Question Ten: Can God Convert The Eucharistic
Question Ten
CAN GOD CONVERT THE EUCHARISTIC
SPECIES INTO SOMETHING PREVIOUSLY
EXISTING?
Arguments Pro and Con 10.1 As regards the second question [in 9.1], namely: Can God convert the Eucharistic species* into something previously exist- (1 | ing,! it is argued he cannot:
Nothing can be converted into something else unless the two have something in common. These species, however, have nothing in common with what already exists. Therefore [they cannot be converted into something already existing].
Proof of the major: If nothing common would remain, then the species would be annihilated and not transformed.
Proof of the minor: These species do not inhere in a substance nor do they modify matter, which serves as the primary subject in such things as are transformed into one another.
10.2 To the contrary:
If nature can convert these species into something which did not exist before, then God can convert them into something which did exist before.
The antecedent is clear: In the act of nutrition these species are transformed into the substance of the one who benefits from their nourishment, so that by virtue of natural causes they become flesh which did not previously exist. If it is claimed that the flesh did exist before, all the better for our thesis. Similarly, fire could produce fire from them and by the powers of the heavens some form of animal life could be produced from their putrefaction.?
Proof of the implication: It seems that the divine power could convert these species more readily into something previously existing than nature's powers could turn them into something which did
1Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. tv, d.10, q.1
(ed. Vivés xvii, 152-86); d. 11, qq.
1-5 (ibid., 314-471); d.12 (ibid., 518-652).
2 See Glossary: "Sun."
QUESTION TEN
not exist before, for the divine power infinitely excels that of nature and whether the term preexists or not, will not alter infinitely its nature.
Body of the Question 10.3 The question is not a general inquiry as to whether one thing can be completely converted into another, but it concerns specifically such terms as are involved here, since they raise a special difficulty of their own. For the solution of the question, then, we must first see whether these terms under investigation possess some special characteristic that would make their complete conversion impossible, and here we shall look first to the terminus a quo,* or separated quantity, and second to the terminus ad quem,* which refers to what is already existing. A third point will take up the question of the kind of conversion involved, for instance, whether it entails an annihilation.
ARTICLE I
The terminus a quo or the Separated Quantity 10.4 [Proof there is no impossibility on the part of the quantity]
As for the first point, I say there is no special reason why it should be impossible for separated quantity* to be converted into something any more than it would be for some other created thing, where complete conversion is assumed to be possible. For the present this brief proof can be given:
An agent whose active power completely dominates both terms alike as to their being or not being, as well as controls whatever is a necessary concomitant of their being, can convert one completely into the other. But any two creatures are equally in God's power in this way. Therefore [he can convert one completely into the other].°
10.5 First, we explain the major as follows: "Whole" is sometimes taken -categorematically and then it designates the same as that which has all its parts. At other times it is taken syncategorematically+ and signifies the same as any one of its parts. When a sub3Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. iv, d.11, 9.1, n.4 (ed. Vives xvil, 321); q.2, n.3
(ibid., 388).
'What Scotus understands by ''categorematic'' and "'syncategorematic"' is clear enough from the context, though it is being used in one of its less familiar senses. Categorematic terms are usually defined as terms which signify something per se, whereas syncategorematic terms only signify someZoi
GOD AND CREATURES
stance is generated, according to the Philosopher,' one whole is changed into another whole. Here "whole" is understood in the first sense and it means that both what perished and what came to be were one per se and hence each was truly a whole. However, when something comes to be only in a qualified sense as is the case where the form is altered or the quantity augmented, what is generated, according to the Philosopher,® is not something that is one per se:
"The quality does not come to be, but wood of that quality, and the quantity does not come to be, but the wood of that size." And therefore in the case we are discussing what comes to be is not something that is truly one.
In our thesis, then, '"complete conversion," or the change of one whole into another, refers to a "whole" taken syncategorematically, namely when one composite is converted into another, as occurs when matter is transmuted into matter and form into form.
10.6 Understood in this way, the major is proved as follows: An agent that has one part of both terms equally under his active power can change one by a partial conversion into the other. Just as a generator that has in his active power the form of what perishes and the form of what comes to be can convert the former into the latter by a partial transformation affecting the form, so also that agent who has equally in his power the form of what is corrupted and the form of what is generated can equally convert the one into the other by corrupting or generating. By the same token, then, that agent who has in his active power alike both the matter and form of this and the matter and form of that, and whose power dominates whatever these two have and whatever is a necessary concomitant of their being, can transmute this term into that term by a complete conversion affecting the matter and form of both. Such an agent, however, is God.
10.7 A second proof is this: One thing can be turned into another in the same fashion that it is possible for the second to succeed the first temporally. Now by divine power, however, any created being in its totality or any part thereof can succeed any other created bething as a modification or determination of something else. For a classical interpretation of all that this implies see, for example, Peter of Spain:
Tractatus Syncategorematum and Selected Anonymous Treatises, trans.
