Question Four: Could The First Divine Person Remain
Question Four
COULD THE FIRST DIVINE PERSON REMAIN
CONSTITUTED AS A PERSON, DISTINCT FROM
THE OTHER PERSONS, APART FROM THE
RELATIONSHIP OF ORIGIN?
4.1 The next question concerns the connection between the relationship of origin* and the persons, especially the first person, namely: Could the first divine person remain constituted as a per- [1] son, distinct from the other persons, apart or prescinding from the relationship of origin??
Arguments Pro and Con Argument for the affirmative:
What adds to a person already constituted neither constitutes nor distinguishes him primarily. But such is the relationship of origin as regards the first person. Therefore, [the relationship of origin neither constitutes nor distinguishes the first person primarily].
Proof of the minor: A relation of origin results from acting or being acted upon, according to the Metaphysics.2 What pertains to the first person can come only from acting, since he does not proceed from anyone. But acting requires an existing suppositum* inasmuch as the notion of acting presupposes the notion of a suppositum.
Therefore, the first person is a person or suppositum by virtue of something antecedent to the relation itself.
4.2 'To the contrary:
Apart from the relations, there is nothing but the essence or common substance. Now this cannot be what formally constitutes a person, since it is neither incommunicable* nor proper to any one of them. Therefore, [apart from a relation, there is nothing to constitute a person].
Body of the Question 4.3 The question itself presupposes the common view that a divine person is constituted by a relation.* This is not discussed here
1 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.28, nn.1-51 (v1, 107-37); d.26 (vi, 1-61).
2 Aristotle, Metaph. v, c.15 (1020bg0, 1021a16-19). d 3 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.26, q.un. (v1, 4ff.).
QUESTION FOUR
since it is more difficult than the issue raised, but in these questions it has been presupposed as commonly conceded, for there is no need to call everything into doubt when the question at issue can be settled on the basis of what is commonly admitted.
This is not a general question of whether it is possible for some person to be constituted by a relation, but it concerns the first person specifically. For there appears to be a special difficulty in his regard, since his priority to the other persons seems to clash with the nature of correlatives.
Assuming the common opinion, therefore, we have four points to investigate in this special question about the first person:
(1) Granted that some divine person is constituted by a relation, as the question seems to assume, would this be something specifically repugnant to the first person? (2) If not, by what relation could the first person be constituted? (3) How are the various relations commonly admitted to be present in the first person interrelated? (4)
Finally, by way of corollary, it will become clear what kind of abstracting or prescinding might be compatible with the notion of what constitutes the first person.
ARTICLE 1
Is it Repugnant that the First Person be Constituted by a Relation?
[3] 4.4 [It is not repugnant that persons of the same nature have personal properties which are by nature simultaneous] On the first question, I accept this proposition: '"To persons of the same nature, it is not repugnant to have personal properties which are simultaneous in nature."
4.5 Proof of this proposition: There is no priority of nature or essence among persons of the same nature. This is confirmed by the Philosopher,* who on this point agrees with Plato: "In those things which are of the same species there is no prior and posterior." But, by hypothesis, the second person can be constituted by a relation of origin [viz., begotten]; therefore it is not repugnant to the first person to be constituted by some property which is simultaneous in nature with it, such as another relation of origin [viz., begetting].
4.6 Besides, if it were specifically repugnant to the first person to be constituted by a relationship of origin, it would not be because of something common to him and the other persons, for by stipulation it is not repugnant to another [to be so constituted]. Therefore, it would be by something peculiar to the first person. But this is not 4 Aristotle, Metaph. 111, c.3 (999a5-6).
GOD AND CREATURES
the case, for the first person has nothing special except this priority of origin in virtue of which every other person proceeds from him, whereas he proceeds from none. This priority, however, does not militate against his being constituted by a relationship to the second person. Any repugnance, if there were such, would come from the fact that the simultaneity between the two terms required by the relationship seems to conflict with this person's priority.
But there is no true conflict here. Proof: When there are several orders of different kinds, one of which does not include or presuppose the other as a necessary prerequisite or concomitant condition, the first can be without the other: it can even co-exist with a simultaneity that excludes the other order. This is clear enough from this example. The order of duration and of nature are such that the latter does not include the former, nor does it require it as a prior or concomitant condition. Therefore, there can be an order or priority of nature* without a temporal priority. This is also clear from reason. Separation is never impossible unless one includes the other or has to have it as a prior or concomitant condition. Now the order of nature or essential order,* on the one hand, and the order of origin, on the other, are not so related that the latter always includes the essential order or presupposes it as a necessary or concomitant condition. Therefore, simultaneity opposed to an essential priority* or order is compatible with an order or priority of origin.* But simultaneity opposed to an essential order is enough to account for the simultaneity required for correlatives. Therefore, some things can be simultaneous with the simultaneity characteristic of correlatives
(i.e., an essential simultaneity) and nevertheless an order of origin may exist between them.
4.7 Proof of the minor, which has two parts, viz., that the order of origin neither (a) includes the other order, nor (b) has it as a prerequisite. An essential order or order of nature necessarily includes imperfection in one of the extremes, viz., in the posterior.' An order of origin, on the other hand, only requires that one come from the other, but the fact that this is so does not necessarily include imperfection in the second, for it does not necessarily imply that the sub- * He speaks of the essential order, which exists between an equivocal cause* and its effect. Outside such an order what is posterior in nature is not thereby more imperfect. Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.8, n.178 (iv, 246-47);
Iv, 4.49, q.4, .5 (ed. Vivés xx1, 98); Ord. prol., nn.265-66 (1, 179-80): cf. infra, Quodl. Q. 13; Ord. 1, d.5, nn.46-157 (Iv, 39-86); d.7, nn.1-91
(IV, 107-
48); d.ig, nn. 54-68 (v, 57-64); d.28, nn.6-51 (v1, 107-37); m1, di, q.1
(ed.
Vives XI, 6-45).
QUESTION FOUR
ject which proceeds is less perfect by nature than that from which it proceeds, for the procession as such does not have to be equivocal* so that the form would be less perfect in the product than in the producer.
ARTICLE By What Relation could the First Person be Constituted?
4.8 a) [Proof it is by a relation opposed to that which constitutes the second person] According to what is assumed [in 4.3, viz., that a person is constituted by a relation], I say about this article that the second person is constituted by one distinct relation and that by another relation opposed to this the first person is constituted.
4.9 It is proved in this way: The first positive incommunicable property is that which constitutes the first person. Such is the property which corresponds correlatively to the first relation in the person produced. Therefore, [this constitutes the first person].
4.10 'The major is evident. Since the person includes the essence and an incommunicable entity (which are presupposed in this question) according to Richard,°® it is not necessary that the property of the first person imply of itself something other than the first incommunicable entity.
