends and by sustaining such the divine nature can support the accident.
19.25 The same solution can be given to the whole-part problem [in 19.16]. For while something simple that is neither a whole nor a part cannot sustain a whole in the way its parts do, it can support some dependency prior to that of the whole upon its parts.
If you ask how this applies to fire, which depends upon its parts, and the angel, who is simple, I reply: The dependence in this case is that of the less noble upon the more noble in the essential order of nature.
19.26 The answer to the third [in 19.17] is similar. An angel either mediately or immediately supports the dependency of any less perfect nature, a dependency that obtains because of the essential order among quiddities and is somehow prior or more basic than the dependence of an effect on its efficient cause. Indeed, this form of dependency [i.e., of the less noble upon the more noble] seems to be absolutely first. It can be commonly said to be found in the case of any independent thing as regards that with reference to which it is said to be independent.
19.27 As for the fourth [in 19.18], it is perfectly clear that what is absolutely independent must be able to support some form of dependence because otherwise it appears to have no connection with other beings. It is not necessary, however, that it can support every form of dependence, for if it is not simply perfect, it will not sustain a dependence that requires pure perfection in its term, such as the dependence of the caused upon a cause. But if imperfection is incompatible with it, even if no pure perfection pertain to it, it can still be independent. Now the hypostatic entity as such is not a pure perfection, but neither is it imperfect.
19.28 This refutes the reply given to the major [in 19.19], for to support any dependence in general cannot be repugnant to some-
GOD AND CREATURES
thing completely independent either by reason of its independence or by virtue of something conjoined with it.
19.29 As for what is added there, viz., some essential priority is required to support such dependency, one could say that the priority of all three persons is one and the same, if we are speaking properly of essential priority as distinct from the priority of a hypostatic entity. However, if we broaden the notion of essential priority to per se priority as regards any entity be it essential or hypostatic, then the personal entity can be said to be essentially prior or, more properly, prior per se to everything caused. If we take priority in the second sense, then it is necessary that everything which supports or sustains some dependency be prior to the entity which depends upon it. It is not necessary, however, if we take priority in the first sense, unless the dependency be that of caused upon its cause or something similar such as the dependency of a later effect upon a prior one, or of one cause upon another cause, or of the measured upon the measure.
19.30 As for the claim [in 19.19] that only forms (i.e., essences) and not hypostatic entities are related to each other like numbers, in the sense that an essential order prevails only among them, we can distinguish two kinds of essential dependence. One is simply essential, where the notion of essence figures in both extremes, viz., the dependent term depends by reason of its essence and the supporting term supports by reason of its essence. The essential dependence of the creature, as caused, upon God, as cause, is of this type. But the dependence can be called essential in another sense, viz., when the supported term does depend by reason of its essence, but that on which it depends is not an essence but an entity distinct from the essence, for instance, a personal or hypostatic entity.
19.31 As for the added remark that the term on which something depends must be perfect, one could argue that perfection, like entity, pertains equivocally to both an essential and a hypostatic entity. Nevertheless, properly speaking, perfection seems to belong only to quidditative entity, for the hypostatic entity is not that by which something is formally perfected but that according to which [a person] receives perfection or at least ends up with the perfection received. And in this sense, one would have to deny this statement "It is necessary that the term supporting the dependence be perfect," for it suffices that the imperfection that marks the dependent be incompatible with it.
19.32 From this the answer to the objection to the minor [in
QUESTION NINETEEN
19.20] appears clear. If "perfection" be taken in its proper and unextended sense, this proposition must be denied "If some entity were the reason why every imperfection is excluded, it would be perfect or a pure perfection," for whatever can be really identical with something that is simply perfect cannot be in any way imperfect and still it is not necessary that it be simply perfect if we consider it precisely in its formal meaning.
2. Second Proof 19.33 [Statement of the Proof] Second, our proposed thesis can be shown as follows. In beings there is some dependence of the communicable nature qua communicable upon the suppositum* or hypostasis* to whom it is communicated; therefore, what ultimately supports this dependence is the incommunicable.