J. P. Mullally (Milwaukee, 1964), pp. 17ff.
® Aristotle, De generat. 1, c.4 (319b6-320a).
6 Aristotle, Metaph. vit, c.g (1034b11-15).
QUESTION TEN
ing. Therefore, [by divine power any created being can be turned completely into another].7
[4] 10.8 'To this argument, however, objections are raised.
[First objection] The first is that if the argument were valid, God could as easily change a bodily substance into an incorporeal one or convert one spiritual substance into another as he can turn one corporeal substance into another. The implication is clear, for the divine power dominates the terms equally in either case. But the consequent is false.
10.9 Proof of this is Augustine,® who says: "There were not lacking those who claimed that any body can be changed into any other, but I do not know of any who thought that a body could be turned into a soul and become a spiritual nature, nor does faith require us to believe this.'' And in the same book,® he repeats this even more explicitly: "It is credible that any body can be changed into any other body, but that a body could be turned into a soul is absurd."
10.10 Besides, Boethius,'® in his work On Two Natures and One Person in Christ, in the section where he argues against Eutyches, declares: ''A corporeal substance cannot be changed into an incorporeal one, nor can one incorporeal substance be transformed into another, for only those things that have a common subject matter can be changed into one another."
10.11 [Second objection] A second objection to our argument [in 10.4] is this. Since it is not only substance but every created thing alike that falls equally under the divine power, it would follow that if God could completely convert one created thing into another, then he could do this with any created thing whatsoever, and then many absurdities would follow, for instance, that a substance could be turned into an accident, i.e., into something which exists only in another, and vice versa, or something absolute could become something relative and thus have two terms, and conversely the relative could be made into an absolute.
10.12 [Third objection] A third objection to our argument is that if an agent controls both terms completely by his active power, this only implies that he can destroy one and create the other. But to 7 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. tv, d.11, g.2, nn.7-8 (ed. Vives xvi, 340-41); q.13, nn.17ff. (ibid., 377ff.).
8 Augustine, Super Gen. vu, c.12, n.19: PL 34, 362.
9 Tbid., c.20, n.26: PL 34, 365.
10 Boethius, De persona et duabus naturis, c.6: PL 64, 1349; The Theo. logical Tractates..., p. 108.
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create one thing and to annihilate another is not to convert one into the other. Therefore [one cannot infer such an agent can convert one into the other].
10.13 [Solutions to the objections] To these objections we reply:
[To the first in 10.8ff.] What Augustine had in mind in the text quoted [in 10.9] was to prove that the soul, when first produced, was not made from some body. The manner in which he proceeds reveals as much. First he considers each sort of body in particular and then he sums up the matter in the text cited, viz., "But that a body could be turned into a soul, etc." And he continues: "Now this first production is not something miraculous, but is the sort of thing that is suited to what is produced." Consequently, he has no wish to deny that God could convert body into soul, but only wanted to say this is not what occurred when they were first made, or this could not have happened then, since they were produced in a manner suited to their natures and not miraculously. Such was the mind of Augustine.
10.14 If one insisted, however, that Augustine's words indicate that one body can be turned into another, but not into a soul, and that only divine omnipotence makes the first possible, and even this cannot make the second possible, my answer would be this: If there are several concurrent reasons for something's impossibility, then something else which lacks some of these reasons can be called
' possible, not in an absolute sense, but in relation to the first. For example: Sight is impossible for a stone, a blind animal, and a kitten not yet nine days old; yet sight is always possible in the second and third cases with reference to what precedes, since they lack the reason for the impossibility found in the preceding.
[6] 10.15 If you examine the following examples, you will see the relevance for our thesis. It is impossible for fire to be transformed into a celestial body for many reasons, such as the lack of active or passive qualities that are formally or virtually opposed, which might serve as principles for the transformation of one into the other. 'They also lack the recipient subject that would underlie such a transformation. The impossibility of turning a body into a soul stems not only from these grounds but also from the fact that one is extended and the other not, and thus they lack a common element such as that which persists when one body is transformed into another, for one corporeal thing is transmuted into another only by an alteration that is received by the bodily substance as extended, and thus it is only as something extended and as having a corresponding mode of existence that such a product is brought into existence.
QUESTION TEN
10.16 To the citation from Boethius [in 10.10] I say that what he had in mind was that only such things can be converted into one another as have some matter in common, and he claims it is not even possible for all of these, but only for such as can act and be acted upon. Hence he points out there that brass cannot be turned into stone. Consequently, he is not referring to every conversion possible to God, but only to such transformations as require a common matter and in addition such opposite active and passive qualities as would suffice for a purely natural change. For the impossibility of changing brass into stone only refers to a natural process and not just any such but to a direct transmutation.
10.17 You may object that if we take his words in this way, they would not support what he wants to prove, namely that humanity could not be converted into divinity, because on the interpretation we have given, one could only exclude the possibility of a direct natural conversion of one into the other, which was not what Boethius had against Eutyches.