4.11 The minor is evident. According to the common view presupposed in this question, only a property that has to do with origin can be incommunicable in the divine. Hence, in the first person only the property pertaining to the first in origin is incommunicable, for what pertains to the second in origin is communicable, because it is shared by two productive persons. What pertains to the first active production, however, is opposed to what pertains to the first passive. As the Son has the first property of being generated or spoken, so the Father has the first incommunicable property of speaking or begetting, for this pertains to the Father insofar as he has a fecund intellect which is the first productive factor in the Father.
4.12 b) [Objection to the major premise and its solution] Objections are raised to both premises of this argument.' First, against the major:
6 Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate iv, cc.21-24:
PL 196, 944-47; ed.
J. Ribaillier (Paris, 1958), 186-go.
7 Bonaventure, Sententiarum 1, d.27, p.1, a.un., q.2 (Opera, ed. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1883-1902, 1, 46off.); Roger Marston, De emanatione aeterna q.2 in corp. (BFS vu, 28-33, 41, 55-56).
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[Objection] It seems that the primary factor constituting the first person is his being unbegotten, and then the major is false, viz., that the first positive property is the personal property.
4.13 Authority and reason both substantiate this. The authority is that of Damascene®: "The Son has all things whatsoever that the Father has, except the Father's being unbegotten, which does not imply any difference in substance ... but rather a manner of existence."
4.14 The reason is this: An incommunicable principle is the primary constitutive factor in the first person. This is proved because the essence is not only the reason for a person's being in a simple or unqualified sense, but also for his being this; hence only incommunicability is required to complete the notion of a person, so that the person is the result of what is had first [i.e., the essence] plus incommunicability. But "unbegotten" seems to imply an incommunicable principle. Therefore, [unbegotten constitutes the first person].
4.15 Proof of this minor: What proceeds from one, but has another proceed from it, is related to the first before the second.
Proof: It has its first being from its source and any order to what proceeds from it presupposes this being. From this proposition about a positive order to both the prior and the posterior, this consequent is inferred. 'To a being which has no order to the anterior but only to the posterior which stems from it, the negation of an order to the anterior pertains to it before its order to the posterior.
Now the first person is not ordered to anything anterior, but he does have an order to his posterior. Therefore, the negation of any order to an anterior is his first characteristic; such is unbegotten.
4.16 Proof that the negation of any order to an anterior is a characteristic prior to his order to any posterior: Contradictories are referred not only to the same moment of duration or time, but also, one could say, to the same '"'now" or "sign of nature.'"'* This appears clear inductively. Because "Man is rational' is true in the first mode of per se predication,* and "Man is risible" in the second per se mode, and "Man is white' in the per accidens mode, one could assign instants or signs of nature on the basis of the order among these predications. And then it would not be contradictory to affirm 'Man is rational per se in the first mode or first sign of nature" and to deny 'Man is rational in the second mode or second sign of nature," even as it would not be contradictory to say 'Man is white in the third sign" and "Man is not white in the second or first sign." It is
* Damascene, De fide orth. 1, c.8: PG 94, 818; ed. Buytaert c.8, 35.
QUESTION FOUR
clear then there would be no contradiction unless it is a matter of the same sign of nature. And similarly as regards "signs of origin," * it is clearly contradictory ''to be from another" and "not to be from another.' It would be in the same sign, therefore, that "to be from another" would be ascribed to one who had this characteristic, and that "not to be from another" would be ascribed to another who had that characteristic. And just as his relation to his source is prior in terms of origin to his relation to his product for one who comes from another, so too for one who is not from anyone, the negation of any order to a prior is anterior to his positive order to his posterior.
4.17 If one objects that a negation lacks what is needed to constitute a person, they® reply that this personal element, which one thinks of as added to the essence, suffices to give the first grounds for incommunicability. For the essence gives the person his being, his singularity, and whatever positive characteristics he has. If then a further affirmation or negation could be the grounds for incommunicability, this would suffice to constitute the person. But the negation in question does have this property, viz., of being the first grounds for incommunicability, as has been proved [in 4.15ff.].
Therefore, {it suffices to constitute the first person].
4.18 [Answer to the objection against the major] Against this type of reasoning, it is argued: The property constitutive of a person is in every way formally and primarily incommunicable.'° No negation of itself is formally and primarily incommunicable. But "unbegotten,'"' insofar as it is distinguished formally from both the essence and the positive relation to the person produced, includes nothing more than a negation formally, for, as many authorities, including Augustine,"! make clear: "To call the Father unbegotten is not to say what he is, but what he is not." Therefore, [unbegotten is not his constitutive property].
4.19 The first proposition is patent. Since a person is formally incommunicable, that by which he is primarily a person must be formally incommunicable.
The second proposition is clear, for no negation, considered absolutely, is proper to anything. Put another way, if it does pertain of ® Roger Marston, De emanat. aeterna q.2, ad 5 and 13 (BFS vit 35, 37).
10 Cf, Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.28, nn.12-20, 27-28 (vi, 111-17, 120-21); d.36, nn.58-59 (VI, 294-95); d.23, nn.21-23 (Vv, 360-63). According to Scotus the divine person is constituted by something positive.
11 Augustine, De Trin. v, c.6, n.7: PL 42, 915; CCSL 50, 212.
GOD AND CREATURES
necessity to one subject alone, this is because the affirmation opposed to such a negation is repugnant to that subject. Only in virtue of something positive, however, is an affirmation repugnant to anything. If it were repugnant because of some negation, we would have to ask if that negation presupposes something positive to which some other affirmation is opposed. And then either our thesis holds good or something positive is not presupposed (and then a negation is simply first as regards the unity, the distinction, and, therefore, the entity characteristic of a person, which is incongruous), or it must be maintained that the negation presupposes something which, though positive, is not proper (and then it follows that the negation is not proper either, because that in virtue of which it pertains to the person, is not proper to him).
4.20 [Two counter-arguments to our answer] Against the minor [in 4.18], it is argued'? that "unbegotten'' does not mean simply a negation, but a measure of perfection, since it implies having being or existence of itself or a se.
Another challenge to the minor is this:'* "Unbegotten'"' implies a fontal plenitude* which is simply perfection in the first person, according to Augustine."
4.21 [Reply to the counter-arguments] Against the first: In [4.20] the phrase "having existence of itself," "of" is either indicative of a cause or positive principle, and then the contradiction is immediately evident, for no mind can grasp the idea of something begetting itself, as Augustine!' points out, or else it is taken in a purely negative sense, 1.e., there is nothing that functions as a cause or source, and then you have what the minor proposed.
Against the second: "Fontal plenitude" [in 4.20] asserts either something negative (the point we wished to make) or something positive. If positive, this is either the essence (and then if "'unbegotten" is a personal property, so too is the essence) or a positive rela- '2 Roger Marston, De emanat. aeterna q.2 in corp., ad 5, 13, 25 (BFS vil, 28-29, 35, 37, 41).
13 Walter of Bruges, Sententiarum 1, d.28, p-1, q.2 in corp.: Cod. Vat.
Chigi (B.v1, 94, fol. 53r); q.5 in corp.