[11] 19.34 Explanation of the antecedent. Some natures like the substantial have their own per se suppositum, and here there is an identity of nature and suppositum?'; neither does the nature depend upon something extrinsic to itself as its suppositum. Other natures because of their imperfection do not have their own intrinsic or per sé suppositum but require an extrinsic one. Thus the nature of an accident requires the suppositum of the substance, and there its dependency ends with a per accidens suppositum, since it can have none that is per se. But here the nature is not identical per se with such a suppositum per accidens because they pertain to different categories. But in this case there is a union that takes the place of this identity insofar as possible, namely, an actual dependence on the part of the nature and the actual sustaining of that nature and its dependency on the part of the suppositum. What it means for that nature to be actually dependent upon a suppositum then is simply that it be communicated to this as its suppositum, namely in the way this nature is able to have such, for unlike substance, it cannot have such per se but only per accidens.
19.35 The principal entailment is manifest. Since the suppositum is per se incommunicable, the nature's dependence as communicable will be to a suppositum that is per se incommunicable. And because a divine person is in the truest sense incommunicable, indeed the only thing incommunicable by a positive entity, as we shall point out in [19.69 of] the third article, there is no incompatibility on its
13 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.2, nn.376-81 (1, 344-46); mm, d.i, q.i, n.5
(ed. Vivés xiv, 16-17).
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part in supporting the dependence of a nature as communicable, thus playing the role not of its intrinsic or per se suppositum, but only of one that is extrinsic and of a different nature.
19.36 [Objection] It might be objected that no nature could depend upon a divine person as its extrinsic suppositum because the person cannot be informed per accidens by any nature in the way the suppositum of the substance is informed by an accident and becomes the per accidens suppositum of the accident's nature.
19.37 Furthermore, the accident's dependence is per se upon the singular or individual substance and not upon the suppositum qua suppositum, namely, on what being a hypostasis or suppositum adds to being an individual, for that is only a negation, it seems, and a negation is not adequate ground for supporting any dependency.
19.38 Confirmation: The individual nature assumed by the Word supports the dependence of the accident in the same way it would if it were not assumed. But as assumed it is no longer a hypostasis or suppositum of itself; therefore, when it is not assumed, its being a hypostasis or suppositum would not be the per se reason for supporting the accident's dependency.
You cannot say that when the nature is assumed, the dependence of the accident which inheres in it is now supported by the person who assumed the nature, for the dependence of the accident consists in its inhering. But an accident of the assumed nature does not inhere in the person assuming the nature.
19.39 [Solution of the objections] To the first [in 19.36]. For the incommunicable to support the dependency of some nature distinct from its own, it is enough that to do so is not something incompatible with it. Whether some nature other than that possessed by the incommunicable can actually depend upon it will be treated in [19.73ff. of] the following article.
19.40 What of the claim that the incommunicable, to be the suppositum of an extrinsic nature, must be informable by it (as substance is informable by accident)? I reply: There are two relations involved in an accident's inherence in a substance. One is that of form to the informable; here substance is the recipient and the potential term (potential, at least, in a qualified sense). The other is the accident's dependence upon the substance; here substance is essen- [13] tially prior and the accident naturally posterior.
No nature can be related to the Word in the first way, for this would imply potentiality and therefore imperfection in the Word.
The second sort of relationship, however, is possible, for all it re-
QUESTION NINETEEN
quires in the Word is per se priority, and it is not incompatible that the Word have such a priority over every created nature. Here the dictum "God is that with reference to which every created substance is a quasi-accident" applies.
For even though the accident-tosubstance relationship of a qualified form to an informable subject is inapplicable, the relationship that a nature, posterior and extrinsically communicable, can have to a divine person is the sort of relationship the accidental nature bears to the suppositum of a substance.
19.41 To the second objection [in 19.37] one could say that an individual substance is incommunicable insofar as "'incommunicable"' is opposed to universal, which is communicable to many, but not insofar as all communicability is ruled out including that of form, be it the partial form (said to be communicated to informed matter) or the total form, i.e., the quiddity or nature (said to be communicated to the person or suppositum that shares it). Incommunicable in this second sense is not the mark of every individual substance, but only of that which is not a partial or total form. Such is what ultimately has the form or the informed being and what in turn is not the form or principium quo* of being. This is a hypostasis or suppositum. Consequently, while the dependence of the accident is somehow upon the singular substance it only ends ultimately with the singular as incommunicable. For if it depends on the singular substance as communicable, since this substance is the being of that to which it is communicated, the dependence only ends with the latter.* 19.42 I do not mean by this that the communicable substance in turn depends upon something incommunicable, and this is the reason why the accident depends ultimately not upon the communicable but upon this other. For the singular communicable substance does not depend upon the suppositum of the substance, since the substance and the suppositum in this case are identical.1* I mean