10.18 I answer: Boethius' argument, given its premises, entails no more than what was said above, namely that human nature cannot be converted into divinity by the sort of transmutation that requires a common subject and mutual principles of acting and being acted upon. To draw the conclusion he wanted, viz., that no power could turn humanity into divinity, one would have to add the proposition:
"The degree to which divinity excels the productive capacity of any active causal power is certainly not less than that by which one natural thing exceeds the natural power of any natural agent." This is evident. Since divinity is infinite and cannot be caused, there is no way it can be the result of a causal power; but every created thing can be, and this not only in an absolute sense, but also with reference to some other thing which it succeeds. Then the Boethian argument may be formulated according to the dialectical rule a matori™ in this way: If all created power cannot transform brass immediately into stone, then for like, or even greater, reason no active power whatsoever can convert humanity to divinity.
10.19 [To the second objection in 10.11] What is said there about substance and the absolute could be conceded, namely that there
11 Rule a maior is a destructive argument from the superior to the inferior. It can be formulated thus: If the superior cannot effect something, neither can an inferior. Example: If a king cannot take a castle by storm, then neither can a knight. Cf. William of Sherwood's Introduction to Logic, trans. N. Kretzmann (Minneapolis, 1966), p. 95.
24]
GOD AND CREATURES
could be a type of conversion which began with a substance and ended with an accident, or that began with an absolute and terminated with something relative. 1t does not follow, however, that substance, while remaining a substance, would inhere in another, for both terms of the conversion would have the mode of being proper to their status, so that if substance were the terminus a quo,* it would have a per se mode of existence, and if the terminus ad quem* were an accident, it would have the sort of existence appropriate to accident, namely existence in another. Therefore the conversion would not result in a substance inhering in another, but rather what would happen is that the per se being of a substance as terminus a quo would be followed by the per accidens being of the terminus ad quem. Something similar could be said of the relative and absolute.
10.20 [To the third objection in 10.12] As for the third, one could say that the creation of one substance and the annihilation of another would not prevent quantity from being completely converted, even into something previously existing. If the argument ruled out anything, it would be total conversion in general, but in this question it seems that some sort of total conversion is presupposed, and granted that, the difficulties associated with a specific type of conversion would have to be ironed out.
ARTICLE II
The terminus ad quem or What Preexists 10.21 [The terminus ad quem presents no special difficulty] As for the second main point, [in 10.3] it is generally conceded that the prior existence of the terminus ad quem introduces no special reason why such a conversion should be impossible, since it is assumed that in the Eucharist the bread is converted into the preexisting body of Christ.
; 10.22 [One theory] One suggested explanation for this article of faith is this.?
Since God, the first agent, acts not as an instrument does, it follows he could act without movement, and hence could restore to the same matter the numerically identical form that had perished, since the reason a created agent cannot do this is that its action involves movement, which, being successive, can never return to what is 2 Giles of Rome, Theoremata de corpore Christi, prop.1 (Romae, 1554),
NOY kt As
QUESTION TEN
numerically the same. Furthermore, God regards matter qua quiddity* and as such it is indistinct. Therefore, any form that could be imposed on such matter could be put into any matter whatsoever.
10.23 'These two points permit the following argument. It follows (from the first) that God can restore to its matter a form that was destroyed, and consequently (from the second) that he can put this form into any matter. By the same token, he is able to put a form existing in its own matter into any other matter, but because of the numerical identity of the form, it follows that the resulting matter will be the same matter. Consequently, God could make any matter become this matter, even as he could make it come under this form. Hence he could make the form of the body of Christ take over the matter of the bread, if he could make its matter come to exist under this form, and thus this matter of the bread is converted into the matter of his body and its form into his form and the whole into the whole.
10.24 Any explanation of the many assumptions underlying this inference would become prolix and in the interests of brevity can be omitted. Indeed, the force of the argument in short seems to be this: The complete conversion of the composite A into the composite
B consists in the potential element of A being informed by B's form; but this is possible; therefore [the complete conversion of A into B is possible].
Proof of the first premise, viz., that the information of A's potential component by B's form, makes it become B's potential component. Identity of form implies identity of matter; thus the conversion of A into B implies not only that the form of A turns into the form of the other, but that the matter of A becomes that of B. The same would hold if the process were reversed.
Proof of the second premise: The potential components of A and B as quiddities are indistinct, and hence the same form can be induced in both by an agent who regards the potential as a quiddity.
In this abbreviated form of the argument, the point made about the possibility of restoring the identical form that had perished seems unnecessary.
10.25 [This theory must be rejected] What is objectionable about the theory is this:
[10] The claim that all matter is the same qua quiddity* (the aspect under which God views it in acting) either means it is the same numerically or at least the same in kind.
GOD AND CREATURES
10.26 In the first sense, the claim seems to be false and runs counter to what Aristotle says in the Metaphysics'*: "The causes of things in the same species are different, not specifically, but in the sense that the causes of different individuals are different, your matter and form and moving cause being different from mine, while in their universal definition they are the same."