(fol. 53v); Alexander of Hales, Summa theologica 1, n.481
(ed. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1924-48, 1, 683-84); Bonaventure, Sent. 1, d.27, a.un., q.2, ad 3 (1,
470-71); Roger Marston, De emanat. aeterna, q.2 in corp., ad 8 (BFS vn, 30-36) Thomas, Summa theol. 1, 4.33, a.4 in corp., ad. 1 (1, 175-76).
4 Augustine, De Trin. v, cc.6-7: PL 42, 914-16; CCSL so, 211-14.
UN oyo amen, reg WAL, "iy, exe (OCESIL 50, 28.
QUESTION FOUR
tion. Since this is obviously a relationship to a person, it is either to one person or to several. Since it is not a relation to anyone producing, it must be to a person or persons produced. If the relation be to several, it will not be one formal principle, constitutive of a person. If it is a relation to one individual person, this is either the first or the second person produced. In either case, the original assumption is abandoned, viz., that ''unbegotten," as distinct from either paternity or spiration,* constitutes the person. If the relation be one which is abstracted from both of these, viz., paternity and spiration, then if some common relationship of this sort can be abstracted from these two, it follows that the first person is not marked out in existence as a person by some one, i.e., singular, relation, but rather by a relation that is somehow one, even though abstracted from two different kinds of relations, for—as we proved [in 2.46ff.] of a previous question—there cannot be two active productions of the same kind in God. Hence, the first person would not be formally constituted by some constitutive factor with at least a kind of specific unity, but by one abstracted from two different kinds of things as it were. There is no need to waste more time here, since many masters admit our thesis about the major, viz., that the first person, with which we are dealing here, is constituted by some positive incommunicable factor.
4.22 As for the appeal [in 4.13] to Damascene in support of the objection, namely that "unbegotten" is the constitutive factor, we can answer with his own words in that same chapter: "It is only in paternity, filiation, and procession, that we recognize their difference." Therefore, when he says earlier, "The Son has all things whatsoever that the Father has, except the Father's being unbegotten," we must understand "'unbegotten"' to include paternity. To put it briefly, he uses now one property, now another to designate the first person, as you can see from the different chapters, and hence by any one of them he understands some property peculiar [to the Father].
4.23 As for the proof [in 4.15], I concede a subject's order or relation to what is prior precedes its order to what is posterior, especially if the subject is something absolute. I also admit [regarding 4.16] that the negation of an order to anything prior precedes a positive relationship to what is posterior if the subject is an absolute, but not if it is formally constituted by its relationship to the posterior, for no order in such a subject can be prior to the order by which it is constituted, and the same holds for a negation of order.
GOD AND CREATURES
If the person were an absolute, one could admit that "unbegotten" was in some sense prior to paternity, but when the proposition
"Two contradictories refer to the same now, not only in the order of duration but also in the order of nature and origin" [cited in 4.16] is applied generally to any subject which has an order to a posterior but no order to any anterior, the proposition is true if understood of per se contradictories, like an affirmation in relation to its negation. It is not true, however, if understood of an affirmation and a negation in relation to some third thing of which they are predicated.
4.24 For example, white in A and non-white in B do not contradict each other as such; neither do they do so when related to anything else. This is so whether we understand A and B to be signs of duration or signs of nature or origin. But if white and non-white are related to something to which they pertain or can pertain, then if white pertains to C at moment A, there is no need that non-white pertain to C at that same moment, for what is absolutely first about anything is that it be itself. Man is first of all man. If he were a stone, he would be first of all a stone, just as stone is first stone. Man is not first of all non-stone, for no negation can be as identical with anything as the affirmation that it is itself. Hence I admit that in order to be contradictory, ''to be from someone" and "'not to be from someone' must be referred to the same instant or "now" in any order, so that to deny what is affirmed, one would have to say at that same instant it is both "from another' and "'not from another."
But "not to be from another" need not pertain to its subject with the same perfection and priority as "to be from another'' does, if such be the case. Consequently, if a suppositum is not ordered to something prior with a priority of origin, this negation does not pertain to it with the same priority that the affirmation of such an order would, if it were so ordered.*¢ 4.25 Cc) [Objections to the minor premise and their solutions?':
16 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.28, nn.12-20, 27-28 (VI, 111-17, 120-21); d.g6, nn.58-59 (VI, 294-95); d.23, nn.21-23 (Vv, 360-63).
17M, and W have the following long addition which seems to be an earlier version of 4.25ff.; Mz gives only the first two objections:
Other objections are raised against the minor of our main argument:
(1) The first incommunicable property in the first person is not an actual but an aptitudinal relation, since it is not concerned with paternity or generation as such but the ability to generate. Proof: Anything
QUESTION FOUR
First objection] The following point is raised against the minor premise of our argument [in 4.9].1° Although the relationship of the first person as the origin of the second is one in reality, nevertheless the mind makes a distinction as regards the way this relationship to the second person is present in the first. One can understand it (a) else presupposes this ability to generate; hence what we propose follows, viz., what constitutes the first person is not the actual but the aptitudinal relationship to the Son.
(2) What is in the first person as a kind of relationship to the second can be considered in two ways: one, as a property; the other, as a relation. In the second case, because of the nature of correlatives, it is simultaneous with the opposite, i.e., that which constitutes the second person.
In the first way, however, it can constitute the first person and the simultaneity characteristic of correlatives is not involved.
Two sorts of replies can be given to these objections, the first of which is a common rejoinder to both objections, the other attacks each separately.
The first common rejoinder is this. In the first divine person there is but one unique entity that is formally and primarily incommunicable and has actual or real existence. This is self-evident, for it is impossible that there should be several primary incommunicable actual entities in one and the same person. Nothing can be a personal property in a person unless it be formally, primarily, and per se incommunicable and has actual or extramental existence; for a divine person cannot be primarily this person in virtue of something potential or in some way not real or in virtue of something communicable or something not primarily incommunicable. Therefore, no matter how different the conceptions the intellect may form by abstraction, such as those mentioned above, when it considers what the real and per se constitutive feature of the first person is, there is no need to introduce any distinction here, because, as the major understands it, this real constitutive can only be something that is in every way one. And no matter how one thinks of it, this one real entity must be something that in itself is an act and not just a potency or aptitude, for there is nothing [in God] that is not there as fully actualized. In itself, then, this entity is either absolute or relative. And thus no matter how the mind distinguishes generativity or generation in the Father, in reality this first incommunicable entity, which represents the actual relationship of the first person to the second, must needs be the first incommunicable entity in the first person and thus is that which first formally constitutes this person.
Furthermore, one can argue against the two objections in two ways.