14 Cf. ibid., m1, d.1, q.1, nn.5-11 (ed. Vives xiv, 16-28); 1, d.2, nn.376-81 (11, 344-46).
15 When Scotus says that the substantial nature is identical with its suppositum, he does not mean that the twofold negation in which the supposttum consists (Ord. 1, d.2, nn.376-81; 1, 344-46) is really identical with the nature; he wants to say that the singular nature which is the basis for the twofold negation and is constituted by a haecceity is absolutely identical with the nature absolutely considered (Ord. 1, d.g, q.1, nn.7-10; ed. Vivés XU, 48-55; q.6, nn.off.; ibid., 1, 32ff.).
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rather that what depends ultimately upon a communicable singular substance actually does depend upon something incommunicable, since the communicable is the being or the nature of something incommunicable, and whatever depends upon the being of something or someone ultimately depends on the individual to which or to whom that being belongs. The incommunicable, however, never functions as anyone's being or nature; hence what depends upon the incommunicable requires no further dependence on some subject having the incommunicable as its being or nature.
19.43 As for the argument [in 19.37] that all that the notion of suppositum adds to the notion of singular substance is a negation,
I reply: Even if this be so, at least this [ontological] priority obtains, viz., it must have such a negation before it can function as the ultimate subject on which the accident depends. Neither is it incongruous that the negation of some imperfection in a subject be prior to the fact that something posterior depend upon it. "Not to be irrational" pertains to man before ''to be white" does. Such a negation is an immediate consequence of what the definition of man affirms, and this would be so even if ''to be white" never did or never could pertain to him.
19.44 As for the claim that negation is no adequate ground for supporting any dependency, I reply: To say "it depends ultimately" asserts two things: (a) dependence upon some term, and (b) there is nothing further on which it depends. To be the term upon which something depends is a positive notion, whereas the idea of its being ultimate is not, since this denies the term is communicable, for otherwise the dependency would not end here. For example, if one accident depended on another as some say color depends on a surface, the color would not depend ultimately upon the surface but upon what has this surface [i.e., the bodily substance]. And even if color did not depend upon the substance but was just a mode of being it had, the ultimate dependence would still end only with the substance.
19.45 To the confirmation [in 19.38] it would be said that the accident of the assumed nature [depends on the Word insofar as the accident depends on the substance assumed by the Word].
3. Proofs Proposed by Others 19.46 [Statement of the Proofs] Some'® defend the thesis proposed on these grounds: The divine person contains the perfection
*6 Thomas, Summa theol. 11, q.2, aa.2-3 (IV, 21-25); William of Ware, Sent. ul, d.1, q.1.
QUESTION NINETEEN
of any created person or suppositum eminently; therefore he could supply for the role any such suppositum would play in sustaining that nature.
19.47 Besides, every created nature is in obediential potency* as regards a divine person; therefore a divine person could sustain any such nature.
19.48 [These reasons are defective] The first reason [in 19.46] seems inadequate on this ground: While a divine person does contain virtually every created being by reason of his essence, he does not seem to contain even one by reason of his personal property. If he did, by the same token he would virtually contain every single created entity and thus his personal property would itself be formally infinite. In Question Five, which dealt with this subject, we showed this was not so.
19.49 Besides, if the personal property did contain all created entity virtually, it could be, it seems, the formal basis of creating, a claim denied earlier [in Question Eight].
19.50 The second argument [in 19.47] also seems defective. The obediential potency of a creature has reference to the omnipotence of the creator and is common to all three persons. Therefore the way the Son supports his created nature in virtue of omnipotence is common to all three.17 But the support by the person united to the nature is proper to the Son. The fact that the nature is in obediential potency as regards the person, therefore, does not entail that this person can sustain it hypostatically but only causally, namely as efficient cause.