10.27 Again, if the matter of A and of B are identical numerically, since the form of A cannot be educed from the matter of A because the matter of A already has it as actualized, then for the same reason it cannot be educed from the matter of B either. Let A stand here for the body of Christ, and B for the bread. Now if the body of Christ is educed from the matter of bread, the matter of bread will not thereby become or be converted into the matter of the body. For matter has a certain priority here as regards the form according to Augustine': "Certainly some unformed being can be formed; but what is not, cannot be formed.' Therefore, matter is somehow prior to that which is made out of it. And in another passage, Augustine? says: ''Since the matter of heaven is other than the matter of earth, heaven and earth are specifically different, you made matter entirely from nothing and the species of the world from informed matter; however you made both simultaneously.''!®
10.28 There is also this argument from reason: Matter itself is the same under opposite forms, but form cannot remain without matter.
Now a variation in what is posterior by nature does not imply variation in what is prior. Therefore if this form is received into some other matter, it does not follow that the matter of the one will become the matter of the other. All we would have is that a form is induced into matter which did not have it before. But the matter passing from privation to form does not thereby become another matter which it was not before.
10.29 But if matter is understood to be the same in the second way [of 10.25], namely, in kind, then it does not follow that the form which is in this matter could be numerically the same as that which is simultaneously in the other matter; all that follows is that the two forms are of the same kind, which does not suffice to prove the theory proposed.
13 Aristotle, Metaph. xu, c.5 (1071a25-30).
'* Augustine, Confess. xu, c.6, n.6: PL 32, 827; CSEL 3, 313.
15 Ibid., xu, c.3g, n.48: PL 32, 866; CSEL 38, 385.
16 There is a reference to Metaphysics 1, c.8 (g8gb65) that is left incomplete in MSS. and text edition.
QUESTION TEN
10.30 [Three meanings of "conversion into what preexists''] I say further, as regards this article, that we can understand "conversion into what existed before" in two ways, accordingly as '"'what existed before" refers either to (1) something which once was, but does not exist at present, or to something which not only existed before but retains its same being now. And this latter can have two further meanings depending on whether that which previously existed and continues to do so, as the term of this new conversion, either: (2) has something new added to its being, such as that here this term is now present to something in a way it was not present to it before, or (3) has nothing new about either its essential being or anything it has posterior to that being.
[11] 10.31 [About the first meaning] Let us look at these three in turn.
The first presents no greater difficulty for a term that preexists than for one that does not, as long as one admits that God could restore the identical thing that was destroyed—something all Catholics concede, and no wonder, since there is nothing self-contradictory about it.
10.32 [As for the second, this is possible] The other way, however, presents more of a difficulty, namely, when what existed before retains its same being now, for none of the changes listed by the Philosopher in the Physics'? seem applicable to the case where the terminus ad quem preexisted. 'The first interpretation of this, however—which is our second main division [in 10.30]—seems possible, because this seems to be what de facto must take place in the Eucharist. For the body of Christ, retaining the same being it had before, through this conversion now becomes present in a new way to the species of bread. The same could be said of the quantity to be converted into what preexists, for there is no impossibility on the part of the terminus ad quem.
10.33 [Three objections to 10.32] This claim, however, is contested'on the following grounds:
First, it is objected to what was said of the Eucharist. Something is per se the terminus ad quem of the conversion only insofar as it succeeds the terminus a quo. But according to you, what succeeds the bread is not the substantial being of the body, but only the new presence it acquires. Hence it is a per se term insofar as it becomes present here or acquires this presence, but this sort of presence is not substance or anything substantial. Therefore, the per se term of the conversion in the Eucharist would not be substance, and conse17 Aristotle, Physic. v, c.1 (2254-35).
GOD AND CREATURES
quently the conversion itself would not be a transubstantiation,* because transubstantiation is the transition of one substance into another.
10.34 Second, the claim made for quantity is challenged for several reasons, the first of which is this: What comes to be is in the same place in which what perished was before, because the reason for being in place, which is quantity, remains the same in both. So too in the Eucharistic conversion, the reason for the bread's being in a certain place [viz., its quantity] remains behind, and thus the body of Christ, which is the term of the change, can be said to be there or to have such a presence. Conversely, then, it would follow that if the quantity of the terminus a quo did not remain behind. then the terminus ad quem would lack such presence and would not be there. But if the quantity is converted into something else, it is clear that the reason for being in that place has vanished, for quantity was the basis for being in place.
10.35 Furthermore, if the conversion of quantity into something, made the latter take presence in this place, then it would have the same sort of presence here that the quantity had when it was here.
But quantity was here circumscriptively.* Therefore, the terminus ad quem is here circumscriptively.
Pasa 10.36 From this two absurdities seem to follow:
First, the same thing would be present in two places at once.