For the distinctions were introduced in both to avoid this common diffi-
GOD AND CREATURES
as an aptitude to generate (expressed by "generative") or (b) as an ability of the suppositum (expressed by "one able to generate') or (c) as an act (expressed by "generating'') or (d) as having his offspring coexisting (expressed by "Father"). What makes this relationship, which is really one, constitutive of the first person is that aspect of it that gives him his personal being. But this is the first of culty, viz., how can the first person be prior to the second and still be simultaneous in nature with him? For this reason some constitutive factor is sought that is to some degree not simultaneous with the second person. This seems to be why the first argument assumes the generative power as quasi simultaneous with, and not prior to, the second person, and the second argument seeks something that is at once a property and a relation. And although it is simultaneous with the Son as a relation, under its other aspect as property it could enjoy somehow a priority.
Both ways then, it seems, make some distinction to escape this difficulty, namely, that what is constitutive of the first person is in every way simultaneous with the second as one correlative is with another. But this is really no difficulty, nor is what they want to avoid an incongruity; rather it is something that has to be. Proof:
If one order neither includes another per se nor requires it as a prior condition, then there is nothing inconsistent about having one order without the other. This clearly holds not only for order but for other things as well. Now an order of © origin neither includes per se nor prerequires an essential order, at least one where the prior could exist without the posterior. An order of origin, therefore, can be present without an essential order; it is compatible with a simultaneity that excludes any order of the second kind. It is clear, then, that an order of origin can obtain between two relata neither of which can exist without the other and are thus simultaneous in nature with a simultaneity, namely, that is opposed to any order of nature. The minor was proved above, because an order of origin implies no more than that this one come from that one; this is compatible with a simultaneity of nature for no aspect of essence or of a principle is included in that order.
(This could be shown by means of an example, although the example is somehow dubious.) A personal property is in every way proper primarily to the person possessing it. It is impossible that it be in every way first and proper to any other being. Unbegotten as distinguished from the essence and from the positive relationship in the first person implies a negation per se.
Therefore, etc.
18 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. 1x, q.1 in corp.
(fol. 3411); q.g in corp. (fol.
348Q); Summa a.54, q.3 in corp.
(1, fol. 1290-Q); a.58, q-4 in corp.
(II, fol. 134K-135N); cf. nn.4.9 and 4.11.
QUESTION FOUR
all these (i.e., the generative aspect), for all of the others seem to characterize a person already constituted. Therefore [it is the first of these that is constitutive of the first person].
2) 4.26 Clarification of the minor [in 4.25]: The more immediate or basic aspect in virtue of which the first person is ordered to his
Opposite would be prior, for this distinction of aspects is in view of the way one person is ordered to its opposite. "Generative" is more basic or immediate to the first person than is ''Father," for all the other aspects include "generative," but the converse is not true. Not every generative is able to generate, but everything able to generate is generative. Not everything able to generate actually generates, but the converse is true. Not everyone who generates is a father. He may die before the foetus is formed in the womb. Yet every father whose foetus coexists, begets or has generated. Therefore, since "generative" is included in or presupposed by the other notions, it seems to be the first. Therefore, when to beget or generate is cited
[in 4.11] as the first incommunicable property of the first person in the minor of our main reason, this is true of the real relation referred to by "generating" or "begetting,' but it does not state the correct aspect which is not "generating" but "generative," for this is prior. And if one goes on to say that the second person is constituted by being generated precisely under the aspect of being generated, then this proposition would be false: "The first person is constituted by that relation which is the opposite of that which constitutes the second person," where this is understood not of the relation as it exists in reality but of the formal aspect under which that same relation is constitutive.
4.27 [Second objection] Another point raised against the same minor [in 4.9] is this!®: What is constitutive of the first person can be considered in two ways; one, as a property; the other, as a relation. Now it constitutes as a property, and therefore not as the relation corresponding to the relation in the second person.
4.28 Two sorts of replies are given to the objections [in 4.25 and 4.27], the first of which is directed against both conjointly, the second type deals with each singly.
The [first] common rejoinder is this: A relation only constitutes a person to the extent that it is real and extramental [ex natura ret]; otherwise it would not constitute a real person, for the real can be constituted only by what is there in reality or extramentally. This relationship of the first person is real or extramental, however, only
19 Thomas, Summa theol. 1, q.40, a.4 (I, 205); cf. supra nn.4.g and 4.11.
GOD AND CREATURES
insofar as it is most fully actualized. Now even though the mind could consider this relation either as an aptitude or as actual, since it only constitutes a divine person insofar as it is real or extramental, it follows it is constitutive only under the aspect of fullest actualization.
4.29 The same holds good of the second objection [in 4.27]. Even though the mind could consider paternity either as a property or as a relation, there is only one way that it exists in reality. Only under this real aspect is it constitutive, and this is not as something absolute, but as a relation. Now this relation is none other than that which corresponds to the second person. Thus the thesis we proposed follows.
4.30 The second common rejoinder [to 4.25 and 4.27] goes like this: The common reason for introducing a distinction to begin with (between ways of viewing the generative principle in the first argument; and between property and relation in the second) was to avoid making the constitutive element of the first person completely simultaneous with that of the second, for the former seems to be somehow prior to the latter. But there is no need to avoid this as though it were incongruous. For, as we argued in the first article
[4.6], given distinct types of order, if one does not include or presuppose the other as a necessary prerequisite, then order of this. type is compatible with a simultaneity that excludes order of the second type. Such is the order of origin (where one comes from another) with reference to the order of nature (where the prior can exist without the posterior). Here the order of origin neither includes nor necessarily presupposes the order of nature. Therefore order of origin is quite consistent with the simultaneity of nature that marks terms that entail each other. Such simultaneity is proper to correlatives. Therefore order of origin between the first and second persons or their respective constitutives is fully compatible with simultaneity of correlation. No ploy for preventing simultaneity is needed like that of the first argument [in 4.25], which makes generativity or some property other than paternity constitutive, or that of the second [in 4.27], which makes paternity as a property rather than as a relation constitutive. It is only in its one real aspect that paternity is constitutive, and as such it is related to the second person and hence simultaneous in nature with him.
4-31 Confirmation: What gives necessarily perfect being to another is of necessity prior to it in origin but simultaneous in nature inasmuch as it cannot exist without the other. To be prior in origin
QUESTION FOUR
but simultaneous in nature then is not inconsistent; indeed the two must go hand in hand where origin is perfect and complete.
4.32 An example provides a further confirmation, although there may be some doubt about this. If Socrates is the father of Plato, not only is Socrates prior to Plato in origin, but Socrates as father is prior in origin to Plato as son. I prove this because paternity is the per se cause of priority of origin. Now by including everything that is the per se cause of some priority, you do not eliminate this priority. Therefore, Socrates as father (insofar as this includes paternity, the basis for the priority) will still be anterior in origin to Plato as son (where son includes the ground for posteriority of origin). Nevertheless, Socrates as father is simultaneous in nature with Plato as son in the way one correlative is with another.
4-33 [Joint confirmation] The main argument [in 4.9] could also be firmed up against the two objections to the minor in this way:
In the case of the second person's constitutive entity no distinction between aptitude and actuality or between property and relation is postulated. Yet there is as much need of a positive and relative entity to constitute the first as to constitute the second person, for both are equally actual and incommunicable and according to the common interpretation only a relation of origin can be the primary incommunicable element.