4. Objection to the Conclusion of this Article 19.51 Against the conclusion of this article, it is objected in the first place that if the union itself is real, then it must have a real term. But the [personal] property and the essence are one and the same thing in reality, and what is identical in reality is also identical in the role played as the term of this union.
19.52 Besides, only its correlative depends upon the relative as relative. Therefore, the human nature does not depend upon the Word as Word, for only the Father is the correlative of the Word.
19.53 Reply to the first [in 19.51]: The formal distinction* between a relation and the essence provides sufficient ground for saying that the property and not the essence is the formal term of the real union. The objection does seem to be effective, however, 17 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 11, d.1, q.1, n.4 (ed. Vivés XIV, 11-12).
43]
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against those who claim the essence and the constitutive property of the person are both really and formally identical.**
19.54 As for the second [in 19.52], one can reply by denying the antecedent. For it is one thing to depend on something relative as its correlative and quite another to depend on the Word, who is relative. For though the human nature assumed by the Word does depend upon him as Word, it does not depend upon him as its correlative.
ARTICLE III
The Possibility of Such a Union on the Part of the Assumed Nature [17] 19.55 [Two points to be investigated] As for the third article, it is certain, according to Damascene,'® that the Word assumed an individual nature, yet one which lacked its own personality since this could not be reconciled with the assumption of a nature in the unity of the Person of the Word. But if the nature's own individuality were formally its own personality, its individuality could not exist without its personality.
For this reason, we must see (1) by what factor a created nature is formally and completely personalized in itself in order to see (2) whether it can lack its own personality and still be personalized by an extrinsic personality.
1. What Constitutes Created Personality?
19.56 [The view of others: human nature is constituted a person by something positive] There is some doubt as to whether personality proper is constituted formally by something positive. It seems so for the following reasons:
What is primarily incommunicable is not negation as such, for negation can pertain to anything. Therefore, if a negation is incommunicable it is only because it presupposes the incommunicability of something positive, and so what is primarily incommunicable is something positive. Now it is the personal property that is primarily incommunicable, for this is what formally constitutes the incommunicable, viz., the person.
19.57 Besides, negation is never primarily proper to anything; it is proper only because it is the consequence of some proper affirmaL21GT, Abid, 1q.1, 17 (ed. Vivés xiv, 44-45).
19 Damascene, De fide orth. 11, c.g: PG 94, 994; ed. Buytaert c.47, pp.
176-77.
QUESTION NINETEEN
tion. But the personal property is primarily proper. Therefore, [it is not a negation].
19.58 What is more, imperfection is excluded by something perfect or at least positive. But to depend on an extrinsic person is an imperfection. Therefore, proper personality which excludes formally such dependence must be something positive.
19.59 Confirmation: Individuality in a nature comes from something positive, for singularity excludes the imperfection of internal division; hence the singular is called an "individual," i.e., something indivisible into more than one. In an analogous way, to be a person in oneself excludes dependence upon an extrinsic person.
19.60 [This view is untenable] But against this view are the words of Damascene?®: "God, the Word, lacked none of those things he implanted in our nature when he formed us in the beginning; he assumed them all... for he was wholly united to me, so that he might bestow the grace of salvation upon the whole; for what has not been assumed, cannot be healed." He wants to say then that every positive entity our nature contains is united to the Word.
19.61 That this is possible for any nature is proved by reason.
Any nature whatsoever is simply in obediential potency to depend upon a divine person. Therefore, if there were some positive entity which made the nature a person in its own right, then this entity would have been assumed by the Word and thus Christ's human nature would be invested with a dual personality, which is impossible. For if it were personalized by something created, this would render it formally incommunicable to another person. Hence it could not be taken up by the person of the Word, and thus be personalized in him.
19.62 Besides, if human nature formally became a person by reason of some positive entity, the Word could not put off the nature he had assumed without either letting it remain depersonalized
(which. seems incongruous) or else giving it some new entity by which it would have created personality. But this too is impossible.
This could be no accidental entity, since an accident is not the formal reason why a substance is a person. Neither could this entity be substantial, be it matter, form, or a composite substance; for then it would no longer have the nature it had before, but it would have another matter, form or composite substance."