Proof that this follows: The terminus ad quem, which becomes localized here, could remain located in its proper place as well, just as the body of Christ now is located in heaven. This result of being localized in two places at once, however, seems to involve many impossibilities. For instance, the same thing could be moving and at rest simultaneously, because it could be in motion there but not here. Similarly it could be heated and cooled at the same time because here it was near fire and there near water. Likewise, it could be both continuous and discontinuous, if it had a part severed from the whole here but not there. The same thing could also be at once living and dead, for instance, if an animal suffered a fatality in one place, but had all that was necessary and sufficient for health in the other.
10.37 The second main absurdity that would follow from being localized both here and there is that two bodies could coexist in the same place. Proof that this follows: This [quantity] could be converted into two bodies, each of which would be localized here for the same reason. Also it could be converted into a larger body, and
QUESTION TEN
if this had to occupy the same place, one part would have to overlap another.
Aristotle, however, in the Physics,1* it seems, has proved the impossibility of two bodies being in the same place at the same time.
[14] 10.38 [Reply to the first objection in 10.33] To the first of these, I say that if the per se term of transubstantiation is substance qua substantial being, as it is argued, since the body of Christ does not properly follow in the place of the bread according to its substantial being, the proposition "Something is per se the terminus ad quem of the conversion only insofar as it succeeds the terminus a quo" has to be denied. For although the body has being there after the being of the bread, it does not begin to exist only when the bread ceases to be, which seems to be necessary if we are to say that it follows the being of the bread here, speaking properly. Otherwise, we could say the being of the sun follows the decay of the worm because its being succeeds that of the worm. Hence, as I say, we have to deny the proposition, since only insofar as the body of Christ is the same now as before, and therefore not properly as succeeding anything, is it the terminus ad quem of the transubstantiation. For since this does not produce the terminus ad quem, but only converts something else into it, the body qua substantial being does not properly succeed the terminus a quo, as we said. But one could admit that there is something new about the terminus ad quem and as such it does, properly speaking, follow the terminus a quo. And then one could grant that as long as the substance of bread occupied this place, this novel situation would not have occurred, namely that the body of Christ became really and truly present here where it was not present before.
[15] 10.39 [Reply to the second objection in 10.34] I say to the second that the body of Christ is where the bread was, but the formal reason for this is not the quantity which was the formal reason for the bread being there. For this quantity is not formally in the body of Christ and hence nothing pertains to his body formally because of it.
Also, quantity can only be formal grounds for locating something circumscriptively, for it is the specific reason something has this type of location. If quantity were the formal ground for anything being here, therefore, it would have a circumscriptive presence in place, and this is not the way the body of Christ is sacramentally present. Consequently, it is clear [that quantity is not the formal ground for Christ's presence here]. Therefore, even if that which 18 Ibid., Iv, c.5 (212b26-30).
Be al}
GOD AND CREATURES
was the formal reason for bread occupying a place did not remain, God could still have made the term of the conversion present here where bread had been.
Also the first statement [in 10.34], about "what comes to be" having the same place as '"'what perished" had because the quantity remains, does not prove what it is supposed to, because it is not necessary that the term that results from the conversion be localized in the same way the other term was. Indeed, it will be present there in the mode of existence given it by the agent effecting the change.
[16] 10.40 [Reply to the third objection in 10.35] As for the other, one can deny this proposition: "The resulting term has the same sort of presence here as the initial term had." One could object that the substance of the bread, which was changed, had been present here in one way, namely, the way it can exist anywhere in place because as extended each part occupied a part of the whole place in which it was in toto. But the substance of the body of Christ into which it was changed is not present in that fashion. Indeed it exists whole and entire in every part of the place. Consequently, it does not follow that the term into which the quantity is changed is necessarily localized there in the same way as the other term was.
10.41 But if one admitted that God could convert quantity into something which did become localized in that way, perhaps some would not consider the resulting consequences [of 10.36-37] to be. simply impossible, in the sense of implying a contradiction. And it is only this sort of thing that we say is impossible to God,?® "for no word shall be impossible with God," where "word" means any concept possible to the intellect, and that would be any concept in which contradictory elements are not included.
10.42 To the many apparently impossible consequences, therefore, that seem to follow from the first absurdity [mentioned in 10.36], viz., that the same thing could be in two places at once, one could provide a probable solution through the use of two principles.
The first is this: "Forms prior by nature to ubiety* as such do not vary with variation of the ubiety itself, because the prior does not vary because of variation in the posterior." From this proposition it would follow that anything present in two places at once would undergo change neither as to substantial form nor as to anything in the category of quantity or quality, for forms in these categories are simply prior to ubiety itself. to Puke 137
QUESTION TEN
[17] The second proposition is this: "Anything affecting its substantial form or its quality or quantity that a body might suffer from two agents acting on it at one place, it would also suffer from them if one acted on it at one place and the other acted on it at the other place."
Example: Putting fire and water near a piece of wood here would have the same effect as putting fire near it in one of its locations and water near it at the other. This would follow from the preceding principle because an absolute form,* being simply prior to ubiety, does not vary because it is in different places.
10.43 A judicious use of these two principles will serve to solve the various instances raised in the objection as well as other similar quandaries.
