Question Twelve: Is The Relation Of A Creature To God
Question Twelve
IS THE RELATION OF A CREATURE TO GOD
AS CREATOR THE SAME AS THE RELATION
TO GOD AS CONSERVER?
[1] 12.1 Once the questions raised about God have been answered, some questions about creatures follow; first about all creatures in general, then about certain creatures in particular.
12.2 One question about creatures in general was asked and it was this: Is the created thing's relation to God as creator the same as its relation to him as conserver??
Arguments Pro and Con Argument for the negative:
Something can be created and not conserved. Consequently, it can have a relation to God as its creator only and not as its conserver. Therefore the two relations are not identical. Proof of the first antecedent: A thing is not conserved at the instant of its creation, for conservation is required only when it is able not to be and tends of itself to nonbeing or nonexistence. While it is being created, however, it cannot not be or tend to nonexistence, since it accepts being at that moment. Nothing is conserved, then, unless it continues to exist after the moment of creation. But God can create something that does not remain after the instant of its creation, for there is nothing contradictory about its having existence at but one moment and that it be created in that instant.
12.3 It is argued to the contrary that the relationship of one simple thing to another simple thing is one and the same real relation.
Now it is the same volition by which a creating and conserving God formally creates and conserves, and the existence itself of the created subject is identical with that of the conserved subject. Therefore the relation of the created and conserved to the creating and conserving God is one and the same.
1 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. u, d.2, q.1, nn.19-20 (ed. Vives x1, 237-38).
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Body of the Question 12.4 There are three points to be investigated in this question.
The first is the main question itself, namely: Is the real relation of a creature to God as creating and conserving identical? The second is a point raised by the first argument, namely: Can a thing be said to be simultaneously created and conserved? This is more a linguistic difficulty. Third, there is a connected question also touched on by the first argument, namely: Can something be created that is not conserved after the first instant of creation?
INRAGIAE, J
Is the Real Relation of the Creature to God as Creator and as Conserver the Same?
12.5 [Affirmative answer and its proof] As for the first, the relation of a creature to God as creator and conserver can be said to be
25) the same.
Proof: For something that is the same both conceptually and in reality there is but one essential dependence of the same type upon something conceptually and really the same. But the existence [exzstentia] of a permanent* or enduring creature is absolutely the same in creation and conservation, and the supporting term, namely, the divine volition, is absolutely identical both conceptually and in reality; and the relationship not only to the creator but also to the conserver is the same sort of essential dependence. Therefore [there is but one relation of the creature to God as creator and conserver].
12.6 Proof of the major: If there were several absolutely essential dependence-relations between extremes absolutely identical, they would be like the dependence of the creature on God as efficient and as final cause. But these two types of dependence seem to be of different kinds, for if they were of the same nature they would be incompatible in the same subject under the same aspect. If something depends upon another in such a way that the latter's support is adequate, it will not depend upon it with a second dependencerelationship of the same kind. Otherwise it would be completely supported in each of these dependencies without the other and would depend and not depend upon such—and this, when the term provides complete and full support in each case of dependency.
12.7 The minor has three parts:
Proof of the first part, viz., that the existence of something that is permanent or endures is the same in creation and conservation: The ghz
QUESTION TWELVE
difference between the permanent and the successive* consists in this, that what is successive as long as it continues always has a new or different being [esse] for each successive part. The permanent on the contrary always has the same being. Neither does it change partially, for otherwise it would be successive.
Neither does it change totally, for otherwise for each different moment it would have a totally different being, which is absurd.
12.8
Proof of the second part of the minor, viz., that it is the same divine volition that supports the dependence-relation of the thing both as created and as conserved: The divine volition remains the same in regard to anything that is able to be willed. Now this volition represents the proximate intrinsic term for anything extrinsic.