20 Ibid., c.6: PG 94, 1006; ed. Buytaert c.50, p. 188.
21 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. m1, d.1, q.1, nn.5-11 (ed. Vivés xiv, 16-28); d.5, q.2, n.4 (ibid., 228).
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19.63 [Scotus' own opinion] Therefore, we can say that the formal reason our nature is invested with a created personality is not something positive; for in addition to singularity we find no positive entity that renders the singular nature incommunicable. All that is added to singularity is the negation of dependence or incommunicability, the denial that it is given over to someone.
19 | 19.64 Negation of communicability or dependence can be understood in three ways. As we can conceive of dependence as actual, potential, or dispositional, so too with its negation.
The negation of actual dependence is the simple or bare denial of dependence. The denial of its possibility adds the note of impossibility. The third implies a contrary inclination or. disposition. For example, a colorless or transparent surface is not white in the first way, since whiteness is only denied of it; an angel is not white in the second way, since it would be impossible for it to be white; a stone not up in the air illustrates the third way; not only does it lack any disposition to remain up; it has the opposite inclination to remain down.
19.65 To the case at hand: speaking of dependence upon an extrinsic hypostasis, especially a divine person, we can say that the simple negation of such actual dependence does not suffice to make one a person in his own right, for the soul of Peter is not dependent in this way and yet it is not a person.
19.66 The second negation is not found to be true of any created nature able to be a person, for nothing in it excludes the possibility of depending upon a divine person. Quite the contrary, every positive entuty in such a nature is in obediential potency to depend upon such a person, and consequently this sort of negation does not constitute a created person.
19.67 Neither does the third type of negation alone suffice, since the nature even as assumed is characterized by such a negation. Being of the same type as my own nature, [Christ's] assumed nature has the same kind of dispositions and natural inclinations as mine, and thus has a natural aptitude to subsist in itself with no inclination by nature to depend upon an extrinsic person. Neither is it incongruous that the possibility be present without a corresponding disposition, since the same situation holds good for supernatural forms. And if there is any potency in the recipient to have such forms, there is still no natural inclination for them, since such an inclination properly speaking only exists in regard to a form which perfects naturally.
QUESTION NINETEEN
19.68 Therefore, a double negation is required to have a created personality, namely, the conjunction of the first and the third type.
The third is habitual, as it were, and is found in the created nature necessarily whether this nature be a person in its own right or is personalized through an extrinsic person. But the absence of any actual dependence together with the absence of any natural inclination to so depend make for a complete personality of one's own.
[20 ] 19.69 [Reply to the arguments for the first opinion] One answer suffices for all the arguments [in 19.56-59] claiming that one's own created personality is formally constituted by something positive.
"To be communicable" or "'to depend in this way" would admittedly be simply inconsistent with my being if, and only if, this being did possess some positive entity of its own which rendered it incommunicable or unable to be dependent. However, '"'to be communicated" or '"'to depend" can be repugnant in a qualified sense to something in virtue of a negation alone, for as long as the negation holds true, its Opposite affirmation cannot be true. But this does not mean the affirmative situation is simply impossible unless the subject is such that it necessarily entails such a negation, and in this case the negation would be simply proper to it; otherwise the negation would be proper to the subject only in a qualified sense. For a negation is proper to something in the same way that its opposite affirmation is impossible. Now only a divine person has incommunicability in the first way, because he has some intrinsic entity all his own which excludes any possibility of such communication. A created nature, on the contrary, though it may subsist in itself, still does not have anything intrinsic that would make dependence [upon a divine person] impossible. Hence only a divine person has his own personality completely; a created nature personalized in itself, however, does not have such personality completely, since it does not exclude the possibility, but only the actuality, of such dependence, and it excludes this only in a qualified sense, namely, so long as the negation of actual dependence remains true.
19.70 As for the form of the argument [in 19.56] based on the notion of person, I say that simple or unqualified incommunicability, viz., that which excludes the possibility of dependence, does not pertain primarily to a negation or to any subject in virtue of a negation. Nor is such incommunicability found in a creature, even one who is a person. At best there is only a qualified incommunicability,
22 Cf. ibid., n.10 (ed. Vivés xiv, 26-27).
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viz., exclusion of actual communication to another person, and this only as long as the actual dependence is not there. Now such qualified incommunicability does not require a positive entity that is simply incommunicable, but only a positive entity as the subject of whom actual dependence is denied. On the other hand, if simple incommunicability did pertain to any negation it would only be because the negation is a consequence of some simply incommunicable positive entity.