Take the first case, viz., that the same thing that was moving in one place was at rest in the other. There is no contradiction here any more than there is for it to be both here and there. For local motion and rest are posterior by nature to ubiety itself and hence can be varied according to variation in what is prior.
10.44 The second case about heating and cooling can be solved by the second principle. For the result of heating and cooling something at two locations would be no different than trying to do both at one location. Should one agent prevail over the other, it would produce its effect in the body and prevent the effect of the other. If both were equally strong, they would induce some intermediate state. The same thing would happen if the body were simultaneously in two places.
[18] 10.45 The same principle solves the continuity problem. If a divisive agent should prevail over whatever preserves the continuity of the body, then wherever it be, it will be divided, though not by someone at both places. The reply here is similar to the question as to how Christ's body would exist in the consecrated host when it was separated from his soul on the cross.
10.46 The fourth case about something being both living and dead can be solved even more easily in the same fashion, for if the substantial form is simply separated from matter by an agent acting on the living body at one place, then it will not remain united to that matter at the other place. Thus the body of Christ would not be said to be living in the Eucharist when it was dead on the cross.
10.47 As for the second principal "absurdity" [in 10.37], viz., that two bodies could coexist in the same place, one could say this is neither incongruous nor impossible, for there is no apparent con-
GOD AND CREATURES
tradiction involved. For oneness of place is not formally unity of body. Indeed, the body has its own intrinsic unity to which unity of place is incidental. Therefore, this does not follow: "Every body that is in this same place is the same body." Simultaneity does not alter the oneness of the body or of the place.
10.48 As for the authority [in 10.37] of Aristotle's Physics, one could say that his proof only shows that a body by its own power or that of any created nature cannot be in more than one adequate place. It proves nothing about what unlimited divine power can accomplish, 10.49 [About the third meaning] As for the third interpretation
[in 10.30], viz., that something which previously exists and continues to be can become the term of a new conversion without acquiring anything new at all, one could declare this is possible as follows. When God conserves a creature, the term of the conservation is not something new; it is the same thing that is conserved and it has the same being it had before. Conservation, then, be it regarded actively or passively, requires no novelty in its term. Therefore, neither does conversion.
10.50 Explanation of the entailment: As God conserves this thing by willing it to have being, as it were, after having had this being, so by willing that this thing have being after that, God could convert that into this, because he makes the latter exist. And in some sense, at least, what ceases to be is succeeded by the being of what existed before and continues to exist, even if "succeeded" is not taken in its proper sense. To be the term of an action, however, it is not necessary that something follow another in the simple and proper sense of "follow," namely as something new, as is clear from the case of conservation. On this interpretation, one could say that just as God with the same volition creates something, insofar as he wills it to exist after it did not exist, and he conserves it, insofar as he wills it to be, as it were, after it had been, so he could by the same volition turn that into this because he willed this to continue after that.
10.51 You may argue: How can this be the term of a conversion or of any action positively if it does not get some being in the process, since even the term of a divine action receives being through that action?
One could say that all that is required of the term of the action is that the being which positively results from the action is something it gets either simply or with reference to something else. And thus the term of the conversion could be said to receive being with ref-
QUESTION TEN
erence to what was turned into it, insofar as God wanted its being to follow that of the other.
10.52 Another solution would be to say that a positive action produces its term either simply or equivalently, and that this conversion is of the second type insofar as the productive action, on its part, suffices to give being to the term and if the latter does not receive being, it is only because it already had it.
10.53 One argument against the explanation [in 10.30] is that on this interpretation one could say that whatever God annihilates, he turns into the sun,* because he wants the sun to retain its being after the being of the thing he annihilates, just as he wants this preexisting thing to remain after the being of whatever is turned into it, 10.54 Another way of explaining how a conversion of the sort
[in 10.39] is possible might be this: If something can be the term of a conversion when accompanied by something posterior in the sense that per se the term itself does not include it, then it can also be the term of a conversion where this accompanying feature is absent.
This is clear, because as prior, it is the term of the change, and from the prior qua prior, the posterior can be absent. But it is the substance of Christ's body that is the per se term of transubstantiation, even though accompanied by a new presence, namely it is now under the species of bread, as we said in explaining the second meaning [in 10.32]. Therefore, Christ's body could also be the term of a conversion without this presence or anything new which would be posterior to the being of the body itself.?°
ARTICLE III
About the Conversion Itself 10.55 As for the third point [mentioned in 10.3], it is generally held that this conversion does not involve an annihilation of the terminus a quo. bails) 10.56 [An unacceptable theory] One opinion deduced from this is that after the change it is not true that nothing of the bread remains. Proof of the entailment: If there were nothing, one would have to say that the bread was annihilated. And if there is not noth20 He is not speaking of the type of conversion that requires the permanence of something common to both terms. Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.ii, q.3, 0.17 (ed. Vivés xv, 377-78). As was said above in this same question, what is required in this type of conversion is that the terms be under the power of the agent as regards their being and non-being.
21 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. 1x, q.g (fol. 3710; x1, q.4 (fol. 450L).