12.9 The third part of the minor, viz., that both relations are relationships of essential dependence, is clear as regards creation. As for conservation, the proof is this: A thing depends essentially in existing [1m essendo| on that from which it has being [esse]. Such is the conservation of the conserving cause according to the words of Augustine': "For the power of the creator, omnipotent and supporting all, is the cause by which every creature subsists. If such power should cease to rule what has been created, all would cease to be and nature would vanish. It is not like the case of a builder of houses. When he has completed the construction, he leaves, and after he has ceased working and has gone away, his work still stands. But the world could not stand, not even for a wink of the eye, if God withdrew his ruling hand."
12.10 [Objections and their solutions] Here one? might object that the ground for the creature's relation to God as creator is not its existence taken in an absolute or unqualified sense, but rather the creation itself considered passively. Similarly the ground for the creature's relation to God as conserver is not its existence taken absolutely but rather the conservation itself considered passively. This is proved from the Philosopher,* who says that relations of the second type are based upon activity and passivity. Now even though a creature's existence considered absolutely be the same afterwards as it was at the first moment, it is no more obvious that creation and conservation considered passively are the same than are the relationships we are investigating.
2 Augustine, Super Gen. Iv, c.12, n.22: PL 34, 304.
3 Bonaventure, Sent. 1, pars. 1, a.3, q.2 (i, 33ff.).
4 Aristotle, Metaph. v, c.15 (1020b26-32).
GOD AND CREATURES
12.11 To this it can be said that the Philosopher does not think that acting [actio] and being acted upon [passio]* are the proximate foundations for relations of the second type, for a relation does not remain if its foundation is gone. Relations of the second type,* however, do remain even though the action and being acted upon do not. For example, one remains a father even though his begetting is not an ongoing act. What he says about the second-type relations being founded on the active and passive must not be understood to mean that action and passion* are the proximate grounds or foundation proper, but rather that they represent an intervening disposition between the relation and its proper foundation. Now it is the active and passive potencies themselves that can be called the immediate grounds for acting and being acted upon. And although the intervention of action and being acted upon are required, they are not needed to ground the relation, but are a kind of prerequisite, as it were, if the relationship is to be based upon such a ground [as the potencies].° 12.12 In our particular case, however, there seems no need to admit that the fundamental reason for the creature's relationship to God as creating and conserving is that it is being acted upon or affected. For properly speaking, the capacity of being acted upon [passio] occurs only when the patient receives some form from the agent, for according to the Philosopher in the Metaphysics*: '""The active potency is the principle of transmuting another qua other."
Therefore the passive potency is the principle of being changed or transmuted by another. Such a change only occurs when a patient receives something from an agent. But in conservation and creation this does not occur, but the whole is created and the whole conserved completely by the creator and the conserver, and it is not just a part of it as is the case when a patient receives a form from the agent.'
12.13 But here there is an objection' based on Augustine's words®: 'Air is not made bright by the sun, but it becomes bright."
Otherwise, when the sun sets, the air would remain bright. Now it seems that every creature depends on God for its being in the way
* Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. tv, d.1g, q.1, nn.g-18 (ed. Vivés xvi, 662-79).
Aristotle, Metaph. v, c.12 (1019a15-16).
7 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 11, d.1, q.4, n.go (ed. Vives x1, 180-81); Iv, d.ig, q-1, n.2g (ed. Vivés xvi, 686-87).
8 Bonaventure, loc. cit., d.37, a.1, q-2 (tu, 864).
* Augustine, De Gen. ad litteram vi, n.26: PL 34, 383; CSEL 281, eno.
QUESTION TWELVE
the air depends upon the sun for its illumination, which was the point of his analogy of being illumined by the sun. Therefore no creature is made into a being [facta in esse], but it continually comes to be [fit im esse], and as a consequence the being [esse] of a creature is in a continual state of becoming.