4.34 [To the first objection in particular] Against the first objection [in 4.25] specifically it is argued, to begin with, that an aptitude never seems to be incommunicable in a primary sense, for it is incommunicable only in virtue either of its foundation or of that towards which it tends [terminus ad quem]*. If an aptitude as such
P15: is not primary but pertains to some being which has the aptitude, then neither its unity nor incommunicability will be first in any absolute sense, but they will be reducible to that of some other entity.
Now if this were communicable, then the resulting aptitude would also be communicable. In fact, generally speaking, answers in terms of aptitudes have little efficacy unless something is cited to account for the aptitude. Otherwise it would be easy to solve all problems by saying: "This is so because such and such exists." But this will not do. If questioned why a stone falls, it is not enough to say: "Because by nature it has an aptitude to fall." One must give a reason for the aptitude, namely that the stone is heavy and this because earth, the heavy element, predominates in its composition. And earth itself is heavy either by its specific essence or in virtue of some
[logically] prior quality. When it is argued then that a relation un-
GOD AND CREATURES
der the aspect of "generativity" rather than that of actually generating is constitutive, since it is under that aspect that it first imparts incommunicable being, one must reply that this minor is false on two counts: first, generativity as such does not contribute that fully actualized being which alone can exist in the divine. Second, generativity as such does not impart primarily that incommunicable being required per se for personal being.
4.35 Also the proof of what is more basic or immediate [given in 4.26] in clarifying the minor actually supports our contention. For the relation of origin the first person bears to the second is most fully actual and simply incommunicable only under that aspect under which he relates immediately to the second. Indeed, if that were eliminated, there would be nothing else there that is most actual or incommunicable. (The suggestion [in 4.25] that all aspects other than "generative" seem to characterize a person already constituted, we shall take up later in our answer to the main argument
[in 4.67].) But there is yet another way in which the argument about what is more immediate can be turned in favor of our conclusion.
The second person is formally constituted by a relation that refers immediately to the first person. No one assumes he is constituted by his ability to be generated. A similar argument could be made for our thesis.
[16] 4.36 As for the point [in 4.26] that "generative" is included in all the other aspects but not vice versa, note that this does not imply any priority as to personal constitution, for there is no priority as regards incommunicable actuality but only as regards what this implies and here the prior is the more common and the less incommunicable.
4.37 [To the second objection in particular in 4.27] Against the second, we can argue that no individual entity can exist extramentally unless it is formally either relative or absolute. Even though, according to some, it is perhaps possible to have a concept that is indifferent to either the absolute or the relative, no extramental thing could be so indifferent that it would be a per se individual entity that is neither absolute nor relative. Let us then call A that property which is said to constitute the person. Now I ask: Is A's entity in reality formally absolute or formally relative? If absolute, then what it constitutes will also be formally absolute, which they deny; if relative, then A is a relation insofar as it formally constitutes the person, which is our thesis.
4-38 Besides, when you say "paternity as property" what do you
QUESTION FOUR
mean? The qualification "as property" expresses either (1) the formal constitutive element or (2) something subsequent to it in reality or in the mind. If you mean the second, then you must concede that the formal constitutive it presupposes and qualifies is "paternity as paternity,' for this is the only formal reality subsequently qualified. Hence, the constitutive element is an entity that is relative per se. If you mean the first, since what property implies precisely is a conceptual relation, the absurd consequent follows that the first person is constituted by a relation of the mind.?° The proof that property implies no more than a conceptual relation lies in this, that it asserts the relationship of paternity to the father. Now this is a purely mental relation, for there is no distinction between paternity and the Father.
4.39 This last point can be clarified in this way. Although [paternity] represents a real relation with reference to a really distinct opposite [viz., the Son], the mind can relate it to its foundation or subject, and if no real distinction is to be found there, then this "relating'' is a matter of the mind or reason alone. But now the intellect can consider this subject as rooting this relationship of reason. Reflection of this sort does not change anything in the relation itself which was first considered. For example, man's capacity to laugh can be considered as his property, or "rational'' as his specific difference, or "humanity" as his nature or quiddity.* None of these considerations alters per se the essence of what is considered. If in answer to the questions "Under what aspect is risibility demonstrable of man?" or "'Is risible as risible his proper attribute?" it would be true to say: ""Risible as a property is demonstrated of man," what is denoted by "as" is not something apart from, but constitutive of, the notion of risible, even though it appears as something appended to it. Consequently, if risible is a quality as such, then even as a proper attribute demonstrated of man, risible is a quality, not a relation, although what is called its mode, namely "property," does assert a relation.
4.40 Similarly, if rational as such is, in its own fashion, substance, then rational as man's specific difference is substance in the same way, even though the fact that it is a specific difference implies a certain conceptual relation, since it involves a second intention. And so it is in general with any real entity said to belong to something that can be considered either in itself or according to some concep20 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.28, nn.89-92
(VI, 152-54); d.26, nn.56-72 (VI, 22-20).
GOD AND CREATURES
tual relation. If the entity is said to pertain to it ''as SUChine VIZerased property or [specific] difference, the essential meaning of what is qualified by such a relationship is not destroyed. Neither is such a relationship the formal ground for some really inherent predicate.
It is merely the aspect under which the predicate pertains to the subject. What this reduplicative phrase "as such' asserts is clear from what was said in article two of the previous question [3.27-30].
4.41 As for the case at hand, since paternity as property represents only a certain conceptual relation, the formal meaning of that of which such a relation is asserted will always remain the same, and it will be just this that is the reason why any predicate is asserted of the subject. Thus if paternity as paternity is a relation, then paternity as property will also be a relation. For if the word
'as' were understood as expressing the proper causal reason for the inherence of a real predicate in its subject, then just as this proposition, 'Paternity as property is a relation to the Son," is false, so too is this other, 'Paternity as property is a real relation." As property, it is a relation of reason, for the fact it is a property is not grounds for the inherence of any real predicate, since this formally asserts a mental relation. In particular where real or extramental constitution is involved, an ''as"' of this sort helps not one whit, for what formally constitutes something real must itself be real and must constitute it as real.
4.42 [An additional objection to our main argument] There is still another way of countering the minor of our proof [in 4.9] along the lines of the second objection [about paternity] as property [in 4.27]. It claims the divine essence constitutes the person, not considered absolutely as essence, but insofar as it is only mentally distinct from the relation.
Proof of the first point [viz., that essence constitutes the person]:
To subsist per se is characteristic of the persons, but only the essence gives grounds for subsisting, for as Augustine?! says: "The substance is that by which the Father is or subsists.'' And he makes the same point earlier**: "Everything subsists in respect to itself; how much more God?" [Proof of the second point]:
It is only through the relation, however, that one person is coupled with his opposite.
4.43 [To the objection in 4.42] On the contrary, when the essence *1 Augustine, De Trin. vu, c.6,n.11: PL 42, 943; CCSL 50, 262.