19.71 I use the same argument against the other major premise based on dependence [in 19.58]. I grant that if the possibility of dependence is incompatible with something, this is due to some perfection or positive reason; but such is not the case with any creature. All we find there is the absence of actual dependence. For example, if an accident is given existence apart from a substance,"* actual or possible inherence in a substance is not incompatible with it purely and simply but only in a qualified sense, namely, it cannot be present as long as the accident continues to exist apart.
19.72 In much the same way I answer the argument [in 19.57] that a negation is not what is primarily proper to anything. Unqualified incommunicability is simply proper only to what has this sort of incommunicability; but incommunicability in a qualified sense is not simply proper to its subject; it is "proper" only in the sense that it belongs to this subject alone.?+ 2. Can a Human Nature Depend upon an Extrinsic Person?
19.73 As for the second problem [in 19.55] of the third main article, some argue that to depend for one's personality on an extrinsic person is incompatible with human nature: first, because it is a substantial nature; second, because it cannot have something intrinsic that would be grounds for such dependence; third, because a human nature possesses an intrinsic reason why it cannot depend in this fashion.
19.74 First argument: What substantial nature is meant to give to the suppositum is being in an unqualified sense; hence it does not presuppose such being. But a nature which depends upon an extrin28 See Glossary: "'eucharist'" for an example of separated accident.
24 He does not answer the confirmation. See Ord. m1, d.1, q.1,,11,197 (ed.
Vives XIV, 44-45), and u, d.g, q.2 (ed. Vivés xu, 77-80), where he answers that indivisibility is positive because by it division is simply repugnant to the nature; however, to be assumed is not simply repugnant to the person: alized nature. Therefore, there is no parity.
QUESTION NINETEEN
sic suppositum does presuppose such being in the latter since it presupposes the being of the suppositum's own nature, a nature which belongs to it even before the dependent nature does.
Proof of the antecedent: As an accident is entity in a qualified sense, so a substantial nature is entity purely and simply. Now the sort of entity a thing is formally is the sort of entity it gives. Thus an accident gives only qualified entity and presupposes a being that is simply such; a substantial nature on the contrary gives being in an unqualified sense and does not presuppose such being.
19.75 Second argument [of 19.73]: Everything dependent possesses an intrinsic ground for its dependence. But human nature does not and cannot have some intrinsic ground for depending in this way. Therefore, [it is not dependent in this fashion].
19.76 The major appears clear inductively if you consider one by one the various types of causal dependence.
Reason also proves the same. If one thing does not have some reason for dependence which another lacks, then the first would be no more dependent than the second. Now my nature does not depend upon the Word with this sort of dependence; therefore, neither does the assumed nature [of Christ] if it has no intrinsic reason for doing so.
Proof of the major: The independent does not become dependent, or vice versa, without some change or mutation. Now only an absolute form is the per se term of mutation; therefore, if a nature becomes dependent it is only because it acquired some absolute form as the ground for such dependence, a form which it loses when it regains its independence.
19.77 Proof of the minor: The Word could put off his human nature without anything absolute in it being destroyed. But if the reason why it depended on the Word were something absolute, then it would be necessary to destroy this absolute entity to make the nature independent [or a person in its own right].
Two natures of the same kind should have the same reason or ground for depending hypostatically on the same person or suppositum. Now Christ's nature is the same in kind as my own, and my nature does not have any reason or ground why it should depend hypostatically upon the Word; otherwise, for me to subsist as a human person would be doing violence to my nature.
19.78 Third argument [of 19.73]: The human personality that can pertain to this nature is really identical with this nature; therefore, as long as it continues to exist, this human nature has this per-
GOD AND CREATURES
sonality. But a personality of its own is adequate ground for excluding dependence upon an extrinsic person. Hence [it cannot depend in this way].
Proof of the antecedent: It is certain that this human nature can have a personality of its own. Now this personality cannot be something other than this nature. It cannot be an accident, because an accident cannot be the reason why a substance is a person. Neither can it be some substance other than this nature; if it were, then this other would either be a composite substance or a substantial part.