12.14 I reply: The Philosopher? says that some things [like the day or a game] are in a state of becoming [in fieri] and do not have complete being [like a substance], but are in succession. By contrast, some [like man or a house] are said to be in fact [in facto esse], when they have their being complete and do not depend for their being on something extrinsic. Now a creature, however, is at all times equally dependent upon God for its being, for it always has the same being from him through the same divine volition. In this sense one could say that the production of a divine person is always in fieri, for such a person could never have being if he were not actually receiving it from his producer, and nevertheless the being of the person is most permanent. In similar fashion, although the being of a creature is permanent, nevertheless as regards God it is always in a quasi state of becoming, that is to say, it is always actually depending on the cause which gives it being and it is never in facto esse, i.€., it is never actual [7m actu] apart from and independent of everything else. However, it is not in fier: in the sense that it is different from moment to moment, and in contrast to this, it is in facto esse, 1.e., it has being complete and needs nothing in addition."
ARTICLE II
Can a Thing be Said to be at once Created and Conserved?
12.15 [Relations concomitant with creation and conservation] As for the second article [of 12.4], I say that other relations can concur with that which a creature having being has to God as the source of its being [esse]. For sometimes this being immediately follows the state of nonbeing opposed to it, as in the case when something first begins to be. At other times, however, this being does not immediately succeed nonbeing, but follows, as it were, the identical being it had before. This must be understood in the sense that, although there is no genuine priority in the very being itself, still we may
10 Aristotle, Physic. 11, c.6 (206a14-206b6).
11 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. 1, d.1, q.4, nn.27-28 (ed. Vives x1, 177-79); d.2, q-1, nn.19-21 (ibid., 237-39).
GOD AND CREATURES
speak of priority there inasmuch as what was there before is still there at present. The first relation, viz., of the being itself to the previous state of nonbeing, does not represent something real, namely, that of the being to the same being as quasi-preexisting, or better as now existing but having also been before, for in this case the two terms are really identical. But the relationship of the being to its cause is real, and hence is not to be identified with either of the other two relations.
Still it happens that the same word at times implies several distinct things. Now one word can be imposed to signify not only the dependence of this being upon its cause but also its relationship to a prior state of nonbeing, and this is just what the word "create" or "creation" does, since it indicates not only the dependence of the thing upon its cause, but also that it has being for the first time, having been until then nonexistent. In like fashion, one can also impose a word that not only indicates this dependence on its cause but also the second relationship, viz., of this being to itself as something that was there before, and when we want to indicate this situation we make use of the word "conserve."
12.16 [Solution to the question] Properly speaking, then, it is only true to say that a creature is created at the first moment [of its existence] and only after that moment is it conserved, for only then. does its being have this order to itself as something that was, as it were, there before. Because of these different conceptual relationships implied by "create" and ''conserve," it follows that one does not apply to a thing when the other does. Nevertheless, the relationship to the cause of the being always remains the same, and if both words signified just this relationship, then they might be truly predicated of the same thing at once, even as "to be from another that gives being" and "to receive being from another" do signify precisely that relation. And here "'to give" and "'to receive" must not be taken to mean there is something new present, nor do the words themselves imply this, for it is true to say that the Son receives deity from the Father and that the Father gives and communicates deity to him, and yet the two expressions can always be predicated simultaneously of the same situation.
12.17 Here I am not concerned whether "to be created" signifies per se the relation to the creator and only connotes the relationship to the prior state of nonbeing, or conversely whether this latter is signified per se and the relationship to the cause only connoted, or whether both relations are signified per se, in which case the word
QUESTION TWELVE
no longer signifies a concept that is one per se but rather two relationships, one real, the other conceptual, the combination of which do not make for a single notion per se. For any one of the three preserves this, at least, that both relationships are somehow implied by the expression, and it is precisely because of the conceptual relation that we deny something is at once created and conserved.?2
ARTICLE III
Can Something be Created without being Conserved after the Instant of Creation?