22 Ibid., c.4, n.g: PL 42, 942; CCSL so, 260.
QUESTION FOUR
is said to constitute the first person insofar as it differs only mentally from the relation, "insofar" either gives the formal reason of what is principiated* or it gives what follows that formal reason. If it is the first, since what differs only mentally from the relation is at best a relation of reason, it follows that a conceptual relation is the formal grounds for constituting a person. If it is the second, I ask just what is that [prior subject] as regards which "insofar as' gives some consequent reason. It can only be the essence in itself. For you claim the divine essence [constitutes the person, not considered absolutely but as mentally distinct, etc.]. But then the essence in itself will be the extramental grounds for constituting the person, which is what you deny.
4-44 Besides, the essence as merely conceptually distinct from the relation is either communicable or not. If communicable, then something communicable formally constitutes the incommunicable. If it is incommunicable and the essence qua essence differs in every way only mentally from the relation, it will be exclusively an absolute entity and thus will not formally refer to another as does the relation. Nevertheless it will not be really distinct from the relation.
Therefore, the essence in every way as essence is only conceptually distinct from the relation and in that case, as before [in 4.37ft.], the essence as essence will constitute the persons.
In similar fashion one could argue that if the essence constitutes solely as conceptually distinct from the relation, then the essence is either absolute or relative. If absolute, what is formally constituted
[ 20 ] [i.e., the person] will also be absolute; if relative, then the essence as such will be relative, since the essence qua essence differs only conceptually from the relation, as was proved.
4.45 Furthermore, it is always the case that what constitutes also provides the reason why one person differs or agrees with another.
But the constitutive entity always constitutes of itself and not insofar as it agrees or differs from another. For instance rational is of itself constitutive of man and not insofar as it agrees or differs, although the man so constituted does agree or differ from others formally by reason of what is rational. Distinction or agreement then belong to what is constituted by virtue of its formal constitutive ground, but this is not something included in the constitutive reason itself. Here then you must give some constitutive reason which provides the grounds why the one constituted agrees or differs yet is present there in such a way that precisely as constitutive reason it does not include per se and primarily the agreement or difference. oF
GOD AND CREATURES
4.46 As for the supporting argument for the objection [in 4.42] based on the notion of "subsisting," I say that "to subsist' is equivocal. In one sense it means "per se being or existence'' insofar as this excludes inherence or being in another as a part is in the whole. In this sense there is but one subsistence in God even as there is but one per se being or existence. It is to this that the texts from Augustine refer. In another sense, however, "to subsist'' means to possess being incommunicably. In this sense there are three "subsistents,"' since there are three persons or personalities, for there are three incommunicable subsistents, even though there is but one per se being. If then one understands the major to mean that what constitutes the person gives subsistent being or is the grounds for its subsisting, this must be taken in the second sense, since it is the ground for subsisting incommunicably.
ARTICLE III
What is the Interrelation of those Relations Admittedly Present in the First Person?
4.47 [Two points for investigation] As for the third article, if something is constitutive in virtue of some [logically] prior aspect, it seems that what is constituted would still remain even if one mentally prescinded from a [logically] posterior aspect. Hence anyone who would claim that the first person is constituted by the relation of origin to the second person under the aspect of generative
(which is an aspect of generation that is prior to that of actual generation), would seem to be saying that, even apart or prescinding from actual generation, the first person could exist apart from the second either in reality or at least conceptually; whereas extramentally no separation is possible because they are really the same.
Similarly, if "to generate' were prior to paternity, and to generate under the aspect of to generate constituted the first person, the first person could conceivably remain apart from paternity as paternity.
In this article then two points need investigation. The first concerns reality and it is this: In the first person is there some distinction of properties—not any properties whatsoever (for we are not talking about "unbegotten" or "active spiration''), but of those which assert a relation of origin between the first and second person? The second derives from the first, viz., [assuming some conceptual distinctions are possible,] what considerations could one abstract or prescind from and still have the first person?
QUESTION FOUR
1. Is there some Distinction of Properties in the First Person?
4.48 On the first point I have two conclusions:
The first is this: Between the first and second person there is one and only one, absolutely unique, relationship of origin so that prior to the consideration of the intellect there is no distinction of any kind in reality.
Second, I say: This relationship, which in reality is absolutely one, can be distinguished conceptually or considered in diverse ways.
[22 ] 4.49 [First conclusion: There is no real distinction in the relationship of origin] There are two proofs for the first conclusion:
One is this: There is but one unique perfect origin of one thing from another, and this holds whether we mean the unique active origin on the part of the originating source or the unique passive origin on the part of product originated, although the former and the latter are somehow two. But the relationship of origin between the first and second person does express the perfect origin of the second person from the first. Therefore, there is but one unique relationship of origin, and this whether one considers it actively from the side of the Father (and then it is unique and active in the Father), or quasi-passively from the side of the Son (where it will be the passive origin, also unique).
Proof of the major: That origination of one from another is not perfect if apart from it, the other would originate from the first no less perfectly than before. But if there were two relationships of origin which were distinct on the part of the thing, call them A and B, then if one were removed, the second person would still originate from the first, because the other, e.g., A is not only a relation of origin but of perfect origin; therefore B is not the perfect origination or the relationship of perfect origin between them. Now if it were distinct from A, B would be a perfect and distinct relationship of origin, and one could argue in a similar way about B apart from A.
Thus if either of the two was eliminated, the second person would still be from the first, for his origination would still be from the other, and yet he would not proceed from the first because his perfect origination would be removed.
If you say it is not possible for A to go and B remain, nor vice versa, this will not help. One and the same suppositum cannot origoo
GOD AND CREATURES
inate from the same other suppositum by means of two origins both of which are perfect, for from either it would receive the fullness of being that could be obtained from its producer, and therefore it is impossible that it would receive any being from the other no matter how it was present or remained there.
4.50 A more logical proof for the same conclusion is this. Relations that are in some way distinct in reality so that formally they are not completely one are not predicated of themselves in the abstract, even when they are in the suppositum. For this is false:
"Paternity or active generation is active spiration or innascibility."
As Augustine?* puts it: "To say he is unbegotten is not the same as to say he is the Father, for even if he had not begotten the Son, nothing would prevent him from being called unbegotten." This text has to be understood correctly because in the second article [4.23] it was remarked that the relation to the second person is presupposed by unbegotten. But we can say this much: this predication 1s not true in the abstract: "Paternity is innascibility,'"" whereas these are true: "Active generation 1s paternity, and vice versa," and "Generativity is active generation, like paternity, and vice versa."