Now one composite substance is never the formal reason why another composite substance is a person. If the personality were a substantial part, then unless both substantial parts remained, the nature would not be the same.
19.79 [Scotus' own opinion] We should never assume two things are formally incompatible unless this is manifest from their definitions or it can be proved that they include such incompatibility or that such incompatibility is a consequence of what they are. But in none of these ways is human nature incompatible with dependence upon another person. Hence we should not assume such dependence is simply impossible so far as the nature is concerned.
The major is proved because everything should be assumed to be possible if there is no evidence of impossibility.
19.80 The first part of the minor is shown from the very notions of what we are discussing. It is more evident in the case of human nature, but the notion of the sort of dependence involved can be described as follows: "It is the dependence of a nature as communicable upon a person proper to another nature in such a way that this person is that upon which the nature depends."
19.81 This description is explained as follows: First, the expression ''as communicable." Something can be communicated in such a way that the recipient becomes that which is communicated, for instance, the way the universal is communicated to an individual.
In another way something is communicated as a formal principle of being and this can happen in two ways, one as a partial form which is communicated to informed matter and thereby to the composite constituted through the form; the other as a total form or quiddity is communicated to the suppositum, for example, humanity to Socrates.
In our case "as communicable" is understood in this third way, viz., the total form is communicated in such a way that the one having it can be said to be formally this sort of thing. Now when the
QUESTION NINETEEN
nature is a suppositum in its own right, the suppositum is said to be this sort of nature, not because the nature depends upon it, but because there is a per se identity. But when the suppositum is not proper to the nature there can be no per se identity. What can be there in its place, however, is perfect dependence of the nature and on the part of the suppositum a perfect sustaining or supporting of this dependence. Such a suppositum, since it is per se the suppositum of another nature, is not the per se suppositum of the dependent nature. Since what is per se is prior to what is not, it follows that the suppositum or person has his own nature prior to having this dependent one, which is a kind of adventitious or second nature.
[23] 19.82 That dependence of this sort is not repugnant to human nature can be shown somehow by a proof similar to that given in the second article [in 19.12-14].
A divine person on his own can be the supporting term for some kind of dependence, not that of causation or, in short, of that requiring formal perfection in the term, but only that sort of dependence that a communicable nature has upon the incommunicable which sustains it. Therefore, it must be possible for some nature to depend in this way, for it would not be possible to support such dependence if some nature did not have a corresponding possibility of depending. But to depend in this way is not more repugnant to human nature than to any other nature.
19.83 We show this secondly in this way: An accident has this sort of dependence upon the suppositum of the substance in which it inheres. Although in this case the dependence is conjoined with inherence, the reason for dependence seems prior to the ground for inherence even as the essential priority by reason of which the term supports such dependence seems prior to its ability to be informed by or to receive accidents, which is the reason why they can inhere in it. There seems to be no contradiction, then, in thinking that some nature may be able to depend as communicable without inhering in that on which it depends, and this is precisely the kind of dependence we are assuming in the present case.
Confirmation: According to the Philosopher in the Metaphysics?® one meaning of "quality" is the substantial difference; consequently, it is not repugnant to a substance to have a mode of existence like that of a quality.
19.84 We show this thirdly as follows: An accident can have the mode of substance [{i.e., it can exist without inhering in a substance],
25 Aristotle, Metaph. v, c.14 (1020a35).
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although not perfectly in the sense that it would be repugnant for it to depend on a subject, but in some analogous way, viz., insofar as it does not actually depend; this is seen in the case of a separated accident.* By the same token, it seems that a substance can have the mode of an accident, although not perfectly in the sense that it would depend or inhere in a subject, but in an analogous fashion, viz., in the sense of actually depending upon an extrinsic suppositum.?6
19.85 [Reply to the arguments for the opposing view] To the arguments in favor of the contrary opinion:
— To the first [in 19.74]: I admit that the substantial nature gives substantial being, but it is only when the suppositum is per se that the substantial nature gives the suppositum its first being. But when its suppositum is not per se but belongs to another nature, it is this other nature that gives the suppositum its first being.
19.86 To the claim that what gives unqualified being to some subject does not presuppose such being in the subject, I answer: Some being may indeed be unqualified being in itself and yet, if its suppositum is not something it has in its own right, then it does not give that suppositum unqualified being in every sense.