12.18 [The answer is affirmative] As for the third main question [in 12.4], I claim there is no contradiction that some being should have being [esse] only for an instant, for the instant itself passes suddenly, so that it exists, so to speak, instantaneously. Or if you say an instant according to substance always remains the same, speaking of a substance that is able to change, since that substance is not a per se term of a [temporal] continuum in the category of quantity, it follows that what you call an instant according to substance is not a term that involves per se a temporal process. But at least an instant according to being [esse] does not remain, but quickly passes, and so one would have to speak of a change and, hence, of an instant as the measure of change. But where a permanent [i.e., nonsuccessive] thing is concerned, there does not seem to be any greater contradiction about its having being only for an instant than that an instant or change itself should exist, for while a permanent thing could have the same being or existence continue [through a time period], whereas the instant or change could not, still the permanent entity could have the whole of what it is at one instant, because it is precisely on this score that it differs from what can exist only in succession. Therefore, there is no contradiction if it did not have being for more than an instant.
12.19 [Three objections] Aristotle'? apparently is against this, for he says: "Becoming and perishing are opposites; therefore, provided it is impossible for a thing to undergo opposite changes at the same time, the change will not be continuous, but a period of time will intervene between the opposite processes." And at the end of this chapter he declares'*: "It would seem to be an utterly absurd thing if as soon as anything has come to be, it must necessarily perish and cannot continue to exist for any time."
12 Ibid., d.2, q.1, n.1g (ed. Vivés x1, 237-38); d.1, q.4, 1.27 (ibid., 177-78).
13 Aristotle, Physic. vil, c.7 (261b5-10).
14 Tbid., c.7_ (261b21-24).
GOD AND CREATURES
12.20 Second objection: Further on in the same chapter?" he says we should not consider the last moment of being of what will perish but the first in what will come to be together with the first moment of nonbeing of what is to perish: "It is true that the point is common to both times, the earlier as well as the later
. being the finishing point of the one and the starting point of the other; but so far as the thing is concerned it belongs to the later stage of what happens to it.' And he adds a little later: "It has become and is [such] at the last moment of the actual time in which it was becoming [such]."
12.21 Third objection: If the created thing only has being in an instant, then it can be truly said of that instant that this thing begins to be because it exists for the first time, and at the same time it is true to say that it ceases to be, for then it exists for the last time.
Now it seems impossible that a thing should begin to be and cease to be at the same time.
12.22 [Reply to the objections] As for the first [in 12.19], I say that what the Philosopher had in mind in the text cited is that local motion alone and no other movement or change can be continuous and perfect, and he proves this from the fact that all other motion and change is from one opposite to another?*: '""Thus for the procie) esses of becoming and perishing the limits are the existent and nonexistent, for alteration the various pairs of contrary affections," etc.
Therefore if any of these changes could be perpetual and continuous, it would not be from the same terminus a quo* to the same terminus ad quem,* for of movement that is simply one in this way the statement of the Physics'? holds good: ''No process of change is infinite." Therefore, if the motion were to continue on it would have to do so by a continuous oscillation from one term to the other. If something changed from hot to cold, the movement would cease so far as these terms are concerned unless it was followed immediately by a change from cold to hot. But the reverse movement cannot be a continuation of the preceding movement since the two changes are opposed to each other and could not form one continuous motion.
12.23 And the reason is this: The changeable would have to move in opposite directions at the same time. Proof that this follows:
Where continuous movement is concerned, it is true to say from the beginning that the subject is being changed to its final state. If this was one of heat, then it would be true to say at the outset of the 15 Thid., c.8 (263b12-15).
16 Tbid., c.7 (261a30-33).
17 Tbid., vi, c.10 (241427).
QUESTION TWELVE
change that the subject is being heated. Now if the heating could continue on as cooling, it would be true to say that the subject was being simultaneously heated and cooled. By a similar argument
[Aristotle] proves in the passage cited that perishing cannot continue onward as generation so as to constitute a single movement, for otherwise from the outset something would be undergoing opposite changes, because it would be both perishing and coming to be, since of any single or continuous movement it is true to say from the beginning that the subject is being changed to its ultimate state. But since this is generation, then from the beginning of the change it is being generated, and nevertheless it would be in the process of perishing, if the assumption were correct that the previous corruption continued on as generation. Now this does not militate in any way against our thesis that something could exist for just a moment, namely, at the instant of creation, for I do not admit that annihilation is a continuation of creation so that they constitute a single movement, for then, according to the Philosopher's argument, it would be true to say that when it is created, it is being annihilated. All I claim is that annihilation follows the creation.