GOD AND CREATURES
ing, the argument continues, then there is something, but this is not what was there before, for that was changed. Neither is it something outside the terminus ad quem. This is evident if we run through the various alternatives. Therefore, after the change there is that into which it was turned, so that it is true to say: What was bread is now the body of Christ. Or if this be denied, then one has to admit that something of Christ's body is what was formerly bread.
10.57 Against the added comment that after the change what remains of the bread is not nothing, therefore it is something, one can argue first as follows:
What is no different in itself after the change than it was before does not acquire something it did not have before. Now the body of Christ is no different in itself after the conversion than it was before. Now before the bread was changed, his body did not have in itself something of the bread; neither was something of his body something of the bread. Therefore, his body does not have something of the bread in it after the conversion.
10.58 Furthermore, the existence of the terminus ad quem of the change requires the nonexistence of the terminus a quo. This is clear if the terms are opposed, since the existence of one opposite excludes that of the other. Therefore the terminus ad quem of the conversion as such does not contain in itself the entity or any part of the terminus a quo.
10.59 [Another unacceptable view] Another explanation"? is that the bread is not annihilated because it remains potentially in the matter of Christ's body.
10.60 Against this it is argued that then God could not annihilate something material unless at the same time he would annihilate everything material, for if anything material remained it would contain potentially every material thing.
10.617? Furthermore, where one whole turns into another whole, the matter of the terminus a quo does not remain. In transformations of this sort which require matter, then, any matter remaining would be that which perished.
10.62 [A third inadmissible opinion] Another*! gives this explanation: According to Aristotle,?° natural change takes various forms.
One is from no subject to a subject and that is generation.* Another 22 Giles of Rome, Theoremata, prop.1,32 (fol. 1v, 221-231).
23 'This paragraph, 10.61, is not found in the MSS.
24 William of Ware, Sent. Iv, d.11.
25 Aristotle, Physic. v, c.1 (225a3-6).
QUESTION TEN
is from a subject to no subject and that is corruption.* Still another is from one subject to another, as in the case of alteration and generally in the case of any movement, which is properly movement.
The case is similar in regard to supernatural transmutations. One form is from no subject to a subject, as in the case of creation; another is the converse, as in annihilation; still another is from a subject to another subject, as the total conversion of one positive thing into another. Therefore this conversion is not an annihilation, because it has something positive as a per se term.
10.63 Against this one can argue that if there are two positive terms, accompanying them are two negative terms. The situation is similar to natural changes where both generation and corruption* are involved. Here the two negative terms are associated with the two positive ones, as when the being of the water that is to perish is linked with the non-being of the fire to be generated, and the being of the fire is accompanied by the non-being of the water.
It is the same in our case. The being of the bread is associated with the non-being of the body of Christ and the being of the body is accompanied by the non-being of the bread.
10.64 And then one can argue. The change can be called creation or annihilation in virtue of its per se terms but not in virtue of what accompanies them, even as generation is not per se creation, because the per se terminus a quo is not nothing but privation, and the same is true of the per se terminus ad quem of the corruption.
Hence, when one compares the per se terms of this conversion, which are the existence and nonexistence of the bread, since this nonexistence is total inasmuch as nothing of the bread remains, it would follow that this destruction considered per se would be an annihilation.
10.65 [A more plausible explanation, apparently Scotus' own] One could put forth another explanation that would apply to our case the example [in 10.63] of something perishing or corrupting, where the transmutation ends with something positive that is not only its per accidens term (namely that which is the per se term of the concomitant generation) but also (since the corruption which affects the form alone is only a partial destruction) with the per se other part of the composite, viz., the matter. Hence the resulting corruption is not an annihilation, because something of what was destroyed remains. Similarly, what remains is not the per se terminus ad quem of the corruption. Therefore this destruction is distinguished even more from annihilation by its per se term, because
[ 23 ] this is not an absolute negation or pure nothingness, but a negation
GOD AND CREATURES
in something which has an aptitude for form, viz., a privation."° Therefore, one could say that the form is not annihilated, because what succeeds it as a term is not nothing, but a privation of this form. And even if both of these grounds were wanting, for example, if God suddenly converted the whole of fire into the whole of water without any common subject remaining, it still would not be an annihilation, because the terminus ad quem [the water] of this destruction of fire, although it is not properly a privation of the form of fire [as would be the case if the matter of the fire continued to exist under the form of water], it is still not a negation that rules out every category of being [i.e., it is not pure nothingness that is the term of this conversion but the whole of water], but it is a negation included in the opposite positive form [i.e., it has a kind of potentiality in the other positive thing in that God, by a reverse action, could reconvert the whole of the water back into the whole of the fire]. But a negation that is [a quasi potentiality] in some category of things cannot be the terminus a quo of a creation.
