Introduction to the Philosophy of Saint Augustine (continued)
the body itself, which is known by that knowledge. For knowledge is a kind of life in the reason of the knower; but the body is not life; and any life is greater than any body, not in bulk, but in power. But when the mind knows itself, its own knowledge does not rise above itself, because itself knows, and itself is known. When, therefore, it knows itself entirely, and no other thing with itself, then its knowledge is equal to itself; because its knowledge is not from another nature, since it knows itself. And when it perceives itself entirely, and nothing more, then it is neither less nor greater. We said therefore rightly, that these three things, when they are perfect, are by consequence equal.
5. Similar reasoning suggests to us, if indeed we can any way understand the matter, that these things exist in the soul, and that, being as it were involved in it, they are so evolved from it as to be perceived and reckoned up substantially, or, so to say, essentially. Not as though in a subject, as color, or shape, or any other quality or quantity, are in the body. For anything of this kind does not go beyond the subject in which'it is; for that color or shape of this particular body cannot be also those of another body. But the mind can also love something besides itself, with that love with which it loves itself. And further, the mind does not know itself only, but also many other things. Wherefore love and knowledge are not contained in the mind as in a subject, but these also exist substantially, as the mind itself does; because, even if they are mutually predicated relatively, yet they exist each severally in their own substance. Nor are they so mutually predicated relatively as color and the colored subject are; so that color is in the colored subject, but has not any proper substance in itself, since colored body is a substance, but color is in a substance; but as two friends are also two men, which are substances, while they are said to be men not relatively, but friends relatively.
6. But, further although one who loves or one who knows is a substance, and knowledge is a substance, and love is a substance; but he that loves and love, or he that knows and knowledge, are spoken of relatively to each other, as are friends: but mind or spirit are not relatives, as neither are men relatives; yet he that loves and love, or he that knows and knowledge, cannot exist separately from each other, as men can that are friends. Although it would seem that friends, too, can be separated in body, not in mind, in as far as they are friends: may, it can even happen that a friend may even also begin to hate a friend, and on this account cease to be a friend, while the other does not know it, and stil] loves him. But if the love with which the mind loves itself ceases