4.51 [Objection] According to Book V of the Metaphysics,** relations of the second type* are based on action and passion, and, what
WA is relevant to our case, he seems to say there that a father is called "father'' because he has begotten, whereas a son is called "'son'' because he has been begotten. Therefore, just as the foundation is not the same as the relation, nor the relation the same as the foundation, so neither are generation and paternity the same. Hilary?® confirms this: '""This procession from God is the perfect birth to which the confession of the Father's name has been joined.' What he wants to say is that paternity follows after generation or nativity. This is explained by the fact that a father is not a father just because he generates, but rather because his offspring coexists with him. Now having his offspring coexisting seems to be different from his generating, because in animals the act of generation insofar as it is an act consists in depositing the semen. But at that time the offspring does not yet coexist with him; consequently he is not a father then but later.
4-52 [Reply to the objection] I say, however, that in God generativity, generating, and paternity are absolutely one and the same
[254 78 Ibid. v,¢.6,n.7> PL 42, 614; 'GGSL rore1i, 4 Aristotle, Metaph. v, c.15 (1020bg0).
2 Hulany, De Dress n.go: PL 10, 304.
QUESTION FOUR
real reason, for as Augustine?® puts it: "What is proper to the Father alone is such not because a [Son] is born, but because he has generated a Son," and according to Hilary?': It is proper to the Father that he is always Father and it is proper to the Son that he is always
Son." And the Master of the Sentences?* quotes several texts to support this. Now there is only one personal property for each person; therefore, this and that are identical.
4.53 [Second conclusion: One real property can be considered differently] This one property, however, can be considered differently and thus acquire different aspects. This is the second conclusion proposed [in 4.48], and it will help in solving objections. There are two ways in which one could make mental or conceptual distinctions in considering this one relation. The one would be in regard to the difference or indetermination or [degree of] abstraction involved in our consideration. The other would be concerned with [the degree of] possibility or actuality (determination, completeness).
4.54 In the first way one could consider the following aspects.
First would be one who produces naturally [i.e., non-voluntarily]; second, one who produces something similar in nature; third, one who exists incommunicably [or as a person] and under this aspect produces. It is clear that the third is more indeterminate than the second and the second more so than the first.
4.55 In the second way I can conceive this first person's begetting under the aspect of generative, or able to generate, or generating, or having generated or having his offspring coexisting.
4.56 In creatures, the first difference is that of universality such that it extends itself to many. The second difference which here [in God] is conceptual, in creatures is real and the various aspects are found at times in separation, because of the imiperfection characteristic of creatures that is absent in God.
4.57 Although one could somehow save the first conceptual distinction insofar as one could have the less determinate conception apart from the more determinate one, this does not help so far as reality is concerned for what corresponds to this and that concept is absolutely identical extramentally.
26 Ps. Augustine, Fulgentius of Ruspe, De fide ad Petrum c.2, n.7: PL 4o, 675° CCSE ora, 716.
27 Hilary, De Trin. xu, n.23: PL 10, 447.
28 Lombard, Sent. 1, d.26, c.2: PL 192, 591-92; ed. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, Grottaferrata (Romae) 1, 197-98.
GOD AND CREATURES
The second difference preserves in the divine a diversity of concepts or ways of conceiving the same thing, nevertheless when applied to what exists extramentally in each case what is of perfection must be retained whereas what is of imperfection must be discarded. For to be separated from its actualization represents imperfection in an aptitude or potency; and in acting [such as generating] it is something of an imperfection not to have the term of the action coexisting, or for the act to pass away and not continue. And as regards that which results as it were from the action, ¢.g., paternity, it is a matter of imperfection that it is not always actually communicating its nature, whereas it is a matter of perfection to have its correlative in continual coexistence with it. Therefore, if the perfection is retained and the imperfection suppressed, generation will never be something merely dispositional, but completely productive as regards its offspring. It will be in short perfect generation, complete generation, and one that is not passing but always going on, one that has all that is required [to be perfect]. Also paternity will not follow an act of generation that was previous, transient and, as it were, dispositional. Paternity will be present in its full actuality, it will be communication of the nature that never ceases; it will include all that is required [to be all perfect]. This complete and eternal generation, and this complete and never-ending paternity, and this complete and eternal actuality all express one and the same thing extramentally. But the name "generation" expresses more of one aspect of perfection found in creatures than does paternity, whereas
[ 26 ] paternity expresses more of another aspect of creatural perfection than does "generation."
[27] 4.58 [Reply to the objection in 4.51] From this we see how to answer the objection raised in this article which seemed to support some sort of extramental distinction between generation and paternity.
Paternity, it was argued first, is based on active generation, according to the Metaphysics.2® The answer to this would require a more extended treatment [than we can give it now]. Besides, we said enough about it earlier [in 4.52]. Nevertheless, I will say this much now. If in creatures generation is somehow prior to paternity, the foundation of generation is not paternity, but the generative power or nature which generates. As dispositional, it is prior; in other words, if this power is non-existent, then paternity will not 29 Aristotle, Metaph. v, c.2 (1013431).
QUESTION FOUR
exist. The distinction is one between a previous disposition and what has come to full term. It is evident that this ground for distinction is not present in the divine, because there, generation is present only as complete and with the Son coexisting. Neither does paternity follow [temporally] the communication [of the nature].
4.59 As for Hilary [in 4.51], one could say that the name "'paternity" is consequent on generation in God by analogy with creatures; for in God there is indeed a certain conceptual sequence where in creatures there is a real sequence. As we said elsewhere [in 1.45], mentally distinct features have an order of reason similar to the order such features would have in reality were they really distinct.
4-60 But should one quibble about this interpretation of Hilary's text, he could be easily answered in this way. Acknowledgement of the paternal name, and perhaps the paternal name itself, came after the creation of the world, and we are speaking here of the naming and acknowledgement by any created intellect. But it is only in the conceptual order, as was said, that paternity followed either the nativity of the Son (which Hilary had in mind) or the generation of the Son. This also provides the answer to the other point made about paternity {in 4.51], namely that it is a relationship in one whose offspring exists and that therefore in creatures it is really distinct from generation, whereas in God the distinction is only conceptual.
2. From What Considerations could One Prescind and still have the First Person?
4.61 Given the two conclusions [of 4.48], viz., that the first person's relationship of origin to the second is only one thing in reality but is conceptually distinguished, we can make clear to what extent the first person is separable apart from this relationship of origin to the second. If this means separable in reality, this is clearly false.
Neither is there any need to distinguish this or that aspect of the relationship, for in reality it is but one single thing. If this were really removed, what is constituted by it would not remain either. If one means separable conceptually without contradiction, however, in the sense that the notion of the first person in the mind is separable from the notion of the relationship of origin between the first and second person, we must, it seems, make use of the distinction cited
[in 4.53ff.] between the diverse ways of considering that one relationship. Of course if one abstracts or prescinds from all the ways at once, the mind will have no conception whatsoever of a supposi-
GOD AND CREATURES
tum related by such a relationship of origin. It is contradictory that an intellect should conceive the complete absence of any relationship of origin in a suppositum and still conceive of a suppositum related by such a relationship. There is no contradiction, however, that the suppositum considered according to a prior reason should be conceivable apart from the relationship considered under some posterior reason or aspect. Now these diverse aspects in our mind would have that order of prior or posterior conceivability they would be apt to have in those objects suited to move our intellect.