10.66 In the case of transubstantiation, though the first two grounds [mentioned in 10.65] are wanting, since nothing of the terminus a quo [i.e., the bread] remains and properly speaking its form does not "remain" as a privation, because the same substrate
[or matter] that had received it is not carried over, nevertheless the third ground [for denying annihilation] still obtains, for the destruction of the bread ended with a negation that did not rule out eveything but is "included" in the being of the terminus ad quem
[i.e., the body of Christ].
10.67 But against this, it is objected: That the terminus ad quem is something positive is only incidental to the term of the destruction. Therefore, in essence [quantum ad per se rationem] this destruction now is precisely the sort of thing it would have been had this positive term not accompanied it.
10.68 To this one could counter that an absolute negation, a negation that does not rule out every kind of thing, and the negation called "'privation" are no different formally as negations. Nevertheless they are distinguished in that one and not the other is the per se term of a certain type of change, such as decay. So too in the case of transubstantiation, the negation as included in the positive term that results is the per se term of the change.?
26 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.28, nn.12-15
(VI, 111-14).
27 Tbid., 1v, d.11, q.4, nn.6ff. (ed. Vivés xvi, 448ff.).
QUESTION TEN
Reply to the Initial Arguments [25 ] 10.69 [To the first argument in 10.1] As for the initial argument, something can be a common term in two ways. Either (1) there is a real commonness such as matter, which is the common substrate of both terms when something perishes. In a complete or total conversion there is no need for this sort of common element, indeed it is inconsistent with the very idea of such a conversion. Or (2) the common term may refer to something conceptual, for instance, that both terms fall under the notion of being. And this suffices to exclude the notion of annihilation and creation. In this way, one may say that these species and the preexistent [body of Christ] have something in common.
10.70 There is another sense in which we could say the terms have something in common though not essentially. It is their common relationship to the same agent, since both terms of the conversion fall under its power in the same way. This would also be enough to rule out annihilation, because pure nothingness does not fall under any agent's power, properly speaking, since it is not something causable.
10.71 [To the argument in 10.2] The counter-argument proves that nature can convert one thing into another by a complete conversion and thus requires no common substance, which is manifestly incongruous so far as any natural transmutation is concerned, according to the Philosopher."* Therefore, to this argument we must reply: I concede a natural agent can cause every change in these species that can be caused in a changeable subject. But in the Eucharist there is no substance that could be changed substantially because here there is no substance, neither matter, nor the composite. Hence a natural agent cannot cause a substantial change but only an accidental one in which quantity suffices as subject. Since nature never corrupts anything except by inducing incompatible qualities, in that moment, then, in which the Eucharist first ceases to exist through the action of a natural agent, there would be produced by virtue of nature a certain accidental combination, namely, of a quantity of such quality as would be incompatible with the Eucharist which perishes; and the subject of this composite [i.e., the quantity] preexisted, and the form was induced by a created agent which possesses such a form [virtually] in its active power."
28 Aristotle, Physic. 1, c.7 (190a32-35, 191a8-13).
29 Cf, Duns Scotus, Ord. Iv, d.12, q.4 (ed. Vives xvul, 614-31).
Zoo
GOD AND CREATURES
10.72 But is any substance produced in such a case? I reply: Not by any action of nature, for there is nothing from which nature could produce a substance. Consequently, if substance is produced,
[ 26 | it is by the action of God, who has so ordained that an accident never exists without a subject except as long as the Eucharist remains. Therefore, when it has ceased, God produces the composite substance which is naturally suited to support these accidents caused by the natural agent. This new substance, however, would not be needed for the action of nature. Indeed, in the order of nature, it follows such an action. Neither does it occur necessarily for God could fail to produce this substance. It follows only because
God so disposes.
10.73 [The cessation of the Eucharistic presence] There are two opinions as to how the Eucharist ceases to be present.
One, which seems to be that of Innocent,*° claims [the substance of bread returns]. As he says in De officio Missae, although the species that remain could still inhere in the substance of bread or wine were they present, yet if their alteration has progressed to such a stage that if bread and wine appeared such it would not be suitable nourishment, the Eucharist ceases to exist and at that same instant by divine action a new substance will come to be there which is suited to be of this quality. Now this will be the substance of bread, and it will continue to undergo alteration until the moment the new substance is generated, and nature will produce this by corrupting that composite substance which the divine action restored.
10.74. The other opinion*? is that the Eucharist remains as long as those qualities remain that could characterize the substance that was converted [i.e., bread or wine], even though if bread or wine were there they would not be regarded as suitable for nourishment.
The Eucharist then would not cease to exist until the stage at which bread would cease to exist. And according to this view it must be said that in that instant when the species are corrupted or perish, then there is a new substance, but it is not bread, because it would not be apt to support the qualities, inconsistent with bread, that have already been induced. But this substance is the sort that nature would have produced from the bread that perished, if the substance of bread had been there.
80 Innocent III, De sacro altaris mysterio 1v, c.g: PL 217, 861-62. Cf.
Duns Scotus, Ord. 1v, d.12, q.6, n.g (ed. Vives xvul, 640-41).
3t'Thomas, Summa theol. 1, q.77, aa.4-5 (IV, 518ff.).