19.87 To the second argument [in 19.75]: Something can be a ground for dependence in one of two ways. One would be if actual dependence necessarily accompanies or follows it. Another way would be if what necessarily accompanies it is not actual dependence but the aptitude to depend, and when actual dependence is present, the reason or ground is the proximate foundation for such.
Dependence of a creature on God is of the first type, because here the foundation of the dependence necessarily involves actual dependence at all times. The dependence of an effect upon a secondary cause is of the second type, since the effect could always be produced immediately by the first cause, and thus not be actually dependent upon the secondary cause even though the aptitude to depend is always there. The major is true then not of "a ground for dependence" understood in the first way, but only if we understand it indiscriminately of the first or the second way.?7
19.88 The first proof of the major [in 19.76] from an inductive consideration of the types of causal dependence proves nothing more.
26 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 11, d.1, q.1, nn.6ff. (ed. Vivés xiv, 21ff.).
27 Cf. ibid., tv, d.1, q.1, nn.16ff. (ed. Vivés xvi, 4off.).
QUESTION NINETEEN
[25 ] 19.89 To the second proof of the major which claims the dependent has some reason for dependence lacking in what is not dependent, I say this:
It is necessary to have such if "reason for dependence" means the formal reason, which is the dependence itself, since without actual dependence nothing can depend. But if "reason for dependence'' refers to some foundation of the dependence in the way that whiteness is the foundation for similarity, I deny that there is any more need for such in something dependent than there is in what is not actually dependent but has an aptitude to depend. For example, an accident when it is in a subject has no more grounds for depending than when it exists apart, for its own nature is the proximate ground for depending in this way. Nothing more needs to be added except the 'formal reason" or actual dependence itself. Something analogous holds for the nature that is assumed and the nature that is not.
19.90 The third proof [in 19.76] seems to establish more, viz., that what is actually dependent always has some absolute entity as the fundamental reason for its depending. And we must simply deny the proposition on which the proof is based, viz., "Only an absolute form is the per se term of mutation." There is movement from place to place, and yet place is not an absolute form. That this is not contrary to what the Philosopher says in the Physics?® was proved earlier in the [Eleventh] question on bodies and place.
19.91 Now the minor [of the second argument, viz., that human nature does not and cannot have some intrinsic ground for depending hypostatically] is not true in the sense that the major is true, namely where "ground" or "reason'"' may mean indiscriminately either a formal reason for depending or a fundamental reason which necessarily entails either actual or at least aptitudinal dependence. For the assumed nature has a formal reason, viz., the dependence itself, and it also has a fundamental reason. Indeed, the nature itself is the proximate fundamental ground of the dependence although what is a necessary consequence of the nature is not actual but aptitudinal dependence. Neither does the first proof of the minor establish anything more, for if the Word put off his human nature, nothing absolute in it would perish. Hence it never had anything absolute which was the necessary reason for its actually depending on the Word. But something absolute was the proximate subject of such dependence and it can remain without such depend28 Aristotle, Physic. v, c.1 (225b5-10, 206-2114).
44]
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ence in the way that the foundation can exist without the relation if the latter is not a necessary consequence of the foundation.
19.92 As for the other proof [of the minor in 19.77] I say: While it is true that two natures of the same kind have the same aptitude to depend upon the Word, it does not follow that if one actually does depend, the other must also. The case of an accident separated from its subject and one conjoined with its subject makes this clear.
Now although my nature does not actually depend upon the Word hypostatically, nevertheless it does have the same aptitude to depend as the nature he assumed.?*
Reply to the Initial Argument 19.93 To the argument at the beginning [in 19.1] I say that while not every form of dependence justifies predicating what depends of the subject on which it depends, nevertheless the dependence of a nature as communicable upon a suppositum that sustains it hypostatically is sufficient for predicating the dependent nature of the person or suppositum on which it depends. This is clear from the case of the accident that depends in this way upon the suppositum of the substance of which it is also predicated. And just as the predication of the accident of the subject, though true, is not per se, as would be the case if the nature were predicated of its own suppositum, so also the predication of human nature of the Word is not per se.
*° He does not answer explicitly the third argument; cf. supra, 19.78.