4.62 Now perhaps one could without contradiction think of someone subsisting incommunicably apart from a relationship of origin to the second person if he were viewed under some special aspect involving a degree of indeterminateness or indifference, or involving only aptitude or degree of actuality or something [e.g., the act of generation] that could conceivably have passed away before [paternity] occurred.
4.63 But if you ask: Under what formal aspect would the first person be thought of as incommunicably existing? I reply: Perhaps one could abstract from the very relative incommunicable concept itself or from that absolute incommunicable form, some less specific concept, namely, 'this form" or "this incommunicable entity.' And then perhaps one could conceive of this, in its proper singularity, to be that by which this person is incommunicable without conceiving anything more specific about his individuality. I do this sort of thing when I conceive not just "being" but "this being" or "this substance" without thinking of this individual in any more specific way, as I do when I view some distant object, seeing it as a body before perceiving it to be an animal or just one animal. And perhaps it is this indifferent concept of an incommunicable form that he had in mind who thought of a divine suppositum without yet determining in his intellect whether the suppositum is absolute or relative. How else could one explain what philosophers thought of God's activity in the world without assuming their every notion false? For it is clear they did not think of this relative suppositum as moving the heavens, yet they did assume some suppositum did so, because every action is ascribed to some suppositum. If they did not think of the notion of an incommunicable suppositum as indifferent to both absolute and relative, then they necessarily thought that this suppositum moving the heavens was absolute, which is false. What we say here about some concept indifferent to both absolute and relative or about that of an incommunicable suppositum unspecified
QUESTION FOUR
as either absolute or relative is not in any way at odds with our prior statement [in 4.37] that every entity invested with reality is either formally absolute or formally relative. For one can readily abstract from several things an indifferent concept, neither relative nor absolute. Nevertheless everything when specified to be existing extramentally has to be determinately either one or the other.
Hence indifference of the concept that can be abstracted from several individuals does not imply a like indifference in the existing individual.*° Reply to the Initial Argument [ 30 ] 4-64 As for the initial argument [in 4.1], it is obvious from the solution of the question that the minor must be denied. As for its proof, we admit the relation constituting the first person is one of origin; it is in fact active origination. *
4.65 To the assumption that action presupposes a suppositum, I reply: The first incommunicable entity presupposes no incommunicable being [ens]. Hence it does not presuppose a suppositum, for a suppositum is an incommunicable being. Now the first productive activity, production, or active origination is the first incommunicable entity to be found in God, for it is preceded only by perfect memory and essence, both of which are communicable. But this first productive act cannot be communicated; otherwise its product would produce itself—an impossible situation which Augustine*! claims no mind could grasp. Our conclusion then is this: If the proposition "action requires an existing suppositum"' refers to hypostatic* being, it could be interpreted to mean either (a) the suppositum exists by reason of some entity prior in nature to the action itself or (b) the person's hypostatic existence is formally constituted by the action itself. Now the first interpretation is false, for prior to the action there is nothing incommunicable here and hence no hypostatic entity. The second, however, is true, for by the very action there is an hypostatic being, because the action is there incommunicably.
4.66 But against this it is objected that since every ''acting"'
[agere] presupposes "being" [esse], the agent's activity cannot be the first ground for its being.
I answer: In the divine, "being" can refer either to "incommunica30 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.25 (v, 371-76); d.8, nn.137-50
(IV, 221-27).
31 Augustine, De Trai, ci, ni: P42, 820;,€CSE 50, 28.
GOD AND CREATURES
ble being" or to "being" in an unqualified sense. In the latter sense, there is but one being, the essence, as Augustine states repeatedly.
But incommunicable or hypostatic being is distinctive for each person there. If your thesis is that acting presupposes being in an unqualified sense, i.e., being as absolute, I concede this. But if you mean that acting presupposes hypostatic being, which in this case means "being in relation to another," your thesis is false, for this acting is itself the first "being in relation to another," even as the productive action itself is the first relationship to another.
4.67 But you may insist that "to act' presupposes not just any sort of being, but a being able to act, for if there is nothing able to act, there will be no action. In God it is only the suppositum that is able to act; therefore ''to act' presupposes the suppositum.
[31] I answer: Extramentally to act does not presuppose to be able to act; indeed the agent is potent primarily by reason of the very acting as such. What is presupposed is a formal principle in virtue of which something is able to act. This and everything else said in reply to the initial argument can be made clear if one keeps in mind that in the real order there is but one unique relationship between the first and second person, for there is but one active production and it is a relationship of the producing to his product. But since we commonly speak of production as a relationship or relation, we think of it as having some foundation, just as, when we speak of it as an action, we think of it as having a formal productive principle.
Consequently, if one finds no difficulty in the idea that the relation does not presuppose a suppositum but only the essence as a kind of foundation (which the common view generally concedes), then he will also have no difficulty with the idea that the action presupposes no suppositum either as agent or as able to act, but it only presupposes the essence, which is a kind of formal reason for the acting.
4.68 If you object to this on the grounds that action in the divine is something absolute and not merely a relation, I have this to say.
Some would deny this to be true of creatures, at least as regards productive action, for it does not seem that active production could be thought of as absolute rather than relative. Be that as it may,°? however, in God the productive action is merely a relationship, for according to Augustine,** everything in the divine is predicated ac- *2In Ordinatio iv, d.1g, q.1, mn.g-11 (ed. Vivés xvu, 668-69) Scotus proves extensively that the six last Aristotelian categories* are extrinsically advenient* relations.
*8 Augustine, De Trin. v, c.5, n.6: PL 42, 914; CCSL 50, 210-11.
QUESTION FOUR
cording to either substance or relation, and what is predicated according to substance is common [to all three persons]. Therefore, origin, be it active or passive, is formally a relation.
4.69 You may argue, finally, on the basis of logic: Every action denominates or names some agent, in this case, the suppositum; but what names or denominates presupposes what is named or denominated; therefore [action presupposes the suppositum]. But the answer to this is clear from the reply to the first argument in the third article of the previous question [3.40-43]. As we said, in God nothing personal is properly predicated denominatively of any incommunicable subject (which is what we are speaking of now), although one could perhaps speak of it being predicated denominatively of something which concretely signifies the common essence, as "God is generating.' But there is no need to speak of this sort of denomination here, because such denominative predication is verified for something [e.g., the essence] contained under the subject [i.e., God]. The reason why in God there is no proper denomination or denominative predication about a non-transcendent subject is that denominative predication proper applies to a subject in the concrete and to what is receptive of the property, not one that includes it
{as a formal constitutive element]. In the divine, however, the only concrete non-transcendental subject of which a personal property is predicated is the person himself who is constituted by the property and hence includes it. Hence the personal property is not predicated denominatively of the person. Now the only quasi subject receptive of such a property present in God is the essence, but the property is not predicated of this in the concrete for reasons to be treated at the end of the first article of the following question
[5-13-15].