12.24 You may argue that both annihilation and creation take place in an instant, because both are the result of infinite power which cannot act in time, as the Philosopher seems to prove. Therefore, in the proposed case either creation and annihilation will occur at the same instant, which the Philosopher!® would consider absurd, viz., that the same thing would be subject to opposite changes, or else creation and annihilation would occur at different instants; but then one would have to follow the other immediately, which the Philosopher also considers absurd.
12.25 To this I say that the argument of the Philosopher that was mentioned, viz., that the same thing cannot be simultaneously in motion with opposite movements, proves that perishing cannot continue on as generation. But besides this there is another true conclusion, namely, that perishing cannot immediately follow generation; but there is another reason for this, namely, that each takes place in an instant and not in the same instant, as is obvious; therefore, they occur at different instants, but no two instants are immediate to one another.
12.26 This proof, which is according to the mind of the Philosopher,'? though he does not cite it here, does not militate against 18 Ibid., vill, c.10 (266a24-266b6).
19 Jbid., c.7_ (261b5-15).
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our thesis. For if the created thing exists only at the instant of its creation, then its annihilation is not in an instant but at a time when the instant of creation is over. Indeed, after the instant there is not something in time that is indivisibly immediate but divisibly so, namely, with such an immediacy as a continuum that is finished or over is next to its term. In this way movement is immediately adjacent to the last moment of rest, because immediately following rest is movement, as the divisible is after the indivisible which is the beginning.
12.27 Consequently, when it is argued [in 12.24] that annihilation takes place in an instant, this would have to be denied of annihilation in the case of which we are speaking, understanding always by "instant" an instant of time, whether we speak of creation and annihilation taking place in time or, better, with time.
As for the proof based on the principle "an infinite power does not act in time," the Philosopher would only admit this holds good of an infinite power acting with natural necessity. But if the infinite power is of another kind [e.g., if it acts contingently], there is nothing absurd about the conclusion he draws, viz., that an infinite and a finite power take equal time to act. Theologians, however, will not admit that where creatures are concerned, God acts with natural necessity.
12.28 But even admitting that God acted with natural necessity, could one not grant that something could remain for an instant only, since change, even according to the Philosopher, remains only for an instant? Look for the answer elsewhere.?°
[15] 12.29 Another interpretation, distinct from the preceding, is needed for the other text of the Philosopher [in 12.19]? about nature not producing anything to have it destroyed immediately or that as soon as it came to be, it must necessarily perish, as he says.
The reason is that the nature producing it also influences its conservation so that the product can exist for a time. Destructive agents are either kept at a distance or are unable to overpower the agent that generates and conserves it. Otherwise the agent would be prevented from generating it. But the only impossibility you can infer from this concerns the interplay of natural causes, and not the divine power.
12.30 [To the second objection in 12.20] As for the other, I say that so far as natural generation and corruption are concerned,
20 See Appendix, Addition 12.28.
*1 Aristotle, Physic. vitl, c.7 (261b21-24).
QUESTION TWELVE
what perishes has no being [esse] at the end; otherwise it would have qualities appropriate to what comes to be, at least to the degree that they could coexist with the form of the latter, and if so, they would not disappear suddenly, nor would what is to perish, perish suddenly. And as what perishes does not have its being at the end, so it has its first instant of nonbeing, since the nonbeing of what perishes concurs with the being of what comes to be. But what came to be has being at the instant of its generation, because then its form is in the matter and then it has its first being because at that moment the form immediately succeeds privation, and just as the thing generated has its first moment of being, so what is destroyed has its first instant of nonbeing. But if by some power a thing were conserved in being at some last instant, then there would not be the first moment of nonbeing. This would be the case with a permanent [i.e., nonsuccessive] creature that existed only for a moment. However, I say in general that with things that succeed one another, whether they be opposed privatively, contradictorily, or contrarily, as it were, since both are something positive, the last of the preceding never coincides with the first of the following. Otherwise opposites would coexist at the same instant or two instants would be immediate. However, there is always either the last of the prior or the first of what follows, for the divisible is immediate only to the indivisible and the mutually successive things are immediate opposites.
12.31 Some things then which get being after nonbeing pass away instantly, other permanent or enduring things are naturally generated or perish, and there can be still other permanent things that are produced or destroyed by divine power. In the first, namely, those that pass away instantly, there is both a first and last moment in being, because there is that sole instant in which they have existence, and therefore there is neither a first nor a last moment of nonbeing, for during the whole time preceding this instant as well as during the entire time that follows it they have nonbeing. In the second type, however, there is a first moment in being but not a last, and similarly with nonbeing there is a first and not a last, as we explained [in 12.22] when expounding the mind of the Philosopher.
In the others, however, which are produced or destroyed by divine power, either of these situations could obtain as well as a third, viz., there can be a last moment in being without a first moment in nonbeing, because that power can cause one thing to succeed another in any way that does not include a contradiction.
22 Aristotle, De caelo 1, c.12 (283a4-b22).
GOD AND CREATURES
12.32 [To the third objection in 12.21] To the other, I say that the expression 'begins to be' can have two meanings. One affirms the present and negates the past in the sense that it implies that something exists now but before it did not. The other negates the present and affirms the future inasmuch as it implies that something does not exist now but it will be. '""Ceases to be" can likewise have two interpretations.
12.33 I say, then, that on one interpretation, it is true that something starts to be and ceases to be simultaneously, for what passes away instantaneously "begins to be'' in the sense that it is now and it did not exist before, and it "ceases to be" in the sense that it is now but it will not be. In both cases, being [esse] is afarmed and the negations "was not" and "will not be" are not opposed. '""To begin to be' and "to cease to be," however, are not mutually consistent if they are given meanings such that something identical is affirmed by one and denied by the other, or in which opposing features are included.?% Reply to the Initial Arguments 12.34 To the first argument at the beginning [viz., in 12.2]:
It is clear from the second main article [in 12.15f.] in what sense the first antecedent is true, viz., that something can be created and not conserved. It holds good only by reason of the different relationships implied by the two terms, namely, in the case of creation, the relation to its opposite, the state of nonbeing that preceded it, and in the case of conservation, the relation to the same being as something it had before. Both relationships are merely conceptual. The first is negative since it regards nonbeing and no relationship of this sort is real. The second refers to the same being as it had before, just as the first relation refers to this being as not having been there before.
12.35
The antecedent, however, is not true of the relation of the being to its cause. Hence the inference that "it can have a relation to God as its creator only and not as its conserver' can be conceded only if the terms be taken in the same sense as before, i.e., if we claim that God never conserves the created in the full meaning of "to conserve." But if we understand this to mean that what was created will never have this relationship to God implied by being conserved by him, then the entailment must be denied, for even though
*8 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. u, d.2, q.1, nn.gff. (ed. Vives x1, 214ff.).
QUESTION TWELVE
what can be created will never have this dependence relationship with a cause together with the other conceptual relationship of quasi-succeeding itself, it will nevertheless have to have that [real] dependence relation. And then the final conclusion [viz., that the two relations are not identical] can only mean that the full meaning of "to be created"' is not the same as the full meaning of "'to be conserved," viz., that the twofold relationship in the one is not the same as the twofold relationship on the other, which is true enough, because even though the [real] relation implied by both terms is absolutely identical, still the [conceptual] relation implied by creation is not the same as that implied by conservation.